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Abstract	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  reconstruct	  analytically	  and	  to	  assess	  normatively	  
the	   emerging	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   translation.	   I	   show	   that	   the	   therapeutic	  
promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  is	  potentially	  revolutionary,	  and	  that	  its	  fulfilment	  depends	  
on	  variables	   that	  are	  at	   the	  same	  time	  scientific	  and	  political.	  The	  establishment	  of	   the	  
governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   translational	   research	   is	   however	   taking	   intricate	   routes.	   It	   is	  
being	  contested	  and	  challenged	  in	  many	  ways	  by	  different	  actors	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  
its	  development	  is	  yet	  in	  the	  making	  and,	  hence,	  uncertain.	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  show	  that	  
democracy	   is	   called	   into	   question	   by	   emerging	   disagreements	   about	   the	   appropriate	  
framing	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  Such	  disagreements,	  that	  are	  indeed	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  our	  
pluralistic	   societies,	   are	   relative	   to	   the	   very	   role	   of	   politics	   with	   respect	   to	   science,	  
citizens’	  interests,	  and	  patients’	  rights.	  I	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  a	  democratic	  polity	  incurs	  
in	   risks	   of	   democratic	   erosion	   due	   to	   the	   current	   political	   configuration	   of	   stem	   cell	  
translation.	   I	   thus	   articulate	   some	   normative	   proposals	   as	   to	   the	   political	   stakes	   of	  
innovative	  medicine	  and	  I	  propose	  technology	  assessment	  mechanisms	  for	  stakeholders	  
inclusion	  and	  public	  participation	  to	  cope	  with	  them.	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Preface	  	  
In	   the	   current	   debate	   on	   the	   political	   accommodation	   of	   widespread	   moral	  
disagreement,	  the	  term	  ‘governance’	  indicates	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  both	  academic	  scholars	  
and	   policy-­‐makers	   see	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   in	   highly	   pluralistic	   and	   complex	   societies.	  
‘Governance’,	   as	  opposed	   to	   ‘government’,	   alludes	   to	   the	  open-­‐ended	   character	  of	   the	  
political	   arrangements	   that	   bring	   divisive	   issues	   under	   democratically	   accountable	  
political	   control.	   This	   dissertation	   focuses	   on	   the	   governance	   of	   regenerative	  medicine	  
and,	   in	   particular,	   it	   aims	   at	   reconstructing	   the	   emerging	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	  
translational	  research.	  
The	   idea	   of	   writing	   a	   dissertation	   on	   the	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	  
translation	  matured	  slowly	  throughout	  the	  four	  years	  of	  my	  PhD.	  Having	  studied	  political	  
philosophy	   as	   an	   undergraduate	   and	   practical	   ethics	   and	   bioethics	   as	   a	   postgraduate	  
student,	   my	   interest	   in	   the	   political	   conditions	   of	   democracy	   in	   pluralistic	   societies	  
extends	  back	  to	  my	  university	  period.	  	  
The	  ideas	  I	  present	  in	  this	  dissertation	  grew	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  truly	  interdisciplinary	  
environment	  at	  SEMM	  (European	  School	  of	  Molecular	  Medicine).	  However,	   in	  an	  age	  of	  
increasing	  academic	  specialisation,	   the	  statute	  of	   interdisciplinary	  scholars	   is	   called	   into	  
question.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  many	  see	  blurring	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  
project	  oneself	   into	  uncharted	   intellectual	   territories.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   the	  
interdisciplinary	  scholar	  uneasily	  situates	   in	  the	  academic	  space	   if	  he/she	  does	  not	  bear	  
membership	   to	   a	   specific	   disciplinary	   troop.	   Probably	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	  
uncomfortable	   situation,	  or	  probably	  as	  a	   cause	   to	   it,	   interdisciplinary	   scholarship	  grew	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into	   a	   new	   specialisation	   itself.	   In	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	   academic	   journal	   editors	  
progressively	   started	   to	   ask	   for	   interdisciplinary	   contributions	   to	   tackle	   problems	   that,	  
arguably,	   established	   styles	   of	   thought	   could	   no	   longer	   afford.	   Among	   the	   fields	   that	  
benefited	   from	   this	   intellectual	   thread,	   the	   study	  of	   science	   and	   technology	  more	   than	  
others	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   convergence	   between	   sociology,	   philosophy,	   history	   of	  
science	  and	  political	  science	  and,	  more	  than	  others,	  opened	  up	  its	  ranks	  to	  collaborations	  
between	  humanists	  and	  scientists.	  Role	  exchanges	  and	  professional	  contamination	  in	  this	  
field	  are	  ever	  more	  frequent,	  and	  less	  scandalous,	  I	  have	  to	  say,	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  	  
As	  a	  SEMM	  PhD	  student	  I	  joined	  the	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Studies	  curriculum	  of	  
the	  FOLSATEC	  (Foundations	  of	  Life	  Sciences	  and	  their	  Ethical	  Consequences)	  programme	  
with	   the	   idea	  of	   specialising	  on	   the	  political	  management	  of	  moral	  disagreement	   in	   the	  
field	  of	  the	   life	  sciences	  and	  biomedical	   innovation.	  For	  almost	  three	  fourths	  of	  my	  PhD	  
period	   I	  have	  been	  actively	   involved	  at	  the	  bench	  of	  molecular	  oncology	   laboratories	  at	  
various	  research	  groups	  at	  SEMM	  labs	  in	  Milan	  (IFOM-­‐IEO	  Campus).	  This	  experience	  was	  
decisive	   for	  me	   to	   elaborate	  my	   ideas	   on	   the	   production	   and	   certification	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  had	  I	  not	  worked	  in	  the	  lab,	  in	  the	  cell	  culture	  facility	  and	  
in	  the	  animal	  house,	  had	  I	  not	  attended	  countless	  scientific	  seminars,	  had	  I	  not	  had	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  meet	  scientists	  and	  clinicians	  and	  to	  discuss	  with	  them	  –	  my	  ideas	  on	  how	  
scientific	   statements	   of	   fact	   are	   generated	   experimentally	   and	   validated	   communally	  
would	  have	  looked	  quite	  different.	  	  
At	  SEMM,	  I	  could	  enjoy	  a	  climate	  of	  open	  interdisciplinary	  collaboration,	  as	  I	  have	  
learnt	  to	  work	  at	  the	  bench	  of	  a	  molecular	  biology	  laboratory,	  and	  hence	  experienced	  the	  
admixture	  of	  pleasure	  and	  frustration	  that	  this	  activity	  entails.	  However,	  although	  versed	  
in	  molecular	  biology,	  and	  truly	  enamoured	  of	  it,	  I	  am	  not	  a	  natural	  scientist	  myself.	  As	  my	  
work	  demonstrates,	  I	  am	  after	  problems	  of	  interpretation	  and	  normative	  concerns	  in	  the	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field	   of	   scientific	   governance	   and	   biomedical	   innovation.	   During	   my	   PhD	   period	   I	   was	  
nonetheless	   immersed	   in	   a	   remarkably	   diverse	   environment,	  whereby	   the	   exchange	   of	  
ideas	   between	   people	   of	   different	   disciplinary	   affiliations,	   albeit	   difficult	   at	   times,	   has	  
been	  constant,	  intense	  and	  rewarding.	  	  
A	  substantive	  contribution	  to	  the	  way	  I	  see	  science	  and	   its	  place	   in	  society,	  both	  
intuitively	   and	   analytically,	   came	   from	   my	   colleagues	   and	   mentors	   in	   the	   FOLSATEC	  
programme.	   Over	   the	   last	   four	   years,	   our	   office	   on	   campus	   has	   been	   a	   tremendously	  
stimulating	  environment	  of	  discussion.	  We	  shared	  papers,	  books	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  a	  
constant	  thread	  of	  dialogue	  that,	  other	  than	  providing	  me	  with	  the	  excellent	   insights	  of	  
my	  colleagues,	  actually	  taught	  me	  how	  to	  think	  and	  speak	  about	  science,	  technology	  and	  
their	   controversial	   presence	   in	   morally	   pluralistic	   democracies.	   Unfortunately,	   to	   my	  
defect,	   this	   thesis	  cannot	  be	  but	  a	   faint	  and	   inadequate	   rendering	  of	   those	  discussions,	  
but	   it	   owes	   all	   the	   good	   it	  may	   contain	   to	   the	   relentless	   enthusiasm	  of	  my	   fellow	  PhD	  
students	  to	  engage	  in	  all-­‐day-­‐long	  conversations	  about	  the	  politics	  and	  ethics	  of	  science.	  
In	   this	   period,	   I	   had	   the	   valuable	   opportunity	   to	   meet	   colleagues	   form	   other	  
institutions	  as	  well,	  and	  to	  discuss	  with	  them	  about	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis	  at	  the	  Gorino	  
Sullam	  and	  Geneva	  graduate	  meetings	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  life	  science	  in	  2008	  and	  2010	  
respectively,	  and	  in	  the	  4S	  Summer	  School	  that	  I	  attended	  in	  Heidelberg	  in	  2008.	  
The	   oversight	   I	   received	   from	   my	   supervisors	   was	   also	   precious	   and	   inspiring.	  
Overall,	   their	  constant	  reminders	  of	   following	  through	  my	  own	   ingenuity	  and	  creativity,	  
coupled	  with	  moments	  of	  seamless	  circulation	  of	  ideas	  among	  us,	  provided	  me	  with	  the	  
necessary	  encouragement	  and	  support.	  	  
I	   presented	   part	   of	   the	   material	   contained	   in	   this	   dissertation	   at	   academic	  
conferences.	  In	  particular,	  I	  owe	  gratitude	  to	  the	  organisers	  and	  attendants	  of	  two	  social	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science	  venues,	  the	  REMEDiE	  closing	  conference	  in	  Bilbao	  in	  2011,	  and	  the	  10th	  Science	  &	  
Democracy	  Network	  at	  the	  Kennedy	  School	  of	  Government	  –	  Harvard	  University	  later	  the	  
same	  year.	  I	  have	  to	  mention	  also	  two	  scientific	  conferences	  where	  I	  presented	  my	  ideas	  
at	  a	  primitive	  stage	  and	  received	  useful	  comments	  from	  the	  audience,	  namely	  the	  ISSCR	  
annual	  meeting	  held	  in	  Barcelona	  in	  2009,	  and	  the	  Reprogramming	  Cell	  Fate	  international	  
workshop	  held	  on	  campus	  in	  2010.	  
Moreover,	   I	   am	   grateful	   to	   the	   Bio-­‐Objects	   research	   platform	   for	   financially	  
supporting	  my	   2011	   visiting	   fellowship	   at	   King’s	   College,	   London	   in	   the	   ambit	   of	   a	   EU-­‐
sponsored	  COST	  Action	  that	  brought	  together	  a	  group	  comprising	  Prof.	  Brian	  Salter	  and	  
Dr.	  Alex	  Faulkner	  from	  King’s	  Department	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  and	  Giuseppe	  Testa,	  MD,	  
MA,	  PhD	  and	  me	  from	  SEMM.	  Joining	  forces	  from	  the	  two	  institutions,	  the	  group	  carries	  
on	   a	   research	   project	   on	   governance	   strategies	   for	   stem	   cell	   translation	   that	   naturally	  
connects	  with	  and	  expands	  on	  the	  themes	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
I	   am	   therefore	   indebted	   to	   a	   number	   of	   people	   for	   the	   ideas	   developed	   in	   this	  
dissertation,	  even	  though	  all	  the	  errors	  it	  may	  contain	  are	  obviously	  imputable	  to	  me,	  and	  
to	  me	  alone.	  	  
A	   further	   expression	  of	   gratitude	   goes	   to	   the	  members	  of	   the	   FOLSATEC	   faculty	  
through	   whose	   mentorship	   and	   support	   I	   was	   able	   to	   secure	   an	   INSERM	   EU-­‐funded	  
postdoctoral	   position	   at	   the	   Faculty	   of	   Medicine	   of	   the	   University	   of	   Toulouse	   (Paul	  
Sabatier),	   in	   the	   research	   group	   led	   by	  Dr.	   Anne	   Cambon-­‐Thomsen,	   starting	   in	   January	  
2012.	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Incipit	  
«Thirty-­‐six	   fresh	  or	   frozen-­‐thawed	  donated	  human	  
embryos	  produced	  by	   IVF	  were	  cultured	   to	   the	  blastocyst	  
stage	   in	   G1.2	   and	   G2.2	  medium	   (25).	   Fourteen	   of	   the	   20	  
blastocysts	   that	   developed	   were	   selected	   for	   ES	   cell	  
isolation,	  as	  described	  for	  rhesus	  monkey	  ES	  cells	   (5).	  The	  
inner	   cell	   masses	   were	   isolated	   by	   immunosurgery	   (26),	  
with	   a	   rabbit	   antiserum	   to	   BeWO	   cells,	   and	   plated	   on	  
irradiated	   (35	  grays	   gamma	   irradiation)	  mouse	  embryonic	  
fibroblasts.	   Culture	   medium	   consisted	   of	   80%	   Dulbecco's	  
modified	   Eagle's	   medium	   (no	   pyruvate,	   high	   glucose	  
formulation;	   Gibco-­‐BRL)	   supplemented	   with	   20%	   fetal	  
bovine	   serum	   (Hyclone),	   1	   mM	   glutamine,	   0.1	   mM	   β-­‐
mercaptoethanol	  (Sigma),	  and	  1%	  nonessential	  amino	  acid	  
stock	  (Gibco-­‐BRL).	  	  
«After	   9	   to	   15	   days,	   inner	   cell	   mass–derived	  
outgrowths	   were	   dissociated	   into	   clumps	   either	   by	  
exposure	   to	  Ca2+/Mg2+-­‐free	  phosphate-­‐buffered	   saline	  with	  
1	   mM	   EDTA	   (cell	   line	   H1),	   by	   exposure	   to	   dispase	   (10	  
mg/ml;	   Sigma;	   cell	   line	  H7),	  or	  by	  mechanical	  dissociation	  
with	   a	   micropipette	   (cell	   lines	   H9,	   H13,	   and	   H14)	   and	  
replated	   on	   irradiated	   mouse	   embryonic	   fibroblasts	   in	  
fresh	   medium.	   Individual	   colonies	   with	   a	   uniform	  
undifferentiated	  morphology	  were	  individually	  selected	  by	  
micropipette,	   mechanically	   dissociated	   into	   clumps,	   and	  
replated.	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«Once	   established	   and	   expanded,	   cultures	   were	  
passaged	   by	   exposure	   to	   type	   IV	   collagenase	   (1	   mg/ml;	  
Gibco-­‐BRL)	   or	   by	   selection	   of	   individual	   colonies	   by	  
micropipette.	   Clump	   sizes	   of	   about	   50	   to	   100	   cells	   were	  
optimal.	  Cell	  lines	  were	  initially	  karyotyped	  at	  passages	  2	  to	  
7»	  (Thomson	  et	  al.	  1998,	  1147). 
The	  passage	  above	  is	  footnote	  six	  of	  the	  1998	  paper	  in	  which	  James	  A.	  Thomson	  
and	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  described	  the	  derivation	  of	  embryonic	  
stem	  cells	  from	  early	  human	  embryos.	  The	  journal	  Science	  received	  the	  manuscript	  from	  
the	  research	  group	   in	  early	  August	  1998	  and	  published	   it	  a	  couple	  of	  months	   later	  as	  a	  
Report	   in	   a	   special	   issue	  on	  neuro-­‐degeneration.	   It	   is	   in	   a	   sense	   surprising	   that	  what	   is	  
now	  considered	  one	  of	   the	   seminal	  papers	   in	   the	   field	  of	   stem	  cell	   research,	   the	  paper	  
that	   backs	   the	   controversial	   patenting	   regime	  of	   the	  whole	   field,	   and	   that	   inspired	   the	  
formation	   of	   an	   industrial	   system	   of	   promise	   and	   hope	   around	   stem	   cell	   medicine,	  
received	  no	  particular	  emphasis	  by	  a	  journal	  normally	  attentive	  to	  the	  wider	  implications	  
of	  the	  science	  it	  publishes.	  In	  a	  provoking	  twist	  of	  events	  however,	  the	  Report	  ended	  up	  in	  
an	   issue	  of	   the	   journal	   that	   featured	   a	   special	   section	  on	  neurodegenerative	  disorders,	  
today	  one	  of	   the	  alleged	  areas	  of	  potential	   expansion	  of	   stem	  cell	   therapies	   (see	   infra,	  
Chapter	  1).	  But	  at	  the	  time	  of	  publication,	  stem	  cells	  were	  not	  the	  major	  breakthrough	  of	  
that	  week’s	  Science.	  	  
The	  stage	  was	  for	  brain	  degeneration,	  and	  Science’s	  cover	  as	  well:	  a	  diseased	  brain	  
of	   an	   Alzheimer	   patient,	   virtually	   sliced	   by	   coronal	   magnetic	   resonance	   scans	   overlay,	  
rendered	  pictorially	  visible	  the	  fringes	  of	  the	  brain	  eroded	  by	  the	  disease	  in	  the	  lapse	  of	  
one	  single	  year.	  This	  cover	  portrays	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  what	  we	  cherish	  
as	  the	  biological	  site	  of	  humanness	  –	  the	  brain	  –	  and	  the	  relentless	  effort	  of	  science	  and	  
technology	   at	   fighting	   the	   disorder	   and	   save	   the	   patient,	   and	   with	   him,	   the	   privileged	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symbol	  of	  our	  civilization.	  This	  was	  the	   image	  that,	  with	   its	  overload	  of	  symbolic	   layers,	  
got	   the	  cover	  of	   that	   issue,	  not	   the	  cell	   lines	  Thomson	  and	  colleagues	  established	   from	  
human	   blastocysts.	   After	   all,	   the	   Nineties	   were	   the	   ‘decade	   of	   the	   brain’,	   as	   the	   US	  
Congress	   had	   defined	   it	   in	   staging	   a	  major	   political	   initiative	   to	   support	   brain	   research	  
some	  eight	  years	  earlier	  in	  1990	  (Jones	  and	  Mendell	  1999).	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  political	  conditions	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  
of	   the	   scientific	   promise	   that	   lined	   up	   the	   interests	   of	   researchers	   and	   the	   efforts	   of	  
public	   regulators	   in	   the	   following	   decade,	   the	   2000s,	   and	   that	   is	   now	   on	   the	   verge	   of	  
attempting	   to	   deliver	   its	   fruits:	   curing	   people	   with	   stem	   cells.	   Ten	   years	   after	   the	  
derivation	  of	  the	  first	  human	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  line,	  the	  expected	  yield	  of	  the	  field	  is	  a	  
paradigmatic	  shift	  in	  our	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  disease,	  injury,	  functional	  degeneration	  and	  
organ	  failure.	  In	  a	  future	  that	  is	  yet	  in	  the	  course	  of	  being	  imagined,	  men	  and	  women	  will	  
resort	   to	   regenerative	  medicine	   to	   fight	   against	   illness,	   to	   preserve	   the	   functionality	   of	  
their	  organs	  and	  to	  extend	  the	  span	  of	  their	  lives	  (see	  infra	  chapter	  2).	  But	  the	  likelihood	  
of	  this	  perspective	  depends	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  current	  incipient	  efforts	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
stem	  cell	   clinical	   research.	  Such	  efforts,	   I	  will	   show,	  are	  at	   the	   same	   time	  scientific	  and	  
political,	   for	   biomedical	   novelty	   needs	   be	   supported,	   channelled,	   directed	   or,	   in	   other	  
words,	  governed	  politically	  if	  it	  has	  to	  fulfil	  its	  promises.	  	  
Just	   like	   the	  science	   that	   it	   tries	   to	   regulate,	   the	  governance	  of	   stem	  cell	   clinical	  
research	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  accumulation	  of	  new	  scientific	  knowledge.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  
the	   array	   of	   possible	   applications	   of	   stem	   cells	   to	   the	   cure	   of	   humans	   solicits	   the	  
imagination	  of	  scientists	  and	  physicians	  in	  ways	  that	  legislators	  can	  rarely	  anticipate.	  But	  
just	   like	  the	  decade	  of	   the	  brain	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  steering	  political	   initiative,	  so	  does	  stem	  
cell	   governance	   attempt	   to	   shape	   the	   course	   of	   innovation	   in	   the	   fascinating	   field	   of	  
regenerative	   medicine.	   Moreover,	   as	   stem	   cells	   make	   their	   cautious	   way	   towards	   the	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human	   body	   through	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	   studies	   and	   early-­‐stage	   clinical	   trials,	   new	  
pluripotent	  entities	  appear	  on	  the	  stage	  of	  science	  and,	  seamlessly,	  become	  the	  next	  hot	  
topic	  of	  discussion	   for	  public	   discourses	   and	   regulatory	  design.	   This	  propensity	  of	   stem	  
cell	  science	  to	  orient	  sight	  towards	  the	  future	  turned	  cellular	  biochemistry	   into	  a	  site	  of	  
the	   imaginary,	  whereby	   ideas	  about	   therapy	   interact	  with	  newly	  available	  manipulative	  
abilities,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  emerging	  legal	  and	  political	  dispensations.	  Certainly,	  the	  journey	  
of	   imagination	   that	   stem	  cells	   elicited	  and	   that	   is	   just	   starting	   to	  align	   the	   field	   toward	  
possible	   applications,	   is	   indeed	   fraught	   with	   controversy.	   Worries	   of	   ethical,	   legal,	  
political	   and	   social	   nature	   counterpoint	   the	   scientific	   and	   technical	   difficulties	   that	   the	  
journey	   from	   stem	   cell	   research	   to	   a	   new	  medicine	   implies.	   But,	   albeit	   in	   a	   climate	   of	  
unsettled	  public	  discourses	  over	  the	  wider	  societal	   implications	  of	  the	  new	  regenerative	  
medicine,	   a	   remarkably	   visionary	   exercise	   of	   anticipation	   lies	   before	   us.	   Thanks	   to	   the	  
innovations	   and	   transformations	   introduced	   by	   the	   science	   of	   stem	   cell,	   what	   is	   being	  
deployed	  is	  a	  ‘sociotechnical	  imaginary’,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  “collectively	  imagined	  form[…]	  of	  
social	   life	  and	  social	  order	  reflected	   in	   the	  design	  and	  fulfilment	  of	   […]	  scientific	  and/or	  
technological	  projects”1(Jasanoff	  and	  Kim	  2009).	  As	  this	  definition	  clearly	  indicates,	  stem	  
cell	  innovation	  is	  about	  designing	  biological	  entities	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  about	  imagining	  the	  
users,	  the	  practices	  and	  the	  institutions	  that	  stem	  cell	  technologies	  will	  create	  and	  require	  
in	   the	   future.	   As	   it	   will	   become	   clearer	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   dissertation,	   stem	   cell	  
medicine	   cannot	   simply	   be	   regarded	   as	   introducing	   a	   new	   technique	   in	   the	   arsenal	   of	  
current	  Western	  medicine.	   The	   argument	   I	   am	  developing	   is	   indeed	  articulated	   around	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  original	  definition	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “collectively	  imagined	  forms	  of	  social	  life	  and	  social	  order	  reflected	  
in	  the	  design	  and	  fulfillment	  of	  nation-­‐specific	  scientific	  and/or	  technological	  projects”	  (emphasis	  added).	  I	  
omitted	   the	   reference	   to	   the	   nation-­‐specific	   dimension	   that	   Jasanoff	   and	   Kim	   had	   included	   in	   their	  
formulation,	  just	  because	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  with	  the	  general	  initial	  considerations	  I	  am	  making	  here.	  
Imagining	  stem	  cell	  medicine,	  nowadays,	   is	  both	  a	  global	  and	  a	  nation-­‐specific	  enterprise.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  
fact,	  the	  scientific	  community	  sees	  itself	  and	  operates	  as	  a	  communitarian	  entity	  that	  cuts	  across	  national	  
boundaries.	  However,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  stem	  cell	  science	  is	  practiced,	  and	  the	  regulatory	  possibilities	  of	  its	  
translation	  into	  future	  therapies	  very	  much	  depend	  on	  national	  legal	  and	  political	  arrangements.	  	  
	   15	  
the	  methodological	  assumption	  that	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  entails	  much	  more	  than	  this.	   In	  
particular,	   I	   hope	   I	   will	   succeed	   in	   clarifying	   that	   the	   challenges	   awaiting	   stem	   cell	  
application	   to	   human	   patients,	   far	   from	   being	   of	   a	   merely	   technical	   nature,	   entail	   a	  
substantial	   revision	   of	   some	   current	   ways	   of	   understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	  
humans	  and	  the	  body,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  governing	  
the	  circulation	  of	  human	  bodily	  tissues	  in	  our	  societies.	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  will	  account	  for	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  stem	  cell	  regulation	  
in	  the	  field	  of	  clinical	  research,	  tracking	  the	  emergence	  of	  specific	  governance	  models	  and	  
their	   contestations,	   and	   assessing	   their	   ability	   to	   cope	   with	   remarkable	   biomedical	  
innovation	   in	  a	  democratically	  accountable	  way.	  Democracy	  here	   is	  called	   into	  question	  
by	  the	  coexistence	  of	  rather	  irreducible	  disagreements	  about	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  stem	  cell	  
research,	  both	  at	  the	  bench	  and	  at	  the	  clinical	  level.	  Such	  disagreements,	  that	  are	  indeed	  
the	  hallmarks	  of	  our	  pluralistic	  societies,	  call	   into	  question	  the	  very	  role	  of	  politics	  with	  
respect	   to	   science,	   citizens’	   interests,	   patients’	   rights.	   It	   is	   indeed	  by	  means	  of	   a	  major	  
rearrangement	   of	   democratic	   practices	   that	   regenerative	  medicine	   proceeds	   to	   its	   yet	  
uncertain	   realisation.	   Even	   though	   the	   fate	   of	   early	   efforts	   in	   building	   regenerative	  
medicine	   remain	   uncertain,	   these	   very	   attempts	   will	   not	   leave	   the	   face	   of	   our	  
democracies	   unchanged.	   This	   dissertation	   thus	   attends	   to	   an	   important	   analytical	   and	  
normative	  question:	  how	  can	  and	  should	  a	  polity	  shape	  the	  course	  of	   innovation,	  foster	  
the	  aims	  of	  science	  and	  preserve	  a	  pluralistic	  character?	  	  
	  
I	   will	   therefore,	   in	   an	   orderly	   fashion,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   under	   the	  methodological	  
guidance	  of	  the	  right	  scholarly	  tools,	  try	  to	  unravel	  what	  is	  manifest	  and	  what	  is	  hidden,	  
what	  reaches	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  public	  debate	  and	  what	  is	  left	  unsaid	  about	  the	  way	  this	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particular	  human	  activity	  (i.e.	  the	  development	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  medicine)	  unrolls	  into	  
events,	  discourses	  and	  institutions.	  	  
Chapter	   one	   aims	   at	   deploying	   such	   scholarly	   tools	   thereby	   making	   the	  
methodology	   of	   this	   dissertation	   known	   to	   the	   reader.	   Chapter	   two	   describes	   the	  
innovation	   promise	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	   with	   respect	   to	   drug	   screening,	   regenerative	  
medicine	  and	  personalised	  medicine.	  Chapter	  three	  comprises	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  
I	   will	   reconstruct	   the	   governance	   models	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   as	   compared	   to	   the	  
established	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  In	  part	  two,	  
I	  will	  describe	  how	  these	  models	  have	   transformed	   to	  accommodate	   the	  emergence	  of	  
stem	  cell	  translational	  research.	  In	  chapter	  four	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  many	  different	  routes	  
that	   stem	   cell	   translation	   is	   taking	   and	   the	   way	   the	   governance	   model	   described	   in	  
chapter	   three-­‐part	   two	   is	   being	   contested.	   Finally,	   in	   chapter	   five,	   I	   will	   assess	   the	  
democratic	  quality	  of	  the	  emerging	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  and	  propose	  ways	  
to	  foster	  its	  democratically	  accountable	  development.	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Chapter	  1:	  Interpreting	  innovation	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  describe	  the	  methodological	  outlook	  that	  I	  will	  use	  throughout	  
this	  dissertation.	   I	  will	   firstly	  explain	  what	   is	  at	  stake	  analytically	   in	   trying	  to	  provide	  an	  
interpretation	  of	  on-­‐going	  biomedical	  innovation	  (1.1,	  1.2).	  I	  will	  then	  propose	  to	  blend	  a	  
co-­‐productionist	   account	   (1.3)	   with	   normative	   insights	   from	   deliberative	   democracy	  
theory	  (1.5).	  Moreover,	  I	  will	  justify	  the	  possibility	  and	  indeed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  use	  this	  
hybrid	   methodology	   to	   track	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell-­‐based	  
regenerative	  medicine	  in	  sections	  1.4,	  1.6,	  1.7,	  and	  1.8.	  	  
1.1	  Interpreting	  novelty	  
A	  first	  unavoidable	  methodological	  hurdle	  that	  my	  work	  has	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  
is	  the	  fact	  that,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  what	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  here	  –	  the	  transformations	  that	  
take	   place	   around	   the	   early	   steps	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   into	   the	   territory	   of	   clinical	  
application	  –	  lies	  temporarily	  ahead	  of	  us.	  The	  object	  of	  my	  discourse	  is	  a	  particular,	  and	  
in	  my	  opinion	  paradigmatic,	  instance	  of	  biomedical	  innovation,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  yet	  entirely	  
with	   us	   today	   and	   whose	   chances	   of	   being	   fully	   realized	   are,	   as	   with	  most	   innovative	  
enterprises,	  deeply	  obscured	  by	  technical	  and	  political	  uncertainty.	  I	  am	  thus	  speaking	  of	  
a	  technology	  that	  is	  in	  the	  course	  of	  being	  crafted,	  both	  as	  an	  object	  of	  scientific	  control	  
and	  as	  a	  politically	  governable	  set	  of	  medical	  practices.	  But	   that	   technology	   is	  not	  here	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yet.	   Its	   delivery	   has	   to	   be	   located	   somewhere	   in	   the	   future,	   provided	   that	   it	   will	   be	  
delivered	  at	  all.	  	  
Yet,	  traces	  of	  this	  possible	  technological	  future	  are	  already	  here	  these	  days,	  in	  the	  
form	   of	   texts,	   inscriptions	   (Derrida	   1976),	   as	   political	   imaginaries	   and	   policy	   narratives	  
(Gottweis	   1998,	   33-­‐4),	   and	   efforts	   at	   realizing	   the	   possibility	   of	   stem	   cell	  medicine	   are	  
potent,	   scientifically,	   politically	   and	   financially.	   A	   trajectory	   of	   innovation	   is	   starting	   to	  
coalesce	  around	  stem	  cells,	  and	  the	  early	  signs	  of	  this	  movement	  can	  already	  be	  tracked.	  	  
All	  the	  more,	  the	  social	  science	  scholar	  has	  to	  develop	  a	  methodological	  toolkit	  to	  
follow	  this	  trajectory,	  to	  monitor	  its	  development	  and	  to	  deploy	  its	  interpretation.	  Let	  me	  
thus	   start	   by	   outlining	   the	   core	   tenets	   of	   my	   argument	   and	   by	   justifying	   the	  
methodological	  choices	  that	  I	  made	  in	  order	  to	  elaborate	  my	  reasoning	  about	  it.	  
The	  argument	   that	   I	  am	  developing	  around	   this	  early	   trajectory	   is	   that	   stem	  cell	  
translation,	   albeit	   being	   at	   an	   early	   and	   uncertain	   state,	   is	   reaching	   an	   unprecedented	  
degree	  of	  social	  and	  political	  relevance,	  one	  that	  at	  least	  parallels	  the	  scientific	  import	  of	  
its	  findings,	  and	  that	  dictates	  a	  thorough	  normative	  reflection	  on	  the	  actual	  state	  of	  our	  
democracies.	  The	  reason	  for	  calling	  democracy	  into	  question	  with	  respect	  to	  biomedical	  
innovation	   is	   grounded	   in	  many	  years	  of	   scholarship	   in	   STS	   that,	   as	   the	   field	   started	   to	  
look	   at	   policymaking	   as	   a	   major	   site	   of	   scientific	   controversy,	   investigated	   the	   role	   of	  
science	  in	  disputes	  of	  political	  representation	  and	  decisional	  accountability.	  In	  particular,	  
biotechnology	   provided	   a	   wealth	   of	   empirical	   material	   to	   comparative	   studies	   on	   the	  
various	   regimes	   of	   governability	   (Gottweis	   1998,	   31)	   that	   arose	   around	   emerging	  
scientific	  novelties.	  Those	  regimes	  were	  shown	  to	  rely	  on	  linguistic	  resources	  to	  form	  and	  
sustain	  themselves.	  In	  Gottweis’	  words,	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«[n]arrative	  and	  discourse	  underscore	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	   boundaries	   of	   politics,	   science,	   and	   technology	   are	  
always	   drawn	   within	   the	   larger	   semiotic	   context	   of	   the	  
various	   stories	   that	   give	   a	   society	   its	   identity	   and	   hold	   it	  
together»	  (Gottweis	  1998,	  31).	  	  
Drawing	  on	  post-­‐structuralist	  discourse	  analysis,	   this	  perspective	  emphasises	   the	  
shifting	   relationship	  between	  power	  and	   language	   in	   social	  phenomena.	  According	   to	  a	  
post-­‐structuralist	   scholar,	   the	   object	   of	   social	   analysis	   is	   “the	   continuously	   fluctuating	  
ways	   in	   which	   speakers,	   within	   any	   discursive	   context,	   are	   variously	   positioned	   as	  
powerful	   or	   powerless	   by	   competing	   social	   and	   institutional	   discourses”	   (Baxter	   2002).	  
This	  outlook,	  as	  it	  will	  become	  clearer	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  fits	  conveniently	  
to	   describe	   the	   emerging	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   research.	   It	   is	   therefore	  
discourses	   and	   power-­‐granting	   institutional	   relationships	   between	   regulatory	   agencies,	  
legislators,	  scientists,	  clinicians	  and	  patients	  that	  constitute	  the	  object	  of	  my	  analysis.	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  policymaking	  looses	  the	  connotation	  of	  a	  socially	  separate	  
quasi-­‐technical	  administrative	  activity,	  to	  be	  better	  understood	  “as	  an	  attempt	  to	  manage	  
a	   field	   of	   discursivity,	   the	   intermediation	   between	   policy	   narrative,	   […]	   and	   discursive	  
context”	  (Gottweis	  1998,	  37).	  The	  creation	  of	  political	  stability	  around	  science	  is	  thus	  to	  
be	   seen	   as	   depending	   on	   linguistic	   resources	   other	   than	   on	   the	   availability	   of	  
administrative	   positions.	   Controversies	   over	   the	   use	   of	   biotechnology	   in	   the	   last	   three	  
decades	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   such	   a	   space	   of	   discourse	   and	   power	   can	   only	   be	  
stabilized	  when,	  “in	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  debate	  and	  reciprocal	  persuasion”	  (Majone	  
1989,	   1)	   that	   characterizes	   any	   democratic	   political	   system,	   one	   narrative	   becomes,	   at	  
least	  temporarily,	  dominant	  over	  the	  others.	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Stem	   cell	   research,	   with	   the	   wide,	   open-­‐ended	   and	   un-­‐stabilized	   array	   of	  
conflicting	  narratives	  that	  arise	  around	  its	  controversial	  use,	  is	  but	  a	  late	  instance	  of	  such	  
discursive	  circulations;	  one	  that	  is	  worth	  analyzing	  however,	  for	  it	  exemplifies	  the	  still	  on-­‐
going	   process	   of	  modifications	   that	   biotechnology	   is	   realizing	   on	   society	   at	   large.	   Stem	  
cells	   should	   thus	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   innovation	   that	   contains	   the	   germs	   of	   a	  wider	   societal	  
transformation	  whose	  direction	  this	  dissertation	  aims	  at	  critically	  appraising.	  As	  a	  matter	  
of	   fact,	   it	   should	   hardly	   be	   surprising	   that	   stem	   cell	   research	   acts	   as	   a	   site	   of	   both	  
biomedical	   and	   political	   change:	   as	   Sheila	   Jasanoff	   put	   it,	   “[t]he	   dynamics	   of	   political	  
power,	   like	  those	  of	  culture,	  seem	  impossible	  to	  tease	  apart	  from	  the	  broad	  currents	  of	  
scientific	  and	  technological	  change”	  (Jasanoff	  2004,	  14).	  
A	  major	   overall	   premise	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   exactly	   the	   realisation	   that,	   as	   a	  
biotechnology	   grows,	   the	   relationship	   between	   science	   and	   the	   polity	   changes	  
profoundly.	   Stem	   cell	   innovation	   will	   therefore	   work	   as	   a	   privileged	   vantage	   point	   to	  
analyse	  one	  of	  the	  latest	  instantiations	  of	  this	  transformative	  trajectory.	  	  
1.2	  A	  hybrid	  methodological	  toolkit	  
From	  a	  methodological	  point	  of	  view	  I	  will	  thus	  need	  two	  things.	  First,	  in	  order	  to	  
appreciate	  the	  societal	  import	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation,	  I	  will	  need	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  
that	  captures	  the	  symmetric	  construction	  of	  knowledge,	   technical	  skills	  and	  governance	  
tools.	  Second,	   in	  order	   to	  assess	   the	   impact	  of	  such	  structured	   innovation	  trajectory	  on	  
the	   trim	   of	   democracy,	   I	   need	   a	   political	   theory	   indicating	   how	   change	   is	   discursively	  
handled	   in	   a	   democratic	   polity,	   especially	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   conflicts	   and	  
disagreements	  that	  are	  typically	  elicited	  by	  the	  advance	  of	  the	  life	  sciences.	  Furthermore,	  
it	   would	   be	   desirable	   that	   these	   two	   elements	   of	   my	   toolkit	   be	   themselves	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methodologically	  related	  in	  some	  theoretically	  meaningful	  sense.	  Therefore,	  I	  will	   justify	  
my	  choices	  below	  not	  only	  individually,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  bundle.	  As	  such,	  this	  hybrid	  bundle	  
will	   lay	   down	   the	   methodological	   foundations	   of	   what	   I	   propose	   to	   call	   a	   political	  
philosophy	  of	  biotechnological	  innovation.	  	  
Let	  us	  thus	  begin	  with	  the	  first	  component	  of	  the	  bundle.	  As	  I	  already	  anticipated	  
(see	  supra),	  stem	  cell	  translational	  research	  is	  a	  complex	  area	  of	  innovation.	  Therefore,	  in	  
investigating	  this	  contemporary	  area	  of	  biomedicine,	  I	  need	  a	  framework	  that,	  while	  fully	  
acknowledging	  this	  complexity,	  allows	  me	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  To	  this	  aim,	  I	  will	  adopt	  the	  
theoretical	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  co-­‐productionist	  framework.	  The	  latter	  is	  supposed	  to	  allow	  
me	  to	  look	  at	  the	  uncertain	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  as	  constructing,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  epistemic,	  technical	  and	  regulatory	  conditions	  of	  innovation.	  	  
As	   it	   may	   already	   seem	   apparent	   to	   the	   academic	   reader,	   I	   am,	   from	   the	   very	  
onset	  of	  my	  work,	  using	   the	  word	   ‘innovation’	   to	  encompass	   the	   technological	   yield	  of	  
stem	   cell	   research	   as	   well	   as	   the	   societal	   import	   that	   the	   presence	   and	   circulation	   of	  
stem-­‐cell	   objects	   and	   clinical	   practices	   imply.	   The	   fundamental	   thread	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	  
therefore	   that	   the	   trajectory	  of	  biotechnological	   innovation,	   realized	  by	  early	   efforts	   at	  
translating	   stem	   cell	   knowledge	   and	   practices	   from	   the	   lab	   to	   the	   clinic,	   cannot	   be	  
observed	   assuming	   a	   pre-­‐given	   separation	   between	   the	   product	   of	   innovation	   and	   the	  
societal	  arrangements	  that	  allow	  such	  product	  to	  be	  crafted,	  circulated,	  commercialized,	  
used	  to	  heal	  human	  patients,	  and	  debated	  within	  the	  polity.	  I	  thus	  underwrite	  to	  the	  co-­‐
productionist	   idiom	   that	   has	   recently	   emerged	   in	   the	   field	   of	   science	   and	   technology	  
studies	   (Jasanoff	   2004,	   chapters:	   1,	   2,	   13,	   14),	   as	   it	   proved	  better	  equipped	   than	  other	  
more	  traditional	  accounts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  messy	  relationship	  that	  technology	  and	  
power	  entertain	  in	  contemporary	  democracies.	  More	  specifically,	  neoclassical	  accounts	  of	  
technological	   innovation,	   used	   to	   see	   knowledge	   production	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   social	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activity	   of	   firms	   and	   regulators	   that	   use	   that	   knowledge	   or	   try	   to	   steer	   its	   production	  
(Nelson	   1959;	   Arrow	   1962).	   The	   production	   of	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   ordering	   of	   society	  
with	   respect	   to	   innovation	   thus	   fell	   on	   separate	   sides	   of	   an	   imagined	   divide	   between	  
science	  and	  society,	  facts	  and	  norms.	  In	  those	  accounts,	  the	  only	  point	  of	  engagement	  or	  
interface	   between	   creators	   of	   knowledge	   and	   creators	   of	   social	   ordering	   in	   those	  
accounts,	  were	  research	  and	  development	  (R&D)	  budget	  allocation	  decisions.	  But	  in	  the	  
age	  of	  biotechnology,	  and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  profound	  cultural	  controversies	  that	  inspire	  
debates	   around	  biomedical	   innovation,	   those	   kinds	  of	   approaches	  and	   their	   vocabulary	  
do	  not	  offer	  satisfying	   insights	   into	  what	   is	   really	  at	  stake	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	   the	  
life	  sciences.	  	  
1.3	  A	  co-­‐productionist	  idiom	  
Co-­‐production	  is	  a	  methodological	  framework	  developed	  in	  STS.	  It	  especially	  owes	  
to	   the	   scholarship	  of	   Sheila	   Jasanoff	   (Jasanoff	   2004),	   and	   to	  her	   effort	   at	   providing	   the	  
growing	   field	   of	   STS	   with	   solid	   methodological	   bases.	   The	   prolific	   academic	   activity	   of	  
Jasanoff	   and	   other	   prominent	   scholars	   in	   STS	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	  
empirical	  and	  theoretical	  analyses	  of	  technological	  phenomena.	  The	  field	  applied	  the	  co-­‐
productionist	  agenda	  especially	  to	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  on	  scientifically	  sensible	  issues,	  
thereby	  producing	  a	  wealth	  of	  academic	  literature	  on	  problems	  such	  as	  scientific	  advice	  
(Jasanoff	   1994;	   Bal,	   Bijker,	   and	  Hendriks	   2004;	   Bijker,	   Bal,	   and	  Hendriks	   2009)	   and	   the	  
role	  of	  experts	   in	  policy	  choice	   (Fischer	  1990;	  Weingart	  1999;	   Jasanoff	  2003a;	  Nowotny	  
2003;	  Maasen	  and	  Weingart	  2005;	  Collins	  and	  Evans	  2007;	  Bijker,	  Bal,	  and	  Hendriks	  2009;	  
Fischer	  2009).	  The	  main	  tenet	  of	  this	  stream	  of	  analysis	   is	  that	  “it	   is	  through	  systematic	  
engagement	   with	   the	   natural	   world	   and	   the	  manufactured,	   physical	   environment	   that	  
modern	  polities	  define	  and	  refine	  the	  meanings	  of	  citizenship	  and	  civic	  responsibility,	  the	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solidarities	   of	   nationhood	   and	   interest	   groups,	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   public	   and	   the	  
private,	  the	  possibilities	  of	  freedom	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  control”	  (Jasanoff	  2004,	  14).	  The	  
theme	  of	  boundary	  construction	  and	  deconstruction,	  appearing	   towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
quote,	   is	   indeed	   among	   the	   main	   tools	   in	   the	   hand	   of	   co-­‐production	   oriented	   STS	  
scholars.	  Originally	  elaborated	  by	  Gieryn	  to	  account	  for	  the	  demarcation	  of	  science	  from	  
non-­‐science	   (Gieryn	   1983;	  Gieryn	   1995),	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘boundary	  work’	   aims	   at	   analysing	  
“the	   attribution	   of	   selected	   characteristics	   to	   institutions	   […]	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
constructing	  a	  social	  boundary	  that	  distinguishes”	  them	  from	  others	  (Gieryn	  1983,	  782).	  It	  
is	   just	   about	   the	   case	   of	   stressing	   the	   linguistic	   nature	   of	   such	   attribution	   games:	   it	   is	  
through	   communicable	   statements,	   visible	   practices,	   and	   public	   institutional	  
arrangements	   that	   social	   actors	  build	  up	  and	  negotiate	   the	  boundaries	  of	   their	   agency,	  
and	   thus	  exercise	  power	  onto	  other	  actors,	  or	   create	   the	  conditions	   for	  doing	   it.	  Those	  
negotiations,	  like	  any	  other	  form	  of	  inscription,	  leave	  traces	  that	  the	  analyst	  can	  follow	  or	  
try	  to	  reconstruct,	  when	  they,	  due	  to	  cunning	  exercises	  of	  black-­‐boxing	  (Latour	  1987),	  are	  
too	   faint	   to	  be	  clearly	  seen.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  on	  the	  background	  of	  a	  social	  constructivist	  
approach,	   broadly	   conceived,	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   boundary	  work	   contests	   conceptual	   and	  
social	   dicotomies	   –	   such	   as	   facts/values,	   science/non-­‐science,	   expert/non-­‐expert,	   basic	  
science/applied	   research,	   natural/artifactual,	   tool/use,	   technology/	   governance	   –	   that	  
typically	  appear	   in	  discourses	  about	  science	  and	   its	  place	   in	  society.	  STS	  has	  shown	  the	  
heuristic	   poverty	   of	   assuming	   that	   those	   demarcations	   simply	   exist,	   like	   immutable	  
metaphysical	  entities,	  thus	  obscuring	  the	  rumbling	  social	  activities	  aimed	  at	  filling	  those	  
twosomes	  with	   different	  meanings	   at	   different	   occasions.	   This	   interpretative	   paradigm	  
seems	   particularly	   fit	   to	   describe	   the	   kind	   of	   simultaneous	   and	   mutual	   production	   of	  
knowledge	  and	  social	  order	  that	  happens	  to	  take	  place	  in	  biotechnology,	  where	  meaning,	  
values	  and	  power	  have	  no	  less	  a	  fundamental	  creative	  potential	  than	  scientific	  discovery	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and	  medical	  application.	  To	  use	  Jasanoff’s	  words,	  “several	  decades	  of	  research	  in	  science	  
and	   technology	   studies	   have	   done	   much	   to	   illuminate	   how	   orderings	   of	   nature	   and	  
society	   reinforce	   each	   other,	   creating	   conditions	   of	   stability	   as	   well	   as	   change,	   and	  
consolidating	  as	  well	   as	  diversifying	   the	   forms	  of	   social	   life”	   (Jasanoff	  2004,	  17).	   It	   thus	  
seems	   tempting	   to	   adopt	   the	   co-­‐productionist	   idiom	   to	   describe	   the	   precarious	   and	  
uncertain	  technological	  trajectory	  like	  the	  coming	  into	  being	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  	  
The	  co-­‐productionist	  account	  of	   scientific	  and	   technological	  phenomena	  brought	  
in	   the	  hands	  of	   social	   scientists	   an	  unprecedented	  explanatory	  power:	   co-­‐productionist	  
analyses	   are	   able	   to	   detect	   power	   games	   and	   stabilization	   dynamics	   directly	   into	   the	  
formation	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   the	   production	   of	   technological	   objects,	   and	   to	  
account	  for	  the	  diversification	  of	  the	  sites	  where	  the	  latter	  activities	  are	  carried	  on.	  In	  this	  
respect,	   particular	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   discourses	   within	   political	  
institutions	   like	   governmental	   agencies,	   parliaments	   and	   courts	   that,	   while	   deploying	  
their	   regulatory	  dispensations,	   at	   the	   same	   time	  produce	   techno-­‐scientific	  narratives	   in	  
the	   form	   of	  more	   or	   less	   outspoken	   visions	   on	   the	   future	   social	   arrangement	   that	  will	  
surround	  an	  emerging	  technology.	  In	  the	  last	  decades,	  and	  under	  the	  increasing	  pressure	  
of	  biotechnology,	  the	  latter	  sites	  gained	  prominence	  as	  forums	  of	  public	  debate	  over	  the	  
use	   and	   limits	   of	   innovation.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   co-­‐productionist	   agenda	   encompasses	  
more	   that	   an	   explanatory	   function	   to	   unravel	   the	   social	   negotiations	   that	   constitute	   a	  
space	   of	   discussion	   and	   public	   decision.	   Major	   technological	   disasters,	   like	   Bhopal,	   or	  
Three	  Mile	   Island,	  disputes	  about	   the	  use	  of	  pesticides	  or	  genetically	  modified	   food,	  as	  
well	  as	  judicial	  disputations	  on	  the	  use	  of	  expert	  testimony	  or	  the	  admissibility	  of	  patent	  
protection	  on	  gene	  sequences	  –	  such	  issues,	  and	  similar	  episodes	  of	  scientifically	  driven	  
public	   contentions,	   received	   sustained	   attention	   by	   STS	   scholars	   in	   recent	   years.	   Given	  
the	   nature	   of	   those	   phenomena	   that	   STS	   takes	   as	   the	   object	   of	   its	   analyses	   –	   showing	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how	  politics	  and	  knowledge,	  norms	  and	  facts,	  entertain	  a	  mutually	  productive	  dynamics	  –	  
the	  field	  legitimately	  aimed	  at	  having	  a	  normative	  bite.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  analyse	  
the	  content	  and,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  limits	  of	  co-­‐productionist	  normative	  concerns.	  	  
1.4	  Concerns	  of	  normativity	  	  
The	  realization	   that	   science,	   just	   like	  any	  other	  human	  activity,	   is	  amenable	   to	  a	  
sociological	  analysis	   that	  deconstructs	   its	   internal	  norms	  as	  socially	  determined,	   led	   the	  
positivistic	   assumptions	   of	   Mertonian	   exceptionalism	   (Bimber	   and	   Guston	   1995)	   to	   a	  
progressive	  decline	   starting	   from	   the	  Sixties.	   In	   the	   span	  of	   almost	   four	  decades,	   social	  
constructivist	  sociology	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  (SSK)	  have	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  “it	   is	  
necessary	   to	   draw	   on	   ‘extra-­‐scientific	   factors’	   to	   bring	   about	   closure	   of	   scientific	   and	  
technical	   debates	   –	   scientific	   method,	   experiments,	   observation,	   and	   theories	   are	   not	  
enough”	   (Collins	   and	   Evans	   2002,	   239).	   This	   view	   resulted	   in	   a	   huge	   literature	   on	   the	  
problem	  of	   scientific	  expertise	  and	  political	  decision-­‐making.	   In	  a	   remarkable	  display	  of	  
intellectual	  contagion,	   those	   ideas	  quickly	  attracted	  support	  within	   the	  public	  sphere	  of	  
Western	   societies	   in	   the	   Seventies,	   years	   of	   unfavourable	   social	   attitudes	   towards	   any	  
kind	   of	   authority	   –	   political,	   philosophical	   and	   epistemic	   as	   well.	   However,	   two	  major	  
normative	  contributions	  of	  the	  field	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  scientific	  expertise	  in	  public	  matters	  
are	   worth	   recalling	   here.	   First,	   the	   realization,	   against	   technological	   determinism,	   that	  
scientific	   development	   by	   no	   means	   follows	   a	   deterministically	   established	   and	  
immutable	   trajectory:	   being	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	   and	   technology	   a	   historical	  
phenomenon,	   it	   is	   feasible	   to	   conceive	   of	   alternatives	   within	   the	   possible	   routes	   of	  
development	  of	   a	   given	   technological	   apparatus,	   and	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   act,	   politically,	   to	  
change	  the	  course	  of	  this	  development.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Andy	  Stirling,	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«the	   form	   and	   orientation	   taken	   by	   science	   and	  
technology	   are	   no	   longer	   seen	   as	   inevitable,	   unitary,	   and	  
awaiting	   discovery	   in	   Nature[;]	   instead	   they	   are	  
increasingly	  recognized	  to	  be	  open	  to	  individual	  creativity,	  
collective	   ingenuity,	   economic	   priorities,	   cultural	   values,	  
institutional	   interests,	   stakeholder	   negotiation,	   and	   the	  
exercise	  of	  power»	  (Stirling	  2008,	  263).	  	  
Second,	  and	  as	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  the	  latter	  critical	  attitude,	  the	  normative	  
concerns	  of	  the	  field	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  plea	  for	  resolving	  “the	  Problem	  of	  Legitimacy	  [i.e.	  
why	   should	   we	   trust	   scientists	   if	   they	   no	   longer	   appear	   to	   have	   special	   access	   to	   the	  
truth?]	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  basis	  of	  technical	  decision-­‐making	  can	  and	  should	  be	  widened	  
beyond	  the	  core	  of	  certified	  experts”	  (Collins	  and	  Evans	  2002,	  237).	  	  
This	   call	   for	   the	   democratization	   of	   expertise	   obviously	   took	   many	   forms	   (see	  
Liberatore	  and	  Funtowicz	  2003,	  whole	  issue),	  and	  also	  gave	  rise	  to	  some	  theoretical	  and	  
practical	  proposals	  (Funtowicz	  and	  Ravetz	  1993;	  Collins	  and	  Evans	  2002;	  Jasanoff	  2003b;	  
Timmermans	   and	   Berg	   2003;	   Hoppe	   and	   Wesselink	   2011),	   mostly	   having	   to	   do	   with	  
coping	  with	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  extension’,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  establishing	  how	  far	  participation	  in	  
technical	  decision-­‐making	  should	  extend	  (Collins	  and	  Evans	  2002,	  237).	  Critical	   thinking,	  
democratization,	   widened	   participation,	   re-­‐negotiation	   of	   the	   boundaries	   of	   scientific	  
expertise	   to	   include	  unheard	  voices	   into	  decisional	  mechanisms	  –	  these	  rapidly	  became	  
the	  most	  pressing	  topics	  of	  a	  conceptually	  and	  empirically	  rigorous	  debate	  about	  science	  
and	  society.	  	  
On	   this	   front	   however,	   several	   commentators	   noticed	   the	   difficulty	   of	   science	  
studies,	   including	  STS	  and	  co-­‐production,	   in	  elaborating	  a	  coherent	  normative	  discourse	  
or,	  more	  simply,	  in	  providing	  ethical	  and	  political	  guidance	  for	  the	  reasonable	  stabilization	  
of	   techno-­‐scientific	   controversies	   (Winner	   1993;	   Collins	   and	   Evans	   2002).	   Winner	   has	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argued	  for	   instance	  that	   in	  spite	  of	  an	  almost	  obsessive	  concern	  for	  deconstructing	  and	  
reconstructing	  the	  conditions	  of	  emergence	  of	  knowledge	  and	  technology,	   the	   field	  has	  
generally	   lacked	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   interest	   for	   debating	   about	   the	   consequences	   of	  
technological	  development	  (Winner	  1993).	  This	  allegedly	  resulted	  in	  –	  and	  probably	  was	  
caused	   by	   –	   a	   rather	   apparent	   paucity	   of	   methodological	   tools	   to	   articulate	   a	   robust	  
normative	   response	   to	   the	   political	   issues	   that	   science	   and	   technology	   scholars	   so	  
wittingly	  have	  isolated.	  	  
In	   broad	   terms,	   I	   agree	   with	   those	   critics	   and	   with	   their	   methodological	  
preoccupations.	   It	   would	   however	   be	   unfair	   to	   the	   field	   of	   STS,	   to	   deny	   that	   defined	  
streams	   of	   normative	   and	   political	   propositions	   flow	   under	   the	   surface	   of	   most	   co-­‐
productionist	   accounts	   of	   science	   and	   technology.	   And	   if	   those	   ideas	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	  
reached	   the	   status	   of	   cogent	   moral	   or	   political	   theory,	   it	   is	   not	   imputable	   to	   the	  
inadequacy	  of	   the	  co-­‐productionist	   framework,	  nor	   to	  a	  certain	   idolatry	   for	  explanatory	  
research	  and	  methodological	  purity.	  Rather,	  this	  outcome	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  certain	  post-­‐
modern	   diffidence	   towards	   grand	   philosophical	   ‘recits’	   (Lyotard	   1984)	   that,	   claiming	   a	  
privileged	  access	  to	  universal	  moral	  truth,	  see	  themselves	  as	  severed	  from	  the	  historical	  
flow	  of	  social	  phenomena	  and	  immune	  to	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  instead,	  according	  to	  
STS,	   should	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   analytical	   inquiry.	   In	   particular,	   along	   these	   lines,	   some	  
strands	  of	  STS	  have	  developed	  a	  critical	   stance	   towards	  bioethics	  and	  political	   theories.	  
They	  are	  accused	  of	  relying	  on	  fictitious	  assumptions	  about	  how	  ethical	  controversies	  are	  
dealt	  with	   in	   society	   (Evans	  2002).	   In	  particular,	   STS	   scholars	  have	  criticized	   the	   idea	  of	  
the	  individual	  agent	  of	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  as	  embodying	  unreal	  attributes	  of	  rationality	  
and	  disinterestedness	  that	  are	  never	  found	  to	  be	  really	  at	  work	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  controversy	  
analysis	   that	   STS	   performs.	   Besides	   these	   epistemological	   concerns,	   the	   language	   of	  
liberal	  bioethics	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  functional	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  scientific	  interests,	  and	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rather	  exclusive	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  culturally	  situated	  stakes	  that	  other	  actors	  might	  have	  with	  
respect	  to	  biotechnological	  innovation,	  and	  that	  deserve	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  democratic	  
decision-­‐making	   process.	   Therefore,	   liberal	   bioethics	   would	   inevitably	   be	   linked	   to	   the	  
technocratic	   aspirations	   of	   scientists	   and	   technologist,	   thus	   enacting	   a	   distinctive	   anti-­‐
democratic	   trait.	   Especially	   troublesome	   to	   STS	   scholars	   are	   power	   imbalances	   that	  
characterize	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  focused	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  science.	  One	  can	  thus	  
conclude	   that	   STS,	   far	   from	  being	  normatively	   inert,	   shed	   light	  on	  problems	  of	  political	  
representation	   in	   decisional	   contexts	   about	   science,	   albeit,	   consciously,	   in	   an	   under-­‐
theorized	  fashion.	  In	  my	  view,	  such	  normative	  drive	  has	  the	  merit	  of	  bringing	  unjustified	  
power	   relations	   to	   the	   surface	   of	   discourses	   that	   tend	   to	   overlook	   power	   distribution	  
issues	   in	   public	   policy,	   thus	   calling	   for	   a	  more	   democratic	   negotiation	   of	   the	   inclusion	  
criteria	  in	  decisional	  settings	  (Funtowicz	  and	  Ravetz	  1993).	  	  
However,	  I	  see	  three	  problems	  with	  such	  normative	  tendencies.	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  think	  
scientific	  credibility	  is	  not	  lost	  upon	  sociological	  deconstruction.	  As	  I	  already	  said	  above,	  a	  
STS	  outlook	  on	  socio-­‐scientific	  controversies	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  social	  constructivist	  vision	  of	  
science.	  If	  this	  has	  the	  merit	  of	  overcoming	  dicotomies	  between	  science	  and	  other	  human	  
activities,	   thus	  rendering	  a	  more	  realistic	  picture	  of	  how	  epistemic	  practices	   lead	  to	  the	  
articulation	   of	   scientific	   facts,	   this	   outlook	   should	   not	   be	   pushed	   too	   far.	   It	   is	   certainly	  
true	  that	  the	  credibility	  of	  science	  as	  a	  dispensator	  of	  positive	  truths	  about	  nature	  has	  a	  
strong	   socially	   constructed	   component:	   in	   this	   respect	   science	   is	   amenable	   to	  
deconstructive	   social	   analysis	   just	   like	   any	   other	   human	   activity.	   It	   is	   however	  
unnecessary	   to	   stretch	   this	   consideration	   to	   the	   limit	   of	   saying	   that	   all	   socially	  
constructed	   activities	   are	   epistemically	   equivalent.	   Without	   entering	   a	   philosophical	  
debate	  that	  has	  been	  occupying	  specialists	  for	  centuries,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  science,	  albeit	  
uncertain	  and	  controvertible,	  still	  has	  to	  offer	  the	  pragmatically	  most	  reliable	  accounts	  of	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natural	   phenomena	   that	   human	   civilization	   has	   ever	   produced	   –	   precisely	   for	   its	  
accommodation	   of	   uncertainties	   and	   regular	   scrutiny	   of	   certainties.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	  
however,	   that	   those	   accounts	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   aspirations,	   interests	   and	  
visions	   of	   the	   world	   of	   people	   inside	   and	   outside	   the	   scientific	   community.	   In	   other	  
words,	  science	  is	  not	  a	  pre-­‐social	  activity	  having	  to	  do	  with	  pure	  nature	  and	  yielding	  pure	  
statements	  of	  fact	  (Nagel	  1989).	  To	  the	  latter	  point,	  I	  think	  STS	  scholarship	  has	  provided	  
all	   the	   empirical	   and	   theoretical	   evidence	   to	   believe	   that,	   indeed,	   scientific	   statements	  
are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  social	  milieu	  that	  produces	  them	  and	  have	  consequences,	  cultural	  and	  
institutional,	   that	  amply	   surpass	   the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  purportedly	   independent	   scientific	  
community.	   But	   science	   is	   nonetheless	   the	   most	   reliable	   source	   of	   knowledge	   about	  
biological	  and	  physical	  phenomena,	  and	  the	  burden	  of	  unmasking	  scientific	  statements	  as	  
sheer	  social	  constructions	  that	  offer	  no	  more	  reasonable	  motivation	  to	  be	  believed	  than	  
other,	   clearly	   non-­‐scientific	   kinds	   of	   knowledge,	   is	   on	   the	   shoulders	   of	   extremist	   social	  
constructivists.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   social	   constructivism,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   scientific	  
controversies	   and	   technical	   failures	   of	   the	   past,	   embraces	   an	   a	   priori	   anti-­‐scientific	  
position	  that	  systematically	  disregards	  science	  as	  a	  credible	  partner	  in	  policy-­‐making,	  it	  is	  
a	  normatively	  unhelpful	  standpoint.	  Weaker	  versions	  of	  this	  attitude	  are	  indeed	  reflected	  
in	   the	  methodological	   commitment	   to	   be	   symmetrical	   or,	   as	   it	   is	   sometimes	   otherwise	  
said,	   agnostic	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   truth	   functionality	   of	   the	   scientific	   claims	   that	   the	  
analysis	  encounters	  (Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  1979).	  It	  the	  words	  of	  Winner,	  	  
«as	  regards	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  
the	  epistemological	  program	  of	  relativism	  in	  the	  sociology	  
of	   science	   remains	   neutral	   as	   regards	   judgments	   about	  
whether	   or	   not	   the	   proclaimed	   discoveries	   or	   theories	   of	  
scientists	   are	   true	   or	   not.	   Extrapolating	   to	   technology,	  
social	  constructivists	  choose	  to	  remain	  agnostic	  as	  regards	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the	   ultimate	   good	   or	   ill	   attached	   to	   particular	   technical	  
accomplishments»	  (Winner	  1993,	  372).	  
Therefore,	  to	  sum	  up	  this	  first	  consideration,	  the	  epistemic	  reliability	  of	  science	  is	  
not	  debunked	  by	  its	  being	  amenable	  to	  sociological	  deconstruction.	  	  
The	   second	   problem	   I	   see	   in	   the	   engagement	   of	   STS	  with	   normative	   discourses	  
about	  science	  and	  technology	  is	  far	  more	  specific	  and	  relative	  to	  political	  considerations.	  
The	   political	   focus	   of	   the	   discipline,	   as	   it	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   scholarly	   work	   of	   its	  
representatives	   in	   the	   field	  of	  expert	  decision-­‐making,	   is	  on	  problems	  of	   representation	  
rather	  than	  on	  problems	  of	  political	   legitimacy.	  Collins	  and	  Evans,	  although	   I	  very	  much	  
agree	  with	  the	  overall	  aims	  of	  their	  famous	  2002	  paper,	  are	  wrong	  in	  characterizing	  STS	  
concerns	   for	   the	   democratization	   of	   expertise	   as	   having	   to	   do	   with	   legitimation.	   As	   it	  
results	  from	  the	  ever-­‐mounting	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  widening	  participation	  in	  decisional	  
settings	  about	   science,	   the	  normative	  drive	  of	   this	   strand	  of	   scholarship	  has	   to	  do	  with	  
having	  more	  voices	  heard	  than	  technocratic	  arrangements	  would	  allow.	  The	  focus	  is	  thus	  
not	  on	   the	   justifications	   that	  end	  up	  backing	  a	   given	  decision	   (i.e.	   legitimation	  proper),	  
but	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	   participants	   across	   the	   boundary,	   or	   as	   one	   should	   probably	  
say,	  the	  gradient	  of	  expertise	  that	  severs	  scientists	  and	  lay	  citizens.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  thus	  
on	  how	  to	  provide	  all	  relevant	  stakeholders	  a	  chance	  to	  influence	  the	  decisional	  outcome,	  
irrespective	  of	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  the	  final	  decision.	  This	  procedural	  concern	  is	  directed	  
towards	  re-­‐balancing	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  the	  relations	  of	  authority	  that	  hold	  at	  
any	   important	   political	   junction.	   The	   aim	   is	   therefore	   that	   of	   taking	   political	  
representation	   seriously,	   not	   that	   of	   interrogating	   a	   particular	   decisional	   situation	   to	  
assess,	  in	  a	  purportedly	  disinterested	  way,	  whether	  sufficiently	  sound	  reasons	  subsist	  to	  
rationally	   justify	   the	   policy	   at	   stake.	   It	   is	   thus	   linguistically	   unwarranted	   to	   dub	   this	  
concern	  as	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Legitimation’,	  as	  Collins	  and	  Evans	  do.	  In	  other	  words,	  STS	  has	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been	  concerned	  mainly	  with	  what	  happens	  at	  the	  decisional	  pole	  of	  a	  controversy	  about	  
science	   and	   technology.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   STS	   Foucauldian	   interest	   with	   power	  
relations.	  But,	   I	  would	  argue,	   this	  attitude	  misses	   the	  actual	  prominence	  of	   legitimating	  
discourses	   in	  “stabilizing	  the	  political	  space”	  (Gottweis	  1998,	  37).	  The	  free	  circulation	  of	  
legitimizing	  discourses	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  relies	  on	  resources	  that	  certainly	  include	  fair	  
representation,	   but	   are	   by	   no	   means	   restrained	   to	   it.	   In	   every	   polity,	   there	   exist	   a	  
multitude	   of	   publicly	   relevant	   decisions	   that	   are	   legitimately	   captured	   by	   delegated	  
specialists	   having	   not	   even	   the	   slightest	   intention	   to	   be	   representative	   of	   the	   full	  
spectrum	  of	  potential	  opinions	  that	  may	  circulate	   in	   the	  public	  space.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	  
that	   the	  decisional	  authority	  of	  even	   those	  kinds	  of	   specialists	   cannot	  or	   should	  not	  be	  
questioned.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   advisable	   that	   a	   polity	   retains	   the	   political	   and	  
discursive	  resources	  to	  publicly	  engage	  in	  anti-­‐authoritative	  initiatives,	  be	  they	  addressed	  
at	   enlarging	   the	   decisional	   bases,	   thereby	   advancing	   a	   plea	   for	   increased	  
representativeness,	   or	   at	   directly	   questioning	   the	   very	   content	   of	   a	   given	   decision.	  
Legitimation,	   as	   I	   will	   illustrate	   below,	   depends	   much	   more	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	  
alternative	  discourses	   to	  be	   continuously	   articulated,	   circulated	   throughout	   society	   and	  
directed	   against	   dominating	   narratives,	   rather	   than	   merely	   on	   balancing	   forces	   at	  
decisional	  sites.	  Although	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  power	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  policy-­‐making	  is	  
functional	   to	   an	   effective	   circulation	   of	   discourses,	   it	   does	   not	   exhaust	   the	   politically	  
legitimizing	   role	   of	   argumentative	   discussion	   within	   a	   polity	   –	   the	   reason	   being	   that	  
decisions	   arrived	   at	   by	   a	   more	   representative	   panel,	   per	   se,	   cannot	   lay	   claim	   to	   a	  
privileged	  access	  to	   incontestable	  political	  wisdom.	  Therefore,	   it	  may	  be	  useful	   that	  the	  
focus	  of	  analyses	  that,	  like	  mine,	  are	  interested	  in	  following	  both	  the	  emergence	  and	  the	  
potential	  political	  consequences	  of	  a	  global	  biomedical	  technology	  like	  stem	  cells,	  has	  to	  
be	  on	  how	  a	  polity	  deliberates	  rather	  than	  decide	  about	  a	  certain	  issue	  (see	  infra	  1.5).	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In	  order	  to	  stress	  the	   importance	  of	  deliberation,	  as	  contrasted	  but	  not	  opposed	  
to	  decision	  making,	  it	  is	  thus	  desirable	  to	  look	  at	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  politics	  that	  go	  
under	  the	  name	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  theories.	  Before	  introducing	  the	  main	  tenets	  
of	  a	  deliberative	  conception	  of	  politics,	   let	  me	  briefly	  enunciate	  the	  third	  reason	  behind	  
my	  scepticism	  towards	  the	  normative	  intentions	  of	  the	  STS	  framework.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  its	  
impressive	  explanatory	  power,	  STS	  has	  evolved	  a	  good	  degree	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  about	  its	  
methodological	   consistency.	   Furthermore,	   it	   has	   programmatically	   refrained	   from	  
acquiring	   the	   status	   of	   a	   full-­‐blown	   theory	   of	   scientific	   and	   technological	   phenomena,	  
both	  because	  of	  its	  above-­‐mentioned	  diffidence	  towards	  philosophical	  discourses	  and	  for	  
an	  apparent	  lack	  of	  necessity	  to	  adopt	  a	  crystallized	  vision	  that	  would	  have	  greatly	  limited	  
the	   richness	  of	   approaches	   that	   the	  discipline	   continues	   to	  harbour.	   STS	  has	   thus	  been	  
reluctant	   to	   look	   into	   the	  portfolio	  of	  available	  political	   theories	  a	  bit	  more	  carefully	   to	  
find	  possible	  systematic	  integrations	  and	  theoretical	  partnerships.	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  think	  it	  
is	  high	  time	  since	  the	  field	  shows	  its	  potential	  at	  informing	  the	  normative	  discourse	  a	  bit	  
more	   consistently,	   or	   at	   least	   at	   integrating	   the	   public	   debate	   about	   science	   and	  
technology	  with	  the	  specific	  insights	  of	  co-­‐production.	  
We	  have	   therefore	  come	  to	  a	  point	  where	  a	  possibility	   starts	   to	  become	  visible:	  
that	  of	  complementing	  the	  co-­‐productionist	  agenda	  (along	  the	  critiques	   just	  developed)	  
via	   the	   tools	  of	   a	   theoretical	   account	  of	  how	  public	  disputes	  about	   the	  production	  and	  
use	   of	   knowledge	   could	   be	   resolved	   in	   a	   democratic	   polity.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   I	   will	  
introduce	  the	  basics	  of	  a	  deliberative	  theory	  of	  democracy	  –	  one	  of	  the	  latest	  and	  more	  
debated	  realizations	  in	  political	  philosophy	  –	  as	  a	  framework	  that	  can	  direct	  STS	  towards	  
a	   methodologically	   more	   controlled	   exploration	   into	   normative	   territories,	   without	  
contradicting	  the	  insightful	  premises	  of	  the	  co-­‐productionist	  agenda.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  
deliberative	   democrat	   can	   indeed	   appropriate	   STS	   main	   normative	   threads,	   and	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viceversa,	  that	  the	  STS	  scholar	  can	  see	  its	  epistemic	  and	  normative	  commitments	  at	  work	  
within	   those	   of	   deliberative	   theories	   of	   democracies.	   In	   particular,	   the	   two	   accounts	  
match	  together	  elegantly,	  as	  both	  emphasise:	  1)	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  discursive	  practices	  at	  
deconstructing	   authority	   and	   thinking	   of	   possible	   alternatives	   to	   current	   political	  
arrangements	   around	   science;	   2)	   the	   necessity	   for	   inclusion	   and	   participation	   of	   all	  
stakeholders	   in	   the	  debate	  on	   science	  policy;	  3)	   the	  need	   for	   the	   stabilization	  of	  public	  
conflicts	   about	   science	   through	   innovative	   institutional	   design	   rather	   that	   authoritative	  
closure.	   Finally,	   to	   this	   last	   point,	   both	   accounts	   have	   tools	   to	   say	   that	   at	   deliberative	  
sites,	   discursive	   dominance	   is	   and	   should	   remain	   revisable,	   and	   reliant	   on	   persuasion	  
rather	  that	  on	  a	  politically	  hegemonic	  aspiration	  to	  moral	  universality	  (Hamlett	  2003).	  
1.5	  Deliberative	  theory	  
An	  analysis	  that	  aims	  at	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  policy	  space	  that	  emerges	  around	  the	  
rise	  of	  a	  politically	  controversial	  technology	  like	  stem	  cells,	  cannot	  do	  without	  an	  outlook	  
of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  is	  so	  for	  a	  basic	  methodological	  reason.	  In	  order	  to	  explore	  
that	  space	  and	  make	  it	  subject	  to	  a	  normative	  discourse,	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  look	  at	  it	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  captures	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  politics	  plays	  out	  both	  as	  a	  partner	  and	  regulator	  
of	   scientific	   and	   technological	   development.	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   decided	   to	   adopt	   the	   co-­‐
productionist	  framework.	  But	  in	  order	  for	  the	  analysis	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  those	  issues	  
impact	  on	  the	  democratic	  estate,	   it	  has	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  state	  of	  some	  sort.	   In	  
this	  regard,	  what	  is	  emerging	  within	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  scholarship	  on	  political	  theory,	  is	  
a	  growing	  consensus	  on	  the	  adequacy	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  democratic	  state	  as	  a	  community	  
of	  discussants.	  Political	  scientist	  Giandomenico	  Majone	  has	  highlighted	  the	  pervasiveness	  
of	  a	  discursive	  character	  in	  democratic	  polities	  with	  great	  clarity:	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«Discussion	  goes	  on	   in	  any	  organization,	  private	  or	  
public,	  and	  in	  any	  political	  system,	  even	  a	  dictatorship;	  but	  
it	  is	  so	  much	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  democratic	  politics	  and	  policy	  
that	  democracy	  has	  been	  called	  a	  system	  of	  government	  by	  
discussion.	  Political	  parties,	  the	  electorate,	  the	   legislature,	  
the	  executive,	   the	  courts,	   the	  media,	   interest	  groups,	  and	  
independent	  experts	  all	  engage	  in	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  
debate	  and	  reciprocal	  persuasion»	  (Majone	  1989,	  1).	  
Thus,	   according	   to	   Majone,	   and	   a	   number	   of	   adherents	   to	   the	   deliberative	  
paradigm	   as	   well,	   discussion	   occurs	   at	   many	   sites	   in	   a	   polity,	   not	   only	   in	   the	   highest	  
spheres	   of	   institutionalized	   political	   bodies.	  What	   can	   immediately	   be	   observed	   is	   that	  
political	  decision-­‐making	  mainly	  occurs	   in	  constitutionally	   specified	  sites,	  or	   in	  powerful	  
private	  organizations	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  activities	  or	  to	  the	  greatness	  of	  their	  
interests,	  are	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  that	  not	  only	  bear	  on	  a	  number	  of	  people	  inside	  and	  
outside	  of	   them,	  but	  ultimately	  become	  of	  public	   relevance	   for	  all.	   For	   this	   reason,	  as	   I	  
said	   above,	   the	   problem	   of	   fair	   representation	   of	   interests	   and	   points	   of	   view	   at	  
decisional	  sites	  has	  been	  occupying	  the	  debate	  in	  a	  rather	  dominant	  fashion.	  Deliberative	  
theories	  however,	  shift	  the	  focus	  of	  theoretical	  attention	  from	  the	  pole	  of	  decision	  to	  that	  
of	   discussion.	   This	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   disregard	   the	   obvious	   importance	   of	   decisional	  
activities	  as	   to	   the	  consequences	  of	  policy	  on	   the	  well-­‐being	  of	   the	  political	  community	  
and	  of	  its	  individual	  members.	  Rather,	  deliberative	  theories	  draw	  on	  the	  realization	  that	  
arguments,	  views,	  and	  interests,	  can	  assume	  a	  linguistic	  articulation	  and	  travel	  within	  the	  
polity,	   thereby	   eventually	   even	   reaching	   decisional	   locations	   and	   informing	   their	  
proceedings.	  To	  this	  point	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  have	  proposed	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘middle	  
democracy’	   to	   indicate	   that	   the	   forums	   of	   deliberation	   extend	   beyond	   “legislative	  
sessions,	   court	  proceedings,	   and	  administrative	  hearings”	   to	   include	   “meetings	  of	   grass	  
roots	   organizations,	   professional	   associations,	   shareholders	   meetings,	   and	   citizen’s	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committees	   in	   hospitals	   and	   other	   similar	   institutions”	   (Gutmann	   and	   Thompson	   1996,	  
13).	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  middle	  democracy	  is	  but	  a	  realization	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  enlarge	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  political	  sight	  into	  previously	  un-­‐thematized	  spaces.	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  with	  
his	  thorough	  analyses	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  public	  sphere,	  has	  probably	  been	  the	  most	  prolific	  
among	  the	  philosophers	  who	  articulated	  this	  shift	  in	  political	  focus	  from	  institutionalized	  
decisional	   sites	   to	   less-­‐structured,	   though	   not	   amorphous,	   spaces	   of	   discussion	  
(Habermas,	  1989).	  	  
These	  ideas	  started	  to	  develop,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	  in	  response	  to	  dominating	  
academic	  debates	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  politics	  of	  the	  Seventies.	   In	  those	  times,	  political	  
philosophers	  where	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  issues	  of	  social	  justice.	  They	  started	  from	  the	  
realization	   that	   classic	   liberal	   rights	   and	   freedom	   are	   rather	   empty	   concept	   in	   the	  
presence	   of	   strong	   social	   inequalities.	   To	   tackle	   this	   problem,	   philosophers	   like	   Rawls,	  
Nozick	  and	  Walzer	  elaborated	  radically	  contrasting	  theories	  of	  justice	  (Rawls	  1971;	  Nozick	  
1974).	  According	  to	  early	  deliberative	  theorists	  however,	  those	  accounts	   imported	  from	  
the	  classical	  liberal	  paradigm	  that	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  criticize	  a	  distinctively	  philosophical	  
aspiration	  to	  universalist	  solutions	   (Manin	  1987).	   In	  other	  words,	  Rawls’	  philosophy,	   for	  
instance,	   while	   eventually	   tackling	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   to	   fairly	   distribute	   resources	  
throughout	   society,	   did	   so	   “to	   demonstrate	   the	   rational	   and	   universally	   acceptable	  
character	  of	  a	  theory	  of	   justice	  that	  bases	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  state	  on	  broader	  functions	  
than	   those	  of	   the	  minimal	   state”	   (Manin	  1987,	  339).	   This	   attitude	  also	   reflected	  a	   long	  
held	   tradition	   in	   classic	   political	   philosophy	   debating	   political	   justification	   in	   terms	   of	  
unanimity	   rather	   than	   majority	   rule	   (Rousseau	   1970).	   According	   to	   Manin,	   and	   other	  
deliberative	   democrats	   as	   well,	   these	   theoretical	   traditions	   rely	   on	   unnecessary	   and	  
unjustified	   assumptions	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   human	   political	   agency.	   In	   particular,	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deliberative	  democrats	  contest	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  political	  legitimation	  requires	  unanimity,	  
that	   political	   choices	   happen	   without	   deliberation,	   and	   that	   the	   will	   of	   individuals	   is	  
predetermined	  and	   fixed	  at	   the	  moment	  of	   political	   decision	   (Manin	  1987,	   347).	   These	  
features	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   operational	   in	   both	   classic	   accounts	   of	   legitimate	   political	  
choice,	   and	   in	   modern	   theories	   of	   justice	   –	   of	   whatever	   orientation.	   However,	   in	   real	  
world	  situations,	  it	  is	  never	  the	  case	  that	  individuals	  have	  all	  the	  information	  to	  make	  an	  
insulated	  decision	  according	  to	  their	  pre-­‐determined	  will.	  In	  other	  words,	  “there	  is	  […]	  no	  
reason	   to	   suppose	   that	   individuals	   have	   from	   the	   first	   a	   complete	   set	   of	   preferences”	  
(Manin	  1987,	  349).	   In	  debates	  about	  biotechnology	   for	  example,	   this	   assumption	  often	  
plays	   a	   politically	   destabilizing	   function,	   as	   it	   attaches	   to	   either	   sides	   of	   public	  
controversies	   the	   incapacity	   to	   reach	   reasoned	   convergence	   towards	   the	   opponent’s	  
assessment	  –	  thus	  reducing	  the	  debate	  to	  sheer	  bargaining	  of	  contrasting	  and	  irreducible	  
interests.	  	  
In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   realization	   that,	   in	   a	   deliberative	   exercise	   participants’	  
preferences,	  opinions	  and	  objectives	  can	  well	  be	  modified,	  deliberative	  democrats	  invite	  
a	   renewed	   reflection	   on	   the	   actual	   sources	   of	   political	   legitimation.	   As	   soon	   as	   the	  
discursive	  character	  of	  democracy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opinion-­‐	  and	  will-­‐formation	  potential	  of	  
deliberative	   engagement	   are	   taken	   at	   face	   value,	   it	   becomes	   evident	   that	   deliberative	  
democratic	   theories	   see	   the	   source	   of	   political	   legitimacy	   not	   to	   coincide	   with	   the	  
predetermined	  will	   of	   individuals,	   but	   rather	   to	   come	   from	   the	  multifarious	   process	   of	  
will-­‐formation	  through	  deliberative	  exchange.	  
By	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   discursive	   negotiations	   that	   precede	   and	  
accompany	  policy-­‐making	  activities	  of	  statutory	  bodies,	  deliberative	  theorists	  successfully	  
showed	   the	   reliance	   of	   democratic	   institutions	   on	   a	   democratic	   culture,	   one	   in	   which	  
citizens	  actively	  participate	  in	  a	  continuous	  self-­‐reflective	  exercise	  of	  discussion	  on	  issues	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of	   public	   interest.	   In	   large	   democratic	   polities,	   not	   everybody	   can	   decide,	   and	  
representation,	  as	   fair	  as	   it	  may	  be,	  cannot	   include	  every	  dissenting	  voice.	  According	  to	  
the	   deliberative	   outlook	   of	   politics,	   however,	   these	   rather	   fundamental	   unbalances	   in	  
representation,	   albeit	   impossible	   to	   resolve	   even	   trough	   democratic	   constitutional	  
arrangements,	   can	   be	   valuably	   mitigated	   in	   their	   erosive	   effects	   through	   widespread	  
deliberative	   engagement.	   Following	   a	   schematic	   articulation,	   Habermas	   claimed	   that	  
“[i]nformal	  public	  opinion-­‐formation	  generates	  “influence”;	  influence	  is	  transformed	  into	  
“communicative	  power”	   through	  the	  channels	  of	  political	  elections;	  and	  communicative	  
power	   is	  again	  transformed	   into	  “administrative	  power”	  through	   legislation”	  (Habermas	  
1994,	  28).	  	  
Such	  conception	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  public	  opinion	  into	  administrative	  power	  
through	   linguistic	   mediation	   reflects	   what	   I	   had	   indicated	   above	   as	   the	   necessity	   to	  
deflate	   the	   analytical	   focus	   on	   representation	   and	   to	   give	   legitimation	   issues	   more	  
prominence	   in	   our	   analysis.	   As	   Habermas	   also	   recognizes,	   emphasising	   the	   discursive	  
circulations	   that	   take	   place	   within	   the	   public	   sphere,	   “has	   implications	   for	   how	   one	  
understands	  legitimation	  and	  popular	  sovereignty”	  (Habermas	  1994,	  28).	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  
public	   sphere,	   as	   originally	   advanced	   by	   Habermas	   (Habermas	   1989)	   “designates	   a	  
theatre	   in	   modern	   societies	   in	   which	   political	   participation	   is	   enacted	   through	   the	  
medium	  of	  talk	   [and]	   in	  which	  citizens	  deliberate	  about	  their	  common	  affairs,	  hence	  an	  
arena	   of	   discursive	   interaction”	   (Fraser	   1990,	   57).	   As	   such,	   the	   public	   sphere	   “is	  
conceptually	   distinct	   from	   the	   state;	   it	   is	   a	   site	   for	   the	   production	   and	   circulation	   of	  
discourses	   that	   can	   in	   principle	   be	   critical	   of	   the	   state”	   (ibidem).	   The	   advantage	   of	   a	  
discourse	   theory-­‐based	   idea	   of	   politics	   consists	   in	   favouring	   the	   realization	   that	   “the	  
procedures	   and	   communicative	   presuppositions	   of	   democratic	   opinion-­‐	   and	   will-­‐
formation	  function	  as	  the	  most	  important	  sources	  of	  the	  discursive	  rationalization	  of	  the	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decisions	  of	  an	  administration”	  (ibidem).	  The	  latter	  should	  be	  conceived	  as	  “a	  subsystem	  
specialized	  for	  collectively	  binding	  decisions,	  whereas	  the	  communicative	  structure	  of	  the	  
public	  sphere	  comprise	  a	  far-­‐flung	  network	  of	  sensors	  that	  in	  the	  first	  place	  react	  to	  the	  
pressure	   of	   society-­‐wide	   problematics	   and	   stimulate	   influential	   opinions.	   In	   this	   way,	  
“public	  opinion	  that	  is	  worked	  up	  via	  democratic	  procedures	  into	  communicative	  power	  
cannot	   “rule”	  of	   itself,	   but	   it	   can	  only	  point	   the	  use	  of	   administrative	  power	   in	   specific	  
directions”	  (Habermas	  1994,	  29).	  This	  instructive	  function,	  however	  feeble	  it	  may	  be	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  self-­‐sustaining	  systemic	  authority	  of	  legislative	  and	  administrative	  power,	  is	  
the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  legitimation	  for	  any	  publicly	  binding	  policy.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  
legitimation,	   the	   first	   and	   foremost	   role	   of	   the	   public	   sphere,	   so	   conceived,	   is	   that	   of	  
monitoring	  the	  state	  authority	  through	  informed	  and	  critical	  discourse	  (Habermas	  1989).	  
In	   this	   respect,	   the	  bourgeois	   public	   spheres	   that	   formed	   in	   the	  XVIII	   century,	   and	   that	  
Habermas	  analysed,	  may	  represent	  a	  blueprint	  of	   rational	  opinion-­‐formation	  gatherings	  
“emancipated	  from	  the	  bonds	  of	  economic	  [and	  political]	  dependence”.	  	  
In	  order	   to	  account	   for	   the	  value	  of	  discussion	   in	  associative	   life,	   theorists	  often	  
adopt	   classic	   definitions	   of	   deliberation	   and	   discursive	   exchange.	   Accordingly,	   some	  
characterize	   a	   discussion-­‐based	   mode	   of	   politics	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   Aristotelian	  
notions	  of	   ‘dialectic’	   and	   ‘prohairesis’.	   These	   concepts,	  however,	   are	  both	  philologically	  
contested	   and	   philosophically	   aporetic	  within	   the	   texts	   of	   Aristotle	   (Chamberlain	   1984;	  
Hamlyn	   1990),	   and	   their	  meaning	   should	   thus	   not	   be	   taken	   to	   encompass	   a	   full-­‐blown	  
endorsement	  of	  Aristotle’s	  ideas	  about	  human	  agency,	  ethics	  and	  politics.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  
is	   useful	   to	   briefly	   discuss	   their	   original	  meaning	   to	   illuminate	   their	   function	   in	   today’s	  
political	  debate.	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The	  notion	  of	  prohairesis	   (deliberate	  choice)	   is	  the	  Aristotelian	  analogue	  of	  what	  
democratic	  theorists	  today	  refer	  to	  as	  deliberation2.	  As	  I	  just	  said	  the	  real	  meaning	  of	  this	  
notion	   in	   the	  writings	  of	  Aristotle	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  of	   long	  exegetical	  debates.	  To	  our	  
aims	  here,	  it	  suffices	  to	  remind	  that	  prohairesis	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  “desire	  involving	  
deliberation”	   (orexis	  bouletikê),	   that	   is	   to	  say	  a	   rational	  way	  of	  choosing	  what	  a	  correct	  
desire	   establishes	   as	   an	   end	   (Arisotle,	   2009,	   EN	   1139a23).	   Discussing	   the	   notion	   of	  
‘correctness’	   (orthotes)	   of	   desire	   would	   lead	   us	   into	   the	   intricacies	   and	   fallacies	   of	  
Aristotle’s	  moral	  thought.	  The	  notion	  of	  desire,	  nevertheless,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  crucial	  
role	   in	   this	   account	   of	   deliberate	   choice:	   the	   desiderative	   component	   of	   the	   soul	  
establishes	  an	  end	  to	  action	  but,	  contrary	  to	  schematic	  interpretations	  of	  these	  notions,	  
this	  end	  is	  not	  set	  once	  and	  for	  good.	  Choice,	  other	  than	  being	  simply	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  
goal-­‐setting	  desires	  and	  mean-­‐finding	  reasons,	  is	  also	  about	  changing	  desires	  according	  to	  
reason.	  In	  other	  words,	  deliberate	  choice	  “is	  the	  process	  of	  consciously	  deciding	  to	  form	  
and	  of	  forming	  a	  new	  desire”	  (Chamberlain	  1984,	  153).	  How	  much	  this	   interpretation	   is	  
grounded	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   Aristotle	   is	   up	   to	   others	   to	   dispute,	   but	   certainly	   it	  
corresponds	   to	   what	   philosophers	   these	   days	   take	   to	   be	   a	   model	   of	   deliberative	  
engagement:	  one	  whereby	  participants,	  rather	  than	  negotiating	  unchangeable	   interests,	  
discuss	  the	  stakes	  of	  public	   issues	   in	  an	  open-­‐minded	  fashion.	  That	   is	  why	  theorists	   like	  
Habermas	   emphasise	   the	   public	   space	   of	   deliberation	   as	   a	   site	   for	   opinion-­‐	   and	   will-­‐
formation,	   rather	   than	   the	   location	  of	  actual	  decisions.	   It	  will	  become	  clear	   later	   in	   the	  
dissertation	  that	  science	  should	  look	  at	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  the	  most	  important	  space	  of	  
cultural	  agency	  in	  view	  of	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  controversy	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  generate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In	  the	  English	  speaking	  world	  the	  word	  ‘prohairesis’	  has	  not	  been	  translated	  with	  ‘deliberation’,	  so	  it	  might	  
be	  misleading	  to	  attribute	  this	  particular	  Aristotelian	  ascendancy	  to	  deliberative	  theories.	  The	  Aristotelian	  
term	   that	   most	   translators	   have	   rendered	   as	   ‘deliberation’	   is	   ‘boulêsis’,	   which	  means	   calculation	   of	   the	  
appropriate	  means	   to	   pre-­‐given	   ends	   (NE	   III,	   4	   and	   5).	   However	   it	   is	   ‘prohairesis’,	   in	   the	   sense	   specified	  
above	   (see	   main	   text),	   that	   deliberative	   theorists	   have	   in	   mind	   when	   they	   speak	   of	   deliberation	   with	  
reference	  to	  Aristotle.	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The	  other	  classic	  reference	  notion	  for	  deliberative	  accounts	  of	  politics	  is	  ‘dialectic’.	  
Dialectic	   is	  a	   form	  of	  discursive	  proceeding	  that	   is	  distinct	   from	  rational	  demonstration.	  
Whereas	   the	   latter	   relies	  on	  necessarily	   true	  premises,	   and	  allows	   to	  deductively	   come	  
from	   them	   to	   logically	   binding	   conclusions,	   (through	   the	  mediation	   of	  middle	   terms	   in	  
demonstrative	  syllogisms),	  the	  dialectic	  process	  starts	  with	  premises	  that,	  while	  enjoying	  
a	  lesser	  degree	  of	  certainty,	  are	  accepted	  “by	  everyone	  or	  by	  the	  majority	  or	  by	  the	  wise”	  
(Aristotle	  1997,	  Topics	  I.1,	  100b21-­‐3).	  Despite	  this	  difference,	  both	  the	  syllogistic	  method	  
of	   science	   and	   the	   dialectic	   are	   deductively	   sound	   operations.	   A	   discussion	   of	   the	  
relationships	   between	   dialectic	   and	   demonstration	   goes	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  
dissertation.	   What	   is	   relevant	   to	   our	   present	   investigation,	   however,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  
dialectic	   points	   the	   attention	   of	   contemporary	   political	   philosophers	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  
conditions	   for	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   given	   position	   as	   offered	   in	   publicly	   staged	  
deliberations.	  Such	  conditions,	   like	  in	  Aristotle,	  have	  not	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  necessary	  
truth	   that	   a	   given	   statement	   can	  demonstratively	  exhibit	  during	  deliberation.	  Rather,	   it	  
has	  to	  do	  with	  how	  persuasion	  builds	  on	  less	  than	  certain	  discursive	  resources	  that	  might	  
nevertheless	  be	  conducive	   to	   reasoned	  agreement.	  Therefore,	  appealing	   to	   this	  ancient	  
notion	  as	  informing	  deliberative	  exchanges,	  deliberative	  policy	  analysts	  achieve	  a	  double	  
gain:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   very	  much	   in	   the	   style	   of	   co-­‐production,	   they	   deconstruct	   the	  
relationship	   between	   truth	   and	   power,	   therefore	   also	   undermining	   the	   technocratic	  
image	  of	  science	  as	  ‘speaking	  truth	  to	  power’;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  moreover,	  they	  retain	  a	  
view	  of	  public	  dialogue	  as	  a	  reasoned	  exercise,	  one	  that,	  when	  it	  informs	  policy	  making,	  
can	  provide	   some	  acceptable	   criteria	  of	   justification	   to	  publicly	  binding	  decisions	  about	  
matters	  of	  general	  concern.	  In	  this	  sense,	  deliberation	  is	  both	  a	  mean	  of	  contestation	  of	  
established	   authorities,	   be	   they	   epistemic,	   political	   or	   economic,	   and	   a	   means	   of	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stabilization	  of	  a	  public	  space	  that,	  especially	   in	  the	  case	  of	  biotechnology,	  may	  well	  be	  
perturbed	  by	  the	  turmoil	  of	  moral	  disagreement.	  
This	   is	  not	   to	  deny,	  however,	   that	  powerful	  agents	  can	   indeed	  end	  up	  capturing	  
the	  game	  of	  persuasive	  exchange	  of	  reasons	  in	  a	  deliberative	  context	  and	  steer	  it	  to	  their	  
own	   private	   advantage.	   Very	  much	   in	   line	  with	   the	   co-­‐productionist	   ideas,	   deliberative	  
democracy	  and	   its	   associated	   conceptions	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  have	   indeed	   recognized	  
the	  unavoidable	  tendency	  of	  persuasion	  to	  occur	  outside	  of	  an	  idealized	  and	  disinterested	  
trafficking	   of	   deliberative	   reasons	   (Habermas	   1989,	   ch	   V,	   VI).	   Furthermore,	   under	   the	  
influence	  of	  Marxist	  and	   feminist	   thought,	   scholars	   in	   this	  strand	  of	  political	  philosophy	  
have	   remarked	   the	   hegemonic	   potential	   of	   a	   public	   sphere	   that,	   albeit	   engaged	   in	  
deliberation,	  restrains	  the	  spectrum	  of	  the	  admitted	  discursive	  practices	  to	  those	  that	  are	  
functional	  to	  specific	  cultural	  and	  material	  interests	  (Landes	  1988;	  Fraser	  1990;	  Benhabib	  
1992;	   Ryan	   1992;	   Eley	   1994).	   Deliberative	   democrats	   however,	   have	   elaborated	  
arguments	  to	  reply	  to	  those	  critiques.	   In	  particular,	  the	  formation	  of	  deliberative	  cirlces	  
has	   been	   conceived	   as	   an	   institutionally	   informal	   activity,	   one	   that	   can	   happen	  
spontaneusly	  outside	  state-­‐controlled	  sites	  of	  discussion,	  or	  at	  least	  at	  their	  margins.	  This	  
allows	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   counter-­‐publics	   via	   deliberation,	  whereby	   contestation	   can	  
occur,	  and	  had	  actually	  often	  occurred	   in	   the	  case	  of	  minority-­‐related	   issues,	  both	  with	  
respect	   to	   other	   dominant	   deliberative	   circles	   and	  with	   respect	   to	   political	   insititutions	  
proper.	  	  
Practical	   ways	   to	   enact	   delibeartion	   and	   participation	   into	   technology	   appraisal	  
and	  policy-­‐making	  have	  proliferated	  in	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  or	  so.	  We	  can	  now	  say	  that	  a	  
whole	  field	  of	  political	  science,	  hyrbidised	  with	  political	  philosophy,	  ethics	  and	  the	  social	  
sciences,	  has	  matured	  around	  the	  elaboration	  of	  deliberative	  techniques.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  
place	  to	  review	  them,	  nor	  to	  assess	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  individual	  issues	  they	  were	  used	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to	  cope	  with.	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  however,	  I	  will	  produce	  some	  practical	  indications	  as	  to	  
the	   implementation	   of	   deliberative	   arrangements	   for	   the	   governance	   of	   biomedical	  
innovation.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  it	  is	  importat	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  deliberative	  democracy	  
stresses	   the	   process	   by	  means	   of	   which	   political	   decisions	   are	   arrived	   at.	   In	   an	   ideally	  
participative	   process	   of	   deliberative	   opinion-­‐	   and	  will-­‐formation,	   individual	   preferences	  
and	  values	  can	  be	  transformed,	  possibly	  –	  although	  not	  necessarily	  –	  leading	  to	  consensus	  
on	   otherwise	   divisive	   public	   issues.	   Most	   importantly,	   deliberation	   is	   conceived	   to	  
motivate	   participants	   “to	   resolve	   conflicts	   by	   argument	   rahter	   than	   other	   means”	  
(Warren,	  1995,	  181).	  
Therefore,	  to	  conclude	  this	  section,	   I	  would	  stress	  once	  again	  that,	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	   deliberation	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   produce	   political	   stabilization	   if	   not	   of	   an	   ever-­‐
contestable	  sort,	  it	  is	  a	  source	  of	  legitimation	  for	  publicly	  binding	  decisions	  in	  a	  pluralistic	  
society.	   However,	   deliberation	   that	   preceeds	   policy	   decisions,	   albeit	   not	   necessarily	  
institutionally	  connected	  to	  them,	  may	  as	  well	  be	  unable	  to	  bring	  political	  confrontation	  
and	  moral	  disagreement	  to	  a	  definitive	  closure.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   I	  embrace	  deliberative	  
democracy	   as	   an	   account	   that	   is	   able	   to	   stress	   the	   necessity	   that	   a	   pluralistic	   society	  
retains	   the	   capacity	   to	   discuss	   about	   divisive	   issues,	   and	   to	   resist	   the	   culturally	   and	  
politically	   erosive	   consequences	   of	   the	   diversity	   of	   moral	   cultures	   that	   contemporary	  
societies	   exhibit.	   It	   is	   thus	   crucial	   to	   understand	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   biomedical	  
innovation,	  deliberation	  and	  participatory	  technology	  assessement	  can	  play	  a	  legitimising	  
role	   for	   policy	   decisions	   by	   rendering	   them	  more	   responsive	   to	   citizens’	   interests	   and	  
concerns.	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1.6	  Towards	  dialectic	  integration	  	  
Let	  me	  know	  briefly	  recapitulate	  why	   I	   think	  that	  co-­‐production	  and	  deliberative	  
democracy	  might	  methodologically	  go	  together	  in	  a	  rather	  fruitful	  way.	  	  
To	  begin	  with,	  I	  have	  described	  co-­‐production	  as	  a	  methodological	  account	  that	  is	  
capable	  of	  appraising	  the	  critical	   role	  of	  discursive	  practices	  at	  deconstructing	  authority	  
and	   thinking	   of	   possible	   alternatives	   to	   current	   political	   arrangements	   around	   science.	  
The	   idea	  of	  public	   sphere,	   as	  described	  by	  Habermas	  and	   followers	   aims	  exactly	   at	   the	  
same	   junction	  of	  discourses	  and	  contestation	   that,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   technological	   change,	  
are	  not	  only	  possible	  but	  also	  appear	  desirable.	  However,	  I	  highlighted	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  
STS	  analyses	  at	  providing	   sufficient	  normative	  guidance	  as	   to	  how	   this	  public	   sphere	  of	  
discourse	   should	   be	   structured	   to	   make	   policy	   decision	   on	   technology	   democratically	  
more	   legitimate.	   To	   this	   deficiency,	   I	   think	   deliberative	   democrats	   have	   interesting	  
insights	  to	  offer	  as	  to	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  truly	  open	  space	  for	  discussing	  innovation.	  On	  
the	   other	   hand	   however,	   STS	   can	   support	   and	   complement	   deliberative	   democracy	   in	  
watching	  out	  against	   the	   risk	  of	  essentialising	   the	   rational	   requirements	  of	  deliberation	  
and	  discursive	  exchange.	  
Secondly,	   I	   think	   I	   have	   made	   clear	   that,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   STS	   has	   given	   a	   valid	  
contribution	  as	  to	  the	  necessity	  for	   inclusion	  and	  participation	  of	  all	  stakeholders	   in	  the	  
debate	   on	   science	   policy.	   I	   also	   said	   however,	   that	   excessive	   focus	   on	   problems	   of	  
representation	  actually	  clouded	  the	  political	  vision	  of	  this	  discipline,	  thereby	  calling	  for	  a	  
substantial	   increment	   in	   the	   attention	   paid	   to	   problems	   of	   legitimation.	   To	   this	   aim,	   I	  
think	  deliberative	  theories	  have	  much	  to	  offer,	  as	   I	   showed	  above.	  Again,	  however,	  STS	  
scholarship	   can	   provide	   deliberative	   accounts	   with	   a	   constant	   reminder	   of	   the	   always	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imperfect	   nature	   of	   the	   Habermasian	   circuit	   that	   connects,	   or	   actually	   often	   fails	   to	  
connect,	  the	  communicative	  power	  of	  public	  opinion	  with	  the	  institutionally	  shielded	  and	  
culturally	  excluding	  mechanisms	  of	  public	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Lastly,	   STS,	   thanks	   to	   the	   co-­‐productionist	   lens,	   has	   been	   able	   to	   detect	   the	  
exclusivist	   premises	   and	   the	   authoritative	   outcomes	   of	   institutional	   design	   aimed	   at	  
bringing	  conflicts	  about	  science	  to	  a	  decisional	  closure.	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  the	   idea	  that	  
deliberation	  does	  not	   rest	  on	  universalistic	  aspirations	   to	   the	  optimal	   solution	  of	  policy	  
debates.	   Rather,	   deliberation	   relies	   on	   the	   democratizing	   function	   of	   an	   open	   debate	  
where	   opinions	   can	   freely	   form	   and	   circulate,	  with	   no	  a	   priori	   preclusions	   towards	   the	  
provenience	  of	  discourses,	   the	   social	  position	  of	  discussants,	  or	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   topic	  
under	  discussion.	  In	  this	  sense,	  political	  deliberation	  absorbs	  in	  advance	  the	  destabilizing	  
potential	  of	  political	  conflict,	  thereby	  reviving	  a	  politically	  democratic	  environment	  where	  
new	   divisive	   issues	   can	   be	   both	   anticipated	   and	   prepared	   for	   decision.	   The	   co-­‐
productionist	   lens	   however,	   is	   still	   able	   to	   deconstruct	   the	   political	   arrangements	   that	  
emerge	  from	  necessarily	  imperfect	  forms	  of	  deliberation,	  thus	  highlighting	  the	  criticalities	  
that	  the	  polity	  should	  organize	  to	  resolve.	  	  
The	   two	   components	   mitigate	   their	   respective	   defects	   complementarily.	  
Furthermore	   they	   reinforce	   each	   other’s	   commitment	   to	   understanding	   social	   and	  
political	  agency,	  as	  well	  as	  power	  relations,	  as	  made	  of	   language,	  knowledge,	  evidence,	  
and	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  that	  allow	  their	  production	  and	  exchange.	  However,	  a	  
bundle	   of	   deliberative	   theory	   and	   co-­‐production,	   as	   I	   intend	   it,	   is	   not	   bound	   to	   fully	  
integrate	   these	   two	   methodologies.	   Rather	   than	   forcefully	   imagining	   a	   seamless	  
intermixing	   of	   the	   two,	   I	   see	   them	   in	   a	   constant	   dialectic	   interaction,	   one	   that	   is	  
permitted	   by	   the	   features	   and	   commitments	   that	   they	   have	   in	   common,	   while	   at	   the	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same	  time	  being	  kept	  in	  tension	  by	  their	  differences,	  thus	  leading	  to	  different	  divisions	  of	  
labour	  according	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  biotechnological	  development,	  the	  two	  components	  of	  the	  bundle	  
allow	  for	  conceiving	  innovation	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  both	  interests	  and	  arguments,	  and	  on	  
both	  the	  social	  and	  the	  epistemic	  resources	  that	  are	  available,	  thus	  avoiding	  both	  social	  
and	  technological	  determinism.	  This	  outlook	  makes	  it	  thus	  possible	  to	  see	  innovation	  as	  
an	  open	  ended	  political	  and	  technical	  process,	  rather	  than	  a	  linear	  trajectory	  of	  progress	  
towards	  a	  land	  of	  promise	  and	  realization.	  	  
	  
1.7	  Democratic	  erosion	  
The	  necessity	   to	  bring	   together	   this	  hybrid	  methodological	   toolkit,	  however,	  has	  
much	   to	   do	   with	   the	   kind	   of	   inquiry,	   and	   the	   kind	   of	   answers	   that	   I	   am	   after	   in	   this	  
dissertation	  –	  my	  aim	  being	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  is	  bound	  to	  produce	  
on	   the	  democratic	   culture	  of	  Western	  democracies.	  Although	  generalization	  are	  always	  
difficult,	  and	  seldom	  useful,	   I	   think	  one	  can	  agree	   in	  characterizing	   the	  kind	  of	   risk	   that	  
conflicts	   over	   biotechnology	   pose	   to	   democracies	   as,	   generally	   speaking,	   one	   of	  
democratic	  erosion.	  	  
With	  that	  expression	  I	  want	  to	  signal	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  cultural	  resources	  by	  
means	  of	  which	  a	  polity	  gathers	  at	  formal	  and	  informal	  sites	  of	  discussion	  and	  collective	  
action,	  are	  amenable	  to	  be	  consumed	  by	  the	  conflicts	  a	  democracy	  debates	  about.	  This	  is	  
so	   because,	   as	   I	   have	   stressed	   above,	   decision-­‐making,	   also	   in	   the	   idealized	   model	   of	  
deliberative	   theories,	   recapitulates	   the	   discursive	   circulations	   and	   brings	   them	   to	   a	  
closure.	   Political	   decisions,	   however,	   by	   no	   means	   have	   to	   represent	   a	   compromise	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among	   the	   existing	   stakes	   and	   points	   of	   view.	   It	   is	   thus	   often	   the	   case,	   that,	   at	   the	  
moment	  of	  public	  decision,	  one	  discourse	  becomes	  dominant	  over	  the	  others,	  albeit	  only	  
temporarily,	   and	   thus	   manages	   to	   implement	   its	   reasons	   through	   legislation.	   These	  
moments	  of	  closure,	  bring	  historicity	   into	  the	  rarefied	   image	  of	  circulating	  opinions	  and	  
political	  wills,	   as	   arguments,	  moral	   commitments,	   and	   political	   ideals	   that	   flow	   around	  
public	   issues	   give	   rise	   to	   concrete	   institutional	   designs.	   This	   is	   the	   moment	   when,	   for	  
instance,	  the	  public	  disagreement	  about	  biotechnology	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  erosive.	  
It	  is	  indeed	  necessary	  to	  recognize	  that	  a	  given	  policy	  or	  regulatory	  regime,	  once	  adopted,	  
needs	  resources	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  maintained,	  or	  as	  some	  say,	  socially	  reproduced.	  
From	   the	  perspective	   of	   deliberation,	   this	  means	   that,	   as	   a	   first	   consequence	  of	   public	  
issues	  becoming	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  decision,	  deliberation	  recedes	  to	  the	  background	  to	  
leave	   room	   for	   actual	   policy-­‐making.	   Public	   discussion	  may	   thus	   seem	  antithetic	   to	   the	  
necessity	  to	  bring	  a	  debate	  to	  a	  closure,	  even	   if	   it	  was	  necessary	  to	  feed	  decisions	  with	  
legitimating	   reasons.	   To	   the	   extent,	   however,	   that	   those	   policy	   decisions,	   unlike	   in	   the	  
classical	   liberal	   framework,	  are	  not	  based	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  democracy	  to	  channel	   full-­‐
blown	   universally	   acceptable	   solutions	   to	   political	   conflicts,	   the	   legitimation	   of	   those	  
policies	  is	  not	  given	  once	  and	  for	  good.	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary,	  policy	  decisions,	  so	  to	  say,	  
have	  to	  remain	  unstable	  and	  open	  to	  further	  contestation,	  especially	   in	  the	  presence	  of	  
appreciable	   degrees	   of	   epistemic	   and	   value	   pluralism	   that	   are	   typical	   of	   late-­‐modern	  
capitalist	  societies.	  The	  stabilisation	  of	  pluralism	  in	  matters	  of	  technological	  innovation	  is	  
precisely	  what	   should	   be	   expected	   from	  deliberative	   and	   participatory	   exercises	   in	   the	  
governance	  of	  technological	  change.	  
Recently,	  the	  debate	  on	  technology	  assessment	  (TA)	  has	  matured	  to	  the	  point	  of	  
fully	   appreciating	   the	   virtues	   of	   deliberation	   with	   respect	   to	   pluralism	   and	   policy	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accountability	  (see	  Chilvers	  2008,	  156	  for	  multiple	  references,	  plus	  Vig	  and	  Paschen	  2000,	  
Guston	  and	  Bimber	  1993,	  Renn	  1999,).	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   that	   a	   participatory	   appraisal	   of	   technology,	   as	   well	   as	  
deterministic	   outlooks	   on	   technological	   innovation,	   remains	   open	   to	   the	   influence	   of	  
incumbent	   interests	   and	   unbalanced	   power	   relations	   –	   a	   characteristic	   that	   has	   been	  
rightly	  termed	  “general	  sensitivity	  to	  framing”	  (Stirling	  2008,	  275).	   It	  has	  however	  to	  be	  
stressed	  that	  deliberation	  foresees	  the	  open-­‐ended	  character	  of	  public	  engagement	  as	  a	  
feature	   that	   preserves	   the	   democratic	   culture	   from	   the	   erosive	   effects	   of	   moral	  
disagreement	  over	  biotechnological	  innovation.	  	  
Technology	   assessment,	   therefore,	  may	   always	   remain	   “about	   closing	   down	   the	  
formation	  of	  technological	  commitments”	  (ivi	  278).	  Stirling	  rightly	  observed	  that,	  whether	  
analytic	   or	   participatory,	   social	   appraisal	   [of	   this	   kind]	   cuts	   through	  messy,	   intractable,	  
and	  conflict-­‐prone	  diversities	  of	  interests	  and	  perspectives	  to	  develop	  clear,	  authoritative,	  
prescriptive	   recommendations	   informing	   decisions”	   (ibidem).	   Scientific	   advisory	  
processes,	  then,	  regardless	  the	  amount	  of	  deliberation	  they	  may	  endorse,	  generally	  lend	  
themselves	  or,	  better,	  are	  generally	  expected	  by	  decision	  makers,	  to	  give	  way	  to	  “unitary	  
and	  prescriptive	  policy	  advice”	  (ivi,	  279).	  	  
But	  social	  appraisal	  of	  technology	  can	  indeed,	  and	  should,	  in	  genuine	  deliberative	  
terms,	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  process	  that	  widens	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  available	  technological	  
options	  by	  including	  discourses,	  uncertainties	  and	  contestations.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  of	  
policies	  having	   to	  do	  with	   rapidly	   changing	  episodes	  of	   technological	  development,	   like	  
stem	  cell	  innovation.	  	  
In	   those	   cases,	   the	   epistemic	   authority	   of	   some	   of	   the	   involved	   actors,	   and	   the	  
institutional	  embeddedness	  of	   substantive	  moral	   commitments	  can	   indeed	  provoke	   the	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marginalisation	  of	  alternative	  framings	  –	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  chapter	  4.	   It	  should	  nowadays	  
be	  notorious	  to	  policy	  scholars	  that,	  in	  those	  conditions,	  conflicts	  are	  more	  than	  likely	  to	  
emerge.	  The	  latter	  usually	  proved	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  govern	  and	  cope	  with,	  and	  led	  to	  
decade	  long	  legislative	  and	  jurisdictional	  battles.	  Deliberation	  and	  participatory	  exercises	  
can	   thus	   counter-­‐balance	   this	   tendency	   and	   indeed	   provide	   firmer	   grounds	   of	  
legitimation	  to	  more	  accountable	  policy	  decisions.	  In	  the	  last	  chapter	  I	  will	  devote	  some	  
specific	  analyses	  to	  the	  available	  deliberative	  tools	  as	  to	  their	  suitability	  to	  ease	  conflict	  
and	   promote	   a	   pluralistic	   appraisal	   of	   cellular	   technology.	   Opening-­‐up	   technological	  
appraisal	  must	  thus	  prevail	  on	  closing-­‐down	  policy	  advice,	  if	  democratic	  erosion	  has	  to	  be	  
limited	  in	  its	  delegitimizing	  effects.	  
As	   it	   is	   evident	   however,	   notwithstanding	   deliberation	   and	   participatory	  
technology	  assessment,	  politics	  will	   almost	  naturally	   try	   to	   limit	   the	  emergence	  of	  new	  
disagreement	  through	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  what	  Habermas	  calls	  the	  administrative	  
power	  (Habermas	  1998).	  Nonetheless,	  a	  more	  inclusive	  political	  culture	  in	  the	  ordering	  of	  
technological	   matters	   is	   certainly	   growing	   in	   Western	   democracies,	   and	   it	   is	   replacing	  
worn-­‐out	  technocratic	  paradigms	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  
In	  recent	  years	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘governance’,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  ‘government’,	  has	  
emerged	  in	  the	  political	  debate	  to	  indicate	  policy	  making	  efforts	  that	  take	  those	  dynamics	  
into	   due	   consideration.	   Governance	   is	   supposed	   to	   mean	   the	   legitimate	   exercise	   of	  
political	   and	   administrative	   power	   unaided	   by	   any	   effort	   at	   articulating	   a	   culturally	  
hegemonic	  narrative	  around	  the	  implemented	  policies.	  This	  of	  course	  corresponds	  more	  
to	  an	  ideal	  that	  to	  an	  actual	  form	  of	  democratic	  politics.	  However,	  I	  think	  that	  in	  order	  to	  
manage	   the	   erosive	   potential	   of	   divisive	   public	   debates	   like	   those	   enacted	   by	  
biotechnology,	   governance	   could	   be	   taken	   as	   a	  model	   for	   letting	   dissenting	   discourses	  
free	  to	  circulate	  and	  re-­‐emerge	  at	  other	  locations	  in	  the	  future.	  From	  this	  perspective	  the	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main	   forums	  of	  democratic	   culture	  are,	  again,	  not	  necessarily	   coincident	  with	   the	   state	  
and	  its	  representative	  institution.	  Rather,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  middle	  democracy	  (see	  supra),	  
a	  deliberative	  outlook	  of	  politics	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  new	  spaces	  and	  new	  places	  as	  emerging	  
forums	  for	  sustained	  and	  democratic	  public	  discussion	  of	  biotechnological	  innovation.	  
	  
Given	  current	  efforts	  at	  bringing	  stem	  cell	  to	  the	  clinical	  side	  of	  development,	  how	  
are	  Western	  public	  spheres	  to	  react	  to	  the	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  these	  efforts	  imply?	  Is	  it	  
possible	   to	   anticipate	   those	   challenges	   and	   prepare	   for	   their	  management	   rather	   than	  
waiting	  for	  their	  divisive	  effect	  to	  manifest?	  And	  if	  so,	  how	  could	  this	  be	  realized?	  What	  is	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  divisions	  that	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  can	  produce,	  and	  what	  is	  the	  place	  of	  
science	  with	  respect	  to	  them?	  Which	  kind	  of	  democracy	   is	  possible	  around	  the	  evolving	  
streamline	   of	   biotechnology?	  What	   are	   the	   risks	   that	   democratic	   polities	   have	   to	   face	  
when	   divisions	   arise	   about	   the	   use	   of	   biotechnology?	   These	   questions	   have	   not	   been	  
taken	   at	   face	   value	   by	   the	   good	   old	   debates	   on	   the	   moral	   status	   of	   the	   embryo	   that	  
figured	  as	   the	  main	   site	  of	  dispute	  on	   stem	  cell	   research	  up	   to	  a	   recent	  past.	  With	   the	  
tools	  that	  I	  have	  outlined	  above,	  I	  thus	  aim	  at	  attempting	  to	  at	  least	  take	  those	  questions	  
in	  due	  consideration.	  	  
1.8	  Ordering	  the	  subject	  matter	  
This	   dissertation	   draws	   on	   the	   realisation	   that	   we	   have	   now	   reached	   a	   point	  
where	   what	   has	   been	   imagined	   about	   stem	   cells	   is	   beginning	   to	   be	   translated	   into	  
practice,	  albeit	  slowly	  and	  watchfully.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  stem	  cell	  research	  today	  is	  
uncontrovertibly	  a	  site	  of	   innovation.	  What	  is	  being	  introduced	  through	  such	  innovation	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trajectory	  however,	  is	  not	  yet	  another	  inert	  technological	  apparatus,	  or	  at	  least	  it	  cannot	  
be	  fruitfully	  interpreted	  as	  such.	  	  
I	  will	  show	  how	  stem	  cell	   innovation	  is	  presently	  calling	  for	  a	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  
existing	   discursive	   resources	   as	   well	   as	   for	   producing	   new	   ones	   in	   order	   to	   construct,	  
along	  with	   knowledge	   and	   experimental	   abilities,	   the	   political	   and	   legal	   order	   that	  will	  
allow	  stem	  cells	  to	  circulate	  from	  and	  into	  human	  bodies.	   In	  this	  sense,	   innovation	  is	  as	  
much	  scientific	  and	  technical	  as	  it	  is	  social,	  political	  and,	  ultimately,	  cultural.	  	  
The	  complex	  interaction	  of	  regulatory	  and	  scientific	  order	  that	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  
junction	  of	  stem	  cell	   innovation	  with	  clinical	  science	   is	  bound	  to	  be	  apparent	  along	  two	  
axes	  of	  such	  developments:	  the	  research	  model	  and	  the	  translational	  model	  of	  stem	  cell	  
science.	  As	  to	  the	  research	  model,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  fabrication	  of	  pluripotent	  cells	  
and	  their	  use	  at	  the	  clinical	  level	  are	  regulated	  are	  emerging	  as	  major	  sites	  of	  governance	  
innovation.	  As	   I	  will	   show	   in	  chapter	  3,	   the	  shifting	  of	  stem	  cell	   science	  towards	  clinical	  
application	  is	  being	  associated	  with	  an	  evolving	  culture	  of	  public	  oversight	  over	  scientific	  
research	  for	  which	  no	  wild	  cards	  exist	  for	  any	  given	  instance	  of	  scientific	  innovation.	  	  
Therefore,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  chapter	  4	  speaking	  of	  the	  translational	  model	  of	  stem	  
cell	   innovation,	   these	   issues	   have	   direct	   repercussions	   on	   how	   stem	   cell	   therapies	   are	  
being	  imagined,	  and	  how	  the	  boundaries	  of	  permissible	  experimentation	  are	  negotiated	  
with	   the	   public	   and	  within	   the	   scientific	   community.	   It	  will	   thus	   become	  apparent	   that	  
stem	  cell	  therapies	  pose	  new	  challenges	  to	  the	  existing	  regulatory	  frameworks	  on	  medical	  
experimentation	  on	  human	  subjects,	  thus	  calling	  for	  some	  major	  reconsiderations	  on	  the	  
use	  of	  notions	  such	  as	  risk	  and	  safety.	  	  
Moreover,	   looking	   at	   those	   emerging	  dynamics,	   I	  will	   primarily	   aim	  at	   using	   the	  
deliberative	   lens	   to	   see	   how	   an	   ultimately	   democratic	   culture	   of	   discussion	   might	   be	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preserved	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  high	  stakes	  that	  these	  developments	  imply.	  Therefore,	  I	  
will	   show	   that	   the	   problems	   of	   both	   the	   research,	   the	   business	   and	   the	   translational	  
model	  of	  stem	  cell	   innovation,	  albeit	  discussed	  in	  specialized	  academic	  and	  professional	  
circles,	   are	   sites	   where	   new	   tensions	   are	   arising	   whose	   erosive	   potential	   must	   be	  
stabilized.	   In	   chapter	  5	   I	  will	   advance	  a	  proposal	   in	   this	  direction	   so	  as	   to	   conclude	   the	  
dissertation	   with	   the	   effort	   of	   stimulating	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   academic	   and	   public	  
debate	  on	  those	  issues.	  
My	  general	  aim	  here	   is	  definitely	  not	   that	  of	  guessing	  whether	  or	  not	  stem	  cell-­‐
based	  medicine	  is	  going	  to	  make	  its	  way	  through	  to	  become	  a	  successful	  technology.	  I	  will	  
instead	  focus	  on	  specific	  controversial	  regulative	  issues	  that	  might	  play	  a	  role	  in	  defining	  
the	   shape	   of	   regenerative	  medicine	   in	   the	   future	   and,	   in	   turn	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   public	  
sphere	  that	  will	  have	  to	  cope	  with	  those	  controversies.	   In	  this	  respect,	  this	   is	  an	  inquiry	  
into	  the	  political	  conditions	  of	  medical	  innovation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  stem	  cells.	  
So	   let	  us	   start,	   in	   the	  next	   chapter,	  by	   illustrating	   the	  content	  of	   the	  promise	  of	  
stem	  cell	  medicine.	  
	  




Chapter	  2:	  Stem	  cell	  attractions	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  explain	  what	  the	  promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  science	  amounts	  to.	  My	  
analytical	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  illustrate	  the	  promissory	  character	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  
To	   begin	   with,	   I	   will	   show	   that	   major	   improvements	   are	   expected	   from	   the	  
possible	  application	  of	  stem	  cells	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  more	  precise	  disease	  models	  and	  
drug	   screening	   libraries	   (2.1).	   Furthermore,	   I	   will	   explain	   what	   is	   intended	   for	  
regenerative	  medicine,	  and	  how	  stem	  cell	  research	  and	  application	  is	  relevant	  to	  it	  (2.2).	  I	  
will	  then	  illustrate	  how	  the	  study	  of	  stem	  cells	  can	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  medicine	  
towards	  more	  personalised	  therapeutic	  approaches	  (2.3).	  Finally,	  I	  will	  restate	  how	  issues	  
of	  governance	  are	  relevant	  to	  these	  various	  trajectories	  of	  innovation	  (2.4).	  
In	   so	   doing,	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   the	   existing	   scientific	   literature	   on	   the	   envisioned	  
applications	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   to	  medical	   practice.	  However,	   I	  will	   not	   attempt	   any	  
estimate	   as	   to	   the	   likelihood	   of	   this	   or	   that	   particular	   application	   to	   ever	   reach	   the	  
patient’s	  bedside.	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	  most	  of	   these	  attempts	  are	  still	   in	   their	   infancy,	   I	  
will	  furthermore	  remain	  neutral	  as	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  clinical	  development	  of	  the	  possible	  
applications	  that	  I	  will	  briefly	  review	  in	  this	  chapter.	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Stem	   cells	   are	   generally	   defined	   operationally,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   stemness	   is	  
attributed	  according	  to	  a	  cell’s	  capacity	  to	  perform	  two	  fundamental	  biological	  functions:	  
self-­‐renewal	  and	  differentiation	  into	  more	  mature	  tissue	  types.	  This	  definition	  has	  given	  
rise	   to	   a	   complex,	   and	   often	   not	   uniform	   (Brivanlou	   et	   al.	   2003;	   Maherali	   and	  
Hochedlinger	  2008;	  Daley	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Ellis	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Müller	  et	  al.	  2010),	  experimental	  
apparatus	   to	  probe	   and	   certify	   cellular	   stemness.	   Such	   an	   apparatus	   allows	   room	   for	   a	  
diversity	  of	  stem	  cell	  derivation	  methods.	  The	  cell	   lines	  that	  go	  under	  the	   label	  of	  stem	  
cells	   therefore	   comprise	  a	   variety	  of	   entities	  exhibiting	   the	  hallmarks	  of	  developmental	  
competence	  as	  well	  as	  self-­‐replication	  ability	  at	  varying	  degrees.	  	  
Stem	   cells	   are	   naturally	   present	   in	   the	   developing	   embryo,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   adult	  
organisms,	   where	   they	   have	   the	   important	   function	   of	   replacing	   some	   kinds	   of	   bodily	  
tissue	   upon	   specific	   physiological	   or	   pathological	   circumstances.	   Those	   stem	   cells	   that	  
reside	  in	  fully	  formed	  adult	  organisms	  generally	  possess	  lower	  degrees	  of	  developmental	  
competence	   than	   their	   embryonic	   progenitors.	  Moreover,	   it	  may	   take	   invasive	  medical	  
procedures	  to	  yield	  just	  small	  quantities	  of	  them	  from	  live	  human	  bodies.	  Presently,	  adult	  
stem	  cells	  can	  be	  safely	  harvested	  by	  direct	   isolation	  only	   from	  bone	  marrow,	  umbilical	  
cord	  blood,	  skin	  and	  adipose	  tissues	  (hematopoietic	  and	  mesenchymal	  stem	  cells).	  Stem	  
cells	   isolated	   from	  the	  early	  blastocyst,	   instead,	  are	  pluripotent,	  meaning	   that	   they	  can	  
self-­‐replicate	   indefinitely	   and	   can	   be	   instructed	   to	   differentiate	   into	   derivatives	   of	   the	  
three	   germ	   layers	   in	   vitro.	   The	   distinction	   between	   embryonic	   and	   adult	   stem	   cells,	  
however,	  is	  not	  just	  a	  biological	  one.	  This	  line	  of	  separation	  indeed	  organised	  the	  political	  
separation	  of	   supporters	  and	  adversaries	  of	  different	  approaches	   to	   stem	  cell	   research.	  
On	   one	   side	   of	   this	   divide	   sit	   the	   promoters	   of	   stem	   cells	   of	   embryonic	   origin,	   whose	  
derivation	   implies	   the	   destruction,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   the	   previous	   creation,	   of	   human	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conceptuses.	   On	   the	   other	   instead,	   reside	   those	   who	   judge	   such	   methods	   ethically	  
unacceptable	  and	  thus	  sponsor	  the	  allegedly	  less	  problematic	  field	  of	  adult	  stem	  cells.	  	  
Thus	   far,	   embryonic	   stem	   cells	   have	   generated	   a	   good	   deal	   of	   ethical	  
disagreement	   ever	   since	   their	   first	   derivation	   in	   1998.	   The	   issue	  of	   the	  moral	   status	   of	  
human	   embryos,	   whose	   creation	   and	   destruction	   are	   required	   to	   derive	   human	  
embryonic	   stem	   (hES)	   cells,	   occupied	   the	   mind	   and	   writings	   of	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	  
bioethical	   community,	   and	   attracted	   the	   interests	   of	  many	   social	   scientists.	  Moreover,	  
also	   the	   popular	   media	   dedicated	   much	   more	   attention	   to	   science	   around	   stem	   cell-­‐
related	  topics	  than	  they	  would	  have	  done	  otherwise.	  Science	   itself,	  on	   its	  part,	  devoted	  
an	  ever	  increasing	  wealth	  of	  financial	  and	  human	  resources	  to	  stem	  cells,	  in	  the	  effort	  of	  
gaining	   molecular	   knowledge	   about	   them,	   and	   in	   constant	   view	   of	   possible	   medical	  
applications.	  To	  mention	  but	  one	  data	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  expectation	  stem	  cells	  have	  
generated,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   look	   at	   the	   case	   of	   California.	   The	   California	   Institute	   of	  
Regenerative	  Medicine	  (CIRM),	  a	  State-­‐owned	  funding	  and	  research	  institution	  created	  in	  
2004	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  fostering	  the	  translation	  of	  basic	  stem	  cell	  research	  into	  deliverable	  
therapies,	   received	   an	   initial	   endowment	   of	   about	   $3	   billion	   over	   a	   ten	   year-­‐period	   to	  
fund	  stem	  cell	  research	  at	  “California’s	  universities	  and	  other	  advanced	  medical	  facilities	  
throughout	   the	   state”	   (Proposition	   71).	   Two	   considerations	   are	   in	   order	   here	   to	  
understand	  the	  import	  of	  this	  fact.	  First,	  CIRM’s	  budget	  for	  stem	  cell	  research,	  as	  pointed	  
out	  by	  Daar	  and	  Greenwood	  (2007),	  is	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Human	  Genome	  Project.	  
The	   latter	   received	   a	   total	   of	   $3.8	   billion	   in	   fifteen	   years,	   from	  1988	   to	   2003	   from	   the	  
Department	   of	   Energy	   and	   the	  National	   Institutes	   of	   Health.	   Indubitably,	   the	   complete	  
sequencing	   of	   the	   whole	   human	   genome	   epitomises	   a	   moment	   of	   crucial	   cultural	  
importance	  in	  the	  history	  of	  human	  civilisation,	  other	  than	  being	  a	  watershed	  event	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  On	  this	  project	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second	   wave	   of	   development	   for	   medical	   biotechnology	   and,	   possibly,	   to	   create	   the	  
conditions	   for	   future	   innovative	   therapies.	   The	   budget	   of	   the	   Californian	   stem	   cell	  
research	   initiative	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  people	  of	  California	  through	  a	  referendum	  on	  a	  
constitutional	  amendment	  named	  Proposition	  71	  in	  2004,	  for	  a	  public	  expense	  figure	  that	  
is	  comparable	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Human	  Genome	  Project.	  This	  reveals	  how	  much	  stem	  cells	  
can	   elicit	   public	   expectations	   on	   the	   potential	   innovations	   they	   may	   bring	   about.	  
Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	   CIRM	  was	   created	   and	   allocated	   resources	   via	   a	   constitutional	  
amendment,	  enacted	  by	  California	  voters	  through	  public	  consultation,	  certifies	  the	  extent	  
of	   public	   endorsement	   that	   stem	   cell	   research	   is	   able	   to	   gain	   within	   the	   public.	   As	   a	  
matter	  of	   fact	  however,	  expectation	  and	  opposition	  are	   indeed	  both	  present	  within	  the	  
public	   debate	   concerning	   stem	   cell	   research	   and	   its	   possible	   applications	   to	   combat	  
human	  diseases.	  Instances	  of	  public	  contestation	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  are	  countless.	  To	  
mention	  but	  a	  recent	  one,	  we	  can	  for	  example	  recall	  the	  opposition	  to	  stem	  cell	  patents	  
in	   Europe.	   A	   decade-­‐long	   judicial	   battle	   over	   stem	   cell	   patentability	   in	   Europe	   saw	  
individual	   scientific	   research	   groups	   facing	   the	   opposition	   of	   a	   large	   and	   fairly	  
representative	   panel	   of	   parties,	   including	   three	   EU	  member	   states	   (Germany,	   Italy	   and	  
the	  Netherlands)	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  (NGOs)	  such	  as	  Greenpeace.	  
With	  these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  let	  us	  now	  review	  the	  directions	  that	  stem	  cell	  
translational	  research	  is	  pointing	  at	  to	  envisage	  the	  possible	  future	  development	  of	  new	  
stem	  cell	  treatments.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  try	  a	  systematic,	  albeit	  inevitably	  incomplete,	  
overview	  of	   the	   current	  directions	  of	   applicative	   stem	  cell	   research.	   Furthermore,	   I	  will	  
outline	  the	  main	  points	  of	  concern	  that	  the	  debate	  on	  stem	  cell	  science	  is	  focussing	  on,	  
with	   respect	   to	   regulatory	  difficulties	  and	  ethical	  problems	  that	   those	  kinds	  of	   research	  
are	   likely	   to	  elicit.	   This	   initial	  overview	  will	   function	  as	  an	  entry	  point	   to	   the	   issues	   this	  
dissertation	  will	   take	  up	   subsequently.	  To	  put	  order	   into	   the	  coming	   review	  of	  possible	  
	  56	  
stem	   cell	   applications,	   I	   have	   divided	   them	   in	   three	   main	   areas:	   drug	   screening	   and	  
disease	  models,	  regenerative	  medicine	  and	  personalized	  medicine.	  	  
Obviously,	   trajectories	  of	  biomedical	   innovation	  are	  not	  easy	   to	  anticipate.	  With	  
stem	   cells	   then,	   predictions	   are	   even	   harder	   than	   normal.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   specific	  
peculiarities	   of	   stem	   cells	   as	   material	   objects	   and	   as	   objects	   of	   study.	   Indeed,	   the	  
biological	  variety	  among	  different	  stem	  cell	  types,	  stem	  cell	  lines,	  and	  variously	  obtained	  
stem	   cell	   derivatives	   makes	   it	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   future	   of	   stem	   cell	  
medicine	  because	  exactly	  which	  kinds	  of	  stem	  cell	  will	  eventually	  prove	  most	  valuable	  in	  
therapy	  and	  other	  patient-­‐oriented	  operations	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  predict.	  	  
Moreover,	  as	  to	  the	  regulatory	  scenario	  surrounding	  stem	  cells,	   it	  has	  to	  be	  said	  
that	   it	   has	   always	   been	   unstable,	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   open	   to	   change	   as	   political	  
initiatives	   unwind	   and	   judicial	   controversies	   are	   decided	   over	   the	   possibilities	   and	   the	  
limits	   of	   stem	   cell	   research.	   Furthermore,	   regulations	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   ongoing	  
scientific	   efforts	   of	   molecular	   and	   mechanistic	   characterisation	   of	   new	   pluripotent	  
entities	  that	  laboratories	  worldwide	  continue	  to	  obtain.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Drug	  screening	  and	  disease	  models	  
A	   distinctive	   feature	   of	   stem	   cells,	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   retaining	   the	   genetic	  
characteristics	  of	  their	  organism	  of	  origin.	  To	  begin	  with,	  stem	  cells	  of	  adult	  origin	  possess	  
the	  same	  genetic	  material	  of	  any	  other	  somatic	  cell	  in	  the	  donor’s	  body.	  They	  can	  thus	  be	  
matched	   to	   the	   same	   individual	   in	   a	   therapeutic	   context,	   although	   they	   may	   present	  
problems	   of	   immunocompatibility	   with	   recipient	   patients	   in	   heterologous	   settings.	  
Moreover,	   they	   have	   another	   important	   limitation	   that	   has	   to	   do	   with	   their	   reduced	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differentiative	  potential:	  adult	  stem	  cells	  are	  unable	  to	  differentiate	  in	  all	  the	  derivatives	  
of	   the	   three	   germ	   layers	   like,	   instead,	   embryonic	   stem	   cells	   can	   do.	  Human	  embryonic	  
stem	  cells,	   instead,	  are	  pluripotent,	   indicating	   that	   they	   can	  give	   rise	   to	  all	   somatic	   cell	  
types	   of	   adult	   organisms.	   Furthermore,	   human	   embryonic	   stem	   cell	   lines	   derived	   by	  
somatic	   cell	   nuclear	   transfer	   (SCNT)	   are	   genetically	   identical	   to	   the	   somatic	   cell	   donor,	  
thus	  permitting	  a	  targeted	  to	  patient	  derivation	  upon	  clinical	  or	  research	  necessity.	  SCNT,	  
however,	  proved	  technically	  problematic	  and	  thus	  prompted	  research	  groups	  to	  look	  for	  
alternative	  methods	  to	  obtain	  pluripotent	  stem	  cell.	  Induced	  pluripotent	  stem	  (iPS)	  cells,	  
obtained	   by	   ectopic	   expression	   of	   key	   transcription	   factors	   in	   somatic	   human	   cells	   (a	  
process	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   reprogramming)	   are	   now	   considered	   a	   valid	   counterpart	   of	  
hES	   cells	   and	   a	   possible	   alternative	   to	   them	   in	   the	   clinical	   and	   research	   contexts	  
(Takahashi	  and	  Yamanaka	  2006;	  Takahashi	  et	  al.	  2007).	  IPS	  cells	  just	  like	  hES	  cells	  proved	  
able	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   derivatives	   of	   all	   the	   three	   germ	   layers,	   but	   they	   are	   considerably	  
easier	   to	   obtain	   from	   an	   experimental	   (as	   well	   as	   from	   and	   ethical)	   point	   of	   view.	  
Importantly,	   also	   iPS	   cells	   retain	   the	   same	   genome	   of	   the	   person	  whose	   biopsied	   cells	  
underwent	  reprogramming.	  These	  features	  immediately	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  
stem	  cells	  obtained	  from	  a	  patient	  should	  exhibit	  the	  same	  diseased	  characteristic	  of	  the	  
original	   tissue	   at	   least	   at	   the	   genetic	   level.	   It	   was	   thus	   tempting	   for	   scientific	   groups	  
working	   in	   molecular	   medicine,	   to	   establish	   pluripotent	   cells	   from	   diseased	   subjects	  
(either	   animal	   or	   human).	   Those	   cells	   can	   then	   be	   differentiated	   into	   mature	   somatic	  
cells,	  generally	  of	  the	  type	  that	  the	  disease	  is	  supposed	  to	  hit.	  It	   is	  so	  possible	  to	  obtain	  
copious	   in	   vitro	   cellular	   cultures	   that	   supposedly	   recapitulate	   the	   diseased	   cellular	  
phenotype	  of	   the	  patient,	   thus	   representing	  what	  has	  been	  called	  a	   “disease	   in	  a	  dish”	  
(Wu	  and	  Hochedlinger	  2011).	  Scientists	  can	  in	  this	  way	  create	  in	  vitro	  models	  of	  human	  
diseases,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  studying	  them,	  so	  as	  to	  hopefully	  learn	  more	  on	  the	  molecular	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mechanisms	  that	  underlie	  the	  disease,	  or	  in	  order	  to	  test	  on	  this	  abundant	  material	  entire	  
libraries	  of	  potential	  drugs,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  finding	  those	  that	  are	  able	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  
disease,	  or	  to	  restore	  the	  normal	  cellular	  phenotype.	  	  
A	  number	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐derived	  disease	  models	  have	  already	  been	  established	  for	  
neurodegenerative	  diseases	  like	  Parkinson,	  Huntington	  and	  amyotrophic	  lateral	  sclerosis;	  
likewise,	  as	   to	  blood	   related	  pathologies,	  many	  cellular	  disease	  models	  exist	  of	  Fanconi	  
anaemia	  and	  Fragile	  X	  syndrome;	  also	  cardiac	  and	  vascular	  conditions	  like	  LEOPARD	  and	  
Timothy	   syndromes	   are	   now	   observable	   through	   in	   vitro	   models,	   like	   also	   pancreatic	  
(Type	  1	  diabetes)	  and	  hepatic	  illnesses	  (for	  complete	  reference	  see	  Wu	  and	  Hochedlinger	  
2011).	  	  
Specific	  technical	  and	  regulatory	  hurdles	  however	  constrain	  the	  full	  development	  
of	  cellular	  models	  for	  human	  diseases.	  To	  begin	  with,	  not	  many	  human	  diseases	  exhibit	  a	  
clinically	  relevant	  phenotype	  at	  the	  cellular	  level	  only.	  Moreover,	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  human	  
pathologies	   has	   a	   cell-­‐autonomous	   nature.	   The	   complexity	   of	   some	   prominent	   human	  
disorders	   may	   therefore	   be	   scarcely	   captured	   by	   in	   vitro	   models.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
heterogeneity	  of	  human	  disorders	  might	  question	  the	  reliability	  of	  disease	  models	  when	  
derived	   from	   a	   small	   number	   of	   initial	   donors.	   Indeed,	   efforts	   at	   replicating	   the	  
establishment	  of	  diseased	  cell	  lines,	  might	  reveal	  that	  a	  single	  disease	  actually	  comprises	  
many	  different	  sub-­‐forms,	  thus	  calling	  for	  a	  more	  refined	  stratification	  of	  donors.	  If	  this	  is	  
in	   itself	   a	   worthwhile	   result,	   it	   adds	   a	   further	   layer	   of	   complexity	   to	   the	   fight	   against	  
human	  disease.	  	  
At	  the	  regulatory	  level,	  the	  use	  of	  cellular	  models	  might	  be	  problematic	  in	  at	  least	  
two	  respects.	  First,	  donor	  tissue	  is	  stored,	  manipulated,	  expanded	  and	  circulated	  to	  such	  
an	   extent	   by	  molecular	   biologists,	   and	   its	   use	  may	   give	   rise	   to	   such	  unforeseen	   results	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that	   the	   initial	   consent	   of	   the	   donor	   cannot	   assure	   control	   over	   all	   the	   possible	   future	  
uses	   of	   the	   samples.	   As	   large	   repositories	   of	   human	   diseased	   cell	   lines	   expand,	   the	  
management	   of	   the	   biomedical	   information	   they	   contain	   for	   research	   and	   clinical	  
purposes	  thus	  becomes	  more	  pressing.	  Second,	  the	  outcome	  of	  drug	  screening	  on	  animal	  
disease	  models,	  might	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  information	  about	  toxicology	  and	  efficacy	  to	  
immediately	  start	  reasonably	  safe	  clinical	  studies.	  This	  problem	  is	  even	  more	  acute	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  cellular	  disease	  models,	  given	  the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	  unable	   to	   fully	   recapitulate	  
the	  effects	  and	  side-­‐effects	  of	  a	  drug	  at	  the	  organismic	  level.	  
It	   is	   also	   worth	   noticing	   that,	   contrary	   to	   commonly	   held	   assumptions	   in	   the	  
academic	   community,	   embryo-­‐related	   issues	   do	   not	   nearly	   exhaust	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
potentially	  problematic	  consequences	  of	  stem	  cell	  research.	  The	  very	  notion	  of	  consent,	  
originally	   brought	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   medical	   practices	   to	   avoid	   clinical	   trials	   being	  
conducted	  on	  human	  subjects	  against	  their	  will,	  seems	  bound	  to	  be	  re-­‐organized	  around	  
the	  new	  uses	  of	  human	  tissue	  that	  stem	  cell	  science	  is	  able	  to	  make	  possible.	  The	  scope	  of	  
consent	  extends	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  scientific	  procedures	  that,	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  diseases	  in	  a	  
dish,	  happens	  at	  sites	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  patient.	  Nonetheless,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  
content	   of	   consent	   seems	   to	   shrink	   or	   even	   exclude	   forms	   of	   extensive	   control	   by	   the	  
initial	  donor.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  drug	  screening,	  large	  revenues	  may	  result	  from	  
these	  initial	  experiments	  on	  existing	  small-­‐molecule	  libraries.	  It	  is	  therefore	  desirable	  for	  
the	  involved	  research	  groups	  and	  companies	  to	  enforce	  in	  advance	  rules	  of	  appropriation	  
for	  those	  revenues	  that,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  in	  all	  cases	  involve	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  donor-­‐
patient	  from	  the	  potential	  financial	  benefits	  of	  drug	  discovery	  activities.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  
practicable	   infrastructure	   to	   allow	   the	   uncontested	   use	   of	   stem	   cell	   techniques	   in	  
modelling	   human	   diseases	   is	   thus	   dependent	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   favourable	   civic	  
environment	  around	  the	  practices	  in	  question.	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2.2	  Regenerative	  medicine	  
Regenerative	  medicine	  is	  one	  of	  the	  articulations	  of	  the	  new	  medicine	  that	  is	  more	  
frequently	   associated	   with	   the	   development	   of	   stem	   cell	   science.	   Albeit	   not	   entirely	  
original,	   the	   idea	  of	  restoring	  human	  tissues’	   impaired	  functioning	  regained	  momentum	  
as	  science	  proved	  able	  to	  experimentally	  control	  the	  proliferative	  and	  differentiative	  fate	  
of	  human	  cells	  in	  vitro.	  Thus	  new	  manipulative	  abilities	  tempt	  biomedical	  researchers	  to	  
probe	  how	  stem	  cells	  could	  be	  harnessed	  in	  vivo,	  to	  restore	  the	  functionality	  of	  diseased	  
bodies.	   In	   truth,	   the	   rationale	   for	   taking	   this	   therapeutic	   direction	   is	   not	   entirely	   new.	  
Well-­‐known	   early	   examples	   of	   regenerative	   medicine	   are	   blood	   transfusions,	   organ	  
transplantations,	  and	  bone	  marrow	  grafts	  for	  leukemic	  patients.	  The	  latter	  technique	  was	  
actually	  the	  first	  stem	  cell	   therapy	  to	  successfully	  bridge	  the	  gap	  from	  the	  bench	  to	  the	  
bedside.	   However,	   one	  main	   difference	   between	   these	   early	   examples	   of	   regenerative	  
medicine	   and	   what	   stem	   cells	   might	   do	   in	   terms	   of	   bodily	   regeneration	   needs	   to	   be	  
highlighted.	  Blood,	  organs	  and	  bone	  marrow	  are	   transferred	   from	  one	  body	   to	  another	  
following	   relatively	   minor	   manipulations,	   apart	   from	   those	   handling	   procedures,	   like	  
refrigeration	  for	  example,	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  keep	  them	  alive	  while	  being	  transported	  
from	  the	  donor	  to	  another	  recipient	  body.	  The	   idea	  of	  regenerative	  medicine	  that	  stem	  
cells	   can	   contribute	   to	  build,	   however,	   generally	  means	  more	   than	   just	   replacement	  of	  
dysfunctional	   tissue	   with	   the	   same	   tissue-­‐type	   taken	   from	   a	   compatible	   donor.	   The	  
displacement	  of	  human	  cells	   from	  one	  body	   to	  another	  will	  be	   technically	  mediated	  by	  
molecular-­‐level	   manipulations	   that	   transform	   an	   initial	   tissue	   into	   the	   desired	   kind	   of	  
entity	   that	   the	   receiving	   patient	   needs.	   Now,	   although	   the	   technical	   feasibility	   of	   such	  
manipulations	  has	  in	  principle	  been	  already	  shown	  in	  model	  organism	  such	  as	  mice,	  these	  
processes	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  control	  than	  tissue	  displacement	  from	  body	  to	  another.	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Let	  us	  now	  try	  to	  be	  more	  specific	  as	  to	  what	  regenerative	  medicine	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  
by	   looking	  at	  a	  definition	   that	   captures	   its	   imagined	  potential	   in	  a	   relatively	   condensed	  
way.	  	  
“Regenerative	  medicine	   is	   an	   interdisciplinary	   field	  
of	  research	  and	  clinical	  applications	  focused	  on	  the	  repair,	  
replacement	  or	   regeneration	  of	   cells,	   tissues	  or	  organs	   to	  
resort	   impaired	   function	   resulting	   from	   any	   cause,	  
including	  congenital	  defects,	  disease,	  trauma	  and	  ageing.	  It	  
uses	   a	   combination	   of	   several	   converging	   technological	  
approaches,	  both	  existing	  and	  newly	  emerging,	  that	  moves	  
it	   beyond	   traditional	   transplantation	   and	   replacement	  
therapies.	  The	  approaches	  often	  stimulate	  and	  support	  the	  
body’s	   own	   self-­‐healing	   capacity.	   These	   approaches	   may	  
include,	   but	   are	   not	   limited	   to,	   the	   use	   of	   soluble	  
molecules,	  gene	  therapy,	  stem	  and	  progenitor	  cell	  therapy,	  
tissue	   engineering	   and	   the	   reprogramming	   of	   cell	   and	  
tissue	  types”	  (Daar	  and	  Greenwood	  2007,	  181).	  
Although	  other	  definitions	  of	   regenerative	  medicine	  exist	   in	   the	   literature	   (Petit-­‐
Zeman	  2001;	  Haseltine	  2003;	  Mironov,	  et	  al.	  2004),	   the	  one	   I	   reported	  here	  enjoys	   the	  
virtues	  of	  brevity	  and,	  to	  an	  acceptable	  extent,	  comprehensiveness.	  Before	  entering	  into	  
some	  more	   details	   about	   what	   effective	   possibilities	   this	   quote	  might	   refer	   to,	   let	   me	  
comment	   a	   bit	   on	  what	   I	   think	   is	  worth	   highlighting	   in	   the	   proposed	   definition.	  Nearly	  
every	  word	  in	  the	  above	  definition	  points	  at	  features	  of	  regenerative	  medicine	  that	  make	  
it	  look	  novel	  and	  innovative	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  past.	  
The	   first	   innovative	   feature	   is	   the	   tight	   coupling	   of	   research	   and	   clinical	  
application.	  The	  traditional	  (and	  overstated)	  division	  between	  basic	  and	  applied	  research	  
is	   blurred,	   to	   the	   point	   of	   allowing	   room	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   interdisciplinary	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field.	  As	  a	  consequence	  it	  is	  currently	  possible	  to	  observe	  the	  flourishing	  of	  departments	  
and	  schools,	  institutes	  and	  departments	  of	  regenerative	  medicine	  worldwide.	  This	  feature	  
has	   a	   counterpart	   in	   the	   proliferation	   of	   interdisciplinary	   programmes	   and	   academic	  
degrees	   dealing	  with	   the	   fundamental	   regulative	   issues	   raised	  by	   the	   coming	  of	   age	  of	  
regenerative	  medicine	  and	  other	  affiliated	  new	  articulations	  of	  medicine.	  	  
Secondly,	  not	  only	  regenerative	  medicine	  aims	  at	  replacing	  non-­‐functioning	  bodily	  
parts,	  it	  points	  at	  repairing	  and	  regenerating.	  What	  is	  meant	  with	  repair	  is	  the	  possibility	  
of	   using	   technologies	   such	   as	   stem	   cells	   to	   intervene	  on	  wounds	   produced	  by	   external	  
traumas	   or	   by	   internal	   failures,	   like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   spinal	   cord	   injury	   or	   myocardial	  
infarction	  respectively.	  Yet	  another	  possibility	  for	  repairing	  diseased	  bodies	  is	  to	  engineer	  
cells	   before	   introducing	   them	   into	   patients	   in	   order	   to	   confer	   them	   a	   phenotype	   that	  
might	  benefit	  the	  patient,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  with	  modified	  β	  cells	  administered	  to	  type-­‐1	  
diabetic	  patients	   (Emamaullee	  et	  al.	  2005).	  With	  regeneration	   instead,	  what	   is	  meant	   is	  
the	  possibility	  of	  intervening	  on	  the	  adult	  stem	  cells,	  already	  present	  in	  the	  human	  body,	  
by	   pharmacologically	   stimulating	   their	   niche,	   where	   they	   generally	   reside	   in	   a	   state	   of	  
quiescence	  thanks	  to	  a	  delicate	  homeostatic	  equilibrium	  (Rafii	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Scadden	  2006;	  
Adams	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  use	  of	  ‘repair’,	   ‘regeneration’	  and	  ‘replacement’	   is	  not	  uniform	  in	  the	  
biomedical	   literature,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  stress	  here	  that	  regenerative	  medicine	  stretches	  
onto	  a	  variety	  of	  diseases	  and	  conditions,	  from	  congenital	  defects	  to	  disease	  and	  trauma.	  
Functional	   restoration	   is	   therefore	   the	   aim	   of	   treating	   a	   continuum	   of	   forms	   of	  
impairment,	  not	  rigidly	  mapping	  onto	  the	  clusters	  of	  medical	  specialisations.	  	  
The	  most	  innovative	  feature	  of	  regenerative	  medicine	  however,	  as	  it	  is	  accounted	  
for	  in	  the	  proposed	  definition,	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  converging	  technological	  approaches.	  To	  an	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extent	   that	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   ignore,	   regenerative	  medicine	   favours	   the	   emergence	   of	  
new	  technological	  platforms,	  such	  as	  stem	  cells	  for	  example.	  By	  technological	  platform	  I	  
mean	  a	  family	  or	  bundle	  of	  biotechnological	  tools	  and	  clinical	  hypotheses	  grouped	  around	  
one	   core	   entity	   (in	   our	   case,	   stem	   cells)	   that	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   developed	   into	   deliverable	  
applications.	  	  
This	  notion	  owes	  to	  Keating	  and	  Cambrosio’s	  idea	  of	  biomedical	  platforms(Keating	  
and	   Cambrosio	   2000;	   Keating	   and	   Cambrosio	   2003).	   However,	   my	   interest	   in	   the	  
emergence	   of	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   is	   less	   concerned	   than	   theirs	   with	   the	   historical	  
upheaval	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	   as	   an	   experimental	   system	   with	   roots	   in	   neighbouring	  
scientific	   fields,	   and	   built	   up	   on	   the	   material	   and	   institutional	   characters	   of	   novel	  
‘epistemic	  things’	  (Rheinberger	  1997).	  
What	  the	   idea	  of	  platform,	  as	   I	   intend	   it,	   is	  supposed	  to	  capture,	   is	   the	  fact	  that	  
the	  technological	  trajectory	  of	  stem	  cells	   is	  not	  decided	  in	  advance,	  but	   is	   instead	  being	  
developed	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  process	  of	  scientific	  characterization	  of	  the	  core	  entity	  itself.	  
Like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   other	   recent	   technological	   platforms	   (e.g.	   recombinant	   DNA	  
technologies),	   it	  will	  thus	  be	  difficult	  to	  predict,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  stem	  cells	  as	  well,	  exactly	  
what	   type	   of	   future	   application	   they	  will	   enable,	   which	   kind	   of	   disease	   they	  will	   most	  
frequently	  be	  used	  to	  combat,	  which	  kind	  of	  industry,	  if	  any,	  will	  profit	  from	  them,	  and	  so	  
on.	  In	  this	  respect,	  commentators	  have	  seen	  a	  line	  of	  connection	  between	  stem	  cells	  and	  
the	  Human	  Genome	  Project,	   beyond	   the	  budget	   they	  were	  endowed	  with,	   highlighting	  
the	   fact	   that	   both	   lend	   themselves	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   forms	   of	   “scientific	   inquiry	   whose	  
benefits	  will	  emerge	  slowly	  and	   incrementally”	   (Dresser	  2010).	   I	  will	  elaborate	  more	  on	  
this	   feature	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   dissertation.	   As	   more	   information	   and	   analyses	   will	  
accumulate	  about	  how	  stem	  cell	   innovation,	  at	   the	  present	  stage	  of	   its	  development,	   is	  
being	  imagined,	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  technological	  platform.	  The	  latter,	  I	  reckon,	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captures	   the	   trajectory	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   in	   a	   more	   convenient	   way	   than	   other,	  
more	  established	  concepts	  such	  as	  that	  of	  ‘technological	  zone’	  (Barry	  2001;	  Barry	  2006).	  
The	   difference	   between	   ‘platform’	   and	   ‘zone’	   lies	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   technological	  
phenomenon	   that	   the	   two	   expressions	   are	   intended	   to	   capture.	   With	   technological	  
zones’,	  scholars	  have	  referred	  to	  families	  of	  products	  that,	   in	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other,	  are	  
related	   to	  one	  specific	  kind	  of	  medical	  application.	  A	   typical	  example	  of	  a	   technological	  
zone	  is	  tissue	  engineering.	  Engineered	  human	  tissues	  can	  come	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  and	  
instantiations,	  but	  they	  are	  all	  designed	  to	  replace	  a	  part	  or	  a	  function	  in	  the	  human	  body.	  
Technological	  platforms,	   instead,	   refer	   to	  an	   innovation	   trajectory	   that	   revolves	  around	  
one	  single	  entity,	  but	   lends	  itself	  to	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  possible	  applications,	  both	  medical,	  
diagnostic	  or	   laboratorial.	  The	   field	  of	   stem	  cells,	  as	   I	   see	   it,	   is	   thus	  more	  appropriately	  
defined	   as	   that	   of	   a	   technological	   platform	   that	   is	   evolving	   into	   as	   yet	   unpredictable	  
applicative	  directions.	  	  
The	  open	  ended	  character	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  as	  a	  biotechnological	  platform,	  
also	  surfaces	  in	  the	  above	  definition	  of	  regenerative	  medicine,	  when	  the	  latter	  is	  said	  to	  
rely	   on	   both	   existing	   and	   newly	   emerging	   technological	   approaches,	   purportedly	  
converging	  on	  stem	  cell	  as	  an	  attractor-­‐innovation.	  Therefore,	  the	  list	  of	  possible	  vectors	  
to	  translate	  stem	  cell	  knowledge	  to	  medical	  practice	  in	  not	  limited	  to	  cell	  therapy	  proper,	  
but	   stretches	   to	   chemical	   drugs,	   biologics,	   functionalised	   materials	   and	   other	   possible	  
applications	  that	  might,	  and	  will	  most	  likely	  spur	  out	  of	  the	  science	  of	  stem	  cells.	  	  
As	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  medical	  translation,	  a	  number	  of	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  studies	  
and	  early-­‐phase	  clinical	  trials	  have	  already	  indicated	  the	  imagined	  future	  of	  the	  new	  stem	  
cell	   medicine.	   Cell	   therapy,	   consisting	   in	   infusing	   patients	   with	   cells	   at	   specific	   bodily	  
locations,	   is	   generally	   thought	   to	   be	   the	   main	   avenue	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	   clinical	  
application.	  A	  number	  of	  recent	  studies	  provide	  support	  for	  this	  assumption.	  Pioneering	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research	   efforts	   are	   currently	   being	   devoted	   to	   previously	   incurable	   and	   strongly	  
debilitating	  neurodegenerative	  conditions,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Parkinson’s	  disease,	  
Huntington’s	   disease,	   and	   amyotrophic	   lateral	   sclerosis	   (Lindvall,	   Kokaia,	   and	  Martinez-­‐
Serrano	   2004).	   Preliminary	   studies	   on	   animal	   models	   suggest	   that	   stem	   cells	   could	   be	  
used	   to	   restore	   brain	   functions	   that	   conditions	   like	   those	   just	   mentioned	   generally	  
disrupt,	   thereby	   restoring	   the	   hope	   for	   patients	   to	   contain	   the	   loss	   of	   crucial	   cognitive	  
capacities,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  re-­‐acquire	  the	  control	  of	  their	  bodily	  movements.	  Furthermore,	  
also	   other	   conditions	   affecting	   patients’	   autonomy	   and	   wellbeing	   by	   impairing	   their	  
capacity	   to	   move,	   like	   muscular	   dystrophy,	   seem	   amenable	   to	   stem	   cell	   therapy	  
(Sampaolesi	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	  
Furthermore,	  evidence	  is	  accumulating	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  possible	  beneficial	  utilization	  
of	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   in	   type-­‐1	   diabetes	   (Lechner	   2004)	   and	   autoimmune	   diseases	  
(Marmont	   2000),	   as	   well	   as	   in	   type-­‐2	   diabetes	   (Soria	   et	   al.	   2000)	   and	   in	   other	   highly	  
spread	   conditions	   often	   related	   to	   metabolic	   syndrome	   like	   stroke	   (Lindvall,	  
Kokaia,andMartinez-­‐Serrano	  2004).	  	  
Cardiac	   infarction	   (Dimmeler,	  Zeiher,	  and	  Schneider	  2005;	  Segers	  and	  Lee	  2008),	  
spinal	  cord	  injury	  (Keirstead	  et	  al.	  2005),	  and	  wound	  regeneration	  are	  yet	  other	  examples	  
of	   possible	   fields	   of	   application	   for	   stem	   cell	   therapy.	   Moreover,	   among	   the	   most	  
promising	  targets	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  regenerative	  medicine,	  some	  squamous	  epithelium	  
disorders	  can	  already	  be	  successfully	  treated	  with	  stem	  cell	  therapy.	  In	  particular,	  corneal	  
regeneration	  by	  injection	  of	  corneal	  epithelium	  cells	  from	  the	  uninjured	  eye	  of	  the	  same	  
patient	   proved	   an	   effective	   treatment	   for	   eye	   lesions	   and	  burns	   (Pellegrini	  et	   al.	   1997;	  
Rama	  et	  al.	  2010).	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Moreover,	  in	  principle,	  cell	  therapy	  could	  also	  be	  administered	  to	  patients	  through	  
previously	  decellularized	  tissue	  scaffolds,	  as	  recent	  studies	  demonstrate.	  Among	  the	  most	  
remarkable	   success	   in	   recent	   stem	   cell-­‐related	   medicine,	   Macchiarini	   and	   colleagues	  
recently	   implanted	   a	   tissue-­‐engineered	   trachea	   functionalised	  with	  mesenchymal	   stem	  
cell-­‐derived	  chondrocytes	  obtained	  from	  the	  patient	  in	  a	  woman	  with	  a	  bronchial	  disease	  
(Macchiarini	  et	  al.	  2008).	  
To	  the	  same	  aim,	  research	  groups	  have	  also	  deprived	  body	  parts	  of	  their	  cellular	  
content,	   to	   subsequently	   seeded	   them	  with	   cells	   grown	   in	   bioreactors.	   This	   procedure	  
results	  in	  the	  cellular	  functionalization	  of	  bioartificial	  organs	  that	  successfully	  engraft	  and	  
function	   in	   animals	   (Ott	  et	   al.	   2008;	  Ott	  et	   al.	   2010;	   Petersen	  et	   al.	   2010;	  Uygun	  et	   al.	  
2010).	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  with	  few	  exceptions	  that	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  later	  on	  in	  chapter	  4,	  
most	  of	  the	  possibilities	  I	  described	  here	  proved	  feasible	  at	  the	  level	  of	  proof-­‐of-­‐principle	  
studies	   only.	   This	   means	   that	   only	   few	   systematic	   clinical	   studies	   to	   test	   safety	   and	  
efficacy	   of	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   have	   so	   far	   been	   undertaken	   on	   large	   enough	   cohorts	   of	  
human	   participants.	   Therefore,	   evidence	   for	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   as	   a	   doable	   medical	  
practice	  mainly	   comes	   from	   animal	   studies	   and/or	   from	  preliminary	   attempts	   on	   small	  
number	  of	  human	  subjects.	  	  
Moreover,	   many	   of	   these	   studies	   showed	   that	   stem	   cell-­‐based	   regenerative	  
medicine	  will	  have	  to	   face	  serious	  safety	  problems.	  The	  main	  safety	  hurdle	   to	  stem	  cell	  
clinical	   translation	   is	   the	  alleged	  tumorigenicity	  of	  stem	  cells.	  The	  more	  a	  cell	  possesses	  
self-­‐renewal	  ability	  and	  differentiation	  potential,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  higher	  a	  cell	  sits	  in	  the	  
differentiative	  hierarchy,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  it	  will	  give	  rise	  to	  uncontrolled	  growth	  
events	  after	  implantation	  in	  patients’	  bodies.	  Although	  this	  needs	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	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case,	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  in	  animal	  models	  as	  well	  as	  early	  experiments	  with	  brain	  stem	  
cell-­‐grafts	  show	  that	  this	  issue	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  careful	  consideration.	  This	  is	  a	  sticking	  
point	  for	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  even	  if	  what	  researchers	  try	  to	  inject	  are	  fully	  differentiated	  
cells	  originated	   from	   less	  mature	  progenitors.	  Presently,	  purification	  techniques	  are	  still	  
not	  100%	  reliable,	  and	   it	  may	   therefore	  happen,	   for	   instance	   in	   the	  case	  of	  pluripotent	  
embryonic	   stem	   cells,	   that	   teratogenic	   cells	   end	   up	   in	   the	   patient	   together	  with	  more	  
mature	  –	  and	  allegedly	  safer	  –	  ones.	  Obviously,	  such	  an	  issue	  is	  not	  only	  a	  technical	  one.	  
The	  scientific	  community,	  other	  that	  establishing	  safer	  ways	  to	  conduct	  cell	  therapy,	  will	  
indeed	  have	  to	  engage	  in	  extensive	  discussions	  and	  negotiations	  with	  both	  stakeholders	  
and	  regulators	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  thresholds	  of	  ethical	  acceptability	  for	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  
trials	  that	  might	  imply	  such	  serious	  safety	  concerns	  (more	  on	  that	  in	  chapter	  4).	  
In	   the	   light	  of	   these	   risks,	  both	  scientists	  and	  regulators	  have	  so	   far	  been	  rather	  
careful	  and	  slow-­‐paced	  in	  attempting	  and	  approving	  of	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  clinical	  research.	  
The	  obvious	  safety	  concerns	  that	  such	  therapeutic	  approach	  elicits	  are	  therefore	  resulting	  
in	  a	  generally	  cautious	  attitude	  of	  all	  relevantly	  involved	  actors	  to	  wait	  for	  credible	  proof-­‐
of-­‐concept	  studies	  before	  daring	  to	  enter	  long	  and	  costly	  regulated	  pipeline	  of	  innovative	  
cellular	  product	  development.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  early	  attempts	  at	  developing	  new	  stem	  
cell	  therapy	  are	  decisive	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  whole	  field.	  Major	  failures	  in	  terms	  of	  safety	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  ethically	  disappointing	  and	  publicly	  difficult	  to	  justify,	  thereby	  
potentially	   causing	   a	   crisis	   of	   public	   trust	   and	   support	   towards	   the	   field	   of	   stem	   cell	  
regenerative	   medicine	   as	   a	   whole.	   Public	   support	   is	   an	   asset	   that	   cannot	   easily	   be	  
acquired:	   it	  has	  to	  be	  deserved	  and	  maintained	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  stem	  cell	  
research	  actually	  fits	  into	  the	  ideal	  promises	  of	  the	  new	  medicine.	  In	  this	  respect,	  safety,	  
even	  more	  than	  efficacy,	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance.	  The	  value	  of	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  are	  
however	   challenged	   not	   only	   by	   the	   intrinsic	   risk	   of,	   say,	   pluripotent	   cells	   being	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technically	   difficult	   to	   control.	   The	   scientific	   community	   is	   indeed	   extremely	   worried	  
about	   unscrupulous	   clinics	   around	   the	   globe	   offering	   allegedly	   experimental	   new	   stem	  
cell	  therapies	  to	  desperate	  patients	  without	  neither	  the	  necessary	  ethical	  safeguards	  nor	  
the	  desirable	  methodological	  rigour.	  Fraudulent	  attempts	  at	  selling	  unproven	  treatments,	  
allegedly	  comprising	  stem	  cell	  concoctions,	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  was	  labelled	  
stem	  cell	  tourism,	  whereby	  many	  hopeless	  patients	  end	  up	  travelling	  to	  distant	  clinics	  in	  
South-­‐America	  or	  China	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  expensive.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  problem	  in	  
chapter	  4,	  when,	  besides	  reconstructing	  the	  image	  of	  the	  stem	  cell	  research	  subjects	  that	  
is	  emerging	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  stem	  cell	  tourism,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  stem	  cell	  community	  
itself,	   through	   a	   remarkably	   organized	   exercise	   of	   boundary	   construction,	   is	   indeed	  
acquiring	  a	  political	  identity	  through	  patrolling	  the	  demarcation	  between	  acceptable	  and	  
unacceptable	  therapies	  resulting	  from	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  stem	  cell	  tourism.	  	  
2.3	  Personalised	  medicine	  
The	   idea	  of	  personalized	  medicine	  attracted	   the	  attention	  of	   academic	   circles	   in	  
the	   last	   couple	  of	  decades.	   I	   take	   the	  expression	   ‘personalized	  medicine’	   to	  encompass	  
the	  scientific	  undertakings	  devoted	  at	  reducing	  adverse	  drug	  reaction,	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  at	  
customizing	  clinical	  treatments	  to	  increasingly	  stratified	  classes	  of	  patients,	  on	  the	  other	  
(Hedgecoe	  2004;	  Woodcock	  2007;	  Sturdy	  2009).	  	  
The	  hopes	  of	  personalized	  medicine	  channelled	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  public	  hype.	  As	  a	  
result,	  Western	  societies	  are	  now	  about	  to	  endorse	  a	  colossal	  cultural	  enterprise:	  as	  they	  
start	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  get	  ill	  in	  unique	  ways,	  and	  are	  thus	  entitled	  
to	  be	  cured	   in	  unique	  ways,	   they	  are	  consequently	  bound	   to	   redefine	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  
social	   arrangements	   that	   so	   far	   have	   characterized	   the	  provision	  of	   health	   care.	  At	   the	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present	   stage	  of	   sequencing	  and	  genomic	  analysis	   techniques,	  genetic	  profiling	   is	  being	  
offered	  over	   the	   Internet	  without	  medical	   intermediation,	   thus	   re-­‐configuring	  potential	  
patients	  as	   individual	  consumer	  of	  medical	   technologies	   (Curnutte	  and	  Testa	  2011).	  But	  
genetic	  sequencing	  is	  also	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  becoming	  an	  increasingly	  common	  practice	  in	  
national	   health	   care	   systems3.	   Moreover,	   interesting	   correlations	   between	   individual	  
physiological	  parameters	  and	  response	  to	  treatment	  are	  being	  gathered,	  thus	  paving	  the	  
way	  for	   increasingly	   tailored	  medical	  approaches	   (Protani,	  Coory,	  and	  Martin;	  Ewertz	  et	  
al.	  2011).	  Personalized	  medicine	  thus	  envisions	  clinical	  practice	  to	   incorporate	  targeted-­‐
to-­‐patient	  therapies	  that	  might	  prove	  more	  effective	  and	  less	  prone	  to	  adverse	  reactions,	  
than	  those	  established	  by	  more	  traditional	  approaches.	  
In	  the	  anticipated	  future	  of	  personalized	  medicine,	  people	  may	  enter	  into	  contact	  
with	   health	   personnel	   before	   any	   symptom	  will	   even	   arise.	   Their	   genome,	   epigenome,	  
RNA,	   proteome	   and	   metabolites,	   according	   to	   the	   most	   prophetic	   proponents	   of	   this	  
medical	  future	  will	  be	  analysed	  by	  means	  of	  emerging	  new	  high-­‐throughput	  technologies	  
(Hood	  and	  Friend	  2011).	  The	  information	  so	  retrieved,	  coupled	  with	  medical	  records	  and	  
environmental	   information	   will	   be	   compared	   with	   existing	   databases	   to	   look	   for	   the	  
occurrence	  of	  medically	  relevant	  characteristics.	  The	  therapeutic	  intervention	  might	  thus	  
begin	   before	   the	   patient	   presents	   the	   phenotypically	   visible	   signs	   of	   being	   ill,	   thus	  
configuring	   the	   rather	   oxymoric	   figure	   of	   a	   healthy	   patient.	   These	   conditions	   imply	   a	  
proactive	   kind	   of	   agency	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   healthy	   patient	   who	  will	   access	   screening	  
facilities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  familial	  history,	  the	  environment	   in	  which	  she	  lives	  and	  her	  
individual	  attitudes	  towards	  prevention.	  On	  the	  part	  of	  the	  medical	  infrastructure,	  genetic	  
screening	   can	  either	   take	  place	   in	   regular	   clinics	   or	   in	   privately-­‐held	  dedicated	   centres.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   The	   PHG	   Foundation	   has	   recently	   issued	   a	   report	   containing	   recommendations	   to	   the	   British	   National	  
Health	  Service	  as	   to	  how	  to	   integrate	  whole	  genome	  sequencing	   in	   the	  standard	  practices	  of	  health	  care	  
provision	  (Wright	  et	  al.	  2011).	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This,	   in	   both	   cases,	   entails	   the	   existence	   of	   specialized	   personnel	   who	   will	   be	   able	   to	  
perform	  the	  tests,	  retrieve	  the	  information,	  communicate	  it	  to	  the	  patient	  and	  pave	  the	  
way	   for	   the	   medical	   intervention	   proper.	   It	   is	   therefore	   evident	   that	   professional	  
boundary	   work	   is	   likely	   to	   happen,	   and	   that	   setting	   up	   these	   roles	   might	   even	   be	  
conducive	   to	   some	   controversy	   and	   professional	   power	   game.	   Treating,	   so	   to	   say,	   the	  
asymptomatic	   patient	  will	   start	   once	   the	   screening	   reveals	   that	   a	   pathology	   is	   likely	   to	  
arise	   in	   the	   future,	  but	   the	  nature	  of	  such	   intervention	  by	  no	  means	  must	  be	  similar	   to	  
the	  actual	  therapeutic	  strategy	  now	  adopted	  to	  tackle	  the	  disease.	  This	  means	  that,	  from	  
a	  technical	  point	  of	  view,	  tailored	  pre-­‐therapeutic	  interventions	  will	  have	  to	  be	  devised.	  It	  
is	  furthermore	  probable	  that	  those	  interventions	  will	  address	  the	  lifestyle	  of	  the	  patient,	  
or	  her	  working	  environment,	  with	  an	  intensity	  that	  is	  way	  beyond	  what	  is	  currently	  being	  
done	  in	  those	  areas.	  	  
A	   massive	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   established	   social	   practices	   that	   currently	  
surround	   traditional	   medicine,	   may	   also	   come	   from	   the	   interaction	   of	   personalized	  
medicine	  and	  stem	  cell	  science.	   In	  the	   light	  of	  the	  more	  or	   less	  probable	  onset	  of	  given	  
medical	  conditions,	  a	  healthy	  patient	  can	  for	  instance	  decide	  today	  to	  harvest	  and	  store	  
bodily	  tissues	  for	  future	  uses.	  In	  this	  sense	  personalized	  medicine	  comes	  to	  coincide	  with	  
regenerative	  medicine.	   Among	   the	   tissues	   that	   it	   will	   be	   possible	   to	   store,	   adult	   stem	  
cells,	   but	   also	   biopsies	   may	   well	   be	   used	   as	   a	   reservoir	   for	   tailored-­‐to-­‐patient	   cell	  
derivation.	   Such	   practices	   are	   already	   spreading	   today	   as	   the	   increasing	   availability	   of	  
cord	  blood	  banking	  facilities	  testifies.	  Two	  considerations	  are	  in	  order	  here.	  First,	  the	  idea	  
of	  privately	  owned	  stored	  tissues	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  narratives	  of	  generosity,	  altruism,	  
solidarity	   and	  mutuality	   that	   characterize	   the	   circulation	  of	   spare	   tissues	   and	  organs	   in	  
medicine	   today.	   Blood	   and	   organ	   donation,	   for	   instance,	   have	   grown	   together	   with	   a	  
strongly	   charged	  moral	   discourse	   about	   the	   value	   of	   making	   one’s	   body	   function	   as	   a	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healing	   source	   for	   the	  diseased	  bodies	  of	   stranger	   fellow-­‐citizens	   (Waldby	  and	  Mitchell	  
2006).	   With	   private	   banking,	   this	   narrative	   reaches	   a	   dead	   end,	   and	   a	   new,	   equally	  
convincing	  one	  should	  supplant	   it	   in	  order	  for	  these	  new	  practices	  to	  really	  become	  the	  
case.	  With	   this	   consideration	  we	   come	   to	  a	   second	  point	   about	  personalized	  medicine.	  
Stem	   cell	   innovation,	   as	   I	   have	   just	   characterized	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   purposes	   of	  
personalization,	   along	   with	   an	   augmented	   concern	   for	   pre-­‐symptomatic	   patients,	  
transforms	   the	   social	   role	   of	   the	   latter	   into	   one	   of	   consumers	   rather	   than	   of	   serviced	  
citizens	   bearing	   a	   right	   to	   a	   healthy	   status.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   private	   companies	   are	  
already	   offering	   personalized	   genetic	   services	   through	   the	   Internet,	   thus	   bypassing	   the	  
intermediation	  of	  the	  medical	  profession,	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  state	  and,	  even	  more	  so,	  
the	  public	  discussion	  on	  the	  desirability	  of	  those	  changes	  (Curnutte	  and	  Testa	  2011).	  This	  
switch	   towards	   the	   consumerization	   of	   future	   patients	   is	   thus	   likely	   to	   determine	   the	  
attitude	  of	  consumer-­‐patients	  towards	  the	  use	  of	  their	  own	  bodily	  parts	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  personalized	  therapeutic	  possibilities	  that	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  might	  offer	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
These	   transformations	   are	  major	   ones4.	   They	   can	   drastically	   change	   the	   face	   of	  
future	  medicine,	  by	  reshuffling	  the	  boundaries	  between	  medical	  and	  non-­‐medical,	  health	  
and	   prevention,	   and	   by	   configuring	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   modes	   of	   agency	   that	  
supersede	   the	   present	   layout	   of	   the	   doctor-­‐patient-­‐state	   relationship.	   These	   changes	  
should	  thus	  be	  the	  object	  of	  careful	  deliberation	  within	  communities	   that	  are	  bound	  or	  
even	  simply	  likely	  to	  embrace	  it.	  Such	  discussions	  however,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  prominent	  
in	   the	  public	  debate,	  although	  many	  academics	  and	   technology	  specialists	  have	  already	  
been	  engaging	  with	  this	  topics	  for	  a	  few	  years.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4For	  a	  general	  consideration	  of	  the	  ethical,	  legal	  and	  social	  implication	  of	  biomedical	  innovation	  in	  th	  field	  of	  
personalised	   medicine	   see:	   Møldrup	   2000,	   March,	   Cheeseman,	   and	   Doherty	   2001,	   Robertson	   2001,	  
Rothstein	  and	  Epps	  2001,	  Issa	  2002,	  Mancinelli,	  Cronin,	  and	  Sadée	  2002,	  Robertson	  et	  al.	  2002,	  Lipton	  2003,	  
Vaszar,	  Cho,	  and	  Raffin	  2003,	  Hedgecoe	  2004,	  Webster	  et	  al.	  2004,	  Stoughton	  and	  Friend	  2005,	  Burke	  and	  
Psaty	  2007,	  Sturdy	  2009,	  McGuire	  et	  al.	  2010.	  	  
	  72	  
Among	   the	  main	   challenges	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   personalized	  medicine	   is	  
the	   fact	   that,	   in	  order,	   for	   instance,	   for	  genetic	  profiling	   to	  be	   scientifically	  meaningful,	  
huge	   numbers	   of	   people	   should	   consent	   to	   give	   away	   tissue	   samples,	   and	   medically	  
relevant	   personal	   information.	   Before	   becoming	   consumers	   of	   personalized	   medicine,	  
patients	   should	   thus	   become	   partners	   of	   scientific	   research	   in	   the	   gathering	   of	   the	  
necessary	   information.	   The	   creation	   of	   large	   databases	   is	   therefore	   both	   a	   technical	  
challenge	  and	  an	  innovation	  that	  requires	  support	  and	  endorsement	  by	  participants.	  The	  
latter	   however,	   might	   rightfully	   be	   worried	   about	   the	   handling	   of	   incredibly	   sensitive	  
medical	  data	  by	  companies,	  researchers	  and	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  thus	  possible	  to	  envisage	  that	  
in	   order	   to	   make	   large	   rates	   of	   participation	   possible,	   some	   work	   will	   have	   to	   be	  
undertaken	   to	   construct	   a	   credible	   consent	   infrastructure	   that	   protects	   donors	   while	  
allowing	  scientists	  enough	  freedom	  to	  operate.	  Moreover,	  also	  the	  rules	  for	  sharing	  these	  
enormous	  sets	  of	  data	  must	   respond	   to	   the	  expectations	  of	  both	  participants,	  be	   them	  
healthy	  volunteers	  of	  patients	  approached	  in	  a	  clinical	  context,	  and	  researchers.	  It	  is	  thus	  
clear	  that	  demarcation	  between	  research,	  profiling	  and	  therapeutic	  intervention,	  far	  from	  
being	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  distinction,	  must	  reach	  a	  reasonable	  degree	  of	  stabilization	  in	  order	  for	  
personalized	  medicine	  to	  be	  possible.	  	  
2.4	  New	  questions	  for	  the	  new	  medicine	  
To	   the	  extent	   that	   stem	  cell	   research	  and	  application	  happen	   to	   intertwine	  with	  
the	   trajectory	   of	   personalized	  medicine,	   regenerative	  medicine,	   in	   vitro	  modelling,	   and	  
innovative	  drug	  discovery,	  these	  areas	  of	  experimentation	  and	  imagination	  come	  to	  share	  
the	   very	   same	   technical	   and	   societal	   challenges.	  Again,	   this	   process	   is	   characterized	  by	  
apparent	   dynamics	   of	   co-­‐production	   whereby	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   epistemic	   and	  
technical	  resources	  necessary	  to	  bring	  about	  change	  into	  medicine	  and	  health	  provision,	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are	  not	  separable	  from	  the	  effort	  aimed	  at	  making	  these	  innovation	  ethically	  credible	  and	  
socially	  accepted.	  
The	   existing	   regimes	   of	   governability	   for	   medical	   research	   and	   health	   care	  
provision	   have	   indeed	   incorporated	   societal	   concerns	   about	   privacy,	   consent,	   and	  
autonomy	  and	  property	  at	  many	  levels.	  Furthermore	  also	  the	  productivity	  of	  research	  and	  
the	  efficacy	  of	  medicine,	  found	  complex	  statutory	  definitions.	  However,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine,	  in	  its	  various	  realizations	  and	  ramifications,	  it	  has	  become	  
urgent	  to	  ask	  whether	  and	  how	  such	   infrastructure	   is	  ready	  to	   incorporate	  and	  stabilize	  
the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  innovation	  that	  are	  now	  for	  the	  first	  time	  appearing	  at	  reach	  for	  
science	   and	   society.	   In	   this	   complex	   scenario,	   the	   challenge	   of	   anticipating	   ethical	  
criticalities	  that	  are	  already	  investing,	  and	  will	  most	  likely	  characterize	  the	  emergence	  of	  
the	  new	  medicine,	  lays	  before	  us.	  
Some	  commentators	  are	  skeptical	  about	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  innovations	  will	  
leave	  the	  existing	  regulatory	  framework	  of	  research	  and	  medicine	  unchanged.	  Therefore,	  
some	   are	   already	   starting	   to	   offer	   reasoned	   practical	   suggestions	   as	   to	   how	   this	  
framework	  could	  evolve	  to	  became	  able	  to	  address	   the	  new	  challenges.	  Such	  proposals	  
also	   include	   the	   idea	   to	   increase	  direct	  participation	  by	  all	   the	   relevant	   stakeholders	   in	  
the	   discussion	   of	   the	   rules	   that	   will	   govern	   the	   uses	   and	   circulation	   of	   human	   tissues	  
(Gottweis	  and	  Lauss	  2010;	  Gaskell	  and	  Gottweis	  2011).	  
In	   the	   next	   chapters	   I	   will	   thus	   track	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   complex	   web	   of	  
technical,	  ethical	  and	  political	  interaction	  with	  respect	  to	  three	  main	  aspects	  of	  stem	  cell	  
innovation.	  Preliminary	  analyses	  of	  the	  current	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  new	  medicine	  indicate	  
that	  major	  instances	  of	  moral	  disagreement	  and	  political	  instability	  are	  likely	  to	  arise	  with	  
respect	  to:	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Issues	   of	   research	   policy	   -­‐	   How	   is	   the	   governance	   model	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	  
changing	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   application	   to	   medicine?	   How	   can	   regulators	   influence	   the	  
route	  of	  knowledge	  production	  in	  view	  of	  possible	  future	  stem	  cell	  therapies?	  
Issues	  of	  translational	  research:	  What	  challenges	  lay	  ahead	  of	  the	  incipient	  efforts	  
of	   clinical	   researchers	   and	   regulators	   to	   test	   the	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   of	   stem	   cells	   on	  
human	  subjects?	  	  
Issues	   of	   property	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   -­‐	   The	   boundaries	   of	   ownership	   and	  
circulation	   of	   cellular	   entities	   derived	   and	   expanded	   in	  molecular	   labs	   and	   the	   biotech	  
business	  model	  that	  forms	  around	  them	  give	  rise	  to	  critical	  questions:	  should	  stem	  cells	  
be	  patentable	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  How	  can	  the	  construction	  of	  ownership	  barriers	  around	  
stem	   cells	   be	   compatible	   with	   an	   ideal	   of	   serviceable	   science	   and	   just	   distribution	   of	  
health	   care	   resources?	   Are	   the	   interests	   of	   biotech	   and	   Pharma	   companies	   prefiguring	  
the	   future	   consumerization	   of	   stem	   cell	   patients	   and	   the	   commoditization	   of	   health	  
services	  and	  biological	  materials5?	  	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  show	  how	  scientific	  governance	  evolved	  from	  the	  traditional	  
delegation	  model,	  to	  state-­‐centred	  initiatives	  to	  regulate	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research,	  to	  
a	   shared-­‐model	   of	   governance	   characterised	   by	   efforts	   at	   regulatory	   normalisation	   of	  
stem	  cell	  clinical	  research,	  and	  competing	  framings	  of	  this	  technological	  trajectory.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   Ethically	   informed	   social	   science	   perspectives	   on	   these	   two	   topics	   can	   be	   found	   in	   (Henderson	   and	  
Petersen	  2002)	  and	  (Waldby	  and	  Mitchell	  2006).	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Chapter	  3:	  Stem	  cell	  medicine	  and	  the	  
transformation	  of	  scientific	  governance	  	  
This	   chapter	   is	   divided	   into	   two	   parts.	   In	   the	   first	   part	   (3.I)	   I	   will	   illustrate	   the	  
governance	  model	  that	  emerged	  from	  ethical	  controversies	  relative	  to	  stem	  cell	  research.	  
I	   will	   show	   how	   the	   latter	   represents	   a	   marked	   depart	   from	   a	   cherished	   mode	   of	  
governance	  of	  scientific	  activities	  in	  Western	  democracies	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  second	  
world	   war.	   More	   specifically,	   I	   will	   track	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   state-­‐centred	   regulatory	  
model	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  social	  contract	  for	  science.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  
chapter	   (3.II),	   I	  will	   instead	   show	  how	  a	  new	   regulatory	  model	   is	   growing	   around	  early	  
efforts	   at	   translating	   stem	   cells	   to	   the	   clinic.	  My	   general	   aim	  will	   be	   to	   analyse	  where	  
stem	  cell	  innovation	  sits	  in	  such	  a	  complex	  scenario	  and	  what	  specific	  governance	  model	  
is	   emerging	   to	   cope	  with	   its	   novelty.	   I	  will	   therefore	   introduce	  what	   I	   call	   the	   ‘shared-­‐
governance’	   regulatory	   model	   –	   one	   that	   is	   currently	   setting	   a	   rather	   open-­‐ended	  
regulatory	  order	  for	  the	  utilisation	  of	  stem	  cells	  with	  human	  subjects.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  Part	  I:	  The	  legacy	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  
3.I.1	  The	  end	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  
The	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  politics	  has	  been	  the	  object	  of	  studies	  that	  
are	  now	  considered	  classics	  (Bush	  1945;	  Gilpin	  and	  Wright	  1964;	  Price	  1965;	  Lapp	  1965;	  
Lakoff	   1966;	   Polanyi	   1967;	   Merton	   1973).	   An	   intense	   debate	   stemmed	   out	   of	   these	  
classics,	   as	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   such	   relationship	   in	   the	   last	   fifty	   years	   or	   so.	   Two	  
prominent	   features	   emerged	   from	   this	   debate	   as	   characteristic	   of	   science	  policy	   in	   the	  
second	  half	  of	  the	  XX	  century.	  First,	   in	  the	  period	  between	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	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present	   times,	   science	   governance	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   political	   handling	   of	   scientific	  
activities	  both	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  use	  of	  science	  for	  
policy	  decisions	  –	  has	  not	  always	  remained	  the	  same.	  Notwithstanding	  being	  realized	   in	  
institutional	   and	   industrial	   arrangements,	   the	   relationship	   between	   science	   and	  politics	  
has	   changed	   over	   time	   within	   single	   countries	   and	   has,	   furthermore,	   given	   rise	   to	   a	  
variety	  of	  governance	  cultures	  in	  different	  Western	  countries.	  It	  is	  indeed	  uncontroversial	  
from	  this	  body	  of	  academic	  work	   that	  each	  State	  enacted	   its	  own	  governance	  strategy,	  
thereby	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   globally	   heterogeneous	   landscape	   of	   differently	   constrained	  
research	  models.	   This	   feature	  has	   been	   conceptualized	   as	   the	  product	   of	   the	   culturally	  
specific	  ways	  in	  which	  “a	  nation’s	  citizens	  come	  to	  know	  things	  in	  common	  and	  to	  apply	  
their	   knowledge	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   politics”,	   thus	   engendering	   distinctive	   “civic	  
epistemologies”	  (Jasanoff	  2005,	  9).	  
Second,	  a	  major	   turning	  point	   for	   the	  articulation	  of	   the	  science-­‐politics	  nexus	   is	  
the	   rise	   of	   biotechnology	   in	   the	   Seventies.	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   historical	   accounts	   of	  
science	   policy,	   although	   drawing	   on	   diverse	   interpretative	   schemes,	   end	   up	  
acknowledging	   in	   the	   late	  Seventies-­‐early	  Eighties	  a	  moment	  of	   rupture	  with	  previously	  
established	  modalities	  of	  interaction	  between	  science	  and	  politics	  (Guston	  2000,	  ch.	  6).	  
In	  particular,	  the	  latter	  transformation	  has	  been	  understood	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  so-­‐
called	  social	  contract	  for	  science	  (Guston	  2000,	  Ch.	  2,3).	  At	  its	  very	  basics,	  such	  metaphor	  
intends	   to	   capture	   the	  mutually	   supporting	   but	   independent	   relationship	   between	   the	  
state,	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  funding	  to	  science,	  and	  scientists	  that,	  free	  form	  any	  constraints	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  politics	  as	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  their	  research,	  would	  allegedly	  provide	  technical	  
innovation	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  nation,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  
value	   and	   of	   individual	   welfare.	   The	   social	   contract	   for	   science,	   as	   described	   in	   such	  
schematic	   terms,	   is	   not	   just	   an	   arrangement	  between	   institutions	   (science	   and	  political	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power),	  but	  responds	  to	  the	  deep	  cultural	  and	  political	  commitments	  of	  its	  creators.	  It	  is	  
generally	   assumed	   that	   the	   putative	   father	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   is	   Vannevar	   Bush,	   an	  
MIT	   engineer	   who,	   during	   WWII,	   had	   directed	   the	   Office	   of	   Scientific	   Research	   and	  
Development.	   Under	   President	   Roosevelt’s	   request,	   in	   1945,	   Bush	   wrote	   Science:	   The	  
Endless	  Frontier,	  thus	  inspiring	  the	  organization	  of	  US	  post-­‐war	  science	  and	  the	  creation	  
of	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  –	  the	  US	  funding	  agency	  for	  natural	  and	  social	  science	  
other	   than	  medicine,	   already	   sponsored	   by	   the	  National	   Institutes	   of	  Health.	   The	  main	  
theoretical	  legacy	  of	  Bush’s	  account	  is	  the	  Mertonian	  conception	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  
science	   and	   politics,	   the	   sharp	   distinction	   between	   basic	   and	   applied	   science	   –	   a	  
distinction	  that	   influenced	  the	  very	   institutional	  architecture	  of	  university-­‐based	  science	  
in	  the	  decades	  to	  come	  –	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  integrity	  and	  productivity	  guaranteed	  by	  
the	  peer	  review	  system.	  	  
Those	   ideas	   gave	   rise	   to	  widespread	   realisation	   that	   technological	   development	  
occurs	  in	  a	  linear	  manner	  and	  should	  thus	  be	  governed	  accordingly.	  A	  linear	  conception	  of	  
technological	   change	  endorses	   the	  belief	   that	   if	   scientists	  are	   left	   free	   to	   conduct	  basic	  
research,	   the	   knowledge	   they	   produce	  will	   automatically	   be	   taken	   up	   by	   commercially	  
oriented	   industries,	  which	  will	  eventually	  develop	   it	   into	  marketable	  applications	   to	   the	  
benefit	  of	  American	  consumers	  and	  economy.	  
A	   linear	   conception	   of	   technological	   change,	   as	   described	   by	   dedicated	  
scholarship,	  thus	  entails	  that	  the	  only	  possible	  intervention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  politics	  into	  the	  
pipeline	   of	   scientific	   research	   and	   technological	   development	   was	   on	   the	   amount	   of	  
public	   money	   spent	   to	   feed	   basic	   research.	   Under	   the	   assumption	   that	   university	  
scientists	  should	  be	   left	   free	  to	  perform	  basic	  science,	  and	  that	  knowledge	  so	  produced	  
would	   be	   developed	   into	   marketable	   inventions	   by	   the	   commercial	   firms,	   this	   model	  
reinforced	  the	  boundaries	  between	  politics,	  science	  and	  industry.	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This	  classic	  model	  of	  the	  scientific	  estate	  (Price	  1965)	  represented	  a	  blueprint	  for	  
countries	  outside	  the	  US	  as	  well.	  As	  noted	  by	  Jasanoff,	  British	  research	  councils	  as	  well	  as	  
Germany’s	   publicly	   funded	   research	   networks,	   tacitly	   adopted	   these	   modes	   of	  
governance	   for	   knowledge	   production	   and	   technological	   development	   (Jasanoff	   2005,	  
225-­‐6).	  
It	  was	   however	   on	   the	   terrain	   of	   both	   productivity	   and	   integrity	   that	   the	   social	  
contract	  for	  science	  started	  to	  fade	  out.	  Scientific	  fraud	  and	  misconduct	  episodes	  hit	  the	  
attention	  of	  a	  wider	  public	  in	  the	  early	  Eighties	  (Broad	  and	  Wade	  1982;	  LaFollette	  1992),	  
when	  Democrat	  Representative	  Al	  Gore	  held	  famous	  hearings	  at	  Capitol	  Hill	  on	  fraud	  in	  
biomedical	   research.	   This	   awareness	   resulted	   in	   the	   intensification	   of	   governmental	  
oversight	   on	   research	   and	   in	   a	   progressive	   decline	   of	   public	   trust	   in	   the	   enterprise	   of	  
science.	   Integrity	   became	   so	   troubling	   for	   the	   political	   infrastructure	   that	   supported	  
science	  in	  the	  States,	  that	  in	  1989	  the	  NIH	  was	  compelled	  to	  install	  an	  Office	  of	  Scientific	  
Integrity	   (OSI)	   “which	   in	   the	  course	  of	   its	  brief	  existence	  attempted	   through	   its	  policies	  
and	   procedures	   to	   maintain	   the	   separation	   between	   politics	   and	   science	   that	  
characterized	   the	   social	   contract	   for	   science”	   (Guston	   2000,	   88).	   A	   few	   years	   later,	   in	  
1992,	  OSI	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  Office	  for	  Research	  Integrity	  (ORI),	  a	  boundary	  organization	  
at	   the	   intersection	   of	   politics	   and	   science	   aimed	   at	   establishing	   procedures	   to	   avoid	  
misdeeds,	  and	  at	  adjudicating	  allegations	  of	  misconduct	  (Guston	  2000,	  ch	  4).	  	  
As	   to	   productivity,	   the	   governance	   structure	   of	   science,	   based	   on	   the	   social	  
contract	  that	  Bush	  had	  initially	  devised,	  and	  theorists	  like	  Polanyi	  had	  further	  elaborated	  
(Polanyi	  1967),	  suddenly	  fell	  apart	  in	  1980.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  biotechnology,	  the	  possibility	  
of	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  basic	  science	  and	  the	  industrial	  application	  and	  commercial	  
exploitation	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   became	   ever	  more	   tempting.	  Moreover,	   given	   the	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difficult	  economic	  conditions	  affecting	  the	  US	  in	  those	  years,	  American	  politicians	  began	  
to	  look	  at	  scientific	  innovation	  as	  a	  potential	  driver	  for	  economic	  growth.	  	  
With	  the	  emergence	  of	  biotechnology	  in	  the	  Seventies,	  the	  latter	  thus	  came	  to	  be	  
identified	  as	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  a	  national	  effort	  to	  reacquire	  global	  economic	  and	  scientific	  
supremacy.	   Allegedly	   however,	   the	   social	   contract	   model	   did	   not	   contain	   sufficient	  
incentives	   to	   make	   that	   possible,	   and	   the	   sharp	   separation	   between	   university	   and	  
commercial	   science	   had	   to	   collapse	   in	   order	   to	   attract	   investments	   and	   lead	   to	   the	  
formation	  of	  partnerships	  between	  universities	  and	  the	  industry.	  	  
To	   this	   aim,	   patent	   protection	   was	   finally	   introduced	   also	   for	   state	   sponsored	  
research	  as	  in	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  passed	  in	  1980.	  This	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  thirty-­‐year	  long	  
narrative	   according	   to	   which	   “the	   results	   of	   research	   supported	   by	   grants	   of	   public	  
moneys	   should	   be	   utilized	   in	   the	  manner	  which	   best	   serves	   the	   public	   interest	   [which	  
generally	  occurs]	   if	   inventive	  advances	   resulting	   therefrom	  are	  made	   freely	  available	   to	  
the	  Government,	  to	  science,	  to	  industry,	  and	  to	  the	  general	  public”	  (Guston	  2000,	  118-­‐9).	  
The	  direct	   contribution	  of	   the	  patent	  bill	   on	  American	  university-­‐based	   research	  
has	   been	   a	  matter	   of	   scholarly	   controversy	   (Mowery	   et	   al.	   2001;	  Mowery	   and	   Sampat	  
2005).	   It	  was	   however	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Bayh-­‐Dole	   Act,	   that	   university	   labs	  
became	  increasingly	  more	  connected	  with	  the	  emerging	  industry	  of	  biotechnology	  start-­‐
ups,	  as	  offices	  of	  technology	  transfer	  worked	  aggressively	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  scientific	  
research	  and	   industrial	   application.	   In	   this	   sense,	   biotechnology	  worked	  as	   a	  model	   for	  
science	   at	   large,	   as	   to	   the	   necessity	   to	   abandon	   the	   linear	   model	   of	   technological	  
development	   that	   the	   social	   contract	   had	   endorsed.	   The	   pervasiveness	   of	   such	  model,	  
however,	  is	  testified	  by	  the	  Stevenson-­‐Wydler	  Technology	  Innovation	  Act	  (1980),	  stating	  
that	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«[m]any	   new	   discoveries	   and	   advances	   in	   science	  
occur	   in	   universities	   and	   Federal	   laboratories,	   while	   the	  
application	   of	   this	   new	   knowledge	   to	   commercial	   and	  
useful	   public	   purposes	   depends	   largely	   upon	   actions	   by	  
business	  and	  labor»	  (Senate	  and	  House	  of	  Representatives	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  1980).	  	  
Stevenson-­‐Wydler	   thus	   sings	   the	   departure	   from	   the	   linear	   model	   towards	  
relevantly	   different	   regimes	   of	   governability	   for	   science	   production	   and	   technological	  
development.	  This	  shift	  in	  the	  governance	  model	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  
dismiss	  the	  linear	  model,	  declared	  right	  after	  as	  the	  text	  continues:	  “[c]ooperation	  among	  
academia,	  Federal	  laboratories,	  labor,	  and	  industry,	  in	  such	  forms	  as	  technology	  transfer,	  
personnel	  exchange,	   joint	   research	  projects,	  and	  others,	  should	  be	  renewed,	  expanded,	  
and	  strengthened”	  (idem).	  
Analogous	  patterns	  of	  change	  from	  the	  social	  contract	  model	  to	  the	  explosion	  of	  
biotechnology	  as	  both	  a	  science	  and	  an	   industry	  are	  detectable	   in	  Countries	  other	   than	  
the	   United	   States,	   where	   the	   model	   of	   scientific	   governance	   also	   inexorably	   veered	  
toward	   the	   construction	   of	   ever	   firmer	   bonds	   between	   universities	   and	   commercial	  
companies.	  	  
Scholars	  have	  analyzed	  the	  features	  of	  the	  linear	  model	  by	  stressing	  that	  it	  did	  not	  
require	   any	   coordinating	   activity	   on	   the	   part	   of	   sponsoring	   institutions	   and	   that	   the	  
political	   community	   was	   not	   charged	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   incentivising	   scientists	   towards	  
specific	   areas	   of	   research	   (Alic	   et	   al.	   1992;	   Guston	   2000,	   chapter	   5).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  
model	  employs	  a	  narrative	  that	  sees	  science	  and	  innovation	  as	  agents	  in	  a	  free	  market	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  items	  of	  high	  scientific	  content.	  The	  market	  is	  stable	  enough	  to	  attain	  two	  
prominent	  goals	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  First,	  it	  feeds	  consumers’	  demand	  without	  the	  need	  of	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any	  steering	  activity.	  Second	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  stable	  innovation	  environment	  for	  new	  basic	  
research	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   and	   for	   new	   technological	   product	   to	   emerge	   from	   such	  
knowledge.	   The	   beneficial	   effect	   of	   such	   market	   dynamics	   is	   given	   for	   granted	   and	  
remained	  unquestioned	  for	  decades.	  	  
The	   model	   however,	   obscures	   the	   cultural	   and	   power	   relations	   that	   the	   social	  
contract	   for	   science	   harboured.	   In	   particular,	   it	   black	   boxed	   the	   embeddedness	   of	  
knowledge	   and	   technology	   delivery	   into	   the	   capitalist	  mode	   of	   production	   in	   post-­‐war	  
America,	  with	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  this	  entailed	  and	  the	  peculiar	  construction	  of	  the	  
consumer	  as	   the	  central	   subject	  of	  American	  politics.	  The	  narrative	  of	   the	   linear	  model	  
helped	   to	   set	   science	   and	   technology	   outside	   of	   the	   public’s	   eye,	   by	   providing	  
reassurance	   as	   to	   the	  beneficial	   public	   effects	   of	   letting	   scientists	   and	   technologists	   do	  
their	  job	  in	  relative	  isolation.	  This	  self-­‐regulative	  character,	  I	  would	  add,	  installed	  science	  
and	   technology	   production	   into	   a	   politically	   empty	   space,	   where	   scientific	   and	  
technological	   accountability	   was	   not	   at	   stake,	   if	   not	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   re-­‐stating	   how	  
citizens	  and	  the	  nation	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  race	  to	  technological	  development.	  	  
	  STS	   scholarship	   has	   played	   a	   major	   scholarly	   role	   in	   highlighting	   that,	   “[this]	  
picture	  has	  contradictory	  implications	  for	  democratic	  accountability	  [as]	  in	  each	  country,	  
governmental	   efforts	   to	   build	   closer	   ties	   between	   academia	   and	   industry	   opened	   rifts	  
between	  the	  practices	  of	  science	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  democracy”	  (Jasanoff	  2005,	  227).	  
Driven	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  interpretation,	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  started	  to	  
stress	   the	   democratic	   deficit	   of	   science	   and	   technology	   governance	  over	   the	   last	   thirty	  
years.	  The	  distance	  between	  science	  governance	  and	  democratic	  legitimation,	  grew	  in	  the	  
long	   years	   when	   science	   and	   technology	   flourished	   in	   isolation	   from	   public	   discourses	  
about	   their	  content,	   their	  modes	  of	  production	  and,	  most	   importantly,	   their	   role	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  wider	  aims	  of	  the	  democratic	  polity.	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Indeed,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  for	  science,	  provided	  impetus	  for	  the	  social	  
science	  to	  re-­‐think	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  the	  science-­‐politics	  relationship,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
may	  take	  citizens	  values	  and	  expectations	  in	  due	  consideration.	  Most	  commentators	  see	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   as	   a	   precondition	   to	   such	   transformed	   political	   program	  
and,	  in	  particular,	  stress	  the	  fading	  away	  of	  the	  linear	  model	  as	  the	  most	  tangible	  sign	  of	  
this	   transformation.	   With	   reference	   to	   the	   1980	   Act	   on	   technological	   innovation,	   for	  
example,	  Guston	  maintains	  that	  “[o]nly	  with	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  for	  science	  
[was]	  such	  policy,	  focusing	  on	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  innovation	  process	  other	  than	  research	  
inputs,	   possible”(Guston	   2000,	   118).	   I	   would	   contest	   however,	   that	   the	   self-­‐regulatory	  
model	   of	   technological	   development	   no	   longer	   plays	   any	   distinctive	   role	   in	   the	  
governance	   of	   scientific	   innovation	   today.	   As	   I	   will	   show	   in	   due	   course	   later	   in	   this	  
chapter,	  albeit	  in	  a	  completely	  transformed	  political	  environment,	  market-­‐inspired	  ideals	  
of	   scientific	   self-­‐regulation	   still	   play	   a	   part	   in	   the	   kind	   of	   boundary	  work	   that	   occupies	  
biotechnological	  development	  today.	  In	  the	  end,	  claims	  to	  self-­‐regulation	  are	  integral	  to	  
the	  highly	  contested	  regulatory	  landscape	  of	  biotechnological	  research.	  It	  is	  true	  however	  
that,	   in	   the	   face	  of	   the	   rather	   stagnant	   condition	  of	   biomedical	   innovation,	   the	   idea	  of	  
politically	   coordinating	   the	   global	   race	   to	   new	   drugs	   and	   biomedical	   technologies	   is	  
gaining	  consensus	  even	  within	  actors	  that	  are	  traditionally	  hostile	  to	  political	  interference	  
like	  the	  industry	  and	  venture	  capital	  firms.	  	  
Stem	  cell	   research,	  on	   its	   part,	   has	  been	   the	  object	  of	   numerous	  nation-­‐specific	  
efforts	   to	   control	  moral	   disagreement.	  Mainly	   due	   to	   embryo-­‐related	   concerns	   and	   to	  
moral	  issues	  regarding	  cloning,	  States	  have	  tried	  to	  regulate	  the	  derivation	  of	  human	  ES	  
cells	   ever	   since	   they	   first	   appear	   on	   the	   scientific	  market	   back	   in	   1998.	   The	   regulatory	  
arrangements	  that	  resulted	  from	  such	  efforts	  qualify	  as	  instances	  of	  revision	  of	  the	  social	  
contract	  for	  science	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  linear	  model	  of	  technological	  development,	  even	  in	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countries	   that	   ended	   up	   adopting	   legislation	   that	  was	   favourable	   to	   stem	   cell	   research	  
like	  the	  UK.	  	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  content	  of	  legislative	  initiatives	  taken	  to	  regulate	  the	  derivation	  
of	  hES	   cells,	   and	   regardless	  of	   the	  kind	  of	  negotiations	   that	  gave	   rise	   to	   these	   complex	  
regulations,	   all	   these	   attempts	   show	   a	   common	   feature.	   The	   morally	   problematic	  
character	  of	  stem	  cell	  research,	  so	  to	  say,	  emerged	  as	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  
science.	  States	  in	  the	  West	  abandoned	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  production	  of	  science	  was	  by	  no	  
means	   to	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  political	   initiative,	  and	  decided	   to	   intervene	  on	   the	  ways	  
stem	  cell	  science	  was	  performed.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  however,	  the	  availability	  of	  research	  
funding	  was	  used	  as	  a	  leverage	  to	  channel	  the	  content	  of	  scientific	  research	  towards	  one	  
direction	   rather	   than	   another.	   In	   the	   years	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   for	   science,	   political	  
awareness	  had	  indeed	  grown	  regarding	  the	  importance	  of	  public	  money	  to	  the	  scientific	  
enterprise.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  early	  episodes	  of	  political	  control	  on	  the	  use	  of	  foetal	  tissue	  
for	  research	  however,	  the	   idea	  that,	  once	  funded,	  science	  could	  not,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  
controlled	  had	  definitely	  faded	  away.	  	  
Let	  us	  then	  recall	  the	  major	  episodes	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  embryo	  use	  and	  cloning	  
for	  stem	  cell	  research	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  Europe.	  This	  survey,	  however,	  will	  only	  sketch	  the	  
regulatory	   landscape	  of	  stem	  cell	   research	  regulation,	  given	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  already	  
copious	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  topic.	  My	  aim	  will	  be	  that	  of	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  charting	  
the	  emergence	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  stem	  cell	   regulation	   in	  the	  subsequent	  sections	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  so	  as	  to	  discuss	  a	  comprehensive	  array	  of	  governance	  options	  in	  the	  end.	  	  
3.I.2	  From	  self-­‐governance	  to	  state	  regulation:	  antecedents	  
The	   emergence	   of	   new	   governance	   models	   to	   replace	   the	   social	   contract	   for	  
science	   has	   a	   lot	   to	   do	   with	   debates	   on	   the	   use	   of	   organs	   for	   transplantation,	   the	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protection	   of	   human	   subject	   in	   biomedical	   research,	   the	   rise	   of	   biotechnology	   in	   the	  
Seventies,	  and	  the	   issue	  of	  using	  tissue	  from	  elective	  abortions.	  A	  multifarious	  direction	  
of	  change	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  unsettling	  biomedical	  advancements	  and	  
biotechnological	  progresses	  shaped	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  around	  them.	  I	  will	  now	  
recall	  a	   few	  prominent	  examples	   from	  the	  regulatory	  history	  of	   the	   last	   few	  decades	  to	  
show	   this	   trend.	   I	   will	   maintain	   that,	   as	   to	   the	   models	   of	   governance	   for	   post-­‐social	  
contract	   science,	   state-­‐centred	   initiatives	   absorbed	   efforts	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   scientific	  
community	  to	  preserve	  the	  privilege	  of	  self-­‐regulation.	  The	  coexistence	  and	  the	  tension	  
between	  these	  two	  models	  of	  science	  governance	  (state-­‐centred	  and	  self-­‐regulated)	  are	  
still	  evident	  in	  the	  main	  regulatory	  events	  of	  stem	  cell	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  current	  
rising	  of	  new	  governance	  options	  for	  the	  use	  of	  cell-­‐based	  medicinal	  products.	  	  
Organs	  and	  death	  
As	  early	  attempts	  at	  using	  organ	  transplantation	  began	   in	  Harvard	   in	   the	  Sixties,	  
an	   ad	   hoc	   committee	   was	   created	   at	   Harvard	   Medical	   School	   to	   establish	   acceptable	  
criteria	  of	  donor	  death	  declaration.	  The	  Ad	  Hoc	  Committee	  of	  Harvard	  Medical	  School	  for	  
Examining	   the	  Definition	  of	  Brain	  Death	  promptly	   issued	  a	   report	   that	  appeared	  on	   the	  
Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  (Anon.	  1968).	  	  
The	  paper,	  written	  by	  a	  panel	  mainly	   composed	  of	  physicians,	   intended	   to	   clear	  
the	  way	  from	  “obsolete	  criteria	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  death	  [that]	  can	  lead	  to	  controversy	  
in	  obtaining	  organs	  for	  transplantation”	  (Anon.	  1968,	  337).	  It	  thus	  spoke	  the	  language	  of	  
scientific	  modernization	   –	   one	   that	   can	   extend	   its	   reach	   to	   bear	   on	  philosophical	   ideas	  
about	   life	   and	   death.	   But	   the	   panel	  was	   also	   aware	   of	   the	   increasing	   cultural	   pressure	  
elicited	  by	  advancing	  biomedicine,	  hence	  the	  necessity	  to	  adjust	  an	  outworn	  conceptual	  
landscape	  to	  the	  new	  emerging	  necessities	  of	  science.	  The	  paper	  was	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  
how	  the	  production	  of	  social	  order	  and	  that	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  reciprocally	  interacted	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to	   stabilize	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   technology	   like	   organ	   transplantation.	   Most	  
importantly	   to	   our	   concerns	   here,	   the	   report	   assumed	   that	   the	   medical	   doctors	  
themselves	  could	  manage	  the	  wider	  cultural	  and	  societal	  consequences	  of	  their	  job,	  and	  
that	   the	   appropriate	   audience	   for	   those	   reflection	   was	   the	   professionally	   coherent	  
readership	   of	   JAMA.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Harvard	   Committee,	   the	   wider	  
consequences	  of	  introducing	  a	  major	  surgical	  innovation	  were	  taken	  care	  for	  by	  the	  very	  
same	   institutional	   and	   professional	   groups	   of	   people	   that	   were	   actually	   attempting	   to	  
develop	  such	  novelty.	  	  
If	   this	   attempt	   at	   self-­‐regulation	   seems	   in	   line	   with	   the	   tenets	   of	   scientific	  
independency	  heralded	  by	  the	  social	  contract,	  a	  crackle	   in	   the	   framing	  of	   the	   latter	  has	  
nonetheless	  to	  be	  noticed.	  Allegedly	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  biomedicine	  had	  to	  provide	  public	  
(albeit	   in	   a	   rather	   restricted	   sense)	   justification	   for	   its	   activity,	   as	   it	   started	   to	   exert	   a	  
destabilizing	  cultural	  influence	  on	  its	  surroundings.	  This	  instance	  of	  scientific	  engagement	  
in	   justificatory	   practices	   within	   the	   public	   sphere,	   signals	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	   social	  
contract	  model	  and	  points	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	  new	  modalities	   to	  cope	  with	   the	  moral	  
disagreements	  that	  biomedicine	  can	  provoke.	  
The	   1968	   report	   from	   the	   Harvard	   committee,	   however,	   gave	   rise	   to	   endless	  
controversies	  over	  the	  most	  appropriate	  definition	  of	  death,	  to	  assure	  that	  explant	  from	  
dying	   donors	  was	   undertaken	   under	   ethically	   acceptable	   circumstances.	   Importantly,	   it	  
has	  to	  be	  noticed	  that	  such	  debate	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  Defining	  Death,	  the	  1981	  report	  
of	   the	   President’s	   Commission	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	   Medicine	   and	  
Biomedical	  and	  Behavioral	  Research	   (Anon.	  1981).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   governance,	   the	   self-­‐
regulative	  model	  of	  the	  Harvard	  commission	  simply	  could	  not	  provide	  enough	  support	  to	  
a	   practice	   as	   culturally	   unsettling	   as	   organ	   explantation.	   With	   Defining	   Death	   the	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insufficiency	   of	   the	   self-­‐regulatory	  model	   of	   science	   governance	   becomes	   apparent.	   In	  
the	  words	  of	  the	  report,	  	  
«medical	   criteria	   alone	   cannot	   meet	   the	   public	  
concern,	   which	   arose	   not	   only	   because	   of	   advances	   that	  
complicated	   the	  decisions	   of	   physicians,	   but	   also	   because	  
the	  public	  perceived	  a	  departure	  from	  long-­‐accepted	  social	  
standards	  for	  differentiating	  life	  and	  death.	  This	  departure	  
seemed	   to	   have	  momentous	   implications	   for	  many	   social	  
practices	  and	  institutions»	  (Anon.	  1981,	  40:45).	  	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  “the	  definition	  of	  death	  can	  touch	  social	  life	  so	  
profoundly,	  […]	  the	  need	  for	  law	  is	  perceived”	  (ibidem).	  The	  document	  by	  the	  presidential	  
commission	  acknowledged	  a	  plurality	  of	  normative	  sources	  for	  the	  legitimation	  of	  public	  
decisions	   on	   organ	   donation,	   including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   medical	   authority.	   The	  
commission	   thus	   conceived	   of	   a	   gradient	   of	   increasingly	   stabilizing	   and	   legitimizing	  
sources	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  scientific	  matters	  that	  spanned	  from	  professional	  authority	  
to	  judicial	  review	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  to	  national	  and,	  eventually,	  federal	  regulation.	  This	  
new	  model	  is	  plural	  in	  acknowledging	  such	  variety	  but	  clearly	  confer	  to	  the	  highest	  ranks	  
of	  the	  legislative	  pyramid.	  	  
Genetic	  engineering	  
Very	  much	  around	  the	  same	  period	  of	  time,	  a	  similar	  regulatory	  trajectory	  could	  
be	   seen	   to	   be	   at	   work	   in	   the	   case	   of	   recombinant-­‐DNA	   (r-­‐DNA).	   When	   in	   the	   early	  
Seventies	  r-­‐DNA	  technology	  became	  a	  reality,	  suddenly	  the	  scientific	  community,	  as	  well	  
as	  politics	  and	  society	  at	  large,	  realized	  that	  something	  had	  changed	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  
scientists	  could	  do	  in	  the	  lab.	  Molecular	  biology,	  so	  far	  sheltered	  in	  esoteric	  laboratories,	  
and	  thus	  removed	  from	  the	  public	  eyes,	  turned	  into	  a	  major	  site	  of	  collective	  imagination,	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as	  soon	  as	  DNA,	  a	  symbolic	  reservoir	  of	  human	  identity	  par	  excellence,	  became	  amenable	  
to	   previously	   unthinkable	   manipulations.	   As	   early	   as	   in	   1974,	   a	   National	   Academy	   of	  
Sciences	  appointed	  committee	  autonomously	  decided	  to	  suspend	  research	  on	  r-­‐DNA	  until	  
the	   risks	   connected	   to	   this	   technology	   were	   qualified.	   One	   year	   later,	   in	   the	   famous	  
Asilomar	   conference,	   the	   scientific	   community	   gathered	   to	   discuss	   those	   risks	   and	   to	  
devise	  measures	  to	  manage	  their	  containment.	  Asilomar	  framed	  the	  risk	  of	  using	  r-­‐DNA	  
mainly	   in	   terms	   of	   containment	   of	   the	   organisms	   used	   to	   perform	   recombination	  
experiments.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact	   however,	   the	   guidelines	   resulting	   from	   the	   Asilomar	  
conference	  represent	  a	  sociologically	  relevant	  example	  of	  an	  emerging	  governance	  model	  
for	   biotechnological	   research.	   The	   scientific	   community	   used	   Asilomar	   to	   convey	   an	  
image	   of	   itself.	   The	   self-­‐imposed	   moratorium	   and	   the	   guidelines	   for	   risk	   containment	  
purportedly	  showed	  that	  the	  scientific	  community	  was	  able	  to	   isolate	  and	  to	  define	  the	  
public	   consequences	   of	   technological	   development	   on	   its	   own.	   In	   this	   sense,	   science	  
qualified	   as	   a	   competent	   moral	   partner	   in	   social	   co-­‐operation,	   rather	   than	   an	  
accomplished	   bearer	   of	   purely	   technical	   expertise.	   This	   all	   effort	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   not	  
only	   proved	   the	   confidence	   of	   the	   scientific	   community	   in	   its	   capacity	   to	   control	   the	  
behaviour	  of	   its	   individual	  members,	  but	  also	  showed	  that	  science	  was	  good	  at	   sensing	  
the	   wider	   social	   worries	   that	  may	   arise	   about	   its	   use,	   and	   at	   taking	  measure	   to	  meet	  
those	   preoccupations	   (Blasimme	   2011).	   It	   didn’t	   take	   much	   however,	   that	   this	   self-­‐
regulative	  model	  showed	  inadequate	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  rising	  concerns	  over	  the	  use	  of	  r-­‐
DNA.	   In	   1982,	   President	   Carter’s	   Commission	   on	   the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	  
Medicine	   and	   Biomedical	   and	   Behavioral	   Research,	   issued	   a	   report	   titled	   Splicing	   Life,	  
affirming	   that	   “[t]he	   recent	  work	   in	  molecular	   genetics	  may	   again	   unseat	   some	  widely	  
held—if	  only	  dimly	  perceived—views	  about	  humanity’s	  place	   in	  nature	  and	  even	  about	  
the	  meaning	  of	  being	  human,	  [so	  that]	  it	  cannot	  be	  long	  before	  the	  new	  knowledge	  and	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new	   scientific	   powers	   begin	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   general	   thinking”	   (President’s	  
Commission	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Ethical	   Problems	   in	   Biomedical	   and	   Behavioral	   Research	  
1982,	   17).	   The	   perception	   that	   molecular	   biology	   was	   likely	   to	   elicit	   “deep	   anxieties”	  
(idem,	  2)	   in	   the	  public,	   lead	   to	   the	   realization	   that	  public	  oversight	  was	   indeed	  missing	  
about	  the	  wider	  social	  implication	  of	  scientific	  research.	  The	  Commission	  suggested	  that	  
public	   organs	   be	   responsible	   for	   advising	   policy-­‐makers	   as	   to	   the	   technical	   and	   ethical	  
consequences	   of	   biotechnological	   innovations	   such	   as	   r-­‐DNA.	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   that,	  
already	   in	   this	   early	   phase	   of	   biotechnology,	   and	   notwithstanding	   the	  mainly	   scientific	  
composition	   of	   the	   President’s	   Commission,	   the	   suggestion	   arose	   that	   ethical	   analysis	  
should	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  not	  exclusively	  by	  politicians,	  nor	  by	  scientists	  alone.	  To	  this	  
last	   point,	   the	   report	   clearly	   recognizes	   that	   “[t]he	   careful	   attention	   paid	   by	   scientists,	  
private	  groups,	  and	  government	  officials	  to	  the	  immediate	  health	  and	  environmental	  risks	  
has	   been	   rewarded	   with	   a	   record	   of	   safe	   and	   fruitful	   research	   and	   development”	  
(President’s	  Commission	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Ethical	  Problems	   in	  Biomedical	  and	  Behavioral	  
Research	  1982,	  81).	  However	  it	  also	  reminds	  that	  “[t]he	  issues	  [of	  genetic	  engineering]are	  
so	  wide-­‐ranging	  as	  to	  require	  a	  process	  that	  is	  broad-­‐based	  rather	  than	  primarily	  expert,	  
since	   the	   issues	   cannot	   be	   resolved	   on	   technical	   grounds	   alone	   and	   since	  many	   of	   the	  
most	  knowledgeable	  scientists	  are	  deeply	  involved	  in	  the	  field	  as	  researchers	  or	  even	  as	  
entrepreneurs”	  (President’s	  Commission	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Ethical	  Problems	  in	  Biomedical	  
and	   Behavioral	   Research	   1982,	   82).	   Ideally,	   an	   enlarged	   panel	   comprising	   scientists,	  
members	  of	  professional	  organizations,	   representatives	   from	   the	   industry,	   specialists	   in	  
ethics,	   law	  and	  religion,	  as	  well	  as	  of	   lay	  members	  of	  the	  citizenry	  should	  discuss	   issues	  
generated	   by	   the	   advancement	   of	   science	   and	   biotechnology.	   The	   history	   of	   state	  
regulation	  of	  biotechnology	  thus	  initiates	  with	  the	  perceived	  necessity	  to	  make	  discussion	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and	  decision-­‐making	   as	   accountable	   as	   possible	   to	   a	  wider	   public	   than	   to	   the	   scientific	  
research	  community	  alone.	  	  
Foetal	  research	  
Among	   the	   issues	  under	  discussion	   in	   those	   times,	   there	  was	  also	   the	  possibility	  
for	   biomedical	   researchers	   to	   use	   tissues	   of	   electively	   aborted	   foetuses	   to	   conduct	  
scientific	   investigations	  and	  to	  attempt	  clinical	  applications.	  Foetal	  tissue	  had	  effectively	  
been	   used	   in	   biomedicine	   to	   develop	   vaccines	   against	   polio	   and	   rubella	   (1950s).	  
Furthermore,	   a	   number	   of	   diagnostic	   advancements	  were	  made	  possible	   by	   the	  use	  of	  
foetal	  tissue	  samples	  including	  Rh	  incompatibility	  detection,	  amniocentesis,	  detection	  of	  
developmental	  abnormalities,	  development	  of	  obstetrical	  anaesthesia	  and	  treatments	  for	  
maternal	  conditions	  (Institute	  of	  Medicine	  1994).	  	  
Moreover,	   aborted	   foetuses	   represent	   one	   possible	   source	   of	   stem	   cells	   to	   be	  
used	   in	   medicine	   and	   research.	   Cell	   lines	   of	   foetal	   origin	   were	   established	   during	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   polio	   vaccine,	   and	   their	   sustained	   proliferative	   potential	   was	  
exploited	   for	   that	   purpose.	   Furthermore,	   the	   absence	   of	   mature	   surface	   markers	   on	  
neuronal	   stem	   cells	   in	   foetal	   brains	   makes	   them	   an	   immunologically	   apt	   to	  
transplantation	  in	  patients	  with	  neurodegenerative	  diseases.	  	  
Indeed,	   tissue	   from	   aborted	   foetuses	   was	   employed	   in	   experimental	  
transplantation	   for	   various	   conditions	   like	   Di	   George	   Syndrome,	   Parkinson’s	   disease,	  
Alzheimer’s	  disease,	  and	  spinal	   cord	   injury,	  but	  also	   leukaemia,	  aplastic	  anaemia,	  blood	  
clotting	  disorders	  and	  juvenile	  diabetes	  (Coutts	  2009).	  	  
These	   medical	   possibilities	   however	   intercepted	   the	   harsh	   debate	   on	   the	  
legalization	  of	  abortion	  in	  the	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  and	  the	  worries	  
elicited	   by	   the	   already	   mentioned	   scandals	   on	   the	   inhumane	   treatment	   of	   biomedical	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research	  subjects.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  many	  commentators	  were	  worried	  of	  the	  possibility	  
that,	   linking	  clinical	  utility	   to	   the	  practice	  of	   voluntary,	  would	  project	  a	   favourable	   light	  
onto	  the	  practice	  of	  abortion	  itself.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  another	  major	  point	  of	  
controversy	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   foetal	   tissue	   research	   was	   relative	   to	   the	   perceived	  
disrespectful	  treatment	  of	  the	  unborn	  on	  the	  part	  of	  researchers	  performing	  mutilations	  
to	   harvest	   tissue	   from	   foetuses.,	   This	   line	   of	   argument	   often	   included	   the	   idea	   that	  
research	  on	   foetuses,	   other	   than	  being	  morally	   unscrupulous	  per	   se,	  might	  be	   the	   first	  
step	   towards	   the	  kind	  of	  moral	  perverseness	  of	  Nazi	  experiments	   (Bopp	  and	  Burtchaell	  
1988).	  	  
The	  same	  National	  Commission	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Subjects	  of	  Biomedical	  
and	  Behavioral	  Research	  that	  was	  working	  on	  what	  will	  then	  become	  the	  Belmont	  Report	  
(1979),	  was	  thus	  charged	  to	   investigate	  also	  the	  medical	  and	  ethical	  prospects	  of	   foetal	  
tissue	   research.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   in	   1974,	   the	   Department	   of	   Health,	   Education	   and	  
Welfare	   (HEW)	   banned	   public	   funding	   on	   foetal	   tissue	   research.	   The	   Commission	   held	  
public	   hearings	   and	   collected	   opinions	   from	   scientists,	   philosophers	   and	   legal	   scholar,	  
eventually	  resulting	  in	  the	  1975	  recommendation	  to	  lift	  the	  ban	  and	  proceed	  with	  foetal	  
tissue	  research.	  	  
Analogous	  liberal	  provisions	  were	  adopted	  by	  dedicated	  commissions	  and	  advisory	  
panels	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  outside	  the	  US	  (Coutts	  2009,	  II).	  
Although	   in	   a	   climate	   of	   unsettled	   moral	   disagreement,	   foetal	   tissue	   research	  
continued	   nonetheless,	   until	   it	   became	   again	   a	   matter	   of	   public	   controversy	   in	   1987.	  
Lured	  by	  apparently	   successful	  experiments	  with	   the	   transplantation	  of	   foetal	  neuronal	  
tissue	  into	  the	  brain	  of	  two	  Parkinson’s	  patients	  (Madrazo	  et	  al.	  1987),	  NIH	  director	  James	  
Wyngaarden	  sought	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  human	  Services	  (HHS)	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for	  funding	  similar	  research	  at	  NIH.	  HHS	  decided	  to	  suspend	  the	  decision	  until	  an	  advisory	  
committee	   could	   analyze	   the	   moral	   stakes	   of	   the	   proposal	   and	   issue	   appropriate	  
recommendations.	  Again,	  public	   funding	  on	  this	  kind	  of	   research	  was	  stopped,	  whereas	  
privately	  funded	  research	  project	  could	  still	   in	  principle	  go	  ahead	  with	  their	  studies.	  The	  
commission	  that	  convened	  at	  NIH	  was	  composed	  of	  medical	  scientists,	  but	  also	  included	  
experts	   in	  ethics,	   law	  and	  religion,	  and	  was	  called	  Human	  Foetal	  Tissue	  Transplantation	  
Research	  Panel.	  The	  panel	   reported	  one	  year	   later	   that,	  also	   in	  accordance	  with	  similar	  
regulatory	   frameworks	   in	   other	   countries,	   it	   found	   foetal	   tissue	   research	   morally	  
acceptable	  with	  a	  majority	  of	  18-­‐3.	  This	  opinion	  notwithstanding,	   the	   freshly	  appointed	  
Secretary	  of	  HHS	  under	  the	  Bush	  Administration,	  allowed	  hearings	  of	  the	  three	  dissenting	  
members,	   and	   eventually	   extended	   the	   moratorium	   on	   federal	   funding	   on	  
transplantation	  research	  using	  foetuses	  from	  elective	  abortions	  in	  November	  of	  the	  same	  
year.	   The	   official	   justification	   for	   this	   decision	  was,	   again,	   the	   idea	   that	   permitting	   this	  
kind	   of	   research	  would	   have	   resulted	   in	   increasing	   the	   number	   of	   induced	   abortion.	   It	  
should	  be	  noticed	  however,	  that	  this	  issue,	  just	  like	  that	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  a	  few	  years	  
later,	   soon	   became	   a	   matter	   of	   political	   identification	   for	   US	   presidencies.	   With	   the	  
election	  of	  President	  Clinton	   in	  1992,	  the	  ban	  was	   lifted	  and	  this	  kind	  of	  research	  could	  
resume.	  
With	  the	  case	  of	  foetal	  research,	  the	  state-­‐centred	  model	  of	  scientific	  governance	  
comes	  to	  maturity.	  It	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  scandal	  for	  politics	  to	  restrict	  science,	  and	  actually,	  
the	   need	   to	   bring	   science	   into	   the	   core	   of	   the	   political	   agenda,	   comes	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  
defining	  demand	  for	  democracy	  itself.	  In	  the	  US,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  the	  
transition	   from	   the	   ‘social	   contract	   for	   science’-­‐model	   to	   state-­‐centred	   patterns	   of	  
governance,	   had	   to	   pass	   through	   the	   realization	   that	   scientific	   self-­‐governance	   was	  
insufficient	  to	  ease	  the	  mounting	  moral	  disagreement	  generated	  by	  biotechnologies.	  The	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ways	  in	  which	  states	  go	  about	  regulating	  such	  complex	  matters	  is	  often	  characterized	  by	  
nation-­‐specific	   patterns	   of	   governance.	   Indeed	   however,	   self-­‐governance	   initiatives	   are	  
still	   possible	  and	  continue	   to	  proliferate	  also	   in	   this	  mutated	   scenario.	   The	   two	  models	  
however	  remained	  in	  tension,	  as	  scientists	  still	  made	  up	  most	  of	  the	  advisory	  committees	  
that	   proposed	   legislative	   initiatives,	   and	   professional	   associations	   continued	   to	   issue	  
guidelines	   to	   govern	   their	  members’	   activities.	   In	   this	   last	   respect,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   noticed	  
that	  guidelines	  and	  codes	  of	  ethical	  conduct	  have	  been	  issued	  by	  the	  American	  Academy	  
of	  Paediatrics,	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  the	  British	  Medical	  Association,	  and	  the	  
Swedish	   Society	   of	  Medicine.	   The	   burden	   of	   public	   accountability	   nonetheless,	   proved	  
difficult	   to	   bear	   for	   the	   scientific	   community	   alone.	   Politics	   had	   to	  provide	   institutional	  
framing	  to	  the	  controversies	  caused	  by	  early	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  and	  research,	  and	  it	  thus	  
set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  regulatory	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  future.	  
A	  defining	  feature	  of	  this	  emerging	  scenario	  is	  worth	  recalling	  here.	  To	  the	  extent	  
that	   biotechnology	   and	   biomedicine	   became	   a	   matter	   of	   national	   policy-­‐making	  
initiatives,	   a	   line	   of	   demarcation	   seemed	   to	   be	   reinforced	   by	   such	   legislative	  
interventions,	   one	   that	   severed	   public	   form	   privately	   funded	   research.	   The	   examples	  
above	   recall	   emergence	   of	   a	   governance	  model	  whereby	   the	   use	   of	   public	  moneys	   for	  
innovative	  scientific	  research	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  decisions.	  One	  should	  however	  
recall	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  biotechnology,	  scientific	  and	  technical	  advancements	  fuelled	  and	  
were	  made	  possible	  by	  an	  intensifying	  narrative	  of	  national	  technological	  supremacy	  that	  
clearly	  saw	  the	  leading	  nations	  of	  the	  West	  racing	  to	  gain	  dominant	  positions.	  Moreover,	  
this	  narrative	  was	  sustained	  by	  the	  hope	  of	  a	  wave	  of	  economic	  growth	  to	  be	  channelled	  
through	   emerging	   biotechnologies.	   In	   this	   context,	   regulation	   of	   ethically	   sensible	  
scientific	   matters	   left	   the	   private	   sector	   untouched	   by	   the	   political	   restrictions	   that	  
constrained	  publicly	   sponsored	   research.	   Such	  dispensations	  were	   retained	   in	   stem	  cell	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policies	   as	   well,	   as	   the	   boundary	   between	   publicly	   founded	   and	   private	   research	  
remained	   a	   barrier	   to	   public	   regulation,	  with	   the	   only	   exception	   of	   the	   ban	   on	   human	  
reproductive	  cloning,	  as	  noted	  by	  Gottweis	  and	  colleagues	  (Gottweis,	  Salter,	  and	  Waldby	  
2009,	  70).	  	  
3.I.3	  State	  regulation	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  
The	   brief	   excursus	   of	   the	   previous	   sections	   tracked	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   specific	  
mode	  of	  governance	  for	  biotechnological	  and	  biomedical	   innovation.	  In	  its	  early	  phases,	  
the	  governance	  of	  strongly	  contentious	  scientific	  matters	   like	  those	  elicited	  by	  technical	  
progress	  in	  the	  life	  sciences,	  took	  the	  form	  of	  both	  state-­‐centred	  initiatives	  and	  effort	  at	  
expert	  self-­‐governance.	  The	  latter	  were	  based	  on	  the	  opinion	  of	  restricted,	  albeit	  diverse	  
panels	  of	  experts.	  Eventually,	  however,	  policy-­‐making	  remained	  firmly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
political	   power	   that	   acted	   primarily	   through	   the	   possibility	   of	   restricting	   funding	   on	  
morally	   and	   politically	   undesirable	   research.	   This	   model	   became	   a	   blueprint	   for	   the	  
governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  either,	  just	  a	  decade	  after,	  with	  the	  only	  difference	  that	  
the	   advisory	   function,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stem	   cell	   research,	   was	   performed	   by	   national	  
bioethical	  commissions	  rather	  than	  by	  scientific	  experts	  sitting	  in	  dedicated	  panels.	  	  
Through	   the	   issue	  of	   foetal	   tissue	   research,	  unborn	  human	  conceptuses,	  already	  
an	   object	   of	   fierce	   ethical	   and	   legal	   controversy	   in	   the	   case	   of	   abortion,	   acquired	   the	  
status	   of	   distinctively	   political	   objects.	   As	   I	   have	   shown	   above,	   regulating	   this	   kind	   of	  
research	  became	  the	  occasion	  for	  restructuring	  the	  whole	  relationship	  between	  research	  
science,	  politics	  and	  medicine.	  This	  relationship,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  said,	  was	  also	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
being	   transformed	  by	   the	  dynamics	  of	   industrialization	   that	  biotechnology	  brought	   into	  
the	  previously	  isolated	  academic	  environment	  of	  science.	  It	  is	  therefore	  apparent	  that	  the	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social	   contract	   for	   science	   that	  had	  been	  dominant	   since	   the	   second	  half	  of	   the	  1940s,	  
came	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  different	  modalities	  of	  research	  governance.	  	  
The	   history	   of	   how	   regulatory	   novelties	   of	   the	   kind	   described	   above	   became	  
entrenched	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  after	  the	  episodes	  relative	  to	  foetal	  
tissue	   research	   is	   a	   complicated	   one.	   Moreover,	   this	   history	   has	   been	   extensively	  
reconstructed	   and	   reviewed	   in	   dedicated	   scholarly	   literature	   (Gottweis,	   Salter,	   and	  
Waldby	   2009).	   I	   will	   therefore	   only	   briefly	   recall	   the	   major	   events	   of	   this	   political	  
trajectory	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  provide	  further	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  
is	  as	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  scientific	  ingenuity	  as	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  transformation.	  	  
With	   the	   successful	   creation	   of	   Dolly	   the	   sheep	   in	   1996,	   not	   only	   the	   idea	   that	  
eukaryotic	  cells	  possess	  remarkable	  degrees	  of	  molecular	  plasticity	  was	  demonstrated	  to	  
the	   scientific	   community.	   The	   cloned	   animal	   became	   the	   visible	   embodiment	   of	   a	  
technical	   peak	   for	   biotechnology	   to	   the	   ensemble	   of	   humanity.	   Somatic	   cell	   nuclear	  
transfer	   (SCNT)	   soon	   gave	   rise	   to	   widespread	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   allegedly	  
uncontrollable	  leap	  in	  the	  technical	  ability	  of	  science	  to	  manipulate	  life.	  People	  started	  to	  
see	  cloning	  as	  technique	  that	  appropriates	  life	  itself,	  thus	  depriving	  it	  of	  the	  sedimented	  
meanings	  that	  humanity	  attaches	  to	   it.	  Such	  discourses	  are	  recurrent	   in	   the	  Nineteenth	  
century	   narratives	   about	   science.	   They	   thus	   soon	   became	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   the	  
discursive	  memory	  (Maingueneau	  1984)	  of	  stem	  cell	  science	  as	  well.	  
As	   cloning	  became	  a	  possibility	   in	   1996,	   public	   calls	   for	   a	   ban	  on	   this	   technique	  
emerged	  promptly.	  With	  SCNT	  traditional	  intuitions	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  life	  suddenly	  
lost	  grounds,	  thus	  urging	  regulators	  to	  fill	  this	  cultural	  gap	  with	  political	   initiative.	   It	  has	  
been	   noticed	   that	   Britain	   handled	   this	   task	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   already	   existing	  
framework	  of	  the	  1990	  Human	  Embryology	  and	  Fertilization	  Act	  (HFEA),	  and	  that	  this	  led	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the	   country	   to	   better	   accommodate	   the	   worries	   generated	   by	   the	   birth	   of	   Dolly	  
(Gottweis,	   Salter,	   and	   Waldby	   2009,	   63).	   Under	   the	   aegis	   of	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	  
Science	   and	   Technology	   Committee,	   the	   British	   Human	   Genetics	   Advisory	   Commission	  
(HGAC)	   immediately	   started	   a	   joint	   working	   group	   with	   the	   HFEA.	   The	   aim	   of	   such	  
working	  group	  was	   to	   initiate	  an	  exercise	  of	  public	  consultation	  on	   the	   issues	   raised	  by	  
the	  possibility	  of	  human	  cloning.	  This	  collaboration	  resulted	   into	  consultation	  document	  
(the	  1998	  ‘Cloning	  Issues	  in	  Reproduction,	  Science	  and	  Medicine’	  report)	  that	  formed	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  public	  consultation.	  Following	  this	  document,	   later	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  second	  
committee	  was	  charged	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  then	  brand	  new	  issue	  
of	   embryonic	   stem	   cell	   research.	   The	   use	   of	   SCNT	   for	   research	   purposes	   thus	   became	  
stabilized	  in	  British	  legislation	  in	  late	  2000,	  when	  this	  second	  committee,	  chaired	  by	  Liam	  
Donaldson,	   issued	   its	   report.	   The	   latter	   basically	   restated	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	  
HFEA-­‐HGAC	   panel	   as	   to	   the	   prohibition	   to	   attempt	   human	   reproductive	   cloning.	   As	   to	  
stem	  cells	  instead,	  it	  allowed	  HFEA	  to	  license	  the	  use	  of	  cloning	  techniques	  to	  derive	  hES	  
cells.	  The	  British	  Government	  and	  Parliament	  ratified	  such	  suggestions	  and	  incorporated	  
them	  in	  legislation.	  	  
In	  the	  US,	  a	  1995	  bill	  known	  as	  the	  Dickey-­‐Wicker	  amendment	  prohibited	  the	  use	  
of	  federal	  funding	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  human	  embryos	  for	  research	  purposes,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  
research	  activities	  in	  which	  human	  embryos	  need	  to	  be	  destroyed.	  Moreover,	  as	  soon	  as	  
in	   early	   1997	   –	   days	   after	   Nature	   announced	   the	   birth	   of	   Dolly	   via	   SCNT	   –	   President	  
Clinton	   asked	   his	   National	   Bioethics	   Advisory	   Commission	   (NBAC)	   to	   express	  
recommendations	  on	  human	  cloning.	  President	  Clinton	  did	  not	  even	  wait	  for	  the	  report	  
by	  NBAC	  to	  be	  delivered	  and	  issued	  a	  moratorium	  on	  human	  cloning	  in	  March.	  Later	  that	  
year,	  the	  NBAC	  report	  eventually	  came	  out,	  supporting	  a	  ban	  on	  human	  cloning	  that	  was	  
promptly	  translated	  into	  the	  Cloning	  Prohibition	  Act.	  Interestingly,	  the	  latter	  extended	  to	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both	  public	  and	  private	  sectors,	  stating	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  child	  via	  SCNT	  should	  
be	   considered	   immoral.	   Notwithstanding	   this	   restriction,	   stem	   cell	   research	   could	   be	  
carried	  out	  in	  the	  States	  by	  using	  public	  money	  on	  pluripotent	  cells	  derived	  from	  donated	  
IVF	  embryos.	  According	  to	  the	  2000	  NIH	  Guidelines	  for	  Research	  Using	  Human	  Pluripotent	  
Stem	  Cells,	  and	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  Dickey-­‐Wicker	  Amendment,	  federal	  money	  could	  
be	   used	   to	   work	   with	   hES	   cells,	   but	   not	   to	   derive	   them	   from	   donated	   embryos.	   Nor	  
research	  could	  be	  funded	  with	  NIH	  money	  if	  the	  embryos	  were	  created	  via	  IVF	  with	  the	  
specific	   aim	   of	   being	   used	   in	   research.	   In	   other	   words,	   NIH	   grants	   could	   only	   go	   to	  
research	  projects	   that	  made	  use	  of	   pluripotent	   cells	   from	   IVF	   supernumerary	   embryos,	  
provided	  those	  money	  were	  not	  employed	  in	  the	  derivation	  process,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  pay	  
for	  a	  procedure	  that	  entailed	  the	  destruction	  of	  a	  human	  embryo.	  
The	  fate	  of	  this	  regulatory	  tool	  is	  known.	  On	  August	  the	  9th	  2001,	  in	  his	  first	  public	  
address	  to	  the	  nation,	  President	  Bush	  further	  restricted	  the	  dispositions	  issued	  by	  the	  NIH	  
a	   few	  months	   earlier.	   He	   announced	   that	   not	   only	   public	  money	   could	   not	   be	   used	   to	  
destroy	  supernumerary	  IVF	  embryos	  for	  research,	  but	  also	  that	  public	  money	  should	  not	  
go	   on	   research	   using	   cell	   lines	   of	   embryonic	   origin	   derived	   after	   the	   day	   of	   the	  
announcement.	  Research	  could	  thus	  be	  funded	  by	  the	  NIH	  only	  on	  existing	  hES	  cell	  lines,	  
but	   new	   lines	   could	   only	   be	   produced	   and	   studied	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   private	   money.	  
Notoriously,	   President	  Obama	   relaxed	   this	   regulations	   in	   2009,	  when	   he	   re-­‐established	  
the	  conditions	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  NIH	  in	  2000.	  	  
3.I.4	  Pervasive	  epistemologies	  
The	  model	   of	   governance	   described	   thus	   far	   enjoyed	  widespread	   application	   in	  
many	   countries	  willing	   to	   join	   the	   global	   race	   of	   stem	   cell	   biotechnology.	   All	   emerging	  
national	   actors	   in	   stem	   cell	   research	   adopted	   a	   state-­‐centred	   regime	   of	   governability,	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coupled	   with	   the	   advice	   of	   dedicated	   bioethical	   expertise	   and,	   at	   times,	   with	   open	  
engagement	   in	  exercises	  of	  public	  consultation.	   It	   is	  worth	  remarking	  however,	  that	  the	  
same	  model	  gave	  rise	   to	  different	  regulations	   in	  different	  countries,	   inspired	  by	  varying	  
degrees	   of	   permissibility	   as	   to	   the	   procurement	   of	   embryonic	   material	   for	   stem	   cell	  
research.	  On	  a	  gradient	  ranging	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  both	  cloning	  and	  creating	  ad	  hoc	  
IVF	  embryos	   for	   research	   (Belgium,	   India,	   Israel,	  South	  Korea,	  UK),	   to	   the	  prohibition	  of	  
even	   importing	   hES	   cell	   lines	   from	   abroad	   (Austria,	   Ireland,	   Lithuania,	   Poland	   and	  
Slovakia),	   different	   countries	   adopted	   variants	   of	   the	   same	   governance	   model	   to	  
articulate	  their	  scientific	  policies.	  	  
Gottweis	  and	  colleagues	  have	  classified	  the	  different	  regulatory	  regimes	  according	  
to	   those	   variants,	   and	   have	   convincingly	   argued	   that	   bioethics	   became	   “the	   political	  
means	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  global	  moral	  economy	  in	  which	  the	  trading	  and	  exchange	  of	  
values	  is	  normalized	  and	  legitimated”	  (Gottweis,	  Salter,	  and	  Waldby	  2009,	  chap.	  6).	  In	  all	  
such	  different	  political	  arrangements,	  bioethics	  attained	  political	   relevance	  by	  means	  of	  
its	   principle-­‐based	   approach	   to	   the	   discussion	   and	   resolution	   of	   allegedly	   intractable	  
moral	  dilemmas	  raised	  by	  the	  advancement	  of	  modern	  medicine	  and	  technology.	  	  
Bioethics	   played	   thus	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   stable	   global	   order	  
around	   stem	   cell	   research.	   This	   role,	   it	   has	   been	   argued,	   is	   due	   to	   “its	   impartial	  
functionality	   for	   the	   governance	   of	   science	   rather	   that	   from	   any	   localized	   source	   of	  
historic	  or	  cultural	  authority	  such	  as	  religion”	  (Gottweis,	  Salter,	  and	  Waldby	  2009,	  131).	  
The	   alleged	   substantive	   neutrality	   of	   bioethics,	   other	   than	   being	   acknowledged	   as	   a	  
distinctive	  reason	  for	  its	  successful	  dissemination	  into	  national	  governance	  strategies,	  has	  
also	   been	   a	   source	   of	  major	   criticisms.	   According	   to	   some	   commentators,	   this	   alleged	  
neutrality	  put	  bioethicists	  in	  the	  position	  to	  exclude	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  
do	   not	   articulate	   their	   moral	   standpoints	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   canonical	   principles	   of	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bioethics.	  Based	  on	  the	  exclusive	  character	  of	  principled	  bioethics,	  critics	  have	  called	  for	  
the	  sociological	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  presumed	  neutrality	  of	  bioethics	  (Hoffmaster	  1994;	  
Evans	  2000;	  Evans	  2002;	  Bird,	  Conrad,	  and	  Fremont	  2000;	  Hedgecoe	  2004).	  
The	  universalistic	  character	  of	  canonical	  bioethics,	  however,	  is	  contradicted	  by	  the	  
variety	  of	  moral	  articulations	  that	  the	  bioethical	  discourse	  gave	  rise	  to	  in	  the	  application	  
of	   the	   state-­‐centred	  model.	   The	   language	   of	   bioethics	   did	   not	   constrain	   the	   directions	  
that	   the	  moral	   discourse	   on	   stem	   cell	   research	   eventually	   took	   in	   individual	   countries.	  
However,	  it	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  the	  instalment	  of	  moral	  reasoning	  into	  the	  very	  core	  of	  
legislation.	   To	   better	   appreciate	   this	   function,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   briefly	   recall	   that	   other	  
governance	   options	   surfaced	   along	   the	   way	   of	   the	   regulatory	   history	   of	   stem	   cell	  
research,	  but	  failed	  to	  secure	  the	  means	  of	  political	  stabilization.	  	  
The	  search	  for	  alternatives	  to	  the	  use	  of	  pluripotent	  cells	  of	  morally	  problematic	  
kinds	  is	  one	  of	  such	  attempts.	  The	  divide	  between	  supporters	  of	  embryonic	  sources	  and	  
those	   who	   insisted	   in	   using	   adult	   stem	   cells	   only	   characterized	   a	   moral	   as	   well	   as	   an	  
epistemic	   battlefield.	   The	   construction	   of	   the	  moral	   acceptability	   or	   unacceptability	   of	  
embryonic	  stem	  cell	  science,	  to	  a	  good	  extent,	  relied	  exactly	  on	  the	  experimental	  probing	  
of	  the	  clinical	  usefulness	  of	  hES	  cells	  and	  adult	  stem	  cells	  respectively.	  But	  the	  debate	  on	  
technical	   alternatives	   to	   embryonic	   cells	   reached	   major	   levels	   of	   ontological	  
sophistications	   as	   researcher	   found	   technical	   ways	   to	   allegedly	   bypass	   the	   moral	  
complications	  of	  embryo-­‐derived	  cells.	  Single	  cell	  biopsy,	  for	   instance,	   is	  a	  procedure	  by	  
means	  of	  which	  Lanza	  and	  colleagues	  managed	  to	  retrieve	  only	  one	  blastomere	  from	  the	  
early	  embryo,	  thus	  leaving	  the	  latter	  viable	  and	  functionally	  integrated	  (Klimanskaya	  et	  al.	  
2006).	  Another	  alternative	   is	   to	  use	  embryonic	  artefacts	  as	   sources	  of	  pluripotent	  cells.	  
One	   such	   possibility	   was	   conceived	   by	   William	   Hurlburt,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   PCB,	   and	  
realised	   by	   MIT	   scientist	   Rudolf	   Jeanisch.	   The	   latter	   genetically	   modified	   the	   somatic	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nucleus	  before	  the	  SCNT	  procedure.	  In	  this	  way	  he	  obtained	  an	  altered	  nucleus	  that,	  upon	  
cytoplasmic	  reprogramming	  into	  an	  enucleated	  egg,	  is	  genetically	  unable	  to	  implant	  in	  a	  
uterus	   –	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   Cdx2,	   a	   gene	   that	   is	   indispensable	   for	   the	   early	   embryo	   to	  
implant.	  The	  procedure	  was	  therefore	  dubbed	  Altered	  Nuclear	  Transfer,	  or	  ANT	  (Hurlbut	  
2005)	   Such	   alteration,	   according	   to	   the	   inventor	   of	   this	   methodology,	   deprives	   the	  
embryo	  of	  its	  developmental	  potentiality.	  It	  thus	  impinges	  on	  the	  alleged	  moral	  status	  of	  
the	  embryo,	  that	  so	  often	  in	  the	  debate	  has	  been	  attached	  to	  the	  potentiality	  argument	  
(Testa	  2009).	  A	  further	  technical	  way	  out	  from	  the	  moral	  controversies	  generated	  by	  hES	  
cell	  research	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  induced	  pluripotent	  stem	  cells.	  The	  latter	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  
specific	  discussion	  as	  to	  the	  opportunity	  of	  either	  abandoning	  hES	  cell	  research	  in	  favour	  
of	  iPS	  cells,	  or	  pursuing	  the	  two	  strand	  of	  research	  in	  parallel	  (Cyranoski	  2008;	  Gottweis	  
and	   Minger	   2008;	   Zarzeczny	   et	   al.	   2009;	   Zarzeczny;	   Caulfield	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Most	  
commentators	  agree	  in	  seeing	  iPS	  cells	  as	  a	  promising	  field	  of	  scientific	  investigation	  in	  its	  
own	  terms.	  None	  of	  them,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  iPS	  might	  replace	  hES	  cells.	  Finally,	  one	  
should	   also	   recall	   the	   already	   mentioned	   recent	   advances	   in	   the	   field	   of	   somatic	   cell	  
direct	  conversion	  from	  one	  tissue	  type	  to	  another	  as	  a	  possibly	   interesting	  resources	  to	  
avoid	  the	  controversial	  use	  of	  cells	  of	  embryonic	  origin.	  	  
All	   the	   above	   possibilities	   can	   be	   usefully	   understood	   as	   the	   result	   of	  what	   has	  
been	  called	   responsive	  epistemologies	   (Testa	  2009).	   This	  notion	  points	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  
“the	  experimental	  process	  and	  the	  biotechnological	  object	  respond	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  social,	  
ethical	  and	  legal	  concerns	  and	  accommodate	  them	  within	  their	  epistemological	  texture”	  
(ivi,	  1624).	  	  
Such	   constructions	   of	   morally	   and	   politically	   more	   tractable	   scientific	   objects,	  
certainly	   represent	   a	   remarkable	   new	   feature	   of	   biotechnology.	   They	   embody	   the	   co-­‐
production	  of	  scientific	  and	  political	  order	  and	  aim	  at	  technically	  stabilizing	  the	  boundary	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between	  the	  two.	  Such	  strategy	  has	  also	  enjoyed	  some	  form	  of	  political	  endorsement	  at	  
least	   in	  the	  States,	  when	  Leon	  Kass’	  President’s	  Council	  of	  Bioethics	  issued	  a	  with	  paper	  
called	  Alternative	  Sources	  of	  Human	  Pluripotent	  Stem	  Cells	   in	  2005.	  The	  report	   included	  
most	   of	   the	   above-­‐cited	   methodologies	   for	   avoiding	   the	   use	   of	   embryos.	   It	   drew	  
inspiration	   from	   realizing	   that	   “people	   of	   all	  moral	   and	   political	   persuasions	   should	   be	  
pleased	  to	   learn	  that	  scientists	  and	  others	  are	  creatively	  seeking	  morally	  unproblematic	  
and	   uncontroversial	   ways	   to	   advance”	   scientific	   research	   (ref).	   Allegedly,	   responsive	  
epistemologies	  are	  therefore	  a	  way	  to	  preserve	  moral	  pluralism	  while	  nurturing	  scientific	  
progress.	  Whereas	  the	   law	  retains	  prescriptive	  prerogatives	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Thomson-­‐like	  
hES	  cells,	  it	  can	  conveniently	  be	  supplemented	  or	  replaced	  by	  biotechnological	  ingenuity	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   ANT	   embryos	   or	   iPS	   cells.	   In	   this	   respect,	   Testa	   correctly	   interprets	   the	  
silencing	   of	   Cdx2	   in	   ANT	   embryos	   as	   the	   sign	   that	   “in	   the	   age	   of	   biotechnological	   kind	  
making,	   genetic	   engineering	   becomes,	   alongside	   the	   law,	   a	   significant	   tool	   for	   social	  
ordering”	  (Testa	  2011,	  98).	  	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  however,	  looking	  for	  technical	  alternatives	  to	  proper	  embryo-­‐
derived	   stem	   cells	   proved	   short-­‐sighted	   for	   at	   least	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   it	   is	   true	   that	  
pluripotency	  is	  a	  multiply	  realizable	  cellular	  state,	  but	  not	  all	  pluripotent	  cells	  look	  equal	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  genetic	  and	  epigenetic	  profiles.	  Therefore,	  even	  if	  science	  might	  one	  day	  
resort	   to	  one	  derivation	  method	  and	  discard	  all	   the	  others,	   it	   remains	   indispensable,	  at	  
the	  very	  least	  for	  reasons	  of	  comparability,	  for	  scientists	  to	  keep	  on	  working	  on	  the	  better	  
characterized	  kinds	  of	  pluripotent	  cells,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  hES	  cells.	  Second,	  all	  the	  supposed	  
alternatives	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   latter,	   albeit	  morally	  more	   friendly	   than	   their	   embryonic	  
counterpart,	   retain	   most	   of	   the	   problems	   implied	   by	   egg	   donation,	   informed	   consent,	  
privacy,	   clinical	   safety	   and	   utility.	   This	   is	   why	   responsive	   epistemologies	   did	   not	   quite	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establish	  themselves	  as	  a	  politically	  reliable	  alternative	  to	  the	  state-­‐centred	  governance	  
model.	  	  
The	  inability	  of	  responsive	  epistemologies	  to	  establish	  a	  scientifically	  credible	  and	  
socially	   robust	  alternative	   to	   state-­‐centred	   initiatives	   is	   yet	  another	  demonstration	   that	  
the	   latter	  provided	  a	  better	  platform	  for	  plausible	  regulatory	   frameworks	   to	  emerge.	   In	  
this	   context	   bioethics	   proved	   integral	   and	   functional	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   discursive	  
sphere	  of	  support	  for	  policy-­‐making.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  countries	  where	  
national	  ethics	  committees	  were	  involved	  in	  consultation	  over	  stem	  cell	  research,	  public	  
debate	  also	  happened	  to	  take	  place	  (source	  Gottweis,	  Salter,	  and	  Waldby	  2009,	  139).	  This	  
was	   crucial	   to	   the	   instalment	   of	   state-­‐centred	   modes	   of	   governance	   for	   stem	   cell	  
research.	  States	  however	   sought	  public	   support	  not	   so	  much	  on	   the	  ethics	  of	   stem	  cell	  
research	  but	  on	   the	   importance	  of	   this	   field	  of	   science	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  economic	  growth.	  
Scholars	   have	   framed	   this	   aspect	   of	   scientific	   governance	   as	   driven	   by	   the	   effort	   of	  
‘competition’	   states	   (Cerny,	   1990,	   1997;	   Hay,	   2004;	   Hirsch,	   1991)	   to	   gain	   or	   maintain	  
hegemonic	   positions	   in	   the	   global	   economy	  of	   biomedical	   innovation	   (Salter	   and	   Salter	  
2010).	   In	   this	   sense	   also	   governance	   manoeuvres	   that	   apparently	   restrained	   scientific	  
freedom	  to	  do	  research	  on	  embryonic	  material	  –	  like	  the	  Dickey-­‐Wicker	  Amendment	  and	  
the	   August	   9	   2001	   Bush	   further	   limitations	   on	   federal	   funding	   –	   ultimately	   left	   ample	  
room	  for	  private	  investors	  and	  individual	  state	  funding	  in	  the	  US.	  State-­‐centred	  modes	  of	  
governance	   are	   thus	   understandable	   as	   integral	   to	   national	   strategies	   to	   maintain	   or	  
expand	  the	  competitive	  edge	   in	  the	  global	  race	  of	  biotechnology.	  States	  that	  wanted	  to	  
compete	   for	   hegemonic	   positions	   in	   the	   speculative	   market	   of	   stem	   cell	   application,	  
however,	   did	   not	   only	   have	   to	   provide	   favourable	   regulatory	   conditions	   for	   embryonic	  
stem	   cell	   research.	   Moreover	   they	   had	   to	   pay	   special	   attention	   to	   the	   cultural	  
consequences	  of	  stem	  cell	  science	  so	  that	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  public	  support	  back	  up	  this	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scientific	   enterprise.	   The	   compromise	   solutions	   of	   the	   US,	   or	   the	   tightly	   overseen	  
licensing	  system	  of	   the	  UK	  can	  thus	  be	  read	  as	  efforts	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  stabilising	  the	  
societal	  attitudes	  towards	  research	  with	  pluripotent	  material.	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Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  Part	  II:	  An	  emerging	  shared	  regulatory	  model	  
for	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  translation	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  reconstruct	  the	  emerging	  new	  governance	  regime	  of	  stem	  cell	  
clinical	   innovation.	   I	   will	   start	   by	   considering	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   regulatory	   tools	   that	  
emerged	  to	  exert	  control	  on	  the	  development	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  development	  (3.II.1).	  I	  
will	   then	   analyse	   the	   features	   of	   what	   a	   call	   a	   shared	   model	   of	   governance	   (3.II.2).	  
Subsequently,	   I	   will	   assess	   this	   model	   from	   a	   political	   standpoint	   in	   the	   light	   of	   a	  
deliberative	  account	  of	  politics	  (3.II.3)	  
	  	  	  
3.II.1	  Multiple	  regulatory	  dispensations	  	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   show	   how	   the	   regulatory	   regime	   of	   embryonic	   stem	   cell	  
research	  stem	  cell	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  translational	  stem	  cell	  research.	  
A	  body	  of	  documents	  and	  regulatory	  tools	   is	  growing	  that	  addresses	  concerns	  of	  
clinical	  safety	  and	  medical	  utility	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  products	  and	  devices.	  To	  mention	  but	  
the	  most	  important	  ones	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Europe,	  one	  should	  at	  least	  recall	  what	  follows.	  	  
The	  FDA	  started	  drafting	  new	  regulation	  on	  cell	  products	  as	  early	  as	  in	  1997,	  in	  the	  
context	  of	   the	  sixth	  “Reinventing	  Government”	   initiative.	   In	   the	  report	   that	  summarizes	  
the	  vision	  of	  the	  initiative,	  measures	  started	  to	  be	  conceived	  to	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of	  
communicable	  disease	  infection,	  and	  contaminations	  during	  the	  handling	  and	  clinical	  use	  
of	  human	  tissue.	  As	  stem	  cell	  science	  grew,	  similar	  recommendations	  were	  systematically	  
applied	  in	  dedicated	  regulatory	  dispositions,	  including:	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• Guidance	  for	  Industry:	  Eligibility	  Determination	  for	  Donors	  of	  Human	  Cells,	  
Tissues,	  and	  Cellular	  and	  Tissue-­‐Based	  Products	  (8/8/2007)	  
• Guidance	   for	   FDA	   Reviewers	   and	   Sponsors:	   Content	   and	   Review	   of	  
Chemistry,	   Manufacturing,	   and	   Control	   (CMC)	   Information	   for	   Human	  
Somatic	   Cell	   Therapy	   Investigational	   New	   Drug	   Applications	   (INDs)	  
(4/9/2008)	  
• Guidance	   for	   Industry:	   Considerations	   for	   Allogeneic	   Pancreatic	   Islet	   Cell	  
Products	  (September	  2009)	  
• Draft	   Guidance	   for	   Industry:	   Current	   Good	   Tissue	   Practice	   (CGTP)	   and	  
Additional	   Requirements	   for	  Manufacturers	   of	  Human	  Cells,	   Tissues,	   and	  
Cellular	  and	  Tissue-­‐Based	  Products	  (HCT/Ps)	  (1/16/2009)	  
• Final	  Guidance	   for	   Industry:	  Potency	  Tests	   for	  Cellular	   and	  Gene	  Therapy	  
Products	  	  
(January	  2011)	  
From	   a	   general	   standpoint,	   in	   assessing	   applications	   for	   clinical	   trials,	   FDA	  
assimilates	  stem	  cell	  therapies	  to	  existing	  somatic	  cellular	  therapies.	  	  
This	  is	  testified	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  initiate	  a	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  clinical	  trial,	  
an	   applicant	   has	   to	   file	   a	   request	   for	   an	   Investigational	   New	  Drug	   (IND)	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
biologics6.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  is	  taken	  not	  to	  require	  any	  further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   Biologics	   are	   all	   those	   medicinal	   products	   that	   are	   not	   created	   through	   chemical	   synthesis	   but	   via	  
biological	  processes.	  They	   include:	  vaccines,	  blood	  and	   its	   individual	  components,	  antibodies,	  cells,	  bodily	  
tissue,	  recombinant	  proteins	  and	  genes	  for	  gene	  therapy. 	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regulatory	  oversight	  than	  other,	  more	  traditional,	  cellular	  products	  and	  therapies	  like,	  for	  
instance,	  bone	  marrow	  transplantation.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   traceability	   of	   cellular	   products,	   and	   adherence	   to	   good	  
manufacturing	   practices	   in	   their	   handling	   are	   required	   for	   stem	   cells	   as	   for	   any	   other	  
biological	  material	   used	   in	   clinical	   research.	   In	   particular,	   very	  much	   like	   other	   tissues,	  
also	  the	  use	  of	  stem	  cells	  has	  to	  obtain	  clearance	  from	  the	  original	  tissue/embryo	  donors,	  
and	  must	   take	  measures	   to	   assure	   the	   absence	  of	   infectious	  or	   genetic	   diseases	   in	   the	  
cells	  to	  be	  used	  in	  vivo.	  	  
As	  to	  the	  use	  of	  stem	  cells	  in	  medical	  practice,	  they	  are	  regulated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  
as	  other	  biological	  products,	  that	  is,	  with	  the	  only	  aim	  of	  preventing	  disease	  transmission	  
from	  donors	  to	  receivers	  –	  under	  Section	  361	  of	  the	  Public	  Health	  Service	  Act,	  provided	  
that	   the	   cell	   product:	   is	   only	   minimally	   manipulated	   (i.e.	   not	   cultured	   in	   vitro	   after	  
retrieval),	  and	   is	   intended	  for	  autologous	  use	  only	  (Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations	  –	  CFR	  –	  
Title	   21,	   Section	   1271.10).	   This	   means	   that,	   for	   instance,	   clinics	   can	   provide	   unproven	  
stem	  cell	  treatments	  only	  if	  the	  above	  criteria	  hold.	  Therefore,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  States,	  it	  is	  
not	  forbidden	  to	  extract	  cells	  from	  a	  patient	  and	  re-­‐inject	  them	  into	  the	  same	  patient.	  The	  
medical	  significance	  of	  such	  procedure	  is	  highly	  questionable	  and,	  to	  date,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
such	  practices	  remains	  unproven.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  clinics	  are	  offering	  this	  kind	  of	  
“treatment”	  on	  the	  market,	  thus	  raising	  debates	  and	  litigations	  that	  I	  will	  account	  for	   in	  
the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
It	   has	   furthermore	   to	   be	   emphasised	   that	   FDA,	   other	   than	   using	   a	   dedicated	  
division	   for	   overseeing	   stem	   cell	   research	   (the	   Cell	   Therapy	   Branch	   of	   the	   Centre	   for	  
Biologics	  Evaluation	  and	  Research),	  avails	  itself	  of	  two	  dedicated	  bodies	  to	  deal	  with	  stem	  
cell	   clinical	   research.	  One	   is	   the	  Human	  Tissue	  Task	  Force	   (HTTF),	  created	  to	  evaluate	   if	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cell	   therapy	   demands	   further	   specific	   measures	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Agency	   to	   protect	  
public	   health.	   The	   Task	   Force	   is	   made	   up	   of	   FDA	   officials	   belonging	   to	   the	   Centre	   for	  
Biologics	  Evaluation	  and	  Research	  (CBER),	  the	  Office	  of	  Regulatory	  Affairs	  (ORA),	  and	  the	  
Office	   of	   the	   Commissioner	   (OC).	   The	   other	   is	   the	   Cellular,	   Tissue	   and	   Gene	   Therapies	  
Advisory	   Committee	   –	   a	   commission	   of	   13	   “authorities	   knowledgeable	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  
cellular	  therapies,	  tissue	  transplantation,	  gene	  transfer	  therapies	  and	  xenotransplantation	  
including	   biostatistics,	   bioethics,	   hematology/oncology,	   human	   tissues	   and	  
transplantation,	  reproductive	  medicine,	  general	  medicine	  and	  various	  medical	  specialties	  
including	   surgery	   and	   oncology,	   immunology,	   virology,	   molecular	   biology,	   cell	   biology,	  
developmental	  biology,	  tumor	  biology,	  biochemistry,	  rDNA	  technology,	  nuclear	  medicine,	  
gene	  therapy,	  infectious	  diseases,	  and	  cellular	  kinetics”	  (source:	  www.FDA.gov).	  The	  aim	  
of	  this	  body	  is	  to	  review	  and	  evaluate	  “the	  safety,	  effectiveness,	  and	  appropriate	  use	  of	  
human	   cells,	   human	   tissues,	   gene	   transfer	   therapies	   and	   xenotransplantation	   products	  
which	   are	   intended	   for	   transplantation,	   implantation,	   infusion	   and	   transfer	   in	   the	  
prevention	   and	   treatment	   of	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   human	   diseases	   and	   in	   the	  
reconstruction,	  repair	  or	  replacement	  of	  tissues	  for	  various	  conditions”	  (ibidem).	  
The	   regulatory	   attitude	   of	   the	   FDA	   is	   a	   clear	   attempt	   at	   normalizing	   the	   clinical	  
development	   of	   stem	   cell	   science,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   very	   specific	   and	   ethically	  
sensible	  features	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation.	  In	  particular,	  the	  FDA	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  peculiar	  biological	  characteristics	  of	  stem	  cell	  products	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  safety	  
and	   efficacy	   evaluation	   of	   the	   relative	   clinical	   trials.	   To	   begin	   with,	   self-­‐renewal	   and	  
pluripotency	  may	  indeed	  result	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  teratoma	  in	  clinical	  research	  subjects.	  
What	   is	   particularly	   dangerous	   about	   this	   kind	   of	   event	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   teratoma	  
occurring	   at	   sensible	   sites	   such	   as	   the	   brain	   or	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   patient.	   Furthermore,	  
stem	   cells	   and	   derivatives,	   due	   to	   protracted	   in	   vitro	   culture,	   might	   have	   developed	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alterations	   (genetic,	   epigenetic	   or	   chromosomal)	   that	   may	   lead	   to	   malignant	  
transformation	   in	   vivo.	   A	   further	   possibility	   is	   that	   induced	   pluripotent	   stem	   cells	   and	  
derivatives,	   if	   created	   by	   viral	   transduction,	   may	   suffer	   from	   dangerous	   mutagenic	  
insertions	   caused	   by	   the	   viral	   vectors,	   thus	   resulting	   in	   potentially	   tumorigenic	   and	  
uncontrollable	   behaviours	   in	   vivo.	   With	   respect	   to	   such	   dangers,	   the	   FDA	   requires	  
extensive	   characterization	   of	   stem	   cell	   products,	   as	   well	   as	   sustained	   refinement	   and	  
improvement	   of	  multiple	   testing	   strategies	   that	   range	   from	  morphological	   analyses,	   to	  
specific	  biomarkers	  detection,	  and	  genomic	  and	  proteomic	  evaluations.	  This	  is	  why	  FDA,	  
by	   means	   of	   the	   scientific	   expertise	   it	   gathers	   and	   distributes	   into	   specific	   advisory	  
bodies,	   seeks	   a	   continued	   dialogue	   with	   applicants	   to	   prevent	   adverse	   events	   or,	  
ultimately,	  cope	  with	  their	  occurrence.	  	  
However,	   preventing	   dangerous	   cellular	   material	   form	   ending	   up	   in	   clinical	  
research	   subjects	   also	   entails	   the	   development	   of	   better	   purification	   protocols	   and	  
cellular	   sorting	   techniques,	   together	   with	   improved	   animal	   model	   organisms	   and	  
preclinical	  study	  designs	  to	  yield	  more	  robust	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  evidence	  before	  starting	  
clinical	  trials.	  	  
Normalization	  efforts	   thus	  encounter	  a	   limit	   in	   the	  technical	  specificities	  of	  stem	  
cell	   products.	   Most	   of	   the	   ethically	   sensible	   stakes	   of	   stem	   cell	   translation,	   such	   as	  
improving	   safety	   through	   cellular	   purity	   and	   genetic	   integrity,	   depend	   on	   the	   future	  
development	   of	   more	   accurate	   tools	   to	   reliably	   analyse	   cellular	   products.	   As	   a	  
consequence,	  it	  is	  currently	  difficult	  for	  regulators	  to	  set	  tight	  standards	  and	  enforceable	  
dispositions.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   still	   evolving	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   of	   cellular	  manipulation,	  
does	   not	   make	   it	   feasible	   for	   regulatory	   agencies	   to	   implement	   precise	   norms	   that	  
efficiently	  cope	  with	  all	  the	  potential	  risks	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation	  to	  human	  subjects.	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California,	  being	  a	  major	  player	  in	  the	  global	  race	  to	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  innovation,	  
has	   also	   issued	   dedicated	   regulations	   to	   govern	   this	   kind	   of	   research.	   The	   California	  
Institute	   for	   Regenerative	   Medicine	   (CIRM)	   Medical	   and	   Ethical	   Standards	   Regulations	  
(February	  3rd	  2010)	  establish	   that	  a	  dedicated	  Stem	  Cell	  Research	  Oversight	  Committee	  
(SCRO)	   must	   review	   and	   approve	   any	   CIRM-­‐funded	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   cells	   from	  
covered	   stem	   cell	   lines	   into	   live	   born	   humans.	   Similarly,	   the	   California	   Department	   of	  
Public	  Health	   (CDPH)	  Guidelines	   for	  Human	  Stem	  Cell	   Research	  –	   issued	  by	   the	  Human	  
Stem	   Cell	   Research	   Advisory	   Committee	   –	   sets	   out	   review	   and	   approval	   functions	   of	   a	  
national	   SCRO	   committee	   to	   evaluate	   research	   outside	   CIRM.	   This	   document	   declares	  
that	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  SCRO	  members	  shall	  include	  developmental	  biology,	  stem	  cell	  
research,	   molecular	   biology,	   assisted	   reproduction,	   as	   well	   as	   expertise	   in	   the	   ethical	  
issues	   of	   stem	   cell	   research.	   Moreover,	   the	   SCRO	   panel	   shall	   include	   at	   least	   a	   non-­‐
scientists	  member	  of	  the	  public	  and	  at	  least	  one	  patient	  advocate.	  	  
	  
At	   the	   European	   level,	   similar	   authorities	   were	   installed	   at	   the	   European	  
Medicines	  Agency	  (EMA),	  although	  they	  are	  not	  dedicated	  to	  tissue	  and	  cellular	  therapy	  
specifically.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   Innovation	   Task	   Force	   (ITF)	   is	   a	   multidisciplinary	  
commission	   comprising	   experts	   in	   regulatory,	   legal	   and	   scientific	   issues,	   and	   providing	  
agency-­‐wide	  coordination	  as	  well	  as	  early	  engagement	  with	  EMA	  applicants.	  Furthermore	  
a	   Scientific	   Advice	   Working	   Party	   functions	   as	   a	   specific	   body	   providing	   dedicated	  
technical	   assistance	   to	   companies	   that	   are	   in	   the	   course	   of	   developing	   new	   human	  
medicines.	  Of	  relevance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine,	   is	  the	  establishment	  
within	   EMA	  of	   a	   Committee	   for	  Advanced	   Therapy	   (as	  mandated	  by	  Regulation	   EC	  No.	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1394/2007)	   charged,	   among	   other	   things,	   of	   evaluating	   advanced	   therapy	   medicinal	  
products	   in	  marketing	  authorization	  procedures.	  Moreover,	  EMA	   issued	  documentation	  
concerning	  the	  possible	  clinical	  use	  of	  cellular	  products,	  including	  among	  others:	  	  
• the	   “Guidelines	   on	   Human	   Cell-­‐Based	   Medicinal	   Products”	   (11th	   January	  
2007);	  	  
• a	   “Reflection	   Paper	   on	   Stem	   Cell-­‐based	   Medicinal	   Products”	   (6th	   March	  
2007);	  	  
• the	   “Final	   Report	   from	   the	   EMA/CHMP-­‐think-­‐tank	   Group	   on	   Innovative	  
Drug	  Development”	  (22nd	  March	  2007);	  	  
• and	  the	  “Guidelines	  on	  Strategies	  to	  Identify	  and	  Mitigate	  Risks	  for	  First-­‐in-­‐
human	   Clinical	   Trials	   with	   Investigational	   Medicinal	   Products”	   (19th	   July	  
2007).	  	  
The	   European	  Group	  on	   Ethics	   in	   Science	   and	  New	  Technologies	   (EGE)	   had	   also	  
released	  a	  report	  on	  the	  “Ethical	  Aspects	  of	  Human	  Stem	  Cell	  Research	  and	  Use”	  in	  2000	  
that	  gives	  some	  attention	  to	   issues	  of	  clinical	   translation.	  However,	   the	  most	   important	  
pieces	  of	  legislation	  on	  those	  matters	  in	  Europe	  are:	  	  
• Directive	   2004/23/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   the	   Council	   (31	  
March	  2004)	  on	   setting	   standards	  of	  quality	  and	   safety	   for	   the	  donation,	  
procurement,	  testing,	  processing,	  preservation,	  storage	  and	  distribution	  of	  
human	  tissues	  and	  cells.	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• Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   1394/2007	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	  
Council	   on	   advanced	   therapy7	  medicinal	   products	   (November	   13th	   2007),	  
amending	   the	   2001	   Directive	   2001/83/EC	   and	   Regulation	   (EC)	   726/2004	  
relating	  to	  medicinal	  products	  for	  human	  use.	  	  
Directive	  2004/23/EC	  addresses	  the	  quality	  and	  safety	  of	  human	  tissues	  and	  cells	  
per	   se,	   before	   they	   are	   implanted	   in	   human	   subjects.	   Its	   main	   aim	   is	   to	   prevent	   the	  
transmission	  of	  infectious	  and	  genetic	  diseases	  from	  donor	  to	  receiver,	  and	  to	  assure	  that	  
products	   of	   non-­‐human	   origin,	   that	   may	   have	   been	   used	   to	   derive	   the	   transplanting	  
material,	  do	  not	  reach	  the	  receiver.	  To	  this	  aims,	  the	  directive	  also	  mandates	  the	  creation	  
of	   a	   system	   to	   assure	   the	   traceability	   of	   tissue	   and	   cells.	   Furthermore	   it	   restates	   that	  
donation	  of	  bodily	  tissue	  should	  remain	  voluntary,	  unpaid,	  and	  anonymous	  and	  inspired	  
by	   principles	   of	   altruism	   and	   solidarity.	   Interestingly,	   the	   directive	   also	   suggests	  
information	  and	  awareness	  campaigns	  to	  stimulate	  the	  practice	  of	  donating	  to	  medicine	  
and	  research.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  directive	  seeks	  standardization,	  it	  so	  does	  in	  view	  of	  
the	  objective	  of	  reassuring	  the	  public	  that	  human	  tissues	  and	  cells	  produced	  in	  different	  
Member	   States	   possess	   even	   high-­‐level	   quality	   characteristics	   throughout.	   There	   is	  
therefore	  an	   idea	  of	  a	  shared	  supranational	  biomedical	  community	  at	   the	  roots	  of	  such	  
regulatory	  effort.	  Such	  community	  has	  to	  overcome	  diffidence	  to	  allow	  human	  tissue	  to	  
reliably	   circulate	  within	   its	   boarders,	   and	   thus	   for	   European	   biotechnology	   to	   properly	  
work.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	   For	   ‘advanced	   therapy	   medicinal	   products’,	   the	   Regulation	   intends:	   gene	   therapy,	   somatic	   cell	   and	  
engineered	  tissue	  products	  (Chapter	  1,	  Article	  2.1.(a)).	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Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   1394/2007,	   on	   its	   part,	   is	   an	   amendment	   to	   pre-­‐existing	  
provisions	   on	   medicinal	   products	   authorization	   in	   Europe.	   Its	   scope	   is	   to	   anchor	   gene	  
therapy,	   somatic	   cell	   therapy	   and	   engineered	   tissue	   (thereafter	   called	   “advanced	  
therapies”	   in	   the	   EU	   regulatory	   documents)	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   European	   regulation	   on	  
medicinal	  products	  and	  devices.	  Furthermore,	  the	  mandated	  creation	  of	  a	  Committee	  for	  
Advanced	   Therapies	   within	   the	   EMA	   (Title	   10),	   goes	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   both	  
acknowledging	   the	   novelty	   represented	   by	   advanced	   medicine,	   and	   of	   normalising	   its	  
presence	   within	   the	   accepted	   boundaries	   of	   biomedical	   innovation	   –	   an	   aim	   that	   is	  
common	  to	  both	  these	  pieces	  of	  European	  regulation.	  	  
	  
The	  UK	  certainly	  possesses	  the	  most	  advanced	  institutional	  design	  to	  account	  for	  
innovative	  cell	   therapy.	  The	  British	  model	  originates	   from	  coordinated	  activity	  between	  
the	  Human	   Fertilization	   and	   Embryology	  Authority	   (HFEA),	   the	  Human	  Tissue	  Authority	  
(HTA),	   the	   Medicines	   and	   Healthcare	   products	   Regulatory	   Agency	   (MHAR),	   the	   Gene	  
Transfer	  Advisory	  Committee	  (GTAC),	  and	  the	  UK	  Stem	  Cell	  Bank	  (UKSCB).	  These	  bodies	  
all	  participate	  in	  a	  concerted	  regulatory	  framework	  that	  is	  summarized	  into	  the	  so-­‐called	  
UK	  Stem	  Cell	  Toolkit,	  a	  streamlined	  pipeline	  of	  clinical	  development	  for	  cellular	  products	  
that	   may	   have	   embryonic	   or	   somatic	   origin,	   and	   may	   or	   may	   not	   harbour	   genetic	  
modifications.	  Adherence	  to	  such	  regulatory	  framework	  is	  not	  enforced	  by	  the	  law,	  but	  is	  
a	  mandatory	  requirement	  of	  the	  above	  agencies	  for	  licensing	  stem	  cell	  research,	  at	  both	  
laboratory	  and	  clinical	  level.	  Interestingly,	  the	  UK	  Stem	  Cell	  Bank	  code	  of	  practice	  insists	  
on	  the	  fact	  that	  standards,	  albeit	  voluntary,	  i.e.	  not	  imposed	  by	  a	  law,	  are	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  
interest	   of	   scientists	   themselves	  who	   are	  described	   as	   having	   “a	   desire	   for	   there	   to	   be	  
ethical	   oversight	   of	   all	   work	   involving	   human	   embryonic	   stem	   cells”	   (page	   2).	   In	   the	  
intentions	   of	   the	   British	   regulatory	   apparatus,	   the	   entire	   framework	   “should	   provide	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confidence	  and	  reassurance	  to	  professionals	  and	  the	  public	  alike	  that	  stem	  cell	  research	  
in	  the	  UK	  is	  performed	  to	  best	  practice	  and	  is	  conducted	  within	  a	  transparent	  and	  ethical	  
framework”8	  (page	  6).	  Again,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  here	  an	  effort	  by	  the	  British	  regulators	  
to	  normalize	  the	  translation	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  into	  the	  clinical	  context	  by	  inserting	  this	  
activity	   into	   a	   credible	   framework	   of	   procedures	   handled	   within	   reliable	   and	   trusted	  
institutions	   and	   authorities.	   It	   is	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   such	   normalisation	   effort	  
endorses	   a	  peculiar	   view	  of	   the	   circulation	  of	  human	   cellular	  material	   for	   research	  and	  
clinical	   applications	   as	   well.	   Namely,	   the	   inspiration	   backing	   the	   British	   regulatory	  
framework	  upholds	  what	  has	  been	  understood	  as	  an	  open	  source	  model	  (Courtney	  et	  al.	  
2011)	   entrusted	   and	   enacted	   directly	   by	   the	   UK	   Stem	   Cell	   Bank.	   This	   institution	   is	  
affiliated	   with	   the	   Medical	   Research	   Counclil	   (MRC)	   and	   governed	   by	   a	   steering	  
committee	   that	   comprises	   eminent	   scientists	   of	   obvious	   academic	   reputation.	   UKSCB	  
encourages	  stem	  cell	  research	  groups	  in	  Britain	  and	  from	  overseas	  to	  deposit	  samples	  of	  
the	   human	   cell	   lines	   they	   use.	   The	   bank	   harvests	   cell	   lines	   from	   various	   different	  
countries,	  especially	  of	  embryonic	  origin,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  that	  type.	  The	  bank	  
thus	  provides	  certification	  as	  to	  compliance	  of	  the	  received	  cells	  with	  EU/UK-­‐level	  GMPs	  
through	   its	   own	  HTA-­‐approved	   laboratories	   located	  within	   the	   storage	   site	   itself.	   Once	  
accepted	  by	  the	  bank,	  cellular	  samples	  can	  receive	  two	  types	  of	  certification,	  according	  to	  
the	  result	  of	  UKSCB	  in-­‐house	  testing,	  as	  either	  ‘research	  grade’	  or	  ‘clinical	  grade’	  human	  
cell	   lines.	  Only	  the	  latter	  can	  then	  be	  circulated	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  clinical	  research	  with	  
human	  subject.	  Nonetheless,	  both	  research	  grade	  and	  clinical	  grade	  deposited	  stem	  cells	  
are	   available	   for	   research	   groups	   to	   borrow	   and	  work	  with	   –	  whence	   the	   name	   “open	  
source	  model”.	  In	  this	  way,	  UKSCB	  seeks	  to	  gain	  a	  prominent	  position	  as	  a	  hub	  for	  stem	  
cell	  circulation	  in	  the	  coming	  phase	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  regenerative	  medicine.	  The	  benefit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  statement	  in	  particular	  is	  referred	  to	  compliance	  with	  the	  UK	  Stem	  Cell	  Bank	  Code	  of	  Practice.	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for	  cell	  users	  is	  to	  obtain	  certified	  stem	  cells,	  whose	  biological	  properties	  are	  tested	  as	  to	  
genetic	   stability,	   absence	   of	   contamination	   and	   ethical	   origin	   of	   the	   line.	   The	   latter	  
indication	   means	   that	   the	   cells	   were	   retrieved	   from	   fully	   informed	   consenting	   human	  
donors,	   irrespective	   of	   their	   biological	   origin	   –	   embryonic	   or	   otherwise.	   The	   intended	  
benefit	   for	   the	   field	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   lies	   instead	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   biological	  
standardisation	   that	   a	   state-­‐level	   cell	   banking	   system	   is	   purportedly	   able	   to	   confer	   to	  
stem	  cell	  studies	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  The	  open	  source	  model	  is	  thus	  an	  attempt	  at	  reducing	  
the	   amount	   of	   biological	   variability	   in	   the	   circulating	   stock	   of	   pluripotent	   entities	   that	  
populate	  research	  and	  clinical	  studies.	  In	  this	  last	  respect,	  the	  open	  source	  model	  is	  also	  a	  
way	   of	   coping	   with	   the	   mounting	   complexity	   and	   uncertainties	   that	   afflict	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  technological	  platform	  of	  stem	  cells	  towards	  clinical	  innovation.	  
The	   first	   clinical	   grade	   approvals	   are	   reported	   to	   be	   on	   their	   way	   in	   2011	  
(Department	  of	  Business	   Innovation	  &	   Skills,	   2011).	  Opting	   for	   the	  open	   source	  model,	  
the	   British	   regulatory	   system	   assumes	   technical	   standards	   of	   good	   manufacture	   as	   a	  
reliable	   pedigree	   for	   human	   cells,	   both	   in	   scientific	   and	   in	   societal	   terms.	   From	   the	  
scientific	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  UKSCB	  guarantees	  that	  deposited	  cells	  can	  reliably	  be	  used	  in	  
research.	  Furthermore,	  from	  the	  societal	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  centralised	  quality	  control	  of	  
the	  UKSCB	  also	  serves	  the	  aim	  of	  reassuring	  the	  public	  that	  all	  due	  measures	  are	  taken	  to	  
prevent	  “un-­‐safe”	  cells	  to	  reach	  human	  subjects	  in	  clinical	  research.	  
This	   model	   clearly	   attempts	   at	   importing	   the	   virtues	   of	   open	   source	   modes	   of	  
sharing,	  such	  as	  openness,	  collaboration	  and	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  capture	  
of	  science	  by	  industry’s	  commercial	  interests.	  The	  scientific	  certification	  of	  manufacturing	  
standards,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  projects	  technical	   liability	  on	  the	  storing-­‐sharing	  activity	  of	  
the	  bank.	  In	  broad	  terms,	  however,	  this	  framing	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  cell	   line	  circulation	  is	  
entirely	   dependent	   on	   technical-­‐scientific	   certification.	   It	   is	   ultimately	   technical	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manufacturing	   standards	   that	   confer	   credibility	   and	   convey	   respectability	   to	   the	  
enterprise	   of	   scientific	   research	   done	  with	  UKSCB-­‐deposited	   cells	   –	   a	   feature	   that,	   as	   I	  
said	   above,	   also	   other	   regulatory	   apparatuses	   like	   those	   created	   in	   the	   States	   and	   by	  
European	  authorities	  happen	   to	   share	  with	   the	  British	  model.	   I	  will	   return	  on	   the	  open	  
source	  model	  later	  on	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  when	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  this	  framing	  plays	  out	  
with	  the	  actual	  expectations	  of	  clinical	  researchers	  and	  their	  commercial	  partners.	  
	  
	  
As	   to	   scientific	   societies,	   two	  notable	   such	  bodies	  have	   issued	  guidelines	   for	   the	  
regulation	  of	  stem	  cells	  research.	  The	  National	  Academies	  of	  Science	  (NAS)	  have	  crafted	  
their	  Guidelines	   for	  Human	  Embryonic	  Stem	  Cell	  Research	   in	  2005	   through	  a	  dedicated	  
Embryonic	   Stem	   Cell	   Research	   Oversight	   (ESCRO)	   committee	   –	   composed	   of	   both	  
scientists	   and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   legal	   and	   ethical	   experts.	   Such	   guidelines	   have	   been	  
amended	   three	   times,	   in	   2007,	   2008	   and	   2010.	   Such	   documents,	   however,	   other	   than	  
recommending	   the	   creation	   of	   dedicated	   stem	   cell	   research	   institutional	   oversight	  
committees,	  mainly	  have	  to	  do	  with	  issues	  of	  hES	  cell	  derivation,	  and	  say	  very	  little	  about	  
clinical	  translation.	  
A	   more	   specific	   self-­‐regulatory	   effort	   was	   made	   in	   2008	   by	   the	   International	  
Society	  for	  Stem	  Cell	  Research	  (ISSCR).	  The	  ISSCR	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Clinical	  Translation	  of	  
Stem	   Cells	   comprise	   forty	   recommendations	   designed	   by	   a	   task	   force	   of	   scientists	   and	  
bioethicists,	   addressing	   a	   rather	   exhaustive	   set	   of	   issues	   in	   the	   clinical	   translation	   of	  
cellular	  therapy.	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Starting	  form	  the	  realisation	  that	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  medicine	  may	  be	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  
adding	   innovative	  applications	  to	  those	  already	  available	  with	  hematopoietic	  stem	  cells,	  
these	  guidelines	  provide	  advice	  as	  to	  how	  to	  conduct	  technically	  and	  ethically	  sound	  stem	  
cell	   clinical	   research.	   At	   first,	   the	   document	   establishes	   a	   clear-­‐cut	   distinction	   between	  
responsible	   clinical	   translation	   –	   assured	   by	   voluntary	   adherence	   to	   the	   guidelines	  
recommendations	   –	   and	   unproven	   commercial	   stem	   cell	   interventions.	   The	   latter,	  
generally	   marketed	   directly	   to	   patients,	   are	   said	   to	   be	   a	   possible	   source	   of	   fraud	   and	  
exploitation,	  since	  they	  are	  not	  backed	  by	  any	  “credible	  scientific	  rationale,	  transparency,	  
oversight,	  or	  patient	  protection”	  (ISSCR,	  2008,	  4).	  I	  will	  say	  much	  more	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  the	  
next	  chapter.	  
Among	  the	  most	  notable	  recommendations	  of	  the	  guidelines	  it	   is	  worth	  recalling	  
here	  the	  following:	  	  
• The	   amount	   and	   force	   of	   regulation	   should	   be	   proportional	   to	   the	   risk	  
involved	  in	  a	  given	  case	  of	  translational	  research	  (rec.	  8);	  
• Genetically	   modified	   cell	   products	   have	   to	   be	   regulated	   as	   both	   gene	  
therapy	  and	  cell	  therapy	  products	  (rec.10);	  
• Sufficient	   pre-­‐clinical	   evidence	  must	   support	   the	  decision	   to	   start	   a	   stem	  
cell	  clinical	  trial	  (rec.	  11);	  
• Some	  risks	  are	  typical	  of	   this	   innovative	  field	  of	  clinical	   research	  (namely,	  
cell	  proliferation	  and/or	  tumour	  development,	  exposure	  to	  animal	  source	  
materials	  and	  risk	  connected	  to	  viral	  vectors),	  and	  other	  risks	  can	  currently	  
be	  unknown,	  so	  that	  special	  attention	  must	  be	  paid	  in	  avoiding	  therapeutic	  
misconception	  (rec.	  20);	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• If	  the	  clinical	  trial	  is	  addressing	  a	  condition	  for	  which	  therapeutic	  strategies	  
of	  some	  efficacy	  already	  exist,	  burdens	  to	  the	  research	  subject	  should	  be	  
minimal,	  and	  perspective	  advantages	  tangible	  (rec.	  25);	  
• The	   efficacy	   of	   the	   new	   stem	   cell	   therapy	  must	   be	   assessed	   against	   the	  
best	  medical	  therapy	  available	  for	  the	  local	  population	  (rec.	  26);	  
• Stem	  cell	  clinical	   interventions	  are	  possible	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  route	  of	  
an	  EBM	  clinical	   trials	  only	  under	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  and	  provided	  
that	   a	   number	   of	   conditions	   hold,	   including	   among	   others:	   those	  
interventions	   are	   confined	   to	  a	   very	   small	   number	  of	  patients;	   there	   is	   a	  
peer-­‐reviewed	  written	  plan	  for	  the	  procedure;	  measures	  are	  put	  in	  place	  to	  
cope	  with	  adverse	  events;	  voluntary	  informed	  consent	  is	  obtained	  by	  fully	  
patients	  who	  are	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  risk	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  procedure	  (rec.	  
34);	  
• Regulators	  should	  explicitly	  seek	  for	  open	  discussion	  on	  the	  ethical	   issues	  
surrounding	   stem	   cell	   trials	   and	   public	   engagement	   in	   policy	   making	   at	  
governmental	  agencies	  (rec.	  35,	  37).	  
Those	   guidelines	   are	   firmly	   rooted	   in	   the	   traditions	  of	   the	   ethical	   principles	   and	  
epistemic	  values	  that	  inform	  evidence	  based	  medicine	  (EMB)	  and	  controlled	  clinical	  trials	  
(CCTs).	   Most	   notably,	   ISSCR	   guidance	   vigorously	   subscribes	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   certified	  
scientific	   knowledge	   cannot	  be	  obtained	  but	   through	   the	   cherished	  procedure	  of	   peer-­‐
reviewing.	  This	  principle	  stands	  as	  a	  defining	  pillar	  in	  the	  edifice	  set	  up	  by	  the	  guidelines,	  
and	  is	  referred	  to	  nearly	  fifteen	  times	  in	  the	  nineteen	  pages	  that	  make	  up	  the	  document.	  
Nonetheless,	  ISSCR	  also	  try	  to	  make	  room	  for	  some	  minor	  adaptations	  to	  the	  paradigm	  of	  
peer-­‐reviewed	  clinical	   science	  by	  affirming	   the	   special	   character,	   and	   thus	   the	  need	   for	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special	   oversight,	   for	   first-­‐in-­‐human	   stem	   cell	   research.	   Most	   importantly,	   the	   ISSCR	  
guidelines	  acknowledge	  a	  role	  of	  regulatory	  oversight	  to	  governmental	  agencies,	  like	  the	  
FDA	  in	  the	  US,	  thus	  coupling	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  scientific	  society	  with	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  
state	  body.	  Both	  ISSCR	  and	  FDA,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  share	  similar	  commitments	  towards	  
peer-­‐reviewed	  science	  and	  ethical	  treatment	  of	  research	  subjects.	  
This	   last	   features,	   as	   we	   will	   see	   in	   much	   detail	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   clearly	  
separates	  ISSCR	  guideline	  from	  a	  slightly	  later	  body	  of	  guidance	  documents	  issued	  by	  the	  
International	   Cellular	   Medicine	   Society	   (ICMS),	   and	   currently	   in	   the	   course	   of	   being	  
adopted	   by	   its	   members.	   The	   latter	   society	   was	   founded	   by	   Dr.	   Christopher	   Centeno,	  
owner	   of	   the	   Regenerative	   Sciences	   clinics,	   that	   offers	   autologous	   adult	   stem	   cell	  
treatments	   both	   in	   the	   States	   and	   off-­‐shore.	   ICMS	   is	   a	   non-­‐profit	   international	  
organisation	   that	   brings	   together	   physicians,	   researcher	   and	   patient	   with	   a	   shared	  
interest	   in	   innovative	  autologous	  stem	  cell	   therapies.	  Since,	  as	   I	   said,	   the	  activity	  of	  Dr.	  
Centeno	  and	   the	   regulatory	  efforts	  of	   ICMS	  will	  be	   the	   focus	  of	  next	   chapter,	   I	  will	  not	  
enter	  here	  into	  further	  detatils.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	   it	   is	  sufficient	  to	  state	  here	  that	  the	  
ICMS	  guidelines	  enact	  a	  completely	  different	  model	  of	  translational	  research	  with	  respect	  
to	  ISSCR.	  
	  
3.II.2	  Towards	  a	  new	  regulatory	  order	  
All	   the	   regulatory	   dispensations	   that	   I	   outlined	   above,	   seem	   to	   depart	   from	   the	  
state-­‐centred	   model	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   governance	   (see	   chapter	   3,	   part	   I)	   quite	  
substantially.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	   incidence	  of	  enforceable	   legal	  provisions	  appears	  to	  be	  
much	  less	  prominent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  regulations	  aimed	  at	  bringing	  normative	  order	  around	  
stem	   cell	   translational	   research.	   The	   only	   legally	   binding	   dispositions	   in	   the	   previous	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section	  are	  the	  rather	  general	  European	  directives	  on	  quality	  standards	  for	  human	  tissues	  
and	  cells	   to	  be	  used	   in	  clinical	   research	  and	  therapy	  (Directive	  2004/23/EC).	  The	  rest	  of	  
what	   I	   presented	   above	   comprises	   voluntary	   codes	   of	   practice,	   guidelines,	  
recommendations	   and	   opinion	   reports	   that	   supposedly	   should	   ensure	   that	   stem	   cell	  
clinical	   research	   and	   cellular	   therapy	   are	   developed	   under	   the	   licence	   of	   regulatory	  
bodies	  and	  implemented	  in	  an	  ethically	  sensible	  way.	  	  
Beyond	   specific	   ethical	   provisions	   regarding	   consent,	   anonymity,	   privacy,	  
traceability	  and	  responsible	  medical	  conduct,	  it	  seems	  that	  stem	  cell	  translation	  resorts	  to	  
the	  already	  existing	  overarching	  ethical	  framework	  of	  research	  subjects’	  protection.	   It	   is	  
indeed	   evident	   from	   the	   guidance	   documents	   that	   both	   in	   Europe	   and	   in	   the	   US	   the	  
ethical	   requirements	   of	   the	   Helsinki	   Declaration,	   the	   Belmont	   Report,	   the	   Oviedo	  
Convention,	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  are	  explicitly	  
or	  implicitly	  considered	  as	  a	  solid	  and	  socially	  credible	  foundation	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovative	  
research.	  	  
The	   state-­‐centred	   model	   seems	   no	   longer	   worth	   of	   consideration	   by	   the	  
stakeholders	   of	   translational	   stem	   cell	   research.	   Rather,	   the	   governance	  model	   that	   is	  
emerging	  veers	   towards	  self-­‐regulation	  by	   the	  scientific	  community,	  with	   the	   functional	  
intermediation	  of	  highly	  specialized	  regulatory	  bodies.	  The	  latter,	  both	  in	  the	  States	  and	  
in	  Europe,	  provide	  strict	  criteria	  as	  to	  the	  manufacture	  of	  cellular	  products,	  with	  respect	  
to	   contamination,	   communicable	   diseases	   and	   genetic	   alteration	   (good	   manufacturing	  
practices	   –GMPs).	   However,	   beyond	   these	   provisions,	   regulators	   tend	   to	   refrain	   from	  
elaborating	   specific	   public	   disposition	   as	   to	   the	   possible	   technical	   and	   ethical	   stakes	   of	  
individual	  translational	  projects.	  The	  legislator,	  in	  other	  words,	  constructs	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  
intervention	   in	   the	   clinical	   translation	   of	   stem	   cell	   research	   as	   limited	   to	   GMP-­‐related	  
issues	   and	   informed	   consent,	   and	   does	   so	   by	   assimilating	   stem	   cells	   to	   other	   medical	  
	   119	  
products.	   This	   classificatory	  move	   thus	  extends	  existing	   regulatory	  authority	  on	  a	  novel	  
biomedical	   product	   –	   stem	   cells.	   It	   is	   thus	   by	   enacting	   a	   co-­‐productive	   exercise	   in	  
boundary	   construction	   that	   regulators	   in	   both	   the	   US	   and	   Europe	   define	   stem	   cells	   as	  
biological	  drugs	  or	  assimilate	  them	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  cellular	  therapies	  that	  already	  belong	  
to	   the	   medical	   standard-­‐of-­‐care.	   This	   exercise	   normalises	   the	   novelty	   of	   stem	   cell	  
medicine	   while,	   at	   the	   very	   same	   time,	   constructing	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   state	   on	   the	  
clinical	  translation	  of	  stem	  cell	  research.	  Such	  authority,	  however,	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  solitary	  
as	   the	   one	   exercised	   by	   public	   regulation	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stem	   cell	   derivation	   from	  
embryonic	  and	  foetal	  materials.	  The	  rigid	  public	  governance	  model	  that	  had	  been	  put	  in	  
place	   to	   control	   the	   highly	   divisive	   stakes	   of	  working	  with	   embryos	   and	   foetuses	   is	   no	  
longer	  there	  for	  regulating	  the	  clinical	  translation	  of	  stem	  cells.	  In	  its	  place	  we	  now	  see	  a	  
model	   of	   shared	   governance,	   whereby	   the	   state	   demands	   adherence	   to	   quality	   and	  
informed	  consent	  standards	  but	  ultimately	  leaves	  huge	  margins	  for	  scientific	  actors,	  both	  
in	   universities	   and	   industries,	   to	   proceed	   with	   clinical	   translation	   according	   to	   self-­‐
established	  criteria.	  Some	  form	  of	  oversight	  is	  certainly	  assured	  by	  technical	  offices	  within	  
regulatory	   bodies,	   but	   those	   offices	   are	   ultimately	   composed	   of	   scientists	   themselves,	  
and	  are	  not	  equipped	  with	  specific	  provisions	  as	  to	  the	  scientific	  and	  ethical	  assessment	  
of	  highly	  innovative	  clinical	  research.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  almost	  entirely	  within	  the	  scientific	  
community	   that	   the	   stakes,	   both	   ethical	   and	   technical,	   of	   clinical	   translation	   are	   dealt	  
with.	   Statutory	   agencies	   do	   not	   provide	   but	   a	   loose	   framework	   to	   construct	   stem	   cell	  
translation	  as	  a	  publicly	  credible,	  safe	  and	  reliable	  practice.	  Regulatory	  provisions	  issued	  
by	   public	   authorities	   primarily	   attain	   this	   function	   by	   framing	   stem	   cells	   as	   biological	  
drugs,	  and	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  as	  comparable	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  tissue-­‐based	  medicine.	  Both	  
in	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  US,	  public	  regulation	  has	  been	  oriented	  to	  a	  framing	  effort	  aimed	  at	  
bringing	   stem	   cells	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   dedicated	   agencies.	   But	   the	   scope	   of	   this	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authority,	  its	  effective	  powers,	  do	  not	  span	  as	  far	  as	  to	  dictate	  specific	  epistemic	  criteria	  
of	   pre-­‐clinical	   evidence,	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	   validity,	   or	   acceptable	   risk	   in	   first-­‐in-­‐human	  
clinical	   research.	   The	   latter	   criteria,	   evidently,	   cannot	   be	   established	   in	   advance,	  
irrespective	  of	  the	  highly	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  the	  clinical	  trial	  or	  medical	  procedure	  
that	  attempts	  to	  use	  stem	  cells	  in	  human	  subjects	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  likely	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  
As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   the	   only	   possibility	   for	   public	   regulators	   to	   exert	   control	   over	   the	  
emerging	  field	  of	  stem	  cell	  translational	  medicine	  is	  to	  frame	  the	  field	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  
regulatory	  competence	  can	  be	  projected	  onto	  it.	  To	  this	  aim,	  existing	  standards	  of	  GMP	  
and	  informed	  consent	  are	  extended	  to	  this	  novel	  field	  of	  biomedical	  innovation.	  However,	  
as	   to	   issues	  of	  sufficient	  pre-­‐clinical	  evidence,	  efficacy	  and	  human	  safety,	  governance	   is	  
left	  to	  scientific	  experts	  and	  interested	  practitioners.	  	  
The	   result	   of	   the	   dispositions	   illustrated	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   is	   therefore	   a	  
rather	  unstructured,	  but	  yet	  precisely	  framed	  shared	  model	  of	  governance.	  This	  may	  be	  
immediately	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   stem	   cell	   derivation	   issues	   are	   dealt	   with	  
elsewhere,	   and	   that	   the	   remaining	  moral	   issues,	   albeit	   important	   in	   themselves	   and,	   I	  
would	   say,	   crucial	   to	   the	   future	   of	   the	   field,	   appear	   as	   yet	   less	   divisive	   than	   those	  
regarding	   the	  moral	   status	   of	   human	   embryos.	  Moreover,	   as	   I	   said,	   some	   of	   the	  most	  
decisive	  uncertainties	  that	  lay	  ahead	  of	  the	  delivery	  of	  safe	  clinical	  research	  in	  this	  field,	  
depend	  on	  as	  yet	  unavailable	  technical	  progresses	  in	  cellular	  characterization,	  purification	  
and	  sorting,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  sensibly	  dealt	  with	  by	  however	  alerted	   legislation.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	  states	  align	  their	  regulatory	  powers	  to	  those	  of	  the	  scientific	  community,	  in	  
a	  shared	  effort	  to	  gain	  control	  on	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  stem	  cell	  translational	  medicine.	  	  
The	   emergence	   of	   such	   a	  model,	   however,	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   put	   in	  
place	   a	  markedly	   technocratic	   governance	  model.	   As	   the	  medical-­‐scientific	   community	  
uses	  its	  epistemic	  authority	  and	  its	  social	  credibility	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  the	  governance	  of	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stem	  cell	  translation,	  bioethics	  is	  providing	  both	  the	  ethical	  expertise	  and	  the	  persuading	  
accountability	   that	  a	  process	   like	  steering	  biomedical	   innovation	  requires.	  The	  presence	  
of	  ethical	  and	  legal	  experts	  is	  nowadays	  entrenched	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  advisory	  panels	  
and	  regulatory	  committees	  –	  a	  feature	  that	  echoes	  the	  worries	  and	  conflicts	  over	  using	  r-­‐
DNA	  technologies	  in	  the	  early	  Eighties	  (see	  supra).	  Furthermore,	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  
governance	   of	   such	   technologically	   advanced	   applications	   should	   be	   transparent	   and	  
inclusive	   is,	   at	   least	   in	   principle,	   widespread	   in	   both	   the	   scientific	   community	   and	  
regulatory	   agencies.	   This	   is	   apparent	   in	   the	   emphasis	   that	   many	   documents	   put	   on	  
reporting	  procedures,	  periodic	   inspections,	  and	  compliance	  with	  clearly	   stated	  codes	  of	  
conducts	  and	  manufacturing	  practices.	  Moreover,	  the	  necessity	  of	  including	  non-­‐scientific	  
actors	   (e.g.	   bioethicists	   as	   well	   as	   patients	   advocates	   or	   unspecified	   members	   of	   the	  
public)	  in	  the	  on-­‐going	  construction	  of	  a	  solid	  governance	  infrastructure	  is	  stressed	  across	  
the	  board.	  The	  necessity	  to	  enlarge	  the	  panel	  of	  recognized	  stakeholders	  well	  beyond	  the	  
scientific	  community	   is	  evident	   in	  the	  ISSCR,	  CDPH	  and	  NAS	  guidelines,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  
European	  Regulation	  1394/2007	  (paragraph	  11	  and	  art.	  21.d),	  and	  in	  the	  British	  oversight	  
system	  as	  well.	  One	  may	  want	  to	  question,	  nonetheless,	  whether	  the	  degree	  of	  openness	  
and	  inclusivity	  permitted	  within	  a	  shared	  regulatory	  model	  like	  the	  one	  I	  am	  describing	  is	  
adequate	  to	  the	  necessities	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  This	  question	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  
next	  chapter,	  when	  I	  will	  characterize	  in	  much	  detail	  the	  emerging	  relationship	  between	  
scientists	  and	  patients	  in	  the	  current	  stage	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  translation.	  In	  the	  context	  
of	   discussing	   unproven	   stem	   cell	   treatments	   and	   the	   complex	   dynamics	   that	   the	   latter	  
enact,	  I	  will	  also	  say	  something	  more	  about	  how	  the	  scientific	  framing	  of	  clinical	  risk	  fares	  
with	  the	  self-­‐regulatory	  governance	  model	  that	  I	  thus	  far	  illustrated.	  
A	  last	  but	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  this	  shared	  governance	  model	  is	  the	  reliance	  on	  a	  
stepwise	  conception	  of	   the	  clinical	  discovery	  process.	  As	  noted	  by	  Sugarman,	   the	   ISSCR	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guidelines,	  but	  the	  same	  could	  be	  said	  of	  all	  the	  other	  dispositions	  that	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
previous	  section,	  “largely	  assume	  a	  stepwise	  process	   involving	  science	  progressing	  from	  
in	  vitro	  research,	  to	  in	  vivo	  research	  with	  non-­‐human	  animals,	  to	  first	  in	  human	  trials,	  to	  
larger	   scale	   clinical	   trials”	   (Sugarman	   2010,	   252).	   Where	   other	   possibilities	   are	  
considered,	  like	  for	  example	  medical	  innovation	  taking	  place	  outside	  a	  formal	  clinical	  trial	  
process,	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  exceptions	  dictated	  by	  peculiar	  clinical	  circumstances	  (See	  
ISSCR,	   2008,	   rec.	   34).	   This	   classical	   outlook	   of	   the	   pipeline	   of	   clinical	   development,	  
responds	   to	   both	   epistemic	   and	   political	   reasons.	   As	   it	  will	   become	   clearer	   in	   the	   next	  
chapter,	   good	   scientific	   reasons	   support	   the	   field’s	   preference	   for	   the	   methods	   of	  
evidence-­‐based	  medicine	   (EBM)	   in	   the	   development	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovative	   therapies.	  
Nonetheless,	   the	   necessity	   to	   maintain	   steering	   capacities	   and	   authority	   over	   the	  
construction	   of	   the	   new	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   also	   motivates	   this	   choice	   by	   regulatory	  
bodies	   and	   scientific	   societies	   alike.	   The	   latter,	   as	   I	   will	   show,	   are	   indeed	   proactively	  
engaged	  in	  fencing	  off	  the	  field	  from	  the	  intrusion	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  offering	  unproven	  
treatments	   over	   the	   counter	   of	   a	   rising	   global	   bio-­‐market	   in	   innovative	   medical	  
technologies.	  	  
That	   innovation	   governance	  was	   steering	   towards	   self-­‐regulation	   recently	  began	  
to	  appear	  also	  in	  fields	  other	  than	  stem	  cell	  research.	  When	  the	  Human	  Genome	  Project	  
(HGP)	  was	  set	  up	  and	  endowed	  with	  federal	  funding,	  part	  of	  the	  money	  went	  for	  covering	  
the	  ethical,	   legal	  and	  social	   implications	   (ELSI)	  of	   the	  sequencing	  of	   the	  human	  genome	  
(Ramsay	  2001).	  Research	  programmes	  were	   thus	   set	  up	   that	   tried	   to	  discuss	   the	  wider	  
impact	  of	   such	  new	   technological	  achievement.	  Academic	   specialists	   inside	  and	  outside	  
the	   life	  sciences	  were	  thus	   involved	   in	  this	  meritorious	  exercise	  of	  anticipatory	  analysis.	  
Cognate	  branches	  of	  the	  academy	  were	  co-­‐opted	  to	  discuss	  the	  technological	  impacts	  of	  
the	   HGP,	   with	   bioethics	   playing	   a	   prominent	   disciplinary	   role.	   It	   has	   however	   been	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noticed	   that	   such	   approach	   to	   technology	   assessment,	   albeit	   capable	   of	   sensing	   the	  
emergence	  of	  possible	  conflicts	  and	  disagreements,	  as	  it	  was	  conceived,	  was	  incapable	  of	  
having	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  course	  of	  technological	  development	  (Macnaghten,	  Kearnes,	  and	  
Wynne	   2005).	   The	   latter	   was	   assumed	   as	   a	   given,	   and	   the	   ELSI	   assessment	   process	  
focused	   on	   its	   impact	   only,	   rather	   than	   on	   its	   responsiveness	   to	   perceived	   needs	   and	  
concerns	   by	   wider	   sectors	   of	   stakeholders.	   In	   the	   last	   chapter,	   I	   will	   discuss	   ways	   of	  
assessing	   technological	   development	   that,	   drawing	   on	   deliberative	   and	   participatory	  
approaches	  of	   technological	  appraisal,	   are	  gaining	  prominence	  as	  usable	   tools	   to	   shape	  
the	  course	  of	  innovation.	  	  
3.II.3	  Deliberative	  innovation	  	  
We	  have	  now	  reached	  the	  point	  where	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  attempt	  an	  assessment	  
of	  the	  emerging	  governance	  model	  for	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  translation	  from	  the	  deliberative	  
point	  of	  view.	  	  
The	   literature	   on	   the	   political	   debate	   that	   surrounds	   stem	   cell	   research	   has	  
focused	   on	   the	   State-­‐centred	   governance	   initiatives	   to	   accommodate	   the	   use	   of	  
embryonic	  material.	  Comparative	  analyses	  described	  how	  political	  power	  constrained	  and	  
regulated	  the	  derivation	  of	  pluripotent	  cells	   from	  human	  embryos	   in	  different	  countries	  
(Jasanoff	  2005;	  Gottweis,	  Salter	  and	  Waldby	  2009).	  	  
However,	   once	   those	   new	  political	   dispensations	  were	   put	   in	   place	   for	   embryo-­‐
related	  research,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  debate	  began	  to	  slide	  towards	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  
by	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   and,	   thus,	   issues	   of	   clinical	   research	   progressively	   gained	  
prominence.	   This	  phenomenon	   resulted	   in	   the	   rising	  of	   a	   specific	   governance	  model	   to	  
regulate	  stem	  cells’	  application	  to	  the	  clinic.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  such	  model,	  which	  is	  still	  in	  
	  124	  
the	  course	  of	  being	  fully	  developed,	  has	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  intricate	  admixture	  of	  technical	  
and	  ethical	  problems	  that	  is	  typical	  of	  innovative	  therapies.	  	  
It	   thus	   appeared	   from	  my	   previous	   analyses	   that	   stem	   cell	   translation	   is	   being	  
constructed	   as	   a	   regulatory	  matter	   that	   advisory	   panels	   within	   governmental	   agencies	  
can	  handle	  by	  including	  scientific	  experts	  and	  bioethicists	  alike.	  
The	  incipient	  regulatory	  regimes	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  make	  the	  case	  for	  this	  field	  
of	  biomedical	  innovation	  to	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  technological	  platform	  (see	  supra).	  As	  I	  
hinted	  to	  above,	  such	  notion	  captures	  the	  fluid	  configuration	  of	  the	  innovation	  trajectory	  
that	  is	  typical	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  In	  particular,	  the	  regulatory	  model	  that	  I	  described	  so	  
far,	  reflects	  the	  technical	  and	  medical	  uncertainties	  of	  the	  field	  at	  the	  institutional	  level.	  
Stem	   cell	  medicine	   is	   thus	   a	   technological	   platform	   precisely	   because	   the	   end-­‐point	   of	  
stem	  cell-­‐driven	  innovation	  is	  unknown.	  	  
Now,	   our	   journey	   into	   the	   regulation	   of	   stem	   cell	   biomedical	   novelties	   testifies	  
that	   governance	   initiatives	   around	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   take	   the	   developmental	  
uncertainty	   associated	   with	   contemporary	   biomedicine	   at	   face	   value.	   Resorting	   to	   the	  
somehow	   mixed	   expertise	   of	   dedicated	   advisory	   panels	   in	   regulatory	   agencies	   and	   in	  
scientific	  societies,	  regulators	  admit	  of	  this	  open-­‐ended	  character	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  
Expertise	   is	   thus	  both	   recruited	  and	  created	  ad	  hoc	  within	   these	   teams	   to	  grapple	  with	  
the	  unpredictable	  direction	  of	  clinical	  research.	  
Furthermore,	   an	   expanding	   array	   of	   actors	   is	   arranging	   around	   the	   stem	   cell	  
platform.	   We	   see	   politicians,	   judges,	   scientists	   of	   diverse	   backgrounds,	   bioethicists,	  
patient’s	  groups	  and	  commercial	  subjects	  negotiating	  their	  respective	  roles	  and	  building	  a	  
regulatory	  regime	  of	  innovation	  around	  a	  rather	  elusive	  biological	  entity	  like	  the	  stem	  cell	  
(Callon	  1999).	  As	  rightly	  pointed	  out	  by	  Faulkner	  with	  respect	  to	  tissue	  engineering,	  also	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stem	   cell	   medicine	   is	   not	   adequately	   depicted	   as	   a	   technology	   ‘sector’	   defined	   by	   a	  
specific	  product	  type	  (Faulkner	  2009).	  Actors	  engaged	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  stem	  cell	  
regulatory	  order	   include	  non-­‐human	  elements	  as	  well	  as	   identifiable	   individuals	   (Latour	  
2005).	  The	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  and	  clinical	  translation	  is	  thus	  made	  also,	  and	  
to	   a	   remarkable	   extent,	   of	  material	   constraints	   implemented	   in	   regulatory	   documents,	  
judicial	   dispositions,	   ethical	   codes,	   and	   technical	   guidelines.	   Interestingly,	   this	   body	   of	  
impersonal	  but	   tangible	  bottlenecks,	  ultimately	  shape	  the	   innovation	  trajectory	  of	  stem	  
cell	  science.	  	  
We	  saw	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  medical	  products	  being	  legislatively	  associated	  with	  other	  
pre-­‐existing	  entities	  (knock-­‐in	  modified	  genes,	  organs,	  blood)	  to	  allow	  for	  their	  circulation	  
and	  governance.	  We	  saw	  advisory	  panels	  using	  already	  available	  bioethical	  frameworks	  to	  
gain	  traction	  on	  the	  moral	  questions	  raised	  by	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research.	  And	  finally,	  we	  
saw	  the	  regulatory	  order	  being	  delegated	  to	  dedicated	  experts	  at	  the	  operational	  level.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   account	   of	   deliberative	   democracy	   that	   I	   provided	   in	   the	   first	  
chapter,	   certain	   features	   should	   characterize	   the	   debate	   on	   policy	   issues	   of	   public	  
interest.	  To	  begin	  with,	   in	  order	   for	   the	  debate	  on	   stem	  cell	   clinical	   research	   to	  exhibit	  
some	   minimal	   requisites	   of	   a	   deliberative	   configuration,	   involved	   actors	   must	   offer	  
reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  policy	  options	  they	  propose.	  This	  first	  requirement	  addresses	  the	  
possible	   representative	  advantages	  enjoyed	  by	  actors	   in	  dominant	  power	   relations.	  The	  
fact	   that	   language	   is	   conceived	   in	   deliberative	   theories	   as	   the	   universal	   medium	   of	  
political	  engagement,	  makes	   reasoned	  arguments	   the	  privileged	  means	   for	   levelling-­‐out	  
existing	  power	  positions,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  civic	  resource	  to	  rationalise	  public	  decisions	  taken	  
under	  conditions	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty	  and	  moral	  disagreement.	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A	  second	  crucial	  requirement	  of	  deliberative	  legitimation	  is	  publicity.	  The	  reasons	  
that	  support	  public	  policy	  have	  to	  be	  openly	  spelled	  out.	  This	  is	  evidently	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  
for	  an	  open	  deliberation	  to	  effectively	  take	  place.	  Publicity,	   furthermore,	  stimulates	  the	  
emergence	   of	   counter-­‐narratives	   and	   contestations	   even	   after	   a	   given	   policy	   has	   been	  
approved	  to	  constitute	  a	  binding	  provision.	  	  
This	  last	  points	  introduces	  us	  to	  a	  further	  general	  requisite	  of	  deliberation,	  that	  is,	  
openness	  to	  revision.	  Policies,	  especially	  in	  a	  field	  of	  rampant	  innovation	  like	  biomedicine,	  
must	   remain	   open	   to	   accommodate	   scientific	   and	   technological	   novelties	   as	   possible	  
drivers	  of	  changed	  ethical	  priorities	  and	  alternative	  political	  necessities.	  	  
Lastly,	  as	  to	  the	  language	  of	  the	  public	  dialogue	  in	  a	  deliberative	  context,	  attention	  
should	  be	  paid	  to	  avoiding	  framing	  one’s	  ideas	  in	  misleading	  and	  manipulative	  terms.	  This	  
unfortunately	   occurs	   quite	   often	   in	   ethically	   charged	   public	   debates,	   when	   holders	   of	  
opposing	  views	  address	  each-­‐other	  willingly	  misrepresenting	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  other	  party,	  
or	  attributing	  to	  their	  own	  positions	  virtues	  and	  advantages	  that	  are	  either	  not	  unique	  to	  
them	  or	  unjustified.	  	  
Deliberative	   virtues,	   in	   other	   words,	   require	   a	   universal	   commitment	   to	   use	  
fairness	  and	  veridicity	  in	  linguistic	  exchange,	  and	  this	  starts	  from	  respecting	  the	  value	  of	  
circulating	  views	  even	  if	  one	  disagrees	  with	  them.	  
To	   this	   point,	   for	   instance,	   in	   analysing	   recent	  developments	   in	   embryonic	   stem	  
cell	  policy	   in	   the	  States,	  Dresser	  has	  highlighted	  that	  President	  Obama’s	   intervention	  to	  
lift	   previous	   restrictions,	   “cautioned	   against	   exaggerating	   the	   possibility	   of	   medical	  
benefits	   for	   [stem	  cell]	   research”	   (Dresser	   2010,	   339).	   Furthermore,	   the	   views	  of	   those	  
who,	   contrary	   to	   the	   ideas	   of	   the	   Obama	   administration,	   oppose	   embryonic	   stem	   cell	  
research	   were	   not	   depicted	   as	   merely	   irrational	   and	   misplaced.	   Rather,	   although	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regulation	   was	   unfavourable	   to	   them,	   they	   were	   acknowledged	   as	   legitimate	   and	  
animated	  by	  sincere	  moral	  concerns	  (ibidem).	  	  
If	   we	   now	   apply	   the	   deliberative	   criteria	   to	   the	   state-­‐centred	   and	   the	   shared	  
model	   in	   a	   comparative	   fashion,	  we	  will	   appreciate	   that,	   for	  different	   reasons,	  none	  of	  
the	   models	   is	   fully	   satisfactory.	   Nonetheless,	   as	   to	   the	   latter,	   it	   seems	   friendly	   to	  
deliberative	  ideals	  and	  amenable	  to	  interesting	  improvements.	  	  
	  The	   shared	   model	   seems	   better	   equipped	   to	   provide	   reasoned	   argument	   in	  
justification	   of	   policy	   choices	   than	   the	   state-­‐centred	   one.	   In	   the	   end,	   scientists	   are	  
culturally	   accustomed	   to	   exchange	   reasons,	   and	   the	   peer-­‐review	   model	   of	   knowledge	  
certification	  that	  sometimes	  appears	  in	  current	  regulations	  and	  guidelines	  is	  an	  instance	  
of	   such	   tendency.	  Moreover,	   knowledge-­‐producing	   communities	   cannot	   but	   adopt	   and	  
exploit	  shared	  technical	  languages,	  and	  this	  predisposes	  their	  members	  to	  consider	  each	  
voice,	   in	   principle,	   to	   have	   equal	   entitlement	   to	   participate.	   The	   state-­‐centred	   model	  
instead	  rests	  on	  the	  administrative	  power	  that	  a	  political	  majority	   is	  able	  to	  mobilise	  to	  
back-­‐up	   its	   wills	   and	   interests.	  Moreover,	   legally	   enforceable	   regulations	   only	   need	   to	  
publicly	  exhibit	   formal	  coherence	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  existing	   legislation.	  They,	   in	  other	  
words,	   can	   let	   the	   intentions	   and	   reasons	   of	   the	   legislator	   remain	   black-­‐boxed	   and	  
invisible	  to	  the	  public,	  with	  no	  formal	  detriment	  to	  their	  enforceability.	  	  
With	   the	   shared	   mode	   of	   regulation,	   instead,	   publicity	   can	   serve	   the	   ends	   of	  
making	   policy	   choices	   more	   acceptable,	   and	   to	   stimulate	   multiple	   stakeholder	   to	  
participate	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   regulatory	   order.	   This	   is	   not	   a	  
guarantee,	   however,	   that	   a	   genuine	   attitude	   towards	   publicity	   will	   actually	   inform	   the	  
activity	  of	   scientific	   regulatory	  bodies	  and	  scientific	   societies.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  when	  
scientists	  and	  other	  specialists	  gather	  at	  bureaucratic	  locations,	  they	  certainly	  run	  the	  risk	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of	  behaving	  like	  an	  elite	  that	  does	  not	  have	  direct	  duties	  of	  accountability	  to	  very	  much	  
wider	   publics.	   It	   has	   to	   be	   said,	   nonetheless,	   that	   many	   guidelines	   and	   regulations	   of	  
acceptable	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   translation	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   open	   public	  
engagement,	  and	  sometimes	  take	  measures	  to	  organize	  that.	  In	  this	  sense,	  they	  go	  in	  the	  
right	   direction	   but	   we	   have	   to	   wait	   and	   see	   to	   which	   degree	   these	   intentions	   will	  
effectively	  be	  enacted.	  	  
As	   to	   the	   possibility	   to	   revise	   the	   normative	   arrangement	   that	   regulate	   science,	  
the	  state-­‐centred	  model,	  again,	  fares	  a	  bit	  worse	  than	  a	  self-­‐regulatory	  one.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
embryonic	   research	   regulations,	   only	   changes	   in	  political	   conditions	   seemed	   to	  provide	  
space	  for	  policy	  revision.	  Within	  the	  current	  regulatory	  framework	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  
instead,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  normative	  arrangements	  remain	  fluid	  (Jasanoff	  2011)	  so	  as	  to	  
accommodate	   new	   technical	   acquisitions	   and	  new	   kinds	   of	   clinical	   trial	   applications,	   as	  
well	  as	  the	  ethical	  implications	  that	  those	  novelties	  imply.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   language	   of	   policy-­‐supporting	   arguments	   may	   in	   both	   cases	   be	   not	  
functional	   to	  a	  deliberatively	  accountable	  discourse.	  Scientists	  might	  use	  their	  authority	  
to	  appropriate	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  on	  scientific	  matters,	  thus	  excluding	  a	  priori	  all	  the	  non-­‐
expert	  as	  unfit	  to	  participate	  to	  the	  debate.	  This	  can	  be	  attained	  by,	  for	  instance,	  framing	  
the	   stakes	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   translation	   in	   exclusively	   technical	   terms,	   hiding	   the	  
normative	   values	   that	   are	   touched	   by	   this	   thread	   of	   innovation	   underneath	   their	  
specialised	  jargon.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  state-­‐centred	  approach	  to	  embryo-­‐
related	   research	  has	  been	   the	   stage	  of	   sustained	  efforts	   at	  undermining	   the	  moral	   and	  
political	   legitimacy	   of	   opposing	   parties	   and	   at	  wisely	   using	   bits	   and	   pieces	   of	   scientific	  
information	  to	  gain	  public	  support	  to	  one	  side	  or	  the	  other.	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Now,	   the	   governance	   regime	   that	   is	   emerging	   around	   early	   efforts	   of	   stem	   cell	  
clinical	  translation	  does	  not	  seem	  perfectly	  fit	  from	  a	  deliberative	  democracy	  standpoint.	  
If	   scientists	   play	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   ethical	   and	   technical	  
infrastructure	   of	   the	   incipient	   stem	   cell	   medicine,	   they	   are	   obviously	   doing	   it	   to	   the	  
advantage	   of	   their	   own	   understanding	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   arise	   in	   the	   field.	  
Inclusiveness	  and	  participation	  of	  wider	  publics	  might	   thus	  be	  overlooked,	   if	   this	  model	  
heavily	  relies	  on	  expert	  advice.	  	  
It	   has	   to	   be	   noticed	   however,	   that	   lack	   of	   openness	   and	   accountability,	   beyond	  
creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  possible	  violations	  of	  decent	  ethical	  standards,	  is	  not	  even	  in	  
the	   interest	   of	   scientist-­‐regulators	   themselves.	   As	   testified	   by	   the	   insistence	   of	   many	  
guidance	   documents,	   publicity,	   inclusion	   and	   openness	   to	   revisions	   and	   improvements	  
figure	  among	  cherished	  characteristics	  of	  this	  regulatory	  model.	  At	  any	  rate,	  in	  the	  future	  
of	   clinical	   stem	   cell	   research	   failures	   and	   casualties	   are,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   as	   likely	   to	  
happen	  as	   in	  other	   fields	  of	   drug	  and	   therapy	  development.	  Being	   able	   to	   absorb	   such	  
adverse	  events	  is	  thus	  perceived	  as	  a	  necessity	  by	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  stem	  cell	  research.	  If	  
those	  failures	  have	  to	  occur,	  and	  they	  will	  –	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  –	  they	  must	  occur	  in	  
the	   context	   of	   a	   fairly	   stabilized	   governance	   regime.	   My	   opinion	   is	   that	   introducing	  
deliberatively	  accountable	  features	  into	  the	  governance	  model	  of	  stem	  cell	  translational	  
research	   will	   be	   conducive	   to	   a	   less	   contentious	   and	   more	   legitimate	   climate	   for	   the	  
advancement	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  	  
It	   is	  thus	  of	  crucial	   importance	  for	  the	  entire	  field,	  and	  for	  the	  promises	   it	  holds,	  
that	  the	  deliberative	  intentions	  of	  the	  shared	  model	  be	  fulfilled	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent.	  	  
Stakeholders	   have	   to	   be	   engaged	   in	   the	   ongoing	   process	   of	   construction	   of	   the	  
regulatory	  conditions	  of	  stem	  cell	  translational	  research.	  This	  can	  obviously	  be	  attained	  in	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a	   variety	   of	   ways,	   but	   it	   is	   of	   the	   upmost	   importance	   that	   no	   epistemic	   dominance	   is	  
exercised	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   excluding	   dissenting	   voices	   or	   to	   force	   the	   direction	   of	  
governance	  towards	  the	  interests	  of	  powerful	  actors.	  
In	  this	  last	  respect,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  reminded	  that	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  is	  not	  only	  
a	  scientifically	  exciting	  field	  of	  innovation,	  but	  also	  a	  potentially	  profitable	  enterprise	  for	  
commercially	  oriented	  stakeholders.	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Intermezzo:	  Stepwise	  and	  frontier	  medical	  research	  	  
I	   said	   in	   the	   last	  sections	  of	   the	  previous	  chapter	   that	  state-­‐driven	   initiatives	  are	  
sharing	  the	  burden	  of	  control	  on	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  with	  scientific	  self-­‐regulation.	  In	  this	  
Intermezzo	  I	  want	  to	  introduce	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  material	  of	  the	  next	  chapter	  by	  showing	  
that	   specific	   uncertainties	   afflict	   the	   shared-­‐model	   of	   governance,	   as	   to	   the	   framing	   of	  
stem	  cell	  innovation.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  show	  how	  commercial	  interests	  and	  epistemic	  
commitments	  are	  pushing	  the	  governance	  model	  that	  I	  described	  and	  analysed	  thus	  far	  in	  
contrasting	  directions.	  I	  will	  thus	  track	  the	  emergence	  of	  competing	  translational	  models	  
for	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  and	  account	  for	  their	  respective	  political	  characteristics.	  
	  
A	   defining	   feature	   of	   the	   shared	   model	   is	   its	   reliance	   on	   cherished	   epistemic	  
virtues,	   scientific	   expertise,	   peer-­‐review	   and	   evidence-­‐based	   methods	   of	   acquiring	  
medical	   knowledge.	   For	   reasons	   of	   prudence,	   as	   much	   as	   for	   reasons	   of	   scientific	  
soundness,	  the	  development	  of	  new	  stem	  cell	  therapies	  is	  therefore	  provided	  within	  the	  
framework	   of	   the	   same	   stepwise	   process	   that	   characterized	   the	   delivery	   of	   new	   drugs	  
from	   the	   bench-­‐side	   to	   the	   market	   in	   the	   last	   three	   decades.	   The	   globally	   adopted	  
paradigm	  of	  drug	  development	  comprises	  a	  staged	  procedure	  that	  goes	  from	  systematic	  
preclinical	   studies	   on	   animal	   models,	   to	   controlled	   toxicological	   analysis	   on	   limited	  
numbers	  of	  patients	  or	  healthy	  volunteers	   (Phase	   I),	   to	  then	  progress	  to	  test	  efficacy	   in	  
much	  larger	  cohorts	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  existing	  standard	  of	  care	  or	  a	  placebo	  (Phase	  
II	  and	  III).	  Regulatory	  agencies	  oversee	  the	  entire	  process,	  up	  to	  final	  marketing	  approval	  
and	   post-­‐authorization	   monitoring.	   Stem	   cell	   treatment	   would	   fall	   into	   this	   regulatory	  
	  132	  
pipeline	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that,	   strictly	   speaking,	   stem	   cells	   are	   not	   drugs.	  
However,	  it	  is	  indeed	  possible	  to	  consider	  stem	  cells	  as	  biologicals,	  therefore	  assimilating	  
the	  regulatory	  route	  of	  their	  development	  to	  that	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  
In	  a	   recent	   thought	  provoking	  paper,	  David	  Magnus	  highlighted	  that,	  albeit	   such	  
model	  is	  globally	  acclaimed	  to	  yield	  the	  most	  reliable	  scientific	  information	  on	  safety	  and	  
efficacy	  of	  new	  treatments,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  accepted	  methodology	  to	  advance	  medicine:	  
“surgical	  innovation	  (in	  contrast	  to	  drug	  development)	  has	  tended	  to	  proceed	  by	  far	  less	  
formal	  protocols	  and	  often	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  regulation”	  (Magnus	  2010,	  267).	  Magnus	  
interestingly	  classifies	  clinical	  trials	  according	  to	  the	  type	  of	  intervention	  that	  they	  imply	  
and	   especially	   the	   amount	   and	   the	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   that	   researchers	   possess	   at	   the	  
moment	  of	  recruiting	  research	  subjects.	  He	  thus	  recognizes	  three	  types	  of	  clinical	  trials:	  
first	  in	  human	  (when	  an	  intervention	  under	  investigation	  is	  performed	  in	  humans	  for	  the	  
first	   time),	   first	   in	   class	   (when	   the	   trial	   is	   not	   only	   first	   in	   human,	   but	   also	   “the	   first	  
intervention	  using	  the	  particular	   type	  of	  mechanism”,	  e.g.	  a	  new	  class	  of	  drugs),	   first	   in	  
kind	  (when	  the	  trial	  is	  not	  only	  first	  in	  class,	  but	  also	  involves	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  intervention)	  
(Magnus	  2010,	  268).	  In	  first	  in	  human	  and	  first	  in	  class	  clinical	  trials,	  “there	  is	  significant	  
basis	   for	  believing	  that	  there	   is	  a	  certain	  probability	  of	  success	   in	  going	  from	  Phase	   I	   to	  
Phase	  III”	  (ibidem).	  The	  author	  also	  calls	  first	  in	  kind	  clinical	  trials	  “frontier	  research”,	  thus	  
intending	   that	   those	   trials	   “are	   sufficiently	   different	   from	   other	   kinds	   of	   approved	  
interventions	   in	  clinical	  use,	  meaning	  that	  there	  exists	   insufficient	  evidence	  for	  any	  kind	  
of	  claims	  about	  the	  probability	  (or	  even	  the	  possibility)	  of	  going	  from	  Phase	  I	  to	  Phase	  III”	  
(ibidem).	  Examples	  of	  frontier	  research	  include	  early	  attempts	  at	  organ	  transplantation	  or	  
gene	  therapy	  research.	   It	   is	  moreover	  evident	  that	  early	  attempts	  at	  transplanting	  stem	  
research	   at	   the	   clinical	   level	   also	  may	   be	   labelled	   as	   frontier	   research.	  With	   stem	   cell	  
clinical	  trials,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  cells	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  differentiative	  potential,	  or	  their	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terminally	   differentiated	   progeny,	   grown	   from	   embryonic	   or	   otherwise	   obtained	  
pluripotent	   progenitors,	   and	   possibly	   harbouring	   genetic	   modifications,	   may	   be	  
administered	   to	   target	   human	   pathologies	   that	  were	   never	   treated	   in	   this	  way	   before.	  
The	   doctors	   and	   scientists	   involved	   in	   these	   developments	   thus	   rightfully	   envisage	   a	  
remarkable	  degree	  of	  novelty	  in	  this	  respect.	  Magnus	  however,	  argues	  that	  being	  frontier	  
research,	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   translation	  might	   avail	   itself	   of	   additional	   ethical	   provisions	  
that,	  albeit,	   in	  his	  opinion,	  not	  required	  by	  the	  normative	  arrangements	  governing	  drug	  
development,	  may	  smooth	  the	  pathway	  to	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  from	  a	  moral	  standpoint.	  He	  
thus	   recalls	   four	   ethical	   norms	   that	  were	   initially	   proposed	   as	   adequate	   safeguards	   for	  
innovative	   surgery	   –	   possibly	   a	   paradigm	   case	   of	   frontier	   research.	   Drawing	   on	   earlier	  
work	  by	  Francis	  Moore,	  Magnus	  establishes	  the	  following	  additional	  moral	  indications	  for	  
stem	  cell	  frontier	  research:	  	  
1. Preclinical	  data	  must	  show	  that	  evidence	  is	  sufficient	  to	  grant	  switching	  to	  
clinical	  research	  as	  reasonable;	  
2. The	   involved	   institutions	  must	   show	  adequate	   institutional	   field	   strength,	  
i.e.	  they	  must	  have	  resources	  and	  personnel	  necessary	  to	  minimize	  risks	  to	  
research	  participants:	  
3. For	   the	   trial	   to	   take	   place,	   adequate	   ethical	   oversight	   and	   consultative	  
capacity	   must	   be	   assured	   (allegedly	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   dedicated	  
personnel	  in	  IRBs);	  
4. Both	   the	   professional	   community	   and	   the	   public	   have	   to	   be	   openly	  
informed	  before	  innovation	  can	  take	  place.	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Now,	  to	  the	  merit	  of	  this	  proposal,	  I	  think	  a	  couple	  of	  objections	  could	  be	  moved.	  
First,	   there	   is	   already	   reference	   to	   all	   the	   above	   listed	   points	   in	   nearly	   all	   regulatory	  
documents	   on	   the	   development	   of	   non-­‐frontier	   research.	   Secondly,	   surgical	   “frontier”	  
innovation	  is	  indeed	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  medical	  improvement,	  but	  it	  requires	  additional	  
moral	  provisions	  exactly	  because	   it	  does	  not	  take	  place	  within	  the	  formal	   framework	  of	  
the	  stepwise	  process	  of	  EBM.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  regular	  clinical	  trials	  are	  free	  of	  any	  
further	   moral	   complication.	   Stem	   cell	   clinical	   research,	   for	   instance,	   regardless	   the	  
adopted	   translational	   model	   (be	   it	   formal	   or	   frontier	   clinical	   innovation),	   presents	   a	  
number	  of	  additional	  ethical	  problems	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  covered	  by	  the	  existing	  moral	  
framework	   for	   the	  protection	  of	  human	  research	  subjects.	  To	   list	  but	   the	  most	  striking,	  
alongside	  with	   the	   already	  mentioned	   technical	   limitations	   in	   assuring	   cell	   purity,	   stem	  
cell	   research	   presents	   some	   special	   problems	   with	   respect	   to	   informed	   consent	   and	  
therapeutic	   misconception.	   In	   particular,	   the	   risk	   of	   therapeutic	   misconception	  
(Appelbaum,	  Roth,	  and	  Lidz	  1982)	  is	  remarkably	  more	  acute	  in	  a	  field	  that,	  like	  stem	  cell	  
research,	  appears	  to	  harbour	  much	  hyped	  expectations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  potential	  patients	  
and	  the	  general	  public	  as	  well.	  	  
Hence,	  in	  my	  view,	  Magnus’	  suggestion	  to	  apply	  additional	  provisions	  to	  stem	  cell	  
clinical	  development,	   is	  not	   in	   itself	  worthless.	  However,	   I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  specific	  
concerns	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation	  map	  entirely	  onto	  the	  distinction	  between	  conventional	  
and	   frontier	   clinical	   research,	   as	  Magnus	   seems	   to	   argue.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   although	   I	  
agree	  that	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  qualifies	  as	  frontier	  research,	  I	  see	  its	  specific	  ethical	  
problems	   arising	   from	   the	   nature	   of	   current	   technical	   limitations	   and	   not	   from	   simply	  
sharing	  features	  of	  novelty	  with	  surgical	  innovation.	  In	  particular,	  as	  it	  will	  emerge	  in	  the	  
next	  chapter,	  a	  limiting	  factor	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  in	  ethically	  safe	  
ways	  is	  the	  still	  limited	  amount	  of	  scientific	  information	  about	  the	  biological	  properties	  of	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stem	   cells	   once	   re-­‐injected	   in	   vivo.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   remarkable	   efforts	   of	   research	  
groups	   around	   the	   world,	   we	   still	   have	   to	   learn	   a	   lot	   about	   stem	   cell	   biology	   to	   fully	  
exploit	   their	   potential	   from	   the	   therapeutic	   point	   of	   view.	   It	   is	   therefore	  only	   scientific	  
knowledge	   that,	   in	   theory,	   can	  be	  conducive	   to	  ethically	   less	   risky	  uses	  of	   stem	  cells	   in	  
humans.	   It	   is	   obvious	   however,	   that	   such	   knowledge	   can	  only	   be	   obtained	  by	   coupling	  
rigorous	   in	   vitro	   research	  with	  experimentally	   controlled	  pilot	   studies	   in	   animal	  models	  
and,	   most	   importantly,	   in	   human	   subjects.	   Now,	   the	   additional	   criteria	   proposed	   by	  
Magnus	  allude	  to	  principles	  of	  reasonable	  conduct	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  availability	  or	  lack	  
of	   sufficient	   scientific	   information	   about	   safety	   and	  efficacy.	  His	   reasoning,	   however,	   is	  
affected	   by	   some	   evident	   circularity:	   if	   the	   problem	   with	   frontier	   research	   is	   lack	   of	  
systematic	   scientific	   information	   about	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   in	   humans,	   requiring	   this	  
information	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  special	  moral	  provisions	  of	  frontier	  research	  is	  incoherent.	  	  
Biomedical	   innovation	   thus	   faces	  a	  dilemma:	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  present	  scientific	  
uncertainties	   generate	   the	   need	   for	   special	   moral	   oversight;	   on	   the	   other,	   the	  
implementation	   of	   those	   special	   principles	   requires	   exactly	   the	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   that	  
currently	   lacks	   and	   makes	   them	   necessary.	   Magnus’	   paper,	   therefore,	   provides	   an	  
unsatisfactory	  answer,	  or	  more	  precisely,	  an	  unsatisfactory	  approach	  to	  the	  translational	  
dilemma	  of	  biomedical	   innovation.	  However,	   it	  touches	  on	  a	  very	   interesting	  dichotomy	  
between	   the	   stepwise	   and	   the	   frontier	   model	   –	   one	   that	   is	   playing	   an	   increasingly	  
prominent	  role	  in	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  stem	  cell	  translation.	  	  
As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   as	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   the	   choice	   between	  
different	   translational	   models	   (i.e.	   stepwise	   clinical	   trials	   and	   surgical	   innovation),	   and	  
thus	   between	   different	   framings	   of	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   development	   (as	   new	   biological	  
drugs	  or	  as	  tissues	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  surgical	  context)	  is	  turning	  into	  a	  harsh	  debate	  about	  
different	  understandings	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  risk,	  safety,	  scientific	  authority	  and	  knowledge	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certification.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   the	   next	   chapter	   I	   will	   therefore	   illustrate	   how	   the	  
governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   is	   coping	   with	   an	   ascending	   disagreement	   over	   the	  
possibility	  to	  adopt	  one	  translational	  model	  or	  the	  other.	  
Chapter	  4:	  Contesting	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  
innovation	  
Notwithstanding	  efforts	   at	  designing	  a	   specific	   form	  of	   governance	   for	   stem	  cell	  
innovation,	   harsh	   controversies	   characterised	   recent	   developments	   in	   the	   use	   of	   stem	  
cells	   for	   clinical	   purposes.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	  will	   account	   for	   those	   episodes	  of	   stem	   cell	  
innovation	   that	   are	   challenging	   the	   shared-­‐model	   of	   governance	   described	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter.	   I	   will	   show	   how	   national	   borders	   are	   being	   exploited	   to	   both	   exert	  
order	   on	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   and	   to	   transgress	   existing	   regulations	   (4.1).	   In	   4.2,	   I	   will	  
describe	  the	  construction	  and	  deconstruction	  of	  scientific	  credibility	  by	  actors	  engaged	  in	  
the	  development	  of	  alternative	   framings	  of	   stem	  cell	   therapy.	   In	  4.3,	   I	  will	   explain	  how	  
controlled	  clinical	  trials	  are	  being	  framed	  to	  bring	  these	  divisions	  under	  control,	  and	  I	  will	  
analyse	  their	  import	  on	  the	  credibility	  cycle	  of	  the	  shared-­‐model	  of	  governance.	  	  
	  
	  
A	  recent	  case	  will	   introduce	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  divisions	  that	  are	  emerging	  in	  the	  
field	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  application.	  Texas	  Republican	  Governor	  Rick	  Perry	   is	  not	  a	  new	  
name	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   biomedicine.	   Three	   times	   Governor	   Perry	   hit	   the	   headlines	   in	  
2007,	   when	   he	   issued	   an	   executive	   order	   to	   make	   Human	   Papilloma	   Virus	   (HPV)	  
vaccination	   mandatory	   to	   11-­‐12	   year-­‐old	   girls	   in	   the	   State.	   Revelations	   of	   vaccine	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producing	  companies	  financially	  backing	  Perry’s	  gubernatorial	  campaigns	  later	  resulted	  in	  
a	  political	  scandal.9.	  Recently,	  he	  took	  the	  stage	  of	  a	  biomedical	  controversy	  once	  again,	  
sending	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Texas	  Medical	  Board	  (TMB)	  on	  July	  the	  25th	  2011.	  In	  this	  letter,	  the	  
Governor	  pleaded	  for	  TMB	  to	  take	  initiative	  in	  order	  to	  make	  Texas	  “the	  world’s	  leader	  in	  
the	  research	  and	  use	  of	  adult	  stem	  cells”	  (Office	  of	  the	  Governor,	  2011).	  	  
A	  consumer	  of	  expensive	  autologous	  stem	  cell	   injections	  himself,	  Perry	  called	  for	  
the	   pursuit	   of	   autologous	   adult	   stem	   cell	   procedures	   as	   a	   promising	   way	   to	   treat	  
“arthritis,	   orthopedic	   conditions,	   cardiovascular	   disease,	   […]	   diabetes,	   […]	   autoimmune	  
diseases,	   leukemia,	   and	  other	   types	  of	   cancer”	   (Office	  of	   the	  Governor,	   2011).	  He	   thus	  
invited	   TMB	   to	   consider	   the	   alleged	   therapeutic	   virtues	   of	   autologous	   adult	   stem	   cell	  
therapy	  while	  drafting	  regulations	  on	  these	  matters.	  	  
The	   latter	   sparked	  quite	   a	   number	  of	   reactions	  within	   the	   scientific	   community,	  
mostly	   expressing	   concerns	   for	   the	   Governor’s	   invitation	   reflecting	   a	   simple-­‐minded	  
attitude	   towards	   the	   meaning	   and	   the	   epistemic	   rules	   of	   medical	   innovation.	   Rushing	  
stem	   cells	   to	   the	   bed-­‐side,	   many	   scientists	   argued,	   is	   unlikely	   to	   do	   any	   good	   to	   the	  
advancement	  of	  the	  field	  (Cyranoski	  2011).	  Indeed,	  it	  may	  well	  undermine	  the	  chances	  to	  
turn	  stem	  cell	  knowledge	  into	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  for	  two	  interconnected	  reasons.	  First,	  
autologous	   treatments	   for	   an	  array	  of	  unrelated	   conditions,	   other	   then	  being	   generally	  
questionable	  from	  a	  medical	  point	  of	  view,	  aim	  at	  producing	  curative	  effects	  on	  individual	  
patients,	   and	   not	   at	   gaining	   generalizable	   knowledge	   on	   the	   applicability	   of	   a	   given	  
procedure	   to	   a	   large	   group	  of	   patients	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   actual	   pay-­‐off	   that	  medical	  
scientists	   expect	   from	   EBM	   controlled	   clinical	   trials	   (CCTs).	   Stem	   cell	   scientists	   are	  
therefore	  worried	  that	  unscrupulous	  practitioners	  might,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  fool	  patients	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   I	   acknowledge	   my	   colleague	   Paolo	   Maugeri	   for	   information	   and	   insightful	   discussions	   on	   the	   HPV	  
controversy	  that,	  unfortunately,	  I	  cannot	  discuss	  much	  further	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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with	  unproven	  therapeutic	  promises	  or,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  exploit	  patients	  as	  research	  
subjects	  to	  short-­‐cut	  the	  time	  consuming	  and	  costly	  procedures	  that	  CCTs	  demand.	  
A	  second	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  scientists	  commenting	  on	  autologous	  adult	  stem	  
cell	  injections	  is	  that,	  were	  those	  treatments	  to	  result	  in	  severe	  adverse	  events,	  the	  whole	  
field	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  risks	  to	  be	  seriously	  undermined	  in	  terms	  of	  credibility.	  	  
Notwithstanding	  these	  reserves,	  we	  will	  probably	  see	  the	  state	  of	  Texas	  adopting	  
liberal	  provisions	  with	  respect	  to	  adult	  stem	  cell	  direct	  application	  to	  the	  clinical	  context	  
in	  the	  imminent	  future.	  
The	  episode	  recalled	  here	  is	  but	  a	  latest	  occasion	  of	  tension	  between	  the	  certified	  
stem	   cell	   community	   and	   practitioners	   who	   either	   already	   sell	   alleged	   stem	   cell	  
treatments	   to	   consumers	   worldwide,	   or	   try	   to	   bypass	   the	   regulatory	   bottlenecks	   of	  
canonical	  CCTs	  therefore	  exposing	  research	  subjects	  to	  risks	  that	  are	  generally	  considered	  
unethical.	  Let	  us	  then	  try	  get	  to	  know	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  such	  phenomenon,	  and	  learn	  how	  
the	  demarcation	  of	  genuine	  scientific	  research	  from	  unproven	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  leads	  
to	  the	  construction	  of	  certified	  stem	  cell	  knowledge	  and	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  competing	  
translational	   models.	   We	   will	   see	   that	   a	   ‘regulatory	   order’	   (Kent	   et	   al.	   2006)	   is	   being	  
crafted	   around	   these	   separations,	   but	   also	   that,	   to	   a	   remarkable	   extent,	   the	   latter	   are	  
indeed	  a	  result	  of	  the	  existing	  regulatory	  order	  or,	  better	  said,	  of	  the	  blank	  spaces	  that	  it	  
leaves	   available.	   Again,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stem	   cell	   translation,	   efforts	   at	   institutional	  
stabilisation	   and	   diverse	   epistemic	   commitments	   conjure	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   ‘regulatory	  
order’	   that	   remains	   in	   tension	   between	   competing	   interests	   and	   different	   modes	   of	  
agency.	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4.1	  The	  borders	  of	  validity	  
	  
The	   landscape	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   offering	   professed	   treatments	   with	   cellular	  
products	  is	  wide	  and	  uncharted.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  at	  least	  200	  clinics	  exist	  in	  the	  world	  
that	   offer	   stem	   cell	   treatments	   and/or	   slots	   in	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   trials	   (Anon.	   2010).	  
Attempting	  to	  compile	  a	  comprehensive	  catalogue	  thereof	  would	  thus	  be	  hopeless.	  In	  this	  
section	   I	  will	   therefore	   report	   on	   selected	  episodes	  of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   transplantation	  
that	  gained	  public	  attention	  due	  to	  controversial	  outcomes	  and/or	  institutional	  conflicts.	  I	  
will	  include	  clinics	  offering	  stem	  cell	  therapies	  in	  China	  (4.1.1),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  US	  (4.1.2).	  
Furthermore	   I	   will	   illustrate	   under	   which	   conditions	   analogous	   procedures	   could	   be	  
possible	   in	   Europe	   (4.1.3)	   and	   how	   existing	   differences	   between	   different	   national	  
regulations	  are	  being	  commercially	  exploited	   in	  what	  has	  been	  called	  stem	  cell	   tourism	  
(4.1.4).	  
The	  cases	  that	   I	  will	  describe	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  compass	  to	   later	  orient	  analysis	   into	  
the	  territory	  of	  marketed	  stem	  cell	  treatments.	  I	  will	  therefore	  use	  the	  word	  ‘treatment’	  
to	  indicate	  any	  attempt	  at	  injecting	  cellular	  concoctions	  into	  human	  patients,	  irrespective	  
of	  the	  actual	  medical	  efficacy	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  those	  practices.	  When	  I	  will	  speak	  
of	   ‘adult	   stem	   cell	   transplantations’,	   moreover,	   I	   will	   not	   mean	   that	   to	   include	   bone	  
marrow	   (BM)	   grafts	   for	   blood-­‐related	   conditions	   that	   already	   enjoy	   widespread	  
acceptance	  within	  both	  the	  medical	  community	  and	  the	  regulatory	  system.	  	  
4.1.1	  Exotic	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  
In	  the	  last	  decade,	  thousands	  of	  people	  received	  stem	  cell	  injections	  in	  dedicated	  
private	  clinics	  at	   their	  own	  expenses.	  Stem	  cell	   centres	  are	  active	   in	   the	  US	  and	  also	   in	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Europe,	  but	  most	  of	  these	  clinics	  are	  reported	  to	  be	  in	  China	  or	  in	  other	  remote	  locations	  
in	   Asia,	   Central	   America	   and	   Eastern	   Europe.	   The	   typology	   of	   those	   cellular	   products	  
ranges	   from	   foetal	   parts	   to	   human	   embryonic	   cells,	   to	   autologous	   adult	   stem	   cells	   of	  
various	  origin.	  The	  research	  community	  has	  been	  rather	  consistent	   in	  considering	  those	  
treatments	   as	   scientifically	   unproven,	  medically	   unjustified,	   and	   ethically	   unwarranted.	  
An	  international	  market	  of	  adult	  stem	  cell	  therapies	  nevertheless	  arose.	  Stem	  cell	  clinics	  
generally	   offer	   their	   services	   over	   the	   Internet,	   through	   web	   sites	   that	   explain	   the	  
presumed	  advantages	  of	  the	  offered	  interventions	  over	  more	  canonical	  alternatives,	  and	  
providing	  the	  means	  for	  a	  first	  contact	  between	  the	  clinic	  and	  the	  patient.	  	  
A	  major	   reason	  of	   consideration	   for	   patients	  who	   resort	   to	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   has	  
always	  been	   the	  absence	  of	   satisfying	  cures	   for	   their	  medical	   conditions.	   It	   is	   therefore	  
almost	   natural	   that	   patients	  with	   tragically	   impairing	   or	   life-­‐threatening	   diseases	   figure	  
among	   the	  most	   typical	   consumers	   of	   stem	   cell	   treatments.	   The	   business	   of	   stem	   cell	  
treatments	   thus	   proved	   particularly	   prolific	   with	   neurodegenerative	   disorders	   (such	   as	  
ASL),	  spinal	  cord	  injury,	  and	  certain	  kinds	  of	  cancer.	  Patients	  affected	  by	  such	  debilitating	  
diseases	   and	   their	   families	   are	   often	  desperate	   enough	   to	   start	   looking	   for	   therapeutic	  
alternatives	  and	  for	  free	  slots	  in	  experimental	  clinical	  trials,	  even	  if	  these	  meant	  travelling	  
to	  distant	  locations	  and	  paying	  high	  fares	  to	  receive	  the	  hoped	  for	  procedure.	  
Let	  us	  take	  spinal	  cord	  injury	  as	  our	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  world	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics.	  	  
Following	  trauma,	  such	  as	  ones	  occurring	  in	  car	  accidents,	  a	  person’s	  spine	  may	  be	  
injured	   so	   as	   to	   provoke	   paraplegia	   or	   even	   tetraplegia,	   depending	   on	   the	   site	   of	   the	  
injury.	  There	   is	  currently	  no	  recovery	   from	  these	  conditions	  and,	  often,	  affected	  people	  
need	   life-­‐sustaining	  machines,	   like	  ventilators,	  and	  dedicated	  personal	  assistance	  to	   just	  
keep	   on	   living.	   Animal	  model	   studies	   have	   been	   published	   showing	   preliminary	   results	  
	   141	  
with	  cellular	  therapy	  for	  spinal	  cord	  injury	  (Li,	  Field,	  and	  Raisman	  1997;	  Ramon-­‐Cueto	  et	  
al.	  2000;	  Li,	  Decherchi,	  and	  Raisman	  2003).	  These	  studies	  used	  olfactory	  ensheathing	  cells	  
(OECs)	  to	  promote	  some	  functional	  recovery	  in	  rat	  models	  of	  spinal	  cord	  injury.	  Based	  on	  
these	   results,	   Dr.	   Hongyun	   Huang,	   a	   neurologist	   at	   the	   Chaoyang	   hospital	   of	   Beijing,	  
started	  to	  use	  OECs	  from	  aborted	  human	  foetuses	  in	  spinal	  cord	  injured	  and	  ASL	  patients.	  
It	   is	   estimated	   that	   he	   treated	   some	   600	   people	   in	   five	   years	   between	   2001	   and	   2006	  
(Huang	   et	   al.	   2009).	   Many	   of	   those	   patients,	   pushed	   by	   their	   desperate	   conditions,	  
travelled	  to	  Beijing	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  spending	  some	  20.000	  $	  each	  to	  receive	  the	  
treatment	  (Cyranoski	  2005).	  This	  phenomenon	  whereby	  people	  travel	  to	  distant	  clinics	  at	  
their	  own	  expenses	  to	  obtain	  unconventional	  treatments	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘stem	  
cell	   tourism’.	   Huang	   repeatedly	   reported	   many	   of	   his	   patients	   enjoyed	   improvements	  
after	  the	  surgery,	  but	  external	  observers	  and	  peer-­‐reviewers	  who	  refused	  to	  publish	  his	  
results	   on	   mainstream	   medical	   journals,	   maintain	   that	   no	   measurable	   data	   support	  
Huang’s	   claims	   other	   than	   anecdotal	   testimony	   from	   some	   patients	   themselves.	   Most	  
commentators	   thus	  discarded	  Hung’s	  procedure	  as	   lacking	  efficacy,	   and	  being	   too	   risky	  
and	   too	   unjustifiably	   expensive	   for	   patients.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   Huang’s	   incapacity	   to	  
meet	   the	   technical,	   not	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   ethical,	   standards	   of	   the	   international	  medical	  
community,	  was	   used	   as	   a	   criterion	   for	   carving	   a	   demarcation	   between	   legitimate	   and	  
illegitimate	  clinical	  procedures,	  thus	  serving	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  unifying	  identity	  for	  the	  
emerging	   stem	   cell	   community.	   Surely,	   this	   image	   had	   geographical	   connotations	   that	  
mapped	  onto	  the	  regulatory	  differences	  that	  permit	  in	  China	  what	  is	  strictly	  prohibited	  in	  
many	   Western	   countries.	   The	   geographical	   divide	   between	   Chinese	   and	   the	   Western-­‐
based	   journals	   that	   refused	   to	   certify	   Huang’s	   interventions	   as	   scientifically	   sound	   and	  
therapeutically	   valid	  was	   also	   a	   direct	  matter	   of	   polemic	   exchanges.	   In	   an	   interview	   to	  
Nature,	  Huang	   accused	   the	  British	  Medical	   Journal,	  Nature	  Medicine,	   the	  New	  England	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Journal	   of	  Medicine,	   Science	   and	   The	   Lancet,	   of	   rejecting	   his	   papers	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  
prejudice	   against	   watershed	   medical	   innovation	   coming	   from	   Chinese	   researchers	  
(Cyranoski	   2005).	   In	   2006,	   a	   panel	   of	   specialists	   conducted	   an	   independent	   inquiry	   on	  
seven	   of	   Huang’s	   patients	   (Dobkin,	   Curt,	   and	   Guest	   2006)	   reporting	   “perioperative	  
morbidity	   and	   lack	   of	   functional	   benefits”	   (ivi,	   5),	   thus	   concluding	   that	   “[u]ntil	  
international	   standards	   for	   scientific	   trial	   methodologies	   have	   been	   incorporated,	  
clinicians	  are	  obligated	  to	  advise	  their	  patients	  to	  forgo	  Dr	  Huang’s	  procedure”	  (ivi,	  13).	  	  
The	  Huang	  controversy	  illustrates	  the	  use	  of	  peer-­‐review	  standards	  of	  knowledge	  
certification	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  demarcate	  epistemic	  and	  normative	  standards	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
The	   dispute	   took	   the	   form	   of	   a	   contention	   about	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   peer-­‐reviewing	  
system.	  	  
In	   particular,	   during	   international	   conferences,	  Huang	  used	   videotaped	  patient’s	  
own	   reporting	   on	   alleged	   benefits	   due	   to	   the	   procedure	   (Cyranoski	   2005),	   but	   this	   is	  
generally	   deemed	   an	   unreliable	   sources	   for	   probing	   clinical	   validity.	   Moreover,	   in	   the	  
paper	  he	  published	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  the	  utility	  of	  his	  procedures,	  Huang	  and	  his	  team	  
fall	   short	   of	   abiding	   by	   the	   canonical	   phasing	   of	   controlled	   clinical	   trials	   10.	   Thus,	  
irreconcilable	   views	   on	   what	   counts	   as	   sound	   clinical	   research	   put	   discussants	   at	   the	  
opposing	   poles	   of	   the	   dispute.	   Critics	   instead,	   saw	   insurmountable	   flaws	   in	   Huang’s	  
unorthodox	  way	  of	  gathering	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  procedure.	  
But	  at	  stake	  here	  was	  not	  only	  the	  medical	  validity	  of	  Huang’s	  procedure.	  In	  a	  clear	  
display	   of	   a	   co-­‐productive	   dynamic,	   the	   protagonists	   of	   this	   quarrel	   were	   espousing	  
contrasted	  normative	  commitments	  about	  the	  ethical	  liability	  of	  the	  procedure	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  It	  has	  also	  to	  be	  recalled	  that	  Huang’s	  publications	  are	  mainly	  in	  Chinese,	  and	  that	  only	  a	  English-­‐written	  
abstract	   is	   available	   over	   the	   Internet	   presenting	   the	   results	   from	   his	   OEC	   procedures.	   See	   Huang	   et	   al.	  
2009,	  available	  here.	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Differing	   considerations	   about	   the	   ethical	   treatment	   of	   research	   subjects	   and	  
patients	  were	  indeed	  crucial.	  Dr.	  Huang	  defended	  his	  procedure	  as	  being	  approved	  by	  the	  
Beijing	   hospital	   ethical	   review	   board,	   and	   insisted	   on	   the	   urgent	   necessity	   to	   give	  
hopeless	   patients	   a	   chance	   with	   an	   innovative	   treatment.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   critics	  
insisted	  that	  the	  treatments	  were	  not	  peer-­‐reviewed	  as	  to	  neither	  safety	  nor	  efficacy.	  In	  
the	   absence	   of	   expert	   oversight,	   patients	   were	   thus	   exposed	   to	   unjustified	   risks	   and	  
superfluous	  costs.	   Inability	   to	  meet	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  standards	  was	  an	  ethically	  grave	  
allegation,	   but	   Dr.	   Huang	   thought	   his	   patients	   had	   a	   right	   to	   receive	   an	   innovative	  
treatment	   that	   Western	   medicine	   wanted	   to	   deny.	   The	   medical	   community,	   instead,	  
stressed	  the	  right	  to	  protection	  from	  unnecessary	  risks	  that	  clinical	  subject	  and	  patients	  
are	   entitled	   to,	   and	   that	   only	   abidance	   by	   international	   standards	   and	   peer-­‐review	  
methods	  are	  able	  to	  guarantee.	  Outside	  the	  stepwise	  procedures	  of	  CCTs,	  critics	  argued,	  
patient’s	  hopes	  are	  irresponsibly	  exploited	  to	  the	  financial	  advantage	  of	  the	  clinic.	  	  
The	  quarrel	   thus	  revolved	  around	  both	  ethical	  and	  clinical	  validity,	  and	  relied	  on	  
diverging	  notions	  of	  patient’s	  rights	  and	  expectations	  in	  the	  clinical	  context.	  Such	  dispute	  
reinforced	  the	  severing	  of	  mainstream	  science	  from	  uncertified	  clinical	  approaches,	  and	  
exhibited	   science’s	   capacity	   to	   watchdog	   its	   borders.	   The	   categories	   of	   ‘unproven	  
treatments’	   and	   ‘stem	   cell	   tourism’	   were	   being	   forged	   to	   construct	   firmer	   boundaries	  
around	   official	   peer-­‐reviewed	   stem	   cell	   research.	   Disputes	   over	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  
unproven	  treatments	  thus	  saw	  part	  of	  the	  global	  stem	  cell	  community	  engaged	  in	  sturdy	  
exercises	   of	   boundary-­‐work.	   The	   necessity	   to	   build	   up	   a	   credible	   image	   of	   responsible	  
stem	  cell	  research	  was	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ISSCR,	  and	  drove	  the	  drafting	  of	  
the	  Guidelines	  that	   I	  mentioned	   in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Such	  proactive	  engagement	  of	  
the	   scientific	   community	   into	   the	   medical	   and	   ethical	   dimension	   of	   unproven	   clinical	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practices,	  also	  ultimately	  reflects	  the	  ‘regulatory	  vacuum’	  (Faulkner	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Faulkner	  
2009)	  that	  characterises	  stem	  cell-­‐related	  products	  and	  practices.	  	  
In	   this	   empty	   space,	   however,	   normative	   ideas	   are	   articulated	   and	   intertwined	  
with	  epistemic	  and	  procedural	  commitments.	  The	  methodologies	  of	  biomedical	  research	  
and	   practice	   thus	   have	   the	   function	   to	   create,	   at	   the	   same	   junction,	   scientific	   and	  
regulatory	  order	  around	  the	  circulation	  of	  stem	  cell	  entities	  in	  the	  clinical	  setting.	  These	  
dynamics	  serve	  the	  creation	  and	  reinforcement	  of	  scientific	  membership	  and	  are	  used	  to	  
back	  power	  claims	  on	  the	  steering	  of	  the	  entire	  field.	  Accreditation	  and	  exclusion	  criteria,	  
notions	   of	   risk	   and	   safety	   standards	   shape	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   transnational	   epistemic	  
community	  and	  bring	  order	  into	  the	  unruled	  territory	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  applications.	  As	  
the	  Chinese	  story	  testifies,	  regulatory	   loopholes	  and	  national	  differences	  prevent	  order-­‐
making	   practices	   of	   scientific	   and	   ethical	   certification	   from	   fully	   stabilising	   a	   definite	  
regulatory	  regime	  around	  stem	  cells.	  For	  this	  reason,	  some	  scholars	  have	  found	  it	  more	  
appropriate,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   unstable	   innovative	   biomedical	   technologies,	   to	   speak	   of	  
‘regulatory	  order’,	  rather	  than	  ‘regulatory	  regime’,	  to	  stress	  the	  scarcely	  formalised	  “web	  
of	  interlinked	  laws,	  regulations,	  guidance,	  surveillance	  and	  other	  behaviours	  which	  might	  
‘govern’	  particular	  technologies”	  (Faulkner	  et	  al.	  2005).	   
	  
4.1.2	  How	  manipulation	  matters	  
The	   rise	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   is	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   is	   caused	   by	   the	   technical	  
progress	  of	  the	  life	  sciences.	  Furthermore	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  hype	  that	  
surrounds	   the	   promise	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	   and	   that,	   to	   a	   great	   extent,	   the	   research	  
community	  can	  no	   longer	  control.	  There	   is	  no	  doubt,	  however,	   that	   the	  proliferation	  of	  
stem	  cells	  being	  offered	  on	  the	  clinical	  market,	  and	  the	  controversies	  that	  it	  elicits	  within	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the	   scientific	   community	  are	  also	   the	   result	  of	   the	   regulatory	  vacuum	  that	   I	  mentioned	  
above.	   Commentators	   have	   stressed	   that	   a	   hybrid	   character	   is	   typical	   of	   novel	  
biotechnological	  procedures	  like	  tissue	  engineering,	  gene	  therapy	  and	  stem	  cells,	  as	  these	  
novelties	  hardly	  qualify	  as	  medicines	  or	  devices	  in	  a	  strict	  sense.	  This	  deprives	  regulatory	  
authorities	   of	   the	   possibility	   to	   properly	   exert	   control	   on	   the	   development	   of	   clinical	  
procedures	  relative	  to	  the	  advanced	  medical	  approaches.	  We	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  
that	   such	   uncertainty	   led	   regulators	   to	   take	   measures	   and	   adopt	   arrangements	   to	  
normalise	   the	   governance	   of	   advanced	   therapies.	   With	   respect	   to	   stem	   cells,	   one	  
standard	  regulatory	  strategy	  is	  to	  classify	  them	  as	  biologics,	  so	  as	  to	  extend	  on	  them	  the	  
regulatory	   powers	   that	   governing	   bodies	   already	   have	   on	   this	   class	   of	   products.	   It	   has	  
nevertheless	   to	   be	   stressed	   that	   the	   regulatory	   order	   that	   is	   being	   developed	   around	  
stem	  cells	  still	   falls	  short	  of	   leaving	  no	  gaps	  to	  be	  filled.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  conflicts	  still	  
arise	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  
institutional	   identity	   of	   regulatory	   agencies,	   and	   the	   scientific	   credibility	   of	   stem	   cell	  
scientists,	   rather	   than	   being	   pre-­‐given	   variables	   of	   those	   conflicts,	   are	   in	   the	  midst	   of	  
being	  crafted	  throughout	  these	  litigations.	  	  
A	   recent	  example	   illustrates	   this	  dynamics	   in	  a	   fairly	  clear	  manner.	  Regenerative	  
Sciences,	   is	   a	   stem	   cell	   clinic	   based	   in	   Broomfield,	   Colorado.	   In	   early	   August	   2008,	   its	  
medical	  director	  Dr.	  Christopher	  Centeno	  found	  himself	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  a	  legal	  and	  scientific	  
tornado.	  His	  clinics	  had	  been	  offering	  autologous	  adult	  stem	  cell	  injections	  to	  patients	  for	  
some	  years,	  at	  a	  price	  of	  around	  $	  8.000	  per	  shot.	  
In	  a	  same-­‐day	  procedure	  Regenerative	  Sciences	  draws	  marrow	  and/or	  blood	  from	  
patients	  and	  then	  re-­‐injects	  those	  stem	  cell-­‐containing	  aspirates	  at	  different	  bodily	  sites	  
depending	   on	   the	   pathology	   they	   intend	   to	   cure.	   This	   thus	   qualifies	   as	   an	   autologous	  
adult	   stem	   cell	   transplant.	   On	   their	   website	   they	   describe	   the	   procedure	   as	   a	   shot	   of	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mesenchymal	   stem	   cells	   (i.e.	   progenitors	   of	   bone,	   cartilage	   and	   fat)	   and	   blood	   platelet	  
lysate	  that	  allegedly	  should	  treat	  joint,	  bone,	  cartilage,	  ligament	  and	  tendon	  problems.	  In	  
the	   absence	   of	   purification	   procedures,	   the	   aspirates	   are	   more	   than	   likely	   to	   contain	  
much	  more	  than	  just	  mesenchymal	  stem	  cells.	  This	  impurity	  however,	  in	  the	  intentions	  of	  
Dr.	   Centeno,	  works	   as	   the	  escape	   valve	   to	   avoid	   FDA	   claiming	   regulatory	   control	   of	  his	  
stem	   cell	   therapies.	   According	   to	   the	   already	   mentioned	   Code	   of	   Federal	   Regulations	  
(1271.10)	   clinical	   use	   of	   stem	   cells	   is	   not	   regulated	   by	   the	   FDA	   if	   cell-­‐donor	   and	   cell-­‐
receiver	  coincide,	  and	  if	  the	  cells	  in	  question	  are	  only	  minimally	  manipulated.	  
It	  was	  thus	  exploiting	  this	  sort	  of	  gap	  in	  regulation	  that	  Regenerative	  Sciences	  could	  offer	  
their	  treatments	  on	  the	  market.	  	  
FDA	  tried	  to	  object	  that	  stem	  cells	  used	  by	  Centeno	  and	  colleagues,	  belonging	  to	  
the	   trademarked	   Regenexx	   product	   family11,	   were	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   drugs	   (namely	  
biological	   products)	   under	   the	   Public	   Health	   Service	   Act.	   Centeno,	   on	   his	   part,	   instead	  
insisted	  that	  his	  was	  a	  medical	  procedure	  for	  which	  FDA	  oversight	  did	  not	  apply.	  	  
However,	   when	   Regenerative	   Science	   started	   offering	   more	   than	   minimally	  
manipulated	  cells,	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  on	  behalf	  of	  FDA,	  filed	  an	  injunction	  in	  the	  
US	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  to	  halt	  Centeno.	  According	  to	  the	  injunction,	  
Regenerative	   Sciences	  was	  now	  growing,	  processing	  and	  mixing	   cells	  with	  drugs	  before	  
putting	   them	   back	   into	   patients	   without	   FDA	   approval,	   thus	   acting	   against	   the	   law	   on	  
current	  good	  manufacturing	  practices	  (cGMP).	  Centeno	  replied	  that,	  although	  he	  was	  not	  
acting	  under	  FDA	  oversight,	  he	  was	  on	  safe	  grounds	  for	  he	  followed	  the	  guidelines	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   The	   characterisation	  of	   Regenexx	   cells	   as	   a	   “product	   family”	   is	   taken	   from	   the	  original	  wording	  of	   the	  
company	   itself.	   It	   has	   to	   be	   stressed,	   however,	   that	   this	   is	   simply	   a	   commercial	   label	   that	   refers	   to	   the	  
allegedly	  unique	  procedures	  that	  Centeno’s	  clinic	  employs	  to	  derive	  stem	  cells.	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International	  Cellular	  Medicine	  Society	   (ICMS),	   that	   I	  mentioned	  already	   in	  the	  previous	  
chapter	  and	  that	  I	  will	  analyse	  in	  depth	  shortly	  in	  the	  present	  one.	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  highlight	  here	  how	  existing	  regulatory	  bottlenecks,	  and	  fears	  of	  
FDA	  interference,	  ended	  up	  building	  the	  very	  constitution	  and	  marketing	  strategy	  of	  the	  
Regenexx	   product	   family.	   As	   it	   is	   clearly	   observable	   from	   the	   company’s	   website,	  
Regenexx	   is	   a	   trademarked	   name	   attached	   to	   a	   group	   of	   cellular	   products	   sold	   and	  
administered	   by	   Regenerative	   Sciences.	   Images	   of	   people	   hiking	   muddy	   pathways	   or	  
professional	   sport	   sequences	   scroll	   on	   the	  upper	   side	  of	   the	  webpage	  where	  Regenexx	  
cellular	   products	   are	   presented.	   Along	   with	   them,	   testimonies	   report	   about	   the	  
therapeutic	  virtues	  of	   the	  Regenexx	   family.	  The	  company	   is	   thus	  evidently	   focussing	  on	  
bone	   and	   joint	   injury	   applications.	   The	   Regenexx	   product	   line	   includes:	   Regenexx	   SD	  
(same	   day),	   bone	   marrow	   cells	   extracted	   and	   implanted	   on	   a	   same-­‐day	   procedure;	  
Regenexx	  AD	  (adipose	  derived),	  allegedly	   fixes	  meniscus	   injury	  via	  a	  structural	   fat	  graft;	  
and	  Regenexx	  C	   (cultured).	   The	   latter	   are	   cultured	   stem	  cells,	   about	  which	   the	  website	  
does	   not	   provide	   further	   information,	   apart	   form	   saying	   that	   they	   are	   available	   at	   the	  
company’s	  non-­‐US	  site	  in	  the	  Cayman	  Island.	  As	  I	  said	  above,	  the	  Regenexx	  product	  family	  
thus	   incorporate	   the	   regulatory	   restrictions	   on	   cellular	   therapies	   within	   its	   very	  
articulation.	   In	   a	   quite	   literal	   sense,	   Regenexx	   represents	   the	  material	   embodiment	   of	  
existing	  regulatory	  loopholes	  and	  alternative	  framings	  of	  the	  epistemic	  and,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  
in	  the	  coming	  section,	  normative	  stakes	  of	  cellular	  therapy.	  
	  
Regulatory	  paternalism	  
When	  Nature	   reported	   the	   news	   of	   the	   FDA	   injunction	   against	   Centeno,	   some	  
patients	  started	  to	  post	  comments	  on	  the	  journal’s	  website	  that	  deserve	  a	  closer	  look.	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A	  terminally	  ill	  patient,	  for	  instance,	  claimed	  that	  “the	  practice	  of	  medicine	  really	  
needs	  to	  be	  between	  a	  doctor	  and	  his	  patient”	  and	  that	  “to	  not	  allow	  autologous	  stem	  
cell	  treatments	  for	  the	  terminally	  ill	  in	  [US]	  is	  a	  travesty”.	  As	  to	  FDA’s	  injunction	  the	  same	  
patient	  commented:	  “[p]atients	  are	  left	  wondering	  why	  the	  scientific	  community	  fails	  to	  
ever	   consider	   what	   we	   want”.	   Along	   the	   same	   lines,	   another	   comment	   “applaud[ed]	  
Regenerative	  Sciences	  for	  standing	  up	  to	  the	  FDA	  […]	  it	  is	  about	  time	  someone	  did”;	  and	  
added	  “[w]e	  must	  stand	  up	  for	  our	  rights	  as	  patients	  and	  if	  our	  very	  own	  cells	  are	  not	  ours	  
I	  don’t	  know	  what	  is”;	  thus	  concluding	  “[i]t	  should	  be	  up	  to	  me	  and	  my	  doctor	  to	  decide	  
what	  is	  the	  best	  treatment	  for	  me	  not	  a	  government	  agency”.	  	  
Those	   persons	   are	   clearly	   stating	   an	   individual	   right	   to	   be	   treated	   according	   to	  
their	  perceived	  medical	  needs	  and	  therapeutic	  preferences.	  Notably,	   such	  right	   is	  being	  
articulated	   in	   an	   adversarial	   fashion	   towards	   centralised	   regulation,	   governmental	  
interference,	  and	  medical	  paternalism.	  FDA	  activity	  is	  perceived	  as	  bearing	  diverging	  ends	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  therapeutic	  rights	  of	  patients.	  It	  is	  indeed	  interesting	  to	  notice	  a	  shift	  
in	   the	   articulation	   of	   medical	   paternalism	   in	   those	   comments.	   Typically,	   medical	  
paternalism	   refers	   to	   the	   overwhelming	   authority	   of	   physicians	   who	   tend	   to	   disregard	  
patients’	   autonomy	   and	   their	   willingness	   to	   participate	   proactively	   to	   the	   therapeutic	  
decisions,	   allegedly,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   patient	   herself.	   In	   this	   instance	   however,	  
paternalist	   allegations	   are	   not	   directed	   to	   the	   practising	   doctor,	   but	   to	   biomedical	  
researchers	  and	  their	  associated	  governmental	  agencies	  who	  impose	  their	  views	  on	  how	  
innovative	   practices	   should	   proceed	   onto	   the	   legitimate	   wills	   of	   patients.	   This	   new	  
framing	  of	  medical	  paternalism,	  I	  propose,	  should	  be	  called	  ‘regulatory	  paternalism’,	  and	  
represents	   a	   still	   uncharted	   territory	   for	  bioethicists	   to	  explore.	  Regulatory	  paternalism	  
can	  thus	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  setting	  up	  regulatory	  standards	  that	  incorporate	  
specific	   ideas	   on	   how	   the	   medical	   research	   community	   and	   regulatory	   bodies	   should	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protect	   the	   interests	  of	   research	   subjects	  and	  advanced	   therapy	   in	   the	  development	  of	  
new	   therapeutic	   approaches.	   Discourses	   of	   protection	   thus	   intercept	   the	   procedural	  
commitments	  of	  biomedical	  innovation	  engaging	  both	  the	  normative	  and	  the	  epistemic	  in	  
the	   creation	   of	   social	   order	   around	   emerging	   biomedical	   technologies.	   According	   to	  
regulatory	   paternalism,	   patients	   and	   research	   subjects	   are	   deemed	   incapable	   of	  
autonomously	   assessing	   the	   risks	   associated	  with	   frontier	   research	   (Magnus	   2010)	   and	  
experimental	   treatments	   because	   their	   judgement	   is	   overshadowed	   by	   three	   limiting	  
factors:	   1)	   the	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   technical	   expertise	   on	   the	  methods	  of	   clinical	   research	  
and	   medical	   progress,	   2)	   the	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   technical	   expertise	   about	   the	   very	  
procedures	  that	  they	  are	  offered,	  and	  3)	  the	  trumping	  desire	  to	  do	  something	  about	  their	  
medical	  conditions	  that	  often,	  although	  not	  always,	  are	  characterised	  by	  extreme	  severity	  
and	  very	  poor	  prognoses.	  In	  other	  words,	  patients	  and	  research	  subjects	  are	  deemed	  to	  
be	  in	  conditions	  that	  are	  sub-­‐optimal	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐making	  rationality,	  a	  condition	  
that	   only	   strict	   ethical	   and	   regulatory	   oversight	   can	   attempt	   to	   remedy.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	   the	   research	   community	   and	   the	   regulatory	   bodies	   see	   it	   as	   one	   of	   their	  
fundamental	   missions	   to	   adhere	   to	   existing	   standards	   of	   patient/research	   subject	  
protection	   and	   to	   do	   all	   they	   can	   to	   steer	   biomedical	   innovation	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	  
comparably	  stringent	  standards.	  	  
Regulatory	   paternalism	   is	   contrasted	  with	   a	   rather	   cluttered	   set	   of	   affirmations	  
about	  individual	  autonomy	  and	  liberal	  rights	  of	  freedom	  from	  governmental	  intrusion	  in	  
private	  matters.	  These	  claims	  thus	  depend	  on	  imagining	  the	  fight	  against	  one’s	  illness	  as	  a	  
sort	  of	  citizen-­‐consumer	  choice	  of	  therapeutic	  options	  available	  on	  the	  market.	  Restoring	  
health	  thus	  becomes	  a	  commercial	  transaction	  between	  the	  patients	  and	  the	  providers	  of	  
medical	  services	  –	  one	  that	  regulatory	  oversight	  can	  only	  impede	  or	  slow	  down,	  and	  that	  
the	   research	   community	   unjustifiably	   contrasts.	   Those	   who	   frame	   their	   claims	   in	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opposition	  to	  regulatory	  paternalism,	  see	  their	  freedom	  curtailed	  by	  regulation,	  oversight	  
and,	   especially,	   by	   scientists’	   abidance	   by	   the	   stepwise	   model	   of	   medical	   innovation	  
implicit	  in	  the	  CCTs.	  Conceptualising	  the	  therapeutic	  relation	  as	  a	  private	  one	  to	  which	  the	  
state	  has	  no	  stake	  in	  intervening,	  is	  in	  tune	  with	  narratives	  depicting	  regulatory	  agency	  as	  
biased	  in	  their	  activity	  by	  connections	  with	  private	  interests.	  Frustrated	  by	  the	  gravity	  of	  
their	   condition,	   patients	   can	   indeed	  be	   brought	   to	   interpret	   the	   slow	  pace	   of	   scientific	  
research	   not	   only	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   clumsy	   regulatory	   activity,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   direct	  
consequence	   of	   a	   mischievous	   triangulation	   between	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry,	  
scientists	   and	   the	   government.	   Compliance	   with	   standards	   of	   safety	   and	   efficacy	  
assessment,	  thus	  comes	  to	  be	  deconstructed	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  exerting	  control,	  both	  political	  
and	  commercial,	  on	  an	  emerging	  field	  of	  biomedical	  innovation.	  	  
By	   the	   same	   token,	   ICMS	   representatives,	   for	   instance,	   cleverly	   framed	   their	  
position	  also	  as	  an	  attack	  to	  presumed	  links	  between	  FDA,	  ISSCR	  and	  the	  drug	  industry.	  In	  
an	   open	   letter	   reported	   by	   Nature,	   ICMS	   accused	   the	   ISSCR	   of	   opposing	   stem	   cell	  
treatments	  due	  to	  its	  ties	  with	  pharmaceutical	  firms.	  The	  rationale	  for	  such	  accusation	  is	  
that	   ISSCR	   is	   partly	   funded	   by	   the	   industry12	   and	   autologous	   therapies	   of	   the	   kind	  
performed	  by	  Regenerative	  Sciences	  do	  not	  promise	  much	  profit	   for	  drug	   firms.	  At	   this	  
junction,	  the	  as	  yet	  uncertain	  material	  constitution	  of	  stem	  cell	  therapies	   intercepts	  the	  
financial	  expectations	  of	  the	  private	  investors	  who	  put	  money	  in	  the	  field	  in	  exchange	  of	  
expected	   revenues.	   The	   administration	   of	   autologous	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   however,	   only	  
produces	  revenues	  for	  the	  clinics	  that	  perform	  it.	  The	  most	  profitable	  way	  for	  the	  industry	  
to	  squeeze	  income	  out	  of	  stem	  cells,	  instead,	  is	  selling	  cell	  lines	  as	  IP-­‐protected	  products,	  
which	   is	   best	   served	   by	   heterologous	   treatments	   using	   patented	   stem	   cells.	   ICMS	   thus	  
conjectured	  that	  the	  industry,	  backed-­‐up	  by	  FDA	  watchdogs	  and	  speaking	  through	  ISSCR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  	  
	   151	  
members,	  may	   act	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   the	   field	   from	   taking	   the	   direction	   of	   homologous	  
patient-­‐to-­‐patient	   cell	   treatments.	   Such	   allegations	   reinforced	   a	   narrative	   of	   denied	  
rights,	  diffidence	  towards	  governmental	  agencies,	  and	  suspicion	  for	  certified	  science	  that	  
feeds	  the	  recriminations	  of	  wannabe	  stem	  cell	  patients	  and	  clinicians13.	  	  
The	   articulation	   of	   regulatory	   paternalism,	   and	   of	   its	   critique,	   can	   be	   viewed	  
against	   the	  background	  of	  a	  more	  general	   transformation	  of	   the	  practice	  of	  health	  care	  
provision	   into	   a	   commercially	   oriented	   activity.	   In	   a	   recent	   letter	   to	   the	   New	   England	  
Journal	  of	  Medicine	  (NEJM),	  Hartzband	  and	  Groopman,	  highlighted	  the	  silent	  adoption	  of	  
a	  commercial	   language	   in	   the	  medical	   community	  as	  a	   sign	  of	   this	   transformation	   (that	  
they	  see	  as	  deleterious)14:	  
«The	   relationship	   between	   doctors,	   nurses	   or	   any	  
other	  medical	  profession	  and	  the	  patients	  they	  care	  for	  are	  
now	   cast	   primarily	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   commercial	   transaction.	  
The	  consumer	  or	  costumer	  is	  the	  buyer,	  and	  the	  provider	  is	  
the	   vendor	   or	   seller»	   (Hartzband	   and	   Groopman	   2011,	  
1372).	  
In	  this	  context,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  regulatory	  paternalism	  is	  but	  one	  instantiation	  of	  
a	   wider	   phenomenon	   that	   sees	  medicine	   increasingly	   entangled	   to	   the	   very	   culture	   of	  
commercial	  firms	  –	  as	  the	  perceived	  shift	  in	  language	  is	  suppose	  to	  reveal.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   however,	   the	   critics	   of	   regulatory	   paternalism	   wave	   an	   image	   of	   patients	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   Having	   read	   the	   content	   of	   Regenerative	   Science	   website,	   and	   of	   many	   other	   similar	   organizations,	   I	  
myself	  formed	  the	  belief	  that,	  from	  a	  scientific	  point	  of	  view,	  what	  these	  clinics	  offer	  is	  unconvincing.	  The	  
reserves	  of	   ISSCR	  scientists,	   instead,	  appear	   to	  me	  to	  be	   justified.	  Furthermore,	   I	   think	   that	  conceiving	  of	  
therapies	   as	   totally	   embedded	   in	   an	   exclusive	   relationship	   between	   doctors	   and	   patients,	   reveals	   a	  
fundamental	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  inner	  workings	  and	  social	  function	  of	  modern	  medicine	  as	  a	  collective	  
enterprise	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  people’s	  welfare.	  As	  an	  analyst,	  however,	  I	  am	  committed	  to	  look	  at	  how	  
identities,	  power	  relations,	  and	  regulatory	  authority	  emerge	  across	  these	  oppositions.	  This	  implies	  that,	  in	  
the	  main	  text,	  I	  espouse	  a	  certain	  neutrality	  towards	  the	  claims	  I	  descirbe,	  notwithstanding	  my	  parting	  for	  
scrupolous	  ethical	  and	  clinical	  oversight	  on	  the	  inevitably	  slow	  development	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  	  
14	  I	  acknowledge	  Giuseppe	  Testa	  for	  pointing	  this	  letter	  at	  me.	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coincide	  exactly	  with	  that	  of	  an	  isolated	  consumer	  of	  heath	  goods.	  Therefore,	  from	  both	  
sides,	   this	   confrontation	   seems	   internal	   to	   an	   overarching	   transformation	   in	   the	   way	  
medicine	   is	   conceived	   and	  offered	   to	   individuals.	   To	  be	   sure,	   such	   cultural	   transition	   is	  
taking	   multiple	   routes	   (e.g.	   through	   personalised	   medicine,	   pharmacogenetics,	  
pharmacogenomics,	  direct-­‐to-­‐consumer	  genetic	  tests,	  and	  self-­‐testing	  devices),	  but	  stem	  
cell	  medicine,	  as	  the	  events	  recalled	  here	  testify,	  is	  likely	  to	  represent	  a	  privileged	  locus	  of	  
its	  articulation.	  
	  
The	  dispute	   I	  described	   in	  section	  4.1.2,	  was	   thus	   the	  site	  of	  a	  major	  exercise	   in	  
boundary	  work,	  whereby	  scientific	  credentials	  are	  distilled	  and	  contested,	  and	  different	  
moral	   commitments	   contrasted	   in	   order	   to	   construct	   a	   line	   of	   separation	   between	   the	  
orthodox	   scientific	   community	   backed	   by	   governmental	   agencies	   on	   one	   side,	   and	  
practising	  stem	  cell	  clinicians	  interpreting	  the	  will	  of	  patients	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
This	   story,	   like	   the	  previous	  one,	   shows	  a	  dispute	  arising	  on	   the	  demarcation	  of	  
science,	   regulatory	   authority,	   and	   patients’	   freedom.	   Terms	   like	   ‘medical	   product’,	  
‘biologic’,	   ‘drug’,	   ‘manipulation’,	   ‘medical	   practice’,	   ‘GMP’	   were	   used	   by	   FDA	   to	  
implement	  its	  authority,	  and	  by	  stem	  cell	  clinicians	  to	  legitimate	  their	  work	  and	  expertise.	  
Individual	  patients,	  resonant	  with	  ICMS,	  framed	  their	  rights	  by	  projecting	  their	  frustration	  
on	  government	  blocking	  research	  and	  on	  the	  allegedly	  inappropriate	  interests	  of	  scientific	  
societies	  like	  ISSCR:	  the	  indubitable	  steering	  influence	  of	  science’s	  industrial	  partners	  cast	  
doubts	  on	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  latter,	  thus	  creating	  an	  adversarial	  relationship	  between	  
different	  actors	  and	  stakeholders.	  
Moreover,	  revealing	  industries’	  financial	  support	  to	  ISSCR,	  the	  quarrel	  shows	  that	  
commercial	  actors	  are	  in	  the	  position	  to	  at	  least	  influence	  the	  form	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	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based	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  translational	  model	  that	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  profits,	  and	  
that	   this	   possibility	   is	   exploited	   argumentatively	   to	   make	   the	   case	   against	   regulatory	  
paternalism.	  	  
On	   this	   terrain,	   involved	   actors	   employed	   resources	   including	   interests,	  
imaginaries,	   and	  moral	   outlooks	   that	   appear	   difficult	   to	   reconcile	  with	   one	   another.	   In	  
particular,	  the	  contrasts	  here	  described	  typically	  take	  the	  form	  of	  quarrels	  on	  regulatory	  
paternalism.	   The	   latter	   category	   thus	  emerged	  as	   a	  novel	   and	   important	  player	   for	   the	  
articulation	   of	   contrastive	   innovation	   narratives	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   separate	  
professional	   identities.	  We	  will	   see,	   later	   in	   this	   chapter	   (section	   4.2.),	   how	   this	   notion	  
played	   out	   in	   the	   disputes	   between	   ISSCR	   and	   ICMS	   on	   the	   certification	   of	   stem	   cell	  
clinics.	  	  
4.1.3	  European	  hospital	  exemptions:	  clinical	  validity	  across	  
internal	  borders	  	  
Europe	   has	   similar	   but	   more	   articulated	   provisions	   than	   the	   States	   as	   to	   the	  
possibility	   of	   injecting	   cellular	   products	   into	  human	  patients.	   I	  will	   show	   in	   the	  present	  
section	  how	  the	  European	  Union	  uses	  its	  powers	  in	  regulating	  the	  internal	  circulation	  of	  
medicinal	  products	  to	  enact	  a	  distinctive,	  albeit	  not	   fully	  specified,	  vision	  on	  the	  clinical	  
validity	  of	  stem	  cell	  treatments.	  
The	   text	   of	   the	   2007	   regulation	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   Council	   on	  
Advanced	  Therapy	  Medicinal	  Products	  (ATMPs)	  amends	  previously	  existing	  provisions	  as	  
to	  use	  of	  medicinal	  products	  in	  Europe.	  	  
The	   main	   effort	   of	   this	   regulatory	   tool	   is	   to	   construct	   cell	   therapy	   (and	   gene	  
therapy	   and	   engineered	   tissues	   as	   well)	   as	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   medicinal	   product.	   As	   I	  
already	   explained	   above,	   this	   strategy,	   whereby	   innovative	   medical	   possibilities	   are	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defined,	   and	   thus	   regulated,	   as	  biological	  drugs,	   stands	  as	  a	  primary	  mode	   for	  exerting	  
regulatory	   control	   over	   novel	   medical	   applications.	   The	   aim	   here	   is	   to	   normalise	   the	  
presence	   of	   novelties	   by	   assimilating	   them	   to	   more	   familiar	   medical	   tools,	   thereby	  
inscribing	   them,	   through	   classification,	   into	   an	   already	   existing	   normative	   order.	   Such	  
strategy,	   however,	   rests	   on	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   ordering	   novelty	   through	   a	   series	   of	  
complex	  epistemic	  moves	  and	  un-­‐obvious	  classificatory	  decisions.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   biological	  medicinal	   drugs,	   cellular	   products	   need	   to	   be	  
framed	  out	  within	   a	   credible	  understanding	  of	   the	  activity	  of	   therapeutic	   agents	   in	   the	  
human	   body.	   It	   is	   worth	   recalling	   here	   however,	   that	   epistemic	   resources	   of	   this	   kind	  
cannot	  simply	  be	  retrieved	  from	  a	  body	  of	  shared	  medical	  notions.	  Rather,	  they	  have	  to	  
be	  established	  ad	  hoc	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  they	  remain	  open	  to	  possible	  contestations.	  	  
Thus,	   the	  classification	  of	  cellular	  products	  as	  biological	  medicinal	  drugs	  rests	  on	  
the	   realisation	   that	   they	   are	   used	   “with	   a	   view	   to	   restoring,	   correcting	   or	   modifying	  
physiological	   functions	   by	   exerting	   principally	   a	   pharmacological,	   immunological	   or	  
metabolic	  action”	  (2)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
This	   vagueness	   as	   to	   the	   modes	   of	   action	   that	   define	   a	   biological	   medicinal	  
product,	   thus	   leaves	   a	   door	   open	   for	   novel	   forms	   of	   biological	   activity	   that	   innovative	  
therapies	   might	   exploit.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   provision	   extends	   regulatory	   control	   to	   both	  
present	   and	   future	   applications.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   to	   accommodate	   to	   the	   uncertain	  
character	   of	   novel	   therapies	   that	   the	   classification	   looks	   somewhat	   underdetermined.	  
Hence	  again,	  in	  line	  with	  what	  I	  said	  in	  chapter	  3,	  whereas	  the	  regulatory	  prerogatives	  of	  
political	  actors	   in	   the	  governance	  of	   stem	  cell	   translation	  are	  challenged	  by	   the	  specific	  
uncertainties	   and	   the	   intrinsic	   instability	   of	   these	   new	   medical	   products,	   European	  
regulators	  left	  room	  for	  future	  applications	  to	  eventually	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  present	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regulations.	  Framing	  cellular	  products	  as	  biological	  drugs,	  however,	  ultimately	  remains	  an	  
open-­‐ended	  process	  and,	  as	  I	  show	  below,	  requires	  further	  resources.	  
According	   to	   the	  2007	  amendments	   included	   in	   the	  EU	  Regulation	  on	  Advanced	  
Therapy	   Medicinal	   Products,	   the	   dispensations	   of	   the	   2001	   Directive	   on	   Medicinal	  
Products	  for	  Human	  Use	  do	  not	  cover	  gene	  therapy,	  cell	  therapy	  and	  engineered	  tissue,	  
provided	  they	  are	  prepared	  	  
“on	  a	  non-­‐routine	  basis	  according	  to	  specific	  quality	  
standards,	   and	   used	   within	   the	   same	  Member	   State	   in	   a	  
hospital	   under	   the	   exclusive	   medical	   responsibility	   of	   a	  
medical	  practitioner,	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  an	  individual	  
medical	   prescription,	   for	   a	   custom-­‐made	   product	   for	   an	  
individual	  patient”	  (2001/83	  art	  3	  par	  7	  as	  amended	  by	  art	  
28	  1397/2007).	  	  
	  
This	   principle	   has	   come	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   ‘hospital	   exemption’	   rule,	   thus	  
stressing	   the	   idea	   that	   individual	   clinics	   can	   derogate	   from	   the	   European	   marketing	  
authorisation	  procedures,	  provided	  certain	  technical	  conditions	  are	  met.	  	  
In	   a	   creative	   display	   of	   awareness	   about	   the	   co-­‐productive	   nature	   of	   scientific	  
policy,	   the	   hospital	   exemption	   rule	   exploits	   the	   very	   geographical	   peculiarity	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  to	  create	  and	  exert	  order	  in	  the	  field	  on	  innovative	  cellular	  therapies.	  As	  
one	  can	   read	   from	  the	  quote	  above,	   it	   is	   intra-­‐European	  borders	   that	  perform	  the	  new	  
regulatory	  function	  here:	  the	  hospital	  exemption	  rule,	  albeit	  permitting	  a	  certain	  degree	  
of	  therapeutic	   freedom,	  confines	   it	   to	  the	   individual	  state	   level.	  The	  borders	  that	  divide	  
Member	   States	   are	   indeed	   being	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   regulate,	   by	   actually	   limiting	   it,	   the	  
circulation	  of	  unproven	  ATMPs	  within	  the	  Union.	  Unspoken	  considerations	  about	  clinical	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validity	   thus	   intertwine	  with	   the	   statutory	   power	   of	   EU	   regulation	   to	   open	   up	   or	   close	  
down	  the	  internal	  borders	  of	  the	  Union	  to	  the	  circulation	  of	  medicinal	  products.	  	  
Whereas	   in	   many	   previous	   examples	   it	   was	   national	   borders	   –	   porous	   to	   the	  
circulation	   of	   both	   patients	   and	   cells	   –	   that	   allowed	   cellular	   products	   to	   be	   injected	   in	  
human	  patients	   in	  different	  geographical	   locations,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Europe	  borders	  play	  a	  
strikingly	   opposite	   role.	   Here,	   borders	   are	   constructed	   as	   barriers	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  
practising	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   outside	   of	   regulated	   CCTs.	   The	   non-­‐permeability	   of	   intra-­‐
European	   borders	   to	   unproven	   cell	   therapies	   forcefully	   contrasts	   with	   the	   overall	  
intention	  of	   this	  piece	  of	   legislation	  –	  aimed	  at	   creating	  a	   common	  space	   for	  European	  
scientists	  and	  patients	  alike	  to	  share	  knowledge,	  materials	  and,	  possibly,	  the	  benefits	  of	  
pursuing	  biomedical	  innovation	  in	  a	  regulated	  manner.	  Whereas	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  latter	  
European	  legislation	  plays	  a	  facilitating	  role,	  with	  respect	  to	  experimental	  treatments,	   it	  
poses	   a	   territorial	   obstacle.	   In	   general,	   European	   regulations	   on	   medicinal	   products,	  
including	   ATMPs,	   have	   the	   aim	   to	   harmonise	   and	   promote	   the	   free	   circulation	   of	  
medicines	   within	   Europe,	   but,	   quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	   hospital	   exemption	   rule	  
constrains	   the	   presence	   of	   human	   cell	   for	   therapeutic	   use	   within	   the	   Member	   State	  
where	  they	  were	  derived	  
The	   hospital	   exemption	   rule,	   however,	   does	   not	   explicitly	   endorse	   any	   clear-­‐cut	  
epistemic	   distinction	   between	   proven	   and	   unproven	   treatments.	   Nor	   does	   it	   set	   a	  
standard	   for	   a	   minimal	   amount	   of	   pre-­‐clinical	   and	   clinical	   evidence	   as	   to	   safety	   and	  
efficacy.	  Nonetheless,	   it	  makes	  use	  of	  national	  borders	  as	  barriers	  –	  both	  epistemic	  and	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normative	   –	   to	   limit	   the	   exercise	   of	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   outside	   accepted	   scientific	  
methods	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  validation15.	  
Thus	  also	   in	  Europe,	   like	   in	   the	  States,	   the	  amount	  of	  manipulation	  configures	  a	  
technical	   boundary	   between	   acceptable	   and	   non-­‐acceptable	   cellular	   treatment.	   At	   the	  
same	  time,	  those	  criteria	  define	  the	  threshold	  of	  acceptable	  risk	   in	  the	  practice	  of	  stem	  
cell	  medicine,	  by	  conceding	  that,	  minimally	  manipulated	  cells	  are	  unlikely	  to	  cause	  harm	  
to	   patients.	   This	   last	   consideration,	   however,	   omits	   to	   take	   into	   due	   account	   the	  
dependence	   of	   the	   safety	   profile	   of	   cell	   therapy	   upon	   cell	   type,	   immunological	  
characteristic	  and	  site	  of	  injection.	  	  
At	  any	  rate,	  albeit	   ill-­‐defined,	  criteria	  of	  non-­‐routinized	  custom-­‐made	  production	  
seem	  apt	  to	  allow	  the	  exercise	  of	  acknowledged	  therapeutic	  practices,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   limiting	   the	   scope	   of	   possible	   application	   of	   unproven	   cellular	   treatments.	   In	   this	  
respect,	   however,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   stem	   cell	   tourism,	   still	   appears	   to	   be	   possible	  
within	   Europe,	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   hospital	   exemption	   concedes	   in	   terms	   of	   technical	  
possibilities.	  
4.1.4	  Border	  crossing	  for	  stem	  cells	  
I	   already	   mentioned	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   stem	   cell	   tourism	   in	   the	   previous	  
sections.	  Travelling	   for	  cures,	  however,	   is	  not	   specific	  of	   stem	  cell	  medicine,	  nor	   it	   is	  of	  
innovative	  therapies.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  patients	   travel,	  and	  have	  always	  travelled,	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  reason	  why,	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  experimental	  treatments	  remain	  possible,	  is	  probably	  attributable	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  2007	  legislation	  did	  not	  want	  to	  put	  extra	  burdens	  on	  standard-­‐of-­‐care	  human	  tissue-­‐
based	   interventions	   –	   like	   blood	   transfusions,	   BM	   and	   organ	   transplantations	   and	   IVF	   treatments	   –	   by	  
introducing	  unsuited	  special	  provisions	  that	  would	  hinder	  their	  practice.	  	  
By	   so	   doing,	   however,	   the	   legislator	   left	   loopholes	   open	   in	   the	   regulatory	   framework	   that	   remind	   those	  
already	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  speaking	  of	   the	  US,	  and	  that,	   in	   theory,	  could	  still	  make	  certain	  
kinds	  of	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  with	  minimally	  manipulated	  infusions	  possible	  at	  the	  national	  level.	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undertaking	   advanced	   surgical	   interventions,	   for	   joining	   clinical	   trials	   in	   the	   hope	   of	  
gaining	  some	  benefits,	  for	  performing	  IVF	  or,	  more	  simply,	  for	  obtaining	  the	  same	  medical	  
treatment	   at	   a	   discounted	   rate.	   The	   latter	   phenomenon	   has	   grown	   especially	   in	   the	  
proximity	  of	  national	  borders,	  such	  as	  that	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Mexico,	  where	  travelling	  
is	   logistically	   less	   demanding	   for	   uninsured	   US	   citizens,	   as	   well	   as	   more	   rewarding	  
financially	  for	  providers.	  
As	   to	   stem	   cell	   medicine,	   cross-­‐border	   medical	   tourism	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	  
differences	   in	   national	   regulation	   to	   offer	   off-­‐shore	   stem	   cell	   treatments	   to	   patient-­‐
customers	   coming	   from	  more	   stringently	   regulated	   countries.	   I	  will	   now	   provide	   a	   few	  
examples	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  that	  operate	  across	  national	  borders	  to	  avoid	  unfavourable	  
regulations.	  
One	   such	   case	   is	   that	   of	   the	   Stem	   Cell	   Treatment	   Institute.	   They	   provide	  
autologous	   bone	   marrow	   transplant	   using	   tissue	   taken	   from	   hip	   bone,	   but	   also	  
heterologous	  (“younger”,	  as	  they	  say)	  cells	  from	  cord	  blood,	  placenta	  and	  adipose	  tissue.	  
Those	  cellular	  products	  are	  supposed	  to	  “treat	  cancer,	  spinal	  cord,	  autoimmune	  diseases,	  
Alzheimer’s,	   cerebral	   palsy,	   diabetes,	   stroke,	   muscular	   dystrophy,	   heart	   failure”.	   Their	  
web	   site	   also	   claims	   the	   cells	   to	   be	   enhanced/activated	   by	   chemical	   “transfer	   factors”.	  
The	   cells	   used	   in	   these	   procedures	   are	   extracted	   in	   San	   Diego,	   CA,	   but	   they	   are	   then	  
injected	  in	  a	  cognate	  clinic	  just	  off	  the	  border	  in	  Mexico.	  
Korean	  RNL	  Bio	  went	  a	  step	  further	  in	  internationalising	  its	  activities.	  They	  extract	  
bone	   marrow	   and	   bank	   cells	   in	   the	   US	   and	   in	   Germany;	   they	   ship	   them	   to	   Korea	   for	  
isolation	  and	  expansion;	  and	  finally	  they	  send	  their	  patients	  in	  China,	  Japan,	  Mexico	  and	  
Germany	   for	   infusion.	   The	   company	   claims	   its	   treatments	   are	   indicated	   for	   ‘de-­‐aging’,	  
rheumatic	  conditions,	  atopy	  and	  stroke.	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Bio-­‐cellular	   Research	  Organization	   Inc.	   is	   based	   in	   the	  US,	   but	   it	   has	   offices	   and	  
manufacturing	   facilities	   in	   Slovakia,	  Malaysia,	   Taiwan,	   India	   and	  Switzerland.	   They	  offer	  
stem	  cells	  extracted	  from	  foetal	  and	  new-­‐born	  rabbits	  and,	  interestingly,	  they	  ship	  them	  
worldwide.	  According	  to	  their	  website,	  they	  recommend	  their	  cells	  for	  treating	  “diabetes	  
and	   its	   complications,	   hormone	   deficiencies,	   early	   menopause,	   male	   and	   female	  
infertility,	  spinal	  cord	  injury,	  Parkinson’s	  disease,	  etc.”	  (ref).	  	  
Progencell	   is	   instead	  based	  in	  Mexico,	  but	  advertises	   its	  treatments	   in	  English	  on	  
its	  website	  and	  clearly	  addresses	  American	  costumers	  who	  can	  easily	  travel	  to	  Mexico.	  	  
The	  Institute	  of	  Cell	  Therapy	  has	  its	  headquarters	  in	  Kiev,	  Ukraine,	  but	  also	  opened	  
offices	  in	  London	  and	  in	  the	  US.	  They	  offer	  autologous	  bone	  marrow	  transplants,	  as	  well	  
as	  heterologous	  placental	  stem	  cells	  for	  “stroke,	  consequences	  of	  craniocerebral	  traumas,	  
disseminated	   sclerosis,	   pancreatic	   diabetes,	   joints	   diseases,	   cardio-­‐vascular	   diseases,	  
hepatitis,	   liver	   cirrhosis,	   rehabilitation	   after	   chemotherapy	   and	   others”	  
(http://www.stemcellclinic.com/en.html).	  
Global	   Laboratories	   LLC’s	   founder	   and	   owner	   Fredda	   Branyon	   recently	   found	  
herself	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  judicial	  case	  for	  selling	  cells	  over	  US	  State	  borders.	  According	  to	  the	  
FDA’s	   Office	   of	   Criminal	   Investigations	   (OCI)	   and	   the	   FBI’s	   San	   Antonio	   Field	   Office,	  
between	   February	   2009	   and	   April	   2010,	   the	   Arizona	   based	   corporation	   sold	   vials	  
containing	   stem	  cells	   to	  an	   individual	   in	  Brownsville,	   Texas,	  who	   later	  administered	   the	  
cells	  to	  patients	  suffering	  autoimmune	  diseases.	  The	  total	  revenue	  from	  the	  traffic	  was	  $	  
300.000,	  according	  to	  the	  investigators.	  August	  the	  18th	  2011,	  Braynon	  was	  charged	  and	  
convicted	  for	  this	  by	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  Texas.	  Branyon	  admitted	  of	  the	  allegations	  
and	  currently	  awaits	  judgement	  on	  November	  18th	  2011.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  highlight	  FDA-­‐
FBI’s	   framing	   of	   the	   case.	   The	   accusation	   states	   that	  Global	   Laboratories	   LLC	   trafficked	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unapproved	  new	  drugs.	  It	  thus	  used	  a	  classificatory	  strategy	  to	  frame	  stem	  cells	  as	  a	  drug,	  
instead	  of	  conceiving	  them	  as	  tissue.	  This	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  with	  FDA’s	  attitude	  in	  other	  
cases	  described	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  the	  Brayon	  case,	  FDA	  again	  can	  avails	  itself	  of	  the	  Code	  
of	  Federal	  Regulations	  (1271.10)	  to	  claim	  regulatory	  control	  over	  cell	  therapies.	  According	  
to	  the	  law,	  heterologous	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  fall	  within	  FDA	  jurisdiction,	  thus	  the	  agency	  
rightly	  convicted	  Global	  Laboratories’	  founder.	  What	  is	  worth	  stressing	  here,	  is	  that	  FDA	  
took	   the	   occasion	   of	   the	   present	   case	   to	   restate	   its	   general	   attitude	   towards	   cellular	  
therapies	  being	  offered	  to	  patients	  outside	  its	  legitimate	  control.	  In	  a	  press	  release,	  FDA-­‐
OCI’s	   Special	   Agent	   in	   Charge	   Patrick	   J.	   Holland	   declared:	   “This	   criminal	   information	  
demonstrates	   the	   commitment	   of	   the	   Food	   and	   Drug	   Administration	   to	   protect	   the	  
American	  public	   from	  harms	   inherent	   in	   being	   exposed	   to	   unapproved	  new	  drugs.	   The	  
FDA	  will	  continue	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  perpetrators	  of	  such	  acts	  and	  ensure	  that	  they	  
are	  punished	   to	   the	   full	  extent	  of	   law”	   (fda	  website).	   In	   this	   statement,	  Holland	   frames	  
the	  role	  of	  FDA	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  protection,	  and	  constructs	  the	  image	  of	  the	  agency	  as	  
the	  unique	  possible	  provider	  of	  such	  function.	  Furthermore,	  probably	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
Regenexx	   controversy,	  Holland	   delivered	   a	  muscular	   proof	   of	   FDA	  willingness	   to	  watch	  
out	  for	   infringements	  of	  existing	  regulations.	  This	  boundary	  work	  exercise	   is	   finalised	  to	  
deter	  profit-­‐oriented	  clinics	  to	  play	  around	  with	  existing	  regulation,	  but	  also	  to	  diffuse	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  legitimate	  regulatory	  function	  of	  the	  agency	  within	  this	  field	  of	  biomedicine.	  	  
	  
4.2	  Designs	  on	  therapy	  
After	  having	  reported	  on	  controversies	  arising	  with	  early	  efforts	  at	  using	  stem	  cells	  
in	   medical	   practice	   and	   clinical	   research,	   it	   is	   now	   time	   to	   see	   how	   these	   disputes	  
configure	   the	   existence	   of	   radically	   different	   epistemic	   and	   normative	   commitments	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towards	  the	  translation	  of	  stem	  cells	  from	  the	  bench	  to	  the	  bedside.	  This	  section	  will	  thus	  
track	  the	  emergence	  of	  two	  contrasting	  attitudes	  with	  respect	  to	  stem	  cell	  translation.	  To	  
do	  so,	  I	  will	  first	  reconstruct	  ISSCR	  efforts	  at	  contrasting	  the	  activity	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  of	  
the	   kind	   described	   above	   (4.2.1).	   Subsequently,	   I	  will	   show	  how	  narratives	   of	   patients’	  
rights	   against	   regulatory	   paternalism	   found	   explicit	   articulation	   in	   the	   guidelines	   on	  
clinical	  translation	  issued	  by	  the	  ICMS	  (4.2.2).	  I	  will	  then	  take	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UK	  Stem	  Cell	  
Bank	   as	   a	   further	   instance	   of	   shared	   regulatory	   control	   over	   stem	   cell	   circulation,	   thus	  
showing,	   once	   again,	   the	   plasticity	   of	   this	   governance	   model	   and	   its	   permeability	   to	  
alternative	  framings	  of	  stem	  cell	   innovation	  (4.2.3).	  Finally,	   in	  section	  4.3,	  I	  will	  speak	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  controlled	  clinical	  trials	  in	  the	  management	  of	  clinical	  risk.	  	  
4.2.1	  Patrolling	  clinical	  freedom	  
In	  this	  sub-­‐section	  I	  will	  account	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  boundary	  work	  activity	  the	  ISSCR	  
enacted	   to	   contrast	   clinical	   practice	   with	   unproven	   stem	   cell	   treatments,	   and	   for	   the	  
contrasts	  that	  emerged	  around	  it.	  	  
Preliminarily,	  It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  dispute	  here	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  
the	  drift	   in	   the	  regulatory	  model	   that	   I	  described	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  scientific	  
community	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   establishing	   criteria	   for	   responsible	   clinical	   conduct	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  voluntary	  guidelines.	  But	  scientists,	  as	  it	  will	  also	  emerge	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  also	  
gained	   prominence	   within	   regulatory	   bodies	   in	   the	   face	   of	   substantial	   legislative	  
uncertainty	  over	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation.	  
The	   case	   I	   will	   illustrate	   in	   the	   present	   section,	   speaks	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   two	  
contrasting	   interpretations	   about	  how	   stem	  cell	   should	  be	   translated	   to	   the	   clinic.	  One	  
side	   lines	  up	  the	  supporters	  of	  marketable	  clinical	  procedures	  mainly,	  but	  not	  uniquely,	  
with	   autologous	   stem	   cells.	   On	   the	   other,	   critics	   of	   the	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   standards	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adopted	  by	   stem	  cell	   clinics	  of	   this	   sort,	  praise	   for	   slow-­‐paced	  and	  watchful	   translation	  
through	  carefully	  designed,	  peer-­‐reviewed	  CCTs.	  
In	   December	   2008,	   together	   with	   the	   already	  mentioned	   Guidelines,	   ISSCR	   had	  
already	  made	   a	  Patient	  Handbook	   on	   Stem	  Cell	   Therapy	  available	   on	   the	   Internet.	   This	  
document,	  other	  then	  popularising	  a	  few	  basic	  notions	  on	  the	  biology	  of	  stem	  cells	  and	  
their	  possible	  medical	  promise,	  warned	  patients	  of	  stem	  cell	  treatments	  if	  the	  providers	  
failed	   to	   show:	   1)	   peer-­‐reviewed	   replicable	   preclinical	   studies,	   2)	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  
Institutional	   Review	   Board	   (IRB)	   or	   Ethics	   Review	   Board	   (ERB),	   3)	   the	   approval	   of	   a	  
regional	  or	  national	  regulatory	  agency.	   In	  addition,	  the	  handbook	  alerted	  patients	  to	  be	  
particularly	   wary	   of	   stem	   cell	   treatment	   providers	   when	   patient	   testimony	   is	   the	   only	  
base	   for	   efficacy	   and	   safety	   claims,	   the	   same	   cells	   are	   used	   to	   treat	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
conditions,	   clear	  documentation	   is	  missing	  as	   to	   the	   source	  of	   the	  cell	  or	  nature	  of	   the	  
treatment,	  and	  risks	  are	  said	  to	  be	  absent.	  	  
In	  June	  2010,	  ISSCR	  launched	  an	  initiative	  called	  “Submit	  a	  Clinic”	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  unexpected	  reactions.	  Through	  a	  dedicated	  website,	   ISSCR	  gave	  members	  of	  
the	  public	   the	  opportunity	   to	  signal	  advertisements	   from	  stem	  cell	   therapy	  centres	  and	  
providers.	  ISSCR	  members	  were	  then	  given	  the	  possibility	  to	  review	  the	  latter	  in	  order	  to	  
assess	  whether	  they	  acted	  under	  the	  regulatory	  oversight	  of	  an	  FDA-­‐like	  authority,	  and	  if	  
an	  institutional	  review	  boards	  was	  scrutinising	  their	  clinical	  activity	  from	  the	  ethical	  point	  
of	   view.	   In	   other	   words,	   ISSCR	   intended	   to	   provide	   a	   public	   accreditation	   service	   that	  
could	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	   black	   list	   of	   unreliable	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   appearing	   on	   their	  
website.	  	  
Just	  a	  few	  months	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  initiative,	  in	  February	  2011,	  ISSCR	  had	  to	  
discontinue	  the	  project	  due	  to	  the	  sudden	  reaction	  of	  clinics	  lawyers.	  	  
	   163	  
Nature,	  like	  other	  journals,	  reported	  on	  the	  issue.	  Among	  other	  things,	  the	  report	  
affirmed	   that,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   decision	   to	   quit	   the	   ISSCR	   initiative,	   some	   researchers	  
were	  now	  worried	  of	  patients	  seeking	  for	  guidance	  at	  ICMS.	  Then	  the	  article,	  in	  an	  effort	  
at	  giving	  substance	   to	  such	  worries,	   recalled	   the	   links	  between	   ICMS	  and	  Dr.	  Centeno’s	  
Regenerative	  Sciences.	  
Once	   again,	   on	   the	  website	   of	  Nature,	   comments	   appeared	   to	   the	   news	   report	  
about	   this	   story.	   Notably,	   the	   first	   one	   was	   from	   Dr.	   Centeno.	   The	   latter	   wanted	   to	  
decouple	  his	  name	  from	  the	  ISSCR	  story,	  but	  indeed	  took	  the	  occasion	  to	  make	  his	  point	  
again	  on	  FDA’s	  regulatory	  paternalism.	  In	  his	  comment,	  Dr.	  Centeno	  claimed	  that	  issue	  at	  
stake	   was	   “whether	   one	   set	   of	   physicians	   practicing	   medicine	   using	   body	   parts	   (stem	  
cells)	  should	  be	  held	  to	  different	  standards	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  physicians	  practicing	  
medicine	   using	   body	   parts	   (for	   example	   cultured	   human	   eggs)”	   (Cyranoski	   2011).	   This	  
statement	   clearly	   refuses	   to	   conceive	   of	   stem	   cells	   as	   drugs	   only	   because	   they	   have	   a	  
medical	  purpose.	   Thus	   the	  analogy	  with	   IVF	   serves	   the	  aim	  of	   showing	   that	   there	  exist	  
already	   medical	   practices	   whereby	   human	   tissues	   are	   used	   without	   being	   considered	  
drugs.	  The	  post	  goes	  on	  asking	  “why	  are	  the	  body	  parts	  called	  “stem	  cells”	  classified	  as	  a	  
drug?	  Well	  since	  FDA	  classifies	  them	  as	  a	  drug,	  they	  must	  be	  produced	  in	  a	  drug	  factory	  
and	  not	  a	  medical	  clinic”	  (ibidem,	  ref.	  24692).	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  clearly	  points,	  
again,	   at	   purported	   liaisons	   between	   drug	   companies	   and	   FDA,	   and	   uses	   classificatory	  
issues	  to	  unveil	  these	  alleged	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  It	  thus	  appeared	  that	  his	  intention	  was	  
to	   defend	   its	   territory	   from	   the	   derogatory	   tone	   of	   the	   journal’s	   report	   against	  
Regenerative	  Sciences.	  
Other	  comments	  however,	  provide	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  regulatory	  
paternalism	   in	   the	   intuitions	  of	   stem	  cell	   patients	   and	   clinical	   subjects.	  Here	   is	   a	   list	   of	  
relevant	   statements	   extracted	   by	   the	   posted	   comments	   that	   make	   the	   case	   for	   the	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presence	   of	   adversarial	   attitudes	   towards	   what	   comes	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   unjustified	  
governmental	  and	  scientific	  interference.	  
“From	  the	  layman’s	  perspective	  (which	  I	  am)	  I	  want	  
the	   use	   of	   my	   own	   body	   parts,	   to	   be	   of	   my	   choice	   and	  
under	   my	   ownership,	   that	   includes:	   blood,	   blood	  
transfusions,	   collection	   of	   eggs	   for	   fertilization,	   my	   stem	  
cells,	  my	   skin	   and	   all	   of	  my	   body	   belongs	   to	  me,	   not	   the	  
FDA”	  (24696);	  
“I	   think	   that	   the	   ISSCR	   vastly	   underestimates	   the	  
ability	  of	  patients	   to	   figure	   things	  out	   for	   themselves.	   […]	  
After	   all,	   why	   should	   it	   only	   be	   the	   lawyers	   and	   medical	  
researchers	   that	   have	   a	   say?	   Many	   patients	   also	   have	  
relevant	   experience/knowledge	   –	   and	   they	   tend	   to	   be	  
under-­‐represented	  in	  the	  decision	  making”	  (24885);	  
	  “At	   issue	   here	   is	   the	   “right”	   of	   each	   individual	   to	  
choose	   the	   type	   of	   therapy	   she/he	  wants	   to	   follow.	   As	   a	  
physician	   I	   have	   certainly	   seen	   many	   patients	   who	  
“choose”	   not	   to	   follow	   the	   accepted	   therapies	   of	  
chemo/radiotherapy	   […].	   Like	   you,	   I	   have	   the	   right	   to	   live	  
my	   life	   the	   way	   I	   want	   to:	   not	   the	   way	  
FDA/NIH/Government	   agencies	   decide	   what	   is	   good	   for	  
me”	  (25065).	  
These	  statements	  articulate	  a	  non-­‐scholarly	  idea	  of	  therapeutic	  freedom,	  one	  that	  
is	   specified	   against	   a	   tendency	   towards	   regulatory	   paternalism	   attributed	   to	   both	   FDA	  
and	  ISSCR16.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Here	  is	  a	  list	  of	  additional	  comments	  that	  stress	  this	  point	  further:	  
“[P]atients	  are	  frustrated	  by	  the	  endless	  research	  that	  has	  so	  far	  produced	  little	  in	  therapies	  for	  patients	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars,	  much	  of	  it	  from	  taxpayers”	  (24696);	  
“I	  myself	  am	  a	  cancer	  survivor	  and	   I	  am	  shocked	  at	  what	  the	  FDA	   is	  attempting	  to	  do	  along	  with	  pharma	  
driven	  anti-­‐stem	  cell	  organizations”	  (idem);	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More	   generally,	   the	   idea	   that	  medical	   information	   could	   be	   handled	   directly	   by	  
the	   individual	   patient	   bypassing	   the	   traditional	   intermediation	   of	  medical	   communities	  
and	  regulatory	  bodies	  –	  thus	  starting	  to	  act	  like	  a	  costumer-­‐consumer	  on	  the	  free	  market	  
of	  health-­‐related	  goods	  –	  is	  gaining	  prominence	  in	  other	  fields	  of	  innovative	  biomedicine	  
as	  well.	   This	   phenomenon	   is	   emerging,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   field	   of	   direct-­‐to-­‐consumer	  
genetic	  testing,	  and	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  fostered	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  user-­‐friendly	  computing	  
interfaces	   like	   Google.	   Imagining	   a	   future	   when	   complete	   genetic	   sequences	   will	   be	  
available	   at	   affordable	   prices,	   Craig	  Venter	   (chief	   executive	  officer	   of	   Celera	  Genomics)	  
said	   in	  2005	  that	   it	  will	  be	  up	  to	  the	  single	  user	  to	  find	  out	  over	  the	   Internet	  about	  the	  
medical	  significance	  of	  specific	  variations	  in	  his	  genes.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Venter:	  	  
«instead	  of	  having	  a	  few	  elitist	  scientists	  doing	  this	  
and	  dictating	  to	  the	  world	  what	  it	  means	  [to	  bear	  a	  certain	  
genetic	  cariation],	  with	  Google	  it	  would	  be	  creating	  several	  
million	  sicentists»17.	  
These	   words	   resonate	   with	   the	   constitution	   of	   regulatory	   paternalism	   as	   a	  
substantial	  obstacle	  to	  the	  therapeutic	   freedom	  of	   individuals	  who	  conceive	  health	  as	  a	  
good	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  buy	  directly	  from	  an	  unmediated	  and	  anonymous	  global	  market.	  
In	  this	  vision,	  the	  patient	  constructs	  its	  health	  as	  a	  private	  space	  that	  he/she	  freely	  shapes	  
and	   determines	   by	   resorting	   to	   innovative	   technologies	   whose	   fruition	   he/she	   directly	  
controls.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“The	  FDA	  has	  no	  jurisdiction	  to	  dictate	  what	  therapies	  are	  “allowable”	  since	  they	  have	  such	  pathetic	  record	  
of	  maintaining	  high	  level	  of	  food	  and	  drug	  standards”	  (24703);	  
“The	  FDA	  is	  not	  about	  successful	  treatments	  of	  diseases	  but	  rather	  a	  profit	  producer	  for	  drug	  companies”	  
(idem);	  
“The	  ISSCR	  is	  interested	  in	  research	  dollars	  and	  patents.	  It	  is	  all	  about	  the	  money”	  (24704);	  
“I	  for	  one	  want	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  make	  my	  own	  choices,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  right	  to	  use	  my	  own	  stem	  
cells	  to	  treat	  myself	  without	  the	  ISSCR	  or	  the	  FDA	  being	  a	  roadblock	  in	  the	  process”	  (24712);	  
“[FDA]	  is	  one	  agency	  that	  would	  benefit	  from	  significant	  budget	  cuts”	  (24906);	  	  
17	  Quoted	  in	  (Nowotny	  and	  Testa	  2011,	  46).	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Such	  narrative,	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  proved	  strong	  enough	  to	  play	  a	  role	  
in	   articulating	   ICMS’	   vision	  and	  political	   identity	   as	   an	  actor	   in	   the	  debate	  on	   stem	  cell	  
translation.	  	  
4.2.2	  Autologous	  certification	  
We	  have	   seen	  how	  efforts	   at	  patrolling	   the	  epistemic	   and	  normative	  borders	  of	  
stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  adversarial	  counter-­‐narrative	  
rooted	  in	  different	  framings	  of	  the	  innovation	  trajectory	  of	  stem	  cell	  science.	  
It	   is	   indeed	   notable	   that	   such	   phenomenon	   came	   to	   be	   backed	   by	   analogous	  
efforts	   to	  set	  up	  guidance	   for	  stem	  cell	   clinical	  practice	   that	   looked	  more	   favourable	   to	  
cellular	   treatments.	   The	   already	   mentioned	   ICMS	   guidelines	   (see	   previous	   chapter)	  
articulate	  a	  set	  of	  alternative	  normative	  and	  technical	  framings	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  clinical	  
translation	  that	  I	  will	  now	  review	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  
Guidance	   documents	   were	   adopted	   by	   the	   ICMS	   as	   early	   as	   2009,	   just	   a	   few	  
months	  after	  the	  ISSCR	  had	  issued	  its	  own.	  Activity	  of	  this	  sort,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	   configures	   a	   kind	   of	   self-­‐governance	   initiative	   that	   is	   typical	   of	   early	   stem	   cell	  
translation	  and	  that	  is	  favoured	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  unitary	  legislation	  on	  those	  matters,	  as	  well	  
as	  by	  the	  persistence	  of	  deep	  regulatory	  and	  technical	  uncertainties	  over	  the	  nature	  and	  
the	  fate	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  	  
Currently,	   the	   ICMS	   guidelines	   are	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   a	   revision	   process.	   The	   first	  
chunk	  of	  guidance	  documents,	  already	  approved	  in	  2009,	  became	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  
guidelines	  that	  comprise	  new	  drafts	  awaiting	  members	  comment	  and	  endorsement	  at	  the	  
next	  Annual	  Congress	  for	  Regenerative	  and	  Cellular	  Medicine,	  to	  be	  held	  in	  Hollywood,	  FL	  
on	  May	   the	   3rd	   2012.	   Altogether,	   the	   guidance	   documents,	   including	   both	   drafted	   and	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approved	  sections,	   forms	  a	  total	  of	  ten	  separate	  but	   integrated	  guidelines	  that	   is	  worth	  
analysing	  further.	  	  
	  The	  first	  striking	  feature	  of	  the	  guidance	  documents	  prepared	  by	  the	  ICMS	  is	  the	  
explicit	  endorsement	  of	  therapeutic	  freedom.	  This	   is	  formulated	  in	  claims	  affirming	  that	  
“an	   informed	   patient	   has	   the	   right	   to	   access	   innovative	   therapies”,	   or	   that	   “[i]n	  
consultation	   with	   a	   qualified	   physician,	   a	   patient	   must	   be	   empowered	   to	   make	   an	  
informed	  healthcare	  decision”	  (ICMS	  2009,	  draft	  section	  I,	  point	  2,	  and	  draft	  section	  III,	  1).	  
The	   patient-­‐doctor	   relationship	   is	   thus	   framed	   as	   an	   exclusive	   one,	   whereby	   undue	  
regulatory	   interference	   is,	   in	   principle,	   unjustified.	   With	   this	   preliminary	   normative	  
endorsement,	   ICMS	  frames	   its	  position	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  will	  of	  patient-­‐consumers	  of	  
stem	   cell	   therapies.	   The	   dichotomy	   that	   is	   being	   exploited	   here	   is	   the	   one	   between	  
protection	  and	  empowerment.	  In	  favouring	  the	  latter,	  ICMS	  refers	  to	  narratives	  of	  denied	  
citizenship	   and	   advocates	   the	   consumer-­‐like	   rationality	   of	   patients	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   therapeutic	  
choice.	  Resonant	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  agency,	  and	  related	  rights,	  that	  are	  typically	  employed	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  commercial	  transactions,	  is	  the	  plea	  for	  transparency	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
estimated	   costs	   of	   the	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   (ivi,	   draft	   section	   III,	   point	   2).	   This	   way	   of	  
articulating	   the	   normative	   context	   of	   stem	   cell	   therapy,	   based	   on	   the	   alleged	   choice-­‐
rationality	   of	   patients,	   not	   only	   asserts	   an	   ethical	   outlook	   of	   patients’	   stakes,	   interests	  
and	   capacities,	   but	   also	   underlies	   the	   epistemic	   resources	   that	   the	   guidelines	   deploy	  
throughout,	  by	  substantially	  setting	  aside	  issues	  of	  protection.	  
As	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   interventions	   that	   ICMS	   guidance	   wants	   to	   regulate,	  
autologous	   adult	   stem	   cell	   (A-­‐ASC	   as	   they	   term	   them)	   transplants	   of	   minimally	  
manipulated	  cells	  are	  the	  sole	  concern	  of	  these	  documents.	  The	  amount	  of	  manipulation	  
is	  quantified	  as	  minimal	  if	  cell	  culture	  lasted	  less	  than	  ten	  passages	  after	  colony	  formation	  
and	  did	  not	  exceed	  the	  limit	  of	  sixty	  days	  (ICMS	  2009	  adopted	  section	  VII,	  page	  6).	  These	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limits	  supposedly	  assure	  that	  potentially	  risky	  genetic	  alterations	  of	  the	  cultured	  cells	  do	  
not	  occur.	  Obviously,	  however,	  these	  limits	  are	  arbitrary,	  both	  in	  regulatory	  and	  scientific	  
terms.	   Nevertheless	   they	   serve	   the	   fundamental	   function	   of	   somehow	   preventing	   FDA	  
claims	   to	   control	   the	   procedure.	   Again,	   co-­‐production	   is	   manifest,	   as	   the	   technical	  
requirements	  for	  preventing	  incontrollable	  genetic	  mutation	  performs	  a	  clear	  regulatory	  
function.	   The	   medical	   practice/drug	   divide,	   far	   from	   being	   a	   pre-­‐given	   ontological	  
distinction,	   is	  worked	  out,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  a	  technical	  and	  regulatory	  parameter	  to	  
prevent	  governmental	  oversight	  and	  assure	  safe	  transplants.	  That	  it	  is	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  
ICMS	  to	  avoid	  dealings	  with	  FDA	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Health,	  thus	  appears	  in	  full	  clarity	  
when	   the	   guidelines	   state:	   “The	   use	   of	   autologous,	   adult	   stem	   cells	   is	   the	   practice	   of	  
medicine	  and,	  as	   such,	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   laws	  and	   regulations	   that	   cover	   the	  practice	  of	  
medicine”	   (ICMS,	   2009,	   draft	   section	   I,	   point	   1).	   To	   the	   very	   same	   aim,	   the	   already	  
mentioned	  reference	  to	  cultured	  embryos	  for	  IVF	  treatment	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  stressing	  the	  
medical	  practice-­‐character	  of	  A-­‐ASC	   therapies.	   IVF,	  according	   to	  2009	  approved	  Section	  
VII	  of	  the	  ICMS	  guidance	  documents,	  transited	  from	  a	  “simple	  tissue	  transplant	  procedure	  
to	   a	   cell	   culture	   technique”	   (ivi	   page	   1)	   to	   allow	   screening	   of	   embryos	   suitable	   for	  
implantation.	  Nevertheless,	   so	   the	  argument	  goes,	   IVF	  continued	   to	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  
“practice	  of	  medicine	  and	  not	  the	  production	  of	  a	  biologic	  drug”	  (ivi,	  2).	  This	  last	  remark	  is	  
evidently	  unnecessary	  here,	   if	  not	  to	  exactly	  make	  a	  point	  against	   interventions	   like	  the	  
2008	  FDA	  injunction	  that	   I	  reported	  above.	  Once	  again,	  a	  conceptual	  argument	  drawing	  
on	   ontological	   similarity	   between	   IVF-­‐related	   embryo	   culture	   and	   in	   vitro	   expansion	   of	  
adult	  stem	  cells	  is	  used	  to	  mark	  the	  territory	  from	  undesired	  political	  intrusions.	  	  
The	  imaginary	  that	  ICMS	  is	  advancing,	  here,	   includes	  implicit	  assumptions	  on	  the	  
consumer-­‐like	  agency	  of	  patients	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  normalise	   the	  use	  of	  unproven	  stem	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cell	   therapies.	   The	   credited	  epistemic	   values	  of	   clinical	   research	  are	  downplayed	   in	   the	  
name	  of	  therapeutic	  freedom.	  	  
Among	   the	  most	   innovative	   features	   of	   the	   entire	   edifice	   constructed	   by	   these	  
guidelines	   is	   what	   ICMS	   calls	   the	   ‘clinical	   staging’	   for	   cell	   lines	   to	   be	   used	   in	   medical	  
practice.	  In	  a	  not	  too	  hidden	  effort	  of	  mimicking	  the	  epistemic	  structure	  of	  stepwise	  CCTs,	  
clinical	  staging	  sets	  standards	  by	  which	  cell	  must	  abide	  in	  order	  to	  be	  used	  in	  difference	  
kinds	  of	  clinical	  practice.	  	  
Clinical	  staging	  is	  a	  classification	  of	  cell	  lines	  according	  to	  the	  previous	  clinical	  and	  
pre-­‐clinical	  applications	  they	  were	  used	  for.	  According	  to	  the	  clinical	  staging	  classification,	  
an	  increasing	  number	  of	  patients	  and	  an	  increasing	  length	  of	  monitoring	  confer	  a	  cell	  line	  
liability	  to	  further	  and	  further	  less	  restricted	  uses.	  	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  illustration,	  it	  will	  be	  convenient	  to	  report	  the	  entire	  paragraph	  on	  
clinical	  staging	  below	  and	  let	  my	  comments	  follow.	  The	  phases	  of	  ICMS	  clinical	  staging	  for	  
cell	  lines	  are	  so	  described	  (ICMS	  2009,	  adopted	  section	  VII):	  	  
«Pre-­‐Investigational	  Cell	  Line	  (PICL):	  No	  animal	  data	  
is	  available.	  These	  cell	   lines	  should	  not	  be	  used	  in	  humans	  
until	  animal	  data	  is	  available.	  
«Early	  Investigational	  Cell	  Line	  (EICL):	  This	  is	  an	  un-­‐
established	  stem	  cell	  line	  being	  used	  in	  a	  new	  tissue	  where	  
several	  animal	  models	  exist	  that	  show	  efficacy	  and	  safety,	  
but	   no	  human	  data	   exists.	  An	  un-­‐established	   cell	   line	   can	  
be	  used	  in	  early	  stage	  human	  studies	  where	  5-­‐10	  patients	  
are	  treated	  and	  followed	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  6	  months.	  The	  
physician	   should	   be	   able	   to	   document	   subjective	   and	  
objective	  outcome	  measures.	  Once	   these	   criteria	   are	  met	  
and	   no	   significant	   complications	   have	   been	   reported,	   the	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cell	   line	   moves	   to	   the	   next	   grade.	   Note	   that	   before	   LICL	  
patients	  can	  be	  treated,	  a	  minimum	  of	  6	  months	  follow-­‐up	  
is	  required	  at	  EICL.	  
«Late	   Investigational	  Cell	   Line	   (LICL):	   This	   is	   an	  un-­‐
established	  stem	  cell	  line	  being	  used	  in	  a	  new	  tissue	  and	  is	  
being	   tested	   in	  humans	   in	   larger	  numbers,	   typically	  20-­‐50	  
patients	  who	  are	  followed	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  6	  months.	  The	  
physician	   should	   be	   able	   to	   document	   subjective	   and	  
objective	  outcome	  measures.	  Once	   these	   LICL	   criteria	   are	  
met	  and	  no	  significant	  complications	  have	  been	  reported,	  
the	   cell	   line	   moves	   to	   the	   next	   grade.	   To	   move	   onto	  
treating	   ECCL	   patients,	   at	   least	   20	   of	   the	   LICL	   patients	  
should	   be	   at	   the	   6	   month	   follow-­‐	   up	   stage	   and	   have	   no	  
complications.	  
«Early	   Clinical	   Cell	   Line	   (ECCL):	   This	   is	   an	   un-­‐
established	  stem	  cell	  line	  being	  used	  in	  a	  new	  tissue	  and	  is	  
being	   used	   for	   early	   stage	   clinical	   treatments	   in	   50-­‐	   200	  
patients	  that	  are	  followed	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  6	  months.	  The	  
physician	   should	   be	   able	   to	   document	   subjective	   and	  
objective	  outcome	  measures.	  Once	   these	   criteria	   are	  met	  
and	   no	   significant	   complications	   have	   been	   reported,	   the	  
cell	   line	  moves	   to	   the	  next	   stage.	   To	  move	  on	   to	   treating	  
LCCL	  patients,	  at	  least	  50	  of	  the	  EICL	  patients	  should	  be	  at	  
the	  6	  month	  follow-­‐up	  stage	  and	  have	  no	  complications.	  
«Late	   Clinical	   Cell	   Line	   (LCCL):	   This	   is	   an	   un-­‐
established	  stem	  cell	  line	  being	  used	  in	  a	  new	  tissue	  and	  is	  
being	   used	   for	   early	   stage	   clinical	   treatments	   in	   100-­‐	   300	  
patients	  that	  are	  followed	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  6	  months.	  The	  
physician	   should	   be	   able	   to	   document	   subjective	   and	  
objective	  outcome	  measures.	  Once	   these	   criteria	   are	  met	  
and	   no	   significant	   complications	   have	   been	   reported,	   the	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cell	   line	  moves	   to	   the	  next	   stage.	   To	  move	  on	   to	   treating	  
CG	  patients,	  all	  phases	  of	  the	  staging	  must	  be	  completed.	  
«Clinical	  Grade	   (CG):	  This	   is	  an	  established	  cell	   line	  
that	   has	   completed	   all	   stages	   above	   and	   is	   being	   used	   in	  
patients	   in	   an	   unrestricted	   fashion.	   All	   patients	   being	  
treated	  must	  still	  be	  entered	  into	  the	  ICMS	  Re-­‐implantation	  
Registry». 
	  
The	  ICMS	  Re-­‐implantation	  Registry	  is	  a	  database	  devised	  and	  maintained	  by	  ICMS	  
that	   aims	   at	   collecting	   information	   about	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   of	   A-­‐ASC	   re-­‐implant	  
procedures.	  It	  should	  shortly	  be	  supported	  or	  integrated	  with	  a	  Treatment	  Registry	  where	  
patient	  and	  clinician	  testimonies	  are	  collected.	  This	  kind	  of	   information	  is	  obtained	  on	  a	  
voluntary	  basis	  from	  patients	  who	  receive	  treatments	  and	  clinicians	  who	  perform	  them,	  
with	   the	   overall	   aim	   of	   providing	   the	   A-­‐ASC	   user	   community	   with	   observational	  
information	   on	   the	   clinical	   characteristics	   of	   cellular	   therapies.	   Moreover,	   the	   registry	  
also	  works	  as	  a	  cell	  bank.	  For	  each	  submitted	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  report,	  ten	  cell	  samples	  
from	   the	   same	  patient	   (presumably	   in	   the	   form	  of	   frozen	  vials)	   and	   two	   resulting	   from	  
two	  culture	  expansions	  from	  the	  same	  patient,	  are	  stored	  at	  the	  Registry.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  
to	   back-­‐up	   cell	   samples	   to	   analyse	   in	   the	   case	   of	   future	   complications	   or	   adverse	  
reactions.	  	  
A	  first	  point	  to	  mention	  here	  is	  that,	  being	  clinical	  staging	  about	  autologous	  stem	  
cells,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	  to	  understand	  the	  expression	   ‘cell	   line’	   in	  terms	  of	  direct	   lineage	  
with	  a	  clonal	  ancestry.	  Since	  every	  patient	  receives	  a	  newly	  established	  cell	  line,	  it	  is	  more	  
correct	   to	   speak	   of	   cell	   types	   rather	   than	   cell	   lines.	   The	   same	   cell	   type	   batches	   from	  
different	  patients	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  cell	   line	   in	  any	   lineage-­‐related	  sense	  of	   the	  word.	  
The	  language	  here	  is,	   I	  believe,	  intentionally	  misleading	  and	  not	  simply	  sloppy.	  Speaking	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of	  cell	  lines	  conveys	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  cells	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  “line”	  behave	  similarly,	  
which	  would	  confer	   some	  more	  biological	   consistency	   to	   the	  clinical	   staging	  categories.	  
Obviously,	  however,	  cells	  of	  the	  same	  tissue	  type,	  but	  not	  of	  the	  same	  patient,	  can	  hardly	  
be	   thought	   as	   having	   the	   same	   genetic	   make-­‐up	   and	   phenotypic	   behaviors,	   given	  
biological	   variability	  between	   individuals	  and	   tissues	  of	  origin	  and	  age,	   to	   say	   the	   least.	  
The	  burden	  of	  proving	  that	  the	  same	  cell	  type	  will	  act	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  in	  autologous	  
re-­‐implantation	  procedures	  in	  different	  patients	  is	  on	  the	  shoulder	  of	  practitioners,	  and	  is	  
a	  matter	  of	  statistical	  inference	  no	  less	  than	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  heterologous	  cell	  therapies	  
with	  a	  bona	  fide	   clonal	  cell	   line,	  or	  new	  drugs.	  Simply	  assuming,	   like	   ICMS	  does,	   that,	  a	  
‘cell	   line’,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   cells	   of	   the	   same	   tissue,	   will	   have	   similar	   safety	   and	   efficacy	  
profiles	   in	   different	   patients	   is	   unproven,	   and	   represents	   a	   clear	   departure	   form	   EBM	  
standards	   of	   inference.	   In	   other	   terms,	   clinical	   staging,	   albeit	   mimicking	   the	   stepwise	  
process	  of	  CCTs,	  establishes	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  standards	  in	  an	  unrigorous	  way.	  To	  begin	  
with,	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  profiles	  for	  ‘cell	   lines’	  are	  established	  in	  the	  context	  of	  medical	  
practice,	   and	   not	   in	   properly	   designed	   and	   controlled	   experiments	   of	   clinical	   research.	  
This	   feature	   contradicts	   a	  dogma	  of	  modern	  medicine	   according	   to	  which	  doctors	   shall	  
not	   try	   to	   gain	   knowledge	   from	   experimental	  medical	   procedures,	   nor	   shall	   they	   have	  
research	  subjects	  believe	  that	  they	  will	  get	  any	  benefit	  for	  themselves	  from	  participating	  
in	  randomized,	  double-­‐blind	  clinical	  research	  trials.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  many	  current	  
standard-­‐of-­‐care	  procedures	  were	  established	  in	  the	  past	  from	  experimental	  practice	  and	  
not	   from	   CCTs.	   Examples	   of	   this	   sort	   are	   organ	   transplantations,	   BM	   grafts	   and	   IVF	  
treatments	   –	   to	   which	   latter	   ICMS	   frequently	   refers	   to	   as	   a	   telling	   precedent.	   It	   has	  
however	  been	   the	  case	   that	   those	  procedures	  have	  been	   the	  object	  of	   later	   systematic	  
and	  independent	  meta-­‐analysis	  studies	  through	  which	  their	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  have	  been	  
established,	   to	   the	   best	   of	   our	   current	   epistemic	   standards.	   The	   ICMS	   clinical	   staging,	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instead,	  coupled	  with	  the	  Re-­‐implantation	  Registry,	  marks	  a	  big	  step	  outside	  the	  pathway	  
of	  EBM.	  These	  tools	  work	  as	  a	  clearing	  house	  for	  the	  use	  of	  cell	  types	  in	  autologous	  stem	  
cell	   transplant,	   but	   lack	   any	   decent	   display	   of	   accepted	   criteria	   for	   sound	   medical	  
inference.	  	  
The	  reason	  why	  a	  cell	  type	  so	  far	  only	  tested	  on	  animals,	  can	  be	  authorized	  to	  be	  
used	   in	   humans	   provided	   in	   small	   numbers	   thereof,	   like	   the	   guidelines	   say	   of	   EICLs,	   is	  
mysterious.	  The	  guidelines	  omit	  to	  specify	  which	  kind	  of	  tests,	  of	  which	  kind	  of	  cells,	  on	  
which	  kind	  of	  animals	  provide	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  which	  kind,	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  going	  
in	  humans	  with	  those	  cells.	  Similarly,	  why	  should	  one	  be	  convinced	  that	  “subjective	  and	  
objective	  measures”	   produced	   by	   an	   involved	   clinician	   can	   constitute	   sufficient	   ground	  
for	  another	  clinician	  to	  undertake	  analogous	  procedures?	  Or	  again,	  what	  is	  the	  rationale	  
for	   assuming	   that	   simply	   enlarging	   the	   involved	   cohorts	   –	   without	   establishing	   any	  
credible	  negative	  control,	  nor	  any	  positive	  control	  with	  existing	  standards	  of	  care	  –	  can	  
produce	  statistically	  valid	  inferences	  about	  safety	  and	  efficacy?	  
What	   is	   worth	   noticing	   here,	   in	   this	   clumsy	   exercise	   of	   standardisation,	   is	   the	  
tentative	   establishment	   of	   a	   whole	   set	   of	   different	   parameters	   for	   the	   acquisition	   of	  
clinical	  knowledge.	  The	  Re-­‐implantation	  registry	   is	  a	  way	  for	   ICMS	  to	  gain	  authority	  and	  
control	  over	  the	  activity	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics,	  thus	  severing	  blatantly	  mischievous	  practices	  
from	   allegedly	   credible	   ones.	   This	   exercise	   of	   appropriation	   relies	   on	   the	   mutually	  
reinforcing	   construction	   of	   unconventional	   clinical	   criteria	   and	   alternative	   normative	  
commitments.	  	  
Commenting	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Registry,	   ICMS	   director	   David	   Audley	  
said	  to	  Nature	  Medicine:	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“The	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  put	  the	  information	  
out	  there	  so	  that	  patients	  and	  clinicians	  can	  look	  at	   it	  and	  
make	   their	   own	   conclusions	   […].	   We're	   not	   making	  
recommendations	   on	   any	   one	   of	   these	   clinics	   [emphasis	  
added].	  	  
This	   is	   just	   the	   data	   that	   you	   as	   a	   consumer	   or	   a	  
clinician	  need	  to	  look	  at”	  (cited	  in	  Dolgin	  2010).	  
The	  inspiration	  that	  guide	  ICMS	  could	  not	  be	  stated	  in	  clearer	  terms.	  Prompted	  by	  
ideas	  of	  therapeutic	  freedom	  and	  refusal	  of	  regulatory	  paternalism,	  ICMS	  tries	  to	  build	  up	  
a	   new	   system	   of	   clinical	   knowledge	   validation,	   in	   veiled	   polemic	  with	   ISSCR	   “Submit	   a	  
Clinic”	   initiative	  (see	  supra).	  The	  most	  unorthodox	  feature	  of	  the	  former	   is	   its	  refusal	  to	  
acknowledge	  any	  authority	  and	  constraining	  power	  to	  the	  most	  cherished	  validation	  tool	  
of	   the	   science	  of	   our	   time:	   peer-­‐reviewing.	  Nowhere	   in	   the	   guidelines	   any	   reference	   is	  
made	   to	   the	   legitimating	   epistemic	   role	   of	   the	   scientific	   community	   as	   a	   source	   of	  
knowledge	  validation.	   In	  a	  typical	  display	  of	  a	  co-­‐productive	  dynamics,	   ICMS	  takes	  upon	  
itself	   the	  authority	   to	   set	   criteria	  of	   scientific	   validity	   and,	   in	   so	  doing,	   states	   again	   the	  
inappropriateness	  of	  intrusions	  in	  the	  therapeutic	  choices	  people	  and	  physicians.	  This	  last	  
feature	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  patient	  as	  a	  consumer,	  one	  who	  has	  an	  exclusive	  
relationship	  with	  doctor,	  conceived	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  medical	  services.	  
ICMS,	   with	   these	   guidelines,	   is	   fencing	   off	   the	   territory	   of	   therapeutic	   freedom	  
from	  the	  unduly	  interference	  of	  both	  the	  state	  and	  the	  official	  scientific	  community	  and	  it	  
does	  so	  by	  elaborating	  of	  ad	  hoc	  new	  standards	  of	  scientific	  validity.	  	  
In	  draft	  Section	  IV	  of	  the	  guidance	  documents,	  ICMS	  says	  that	  “[a]ny	  data	  should	  
be	  validated	  by	  an	  independent,	  third	  party	  organisation	  prior	  publication	  of	  any	  claim	  of	  
safety	  or	  outcome”(ICMS	  2009,	  draft	  section	  IV).	  Soon	  after	  however,	   it	   is	  also	  said	  that	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“[w]henever	   possible,	   patient	   data	   should	   be	   collected	   and	   managed	   in	   Treatment	  
Registry”	   (ibidem).	   This	   is	   tantamount	   as	   saying	   that	   it	   is	   ICMS	   here	   that	   performs	   the	  
function	  of	  the	  independent	  third	  party.	  
The	  scientific	  community	  is	  thus	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  the	  validation	  of	  scientific	  
claims,	  but	  rather,	  let	  us	  recall	  it	  here,	  as	  an	  unreliable	  interested	  party	  in	  the	  commercial	  
venture	  towards	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  Accused	  of	  ties	  with	  the	  industry,	  and	  bonding	  with	  
FDA	   in	   slowing	   down	   the	   pace	   of	   new	   therapies,	   the	   official	   scientific	   community	   is	  
denied	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  its	  function	  as	  a	  validating	  source	  of	  expertise	  through	  peer-­‐
reviewing.	  	  
A	   further	   remarkable	   feature	  of	   the	   ICMS	  guidelines	   is	   the	  definition	  of	  Minimal	  
Risk	   and	   More	   than	   Minimal	   Risk	   Categories.	   In	   a	   clear	   effort	   at	   framing	   A-­‐ASC	  
interventions	   as	   bearing	   only	   minimal	   risks,	   the	   guidelines	   attempt	   an	   unprecedented	  
classification	  of	  human	  tissue	  of	  origin.	  According	  to	  the	  latter	  classification,	  tissue	  type-­‐
groups	   exist	   that	   lump	   together	   tissues	   of	   different	   kind.	   The	   idea	   behind	   this	  
classificatory	   effort	   is	   to	   link	   new	   tissue	   type-­‐groups	   to	   a	   ready-­‐made	   risk	   assessment	  
criterion:	  cell	   transplant	  occurring	  within	   the	  same	  tissue	   type-­‐group	  bear	  only	  minimal	  
risk,	  whereas	  attempting	   to	   transplant	  a	   cell	   type	   that	  belongs	   to	  a	  group	   into	  a	  bodily	  
site	   that	  belongs	   to	  another	   implies	  more	   than	  minimal	   risks.	  The	  proposed	   tissue	   type	  
classification	  is	  articulated	  as	  follows	  (taken	  from	  ICMS,	  approved	  Section	  VII,	  page	  15-­‐6):	  	  
• Ectodermal	   Integument:	   Skin	   (epidermis),	   hair,	   nails,	  
sweat	  glands,	  teeth	  enamel,	  inner	  ear,	  eye	  lens	  	  
• Ectodermal	   Upper/Lower	   Digestive	   Tract:	   Mouth,	  
Pharynx,	  Terminal	  Rectum	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• Ectodermal	   Neurological:	   Peripheral	   Nervous	   System,	  
Central	   Nervous	   System,	   Autonomic	  Nervous	   System,	  
Retina,	   Pineal	   Body,	   Posterior	   Pituitary,	   Cranial	   and	  
Sensory	  Ganglia	  	  
• Mesodermal	  Vascular:	  Heart,	  Vascular	  Smooth	  Muscle,	  
Artery,	  Vein	  	  
• Mesodermal	   Orthopedic:	   Muscle,	   Tendon,	   Cartilage,	  
Bone,	  Ligament,	  Intervertebral	  Disc	  	  
• Mesodermal	  Organ:	  Spleen,	  Kidney,	  Adrenal	  Glands	  	  
• Mesodermal	  Integument:	  Skin	  (Dermis)	  	  
• Mesodermal	  Urogenital:	  Oviducts,	  Uterus,	  Epididymis	  	  
• Endodermal	  Organ:	  Endocrine-­‐Pancreas,	  Thyroid	  	  
• Endodermal	  Organ:	  Digestive-­‐Liver	  	  
• Endodermal	   Respiratory:	   Trachea,	   Bronchi,	   Alveoli	   of	  
Lungs	  	  
• Endodermal	  Urinary:	  Bladder-­‐Urethra	  	  
• Endodermal	   Digestive	   Tract:	   Esophagus,	   Stomach,	  
Small	  Intestine,	  Colon	  	  
	  
Again,	   like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   clinical	   staging,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   appreciate	   here	   the	  
mutually	  productive	  relationship	  between	  scientific	  categories	  and	  normative	  parameters	  
relating	  to	  risk.	  Classification	  criteria,	  far	  from	  reflecting	  immutable	  attributes	  of	  naturally	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occurring	   phenomena,	   are	   mobilized	   to	   accommodate	   favorable	   risk	   assessment.	   The	  
boundaries	   between	   bodily	   parts	   are	   functionally	   rearranged	   in	   a	   way	   that	   fits	  
assumptions	  about	  safety	  of	  practising	  stem	  cell	  therapists.	  This	  is	  indeed	  a	  creative	  effort	  
to	  project	  scientific	  credibility	  onto	  cellular	  transplantation,	  and	  to	  provide	  risk	  categories	  
with	   the	   advantage	   of	   corresponding	   to	   physiological	   ones.	   Of	   course,	   the	   latter	   are	   a	  
sheer	   construction,	   and	   there	   is	  nothing	   “natural”	  about	   them.	  Nevertheless,	   epistemic	  
and	   value-­‐laden	   judgments	   are	   here	   closely	   knitted	   together	   to	   bring	   order	   and	   exert	  
control	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  cell	  treatments.	  	  
This	  case	  is	  a	  clear	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  co-­‐productive	  lens	  can	  bring	  the	  mutual	  
relation	  of	   epistemic	   and	  normative	   instances	   into	   relief.	  Other	   theoretical	   frameworks	  
are	  not	  as	  sensitive	  in	  reconstructing	  how	  knowledge	  and	  values	  are	  mobilised	  by	  actors	  
involved	  in	  a	  science-­‐related	  controversy	  or	  litigation.	  
4.2.3	  Banking	  cells	  and	  risk	  control	  
A	  similar,	   although	   less	   comprehensive	  and	  unorthodox	  effort	   at	   gaining	   control	  
over	   human	   cellular	   entities	   through	   classification	   is	   the	   UKSCB	   distinction	   between	  
‘research	  grade’	  and	  ‘clinical	  grade’	  human	  cells.	  Just	  like	  ICMS,	  the	  UKSCB	  sees	  itself	  and	  
tries	   to	  establish	   itself	   as	   a	   certificatory	  agency.	  Based	  on	   claims	  of	   scientific	   expertise,	  
the	  UKSCB	  can	  lay	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  doing	  clinical	  research	  with	  human	  
subjects	   using	   this	   or	   that	   particular	   cell	   line.	   The	  UKSCB	   grading	   system	   imports	   good	  
manufacturing	   standards	   into	   the	   classification	   of	   research	   grade	   and	   clinical	   grade	  
human	   cell	   lines.	   In	   so	   doing	   it	   frames	   the	   risks	   associated	  with	   first-­‐in-­‐human	   clinical	  
research	   in	  merely	   technical	   terms.	   This	  move	  normalizes	   stem	  cell	   clinical	   research	  by	  
limiting	  the	  width	  of	  factors	  that	  bear	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  risk	  categories.	  Once	  a	  cell	  
line	  has	   received	  clinical	  grade	  classification,	   the	   research	  group	   that	   is	  willing	   to	  use	   it	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obtains,	  so	  to	  say,	  a	  green	  light	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  its	  clinical	  studies.	  Such	  an	  authorization	  
is	   based	   on	   both	   scientific	   and	   ethical	   assessment	   of	   the	   distributed	   cells.	   As	   I	   have	  
already	  mentioned,	  not	  only	  clinical	  grade	  stem	  cells	  have	  to	  pass	  GMP	  testing,	  they	  also	  
have	  to	  show	  their	  derivation	  was	  completed	  in	  compliance	  with	  internationally	  accepted	  
standards	  of	  tissue	  donor	  informed	  consent.	  This	  projects	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  credibility	  on	  the	  
certification	  and	  distribution	  activity	  of	  the	  UKSCB	  and,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  gives	  scientific	  
groups	  sufficient	  confidence	  that,	   in	  some	   important	  respects,	   their	  activity	  with	  UKSCB	  
cells	   is	   socially	   acceptable.	   No	   other	   factors,	   other	   than	   strict	   compliance	   with	   EU	  
standards	  of	  GMP,	   including	  donor	   consent,	   are	   conceived	  as	  having	   importance	   in	   the	  
initial	  decision	  to	  distribute	  a	  cell	  line	  to	  clinical	  researchers.	  Further	  regulatory	  oversight	  
on	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  will	  be	  delegated	  to	  agencies	  such	  as	  FDA,	  MHRA,	  or	  EMA,	  
depending	  on	  the	  geographical	  location	  of	  the	  team	  that	  uses	  UKSCB	  lines.	  But	  the	  risks	  
connected	   to	   human	   tissue	   circulation	   in	   stem	   cell	   research	   are	   framed	   as	   being	  
technically	  manageable,	  centrally	  controllable	  and	  scientifically	  affordable.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  banking	  of	  human	  cell	  lines	  in	  the	  UKSCB	  establishes	  both	  a	  scientific	  and	  a	  
normative	   order	   through	   attested	   expert	   certification	   and	   dedicated	   classification.	   The	  
UKSCB	  thus	  attains	  prominence	  as	  an	  international	  hub	  of	  human	  tissue	  analysis,	  storage	  
and	  distribution.	  	  
I	   have	   already	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   how	   this	   classification	  
corresponds	  to	  the	  UKSCB	  adoption	  of	  an	  open	  source	  model	  of	  human	  cell	  circulation.	  
However,	   now	   that	   the	   first	   stem	   cell	   lines	   are	   receiving	   clinical	   grade	   approval	  
(Department	   of	   Business	   Innovation	   &	   Skills,	   Department	   of	   Health,	   UK	   2011),	   this	  
cooperation-­‐oriented	   framing	  of	   the	   field’s	  efforts	   in	   research	  and	   innovation	  are	  being	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contested.	  One	  evident	  pitfall	  of	  this	  model	  is	  that	  commercially	  oriented	  actors	  seeking	  
to	  exploit	  proprietary	  technologies	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  damaged	  from	  sharing	  practices,	  thus	  
ultimately	   having	   to	   refrain	   from	   depositing	   their	   cell	   lines.	   Furthermore,	   it	   has	   been	  
argued	  that	  holders	  of	  IP	  rights	  on	  a	  given	  cell	  line,	  is	  likely	  to	  face	  reputational	  risks	  in	  an	  
open	  source	  model	  (Courtney	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Reputational	  risk	  has	  to	  do	  with	  possibility	  of	  
two	  research	  groups	   (or	  more,	   for	   that	  matters)	  using	   the	  same	  cell	   line	   in	   two	  distinct	  
translational	  projects.	  Given	  difference	  in	  handling	  and	  cell	  culture	  conditions,	  the	  same	  
cell	   line	  might	  end	  up	  behaving	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  clinical	  contexts.	   If	  the	  cell	  
line	   experiences	   adverse	   effects	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   one	   group,	   so	   the	   argument	   goes,	  
“regulators	  are	  likely	  to	  question	  [its]	  fitness”	  for	  the	  other	  group	  as	  well	  (ivi).	  This,	  at	  the	  
very	   least,	   is	   bound	   to	   increase	   the	  developmental	   costs	   for	   the	   latter	   group	  –	  both	   in	  
terms	  of	  money	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  time.	  Thus	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  UKSCB	  framing	  is	  criticized	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  its	  potential	  to	  undermine	  research	  and	  slow	  down	  innovation.	  
	  
Compared	   to	   the	   framing	   of	   clinical	   staging	   that	   I	   described	   in	   the	   previous	  
section,	  the	  classification	  used	  by	  UKSCB	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  in	  tune	  with	  the	  standards,	  
epistemic	  and	  ethical,	  of	  the	  official	  scientific	  community.	  UKSCB,	  moreover,	  is	  endowed	  
with	  a	  much	  higher	  degree	  of	  credibility	  then	  ICMS,	  provided	  by	  its	  institutional	  affiliation	  
with	   the	   Medical	   Research	   Council	   (MRC),	   and	   by	   its	   scientifically	   prestigious	   steering	  
committee.	   However,	   it	   cannot	   go	   unnoticed	   that,	   albeit	   epistemically	   weaker	   and	   of	  
lesser	   academic	   reputation,	   also	   ICMS	   rewiring	   of	   clinical	   staging	   and	   tissue	   type	  
classification	  are	  “materially	  powerful”	  (Macnaghten,	  Kearnes,	  and	  Wynne	  2005,	  12)	  tools	  
for	   structuring	   ICMS	   power	   claims	   as	   a	   certification	   authority	   and	   a	   clearing	   house	   for	  
stem	  cell	  clinics.	  It	  is	  thus	  crucial	  to	  understand	  while	  interpreting	  conflicting	  trajectories	  
of	  biomedical	  innovation,	  that	  the	  involved	  actors,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  scientific	  standing,	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strategically	   try	   to	   position	   themselves	   by	   advancing	   their	   epistemic	   and	   normative	  
visions	  in	  a	  mutually	  reinforcing	  fashion.	  	  
I	  have	  shown	  that,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  scrape	  against	  the	  surface	  of	  this	  issue	  and	  stop	  
taking	   for	   granted	   distinctions	   between	   certified/uncertified	   science,	   proven/unproven	  
treatment,	   responsible/self-­‐interested	  practice,	   research	   subject/patient,	  expert/layman	  
we	   found	   divergent	   values,	   visions	   and	   commitments	   struggling	   for	   supremacy.	   This	  
speaks	  of	   the	  great	  uncertainty,	  both	  normative	  and	  technical,	   that	  surrounds	  stem	  cell	  
medicine.	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  meaning	  of	  those	  distinctions	  does	  not	  come	  pre-­‐boxed	  
in	  an	  uncontroversial	   form.	  Rather,	   those	  meanings	  are	  re-­‐stated,	  contested,	   re-­‐worked	  
out,	   negotiated,	   defended	   and	   ultimately	   used	   to	  mark	   spaces	   of	   action	   and	   to	   define	  
identities.	  	  
I	  will	  now	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  resources	  that	  actors	  resort	  to	  
in	  the	  practice	  of	  state-­‐regulated	  stem	  cell	  controlled	  clinical	  trials	  (CCTs).	  	  
	  
4.3	  Clinical	  trials	  and	  affordable	  errors	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   introduce	   the	   role	   of	   controlled	   clinical	   trials	   (CCTs)	   as	   a	  
resource	   to	   exert	   control	   over	   the	   transactions	   that,	   like	   those	   described	   so	   far,	   are	  
happening	   at	   the	   junction	   between	   stem	   cell	   research	   and	   their	   clinical	   application	  
(4.3.1).	  Furthermore,	   in	  section	  4.3.2,	   I	  will	  describe	  the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	   in	  
the	  case	  of	  publicly	  regulated	  clinical	  trials	  as	  characterised	  by	  a	  specific	  version	  of	  what	  
Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  called	  the	  ‘credibility	  cycle’	  (Latour	  and	  Woolgar	  1979,	  ch	  5).	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4.3.1	  The	  disciplining	  role	  of	  CCTs	  
In	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  conflicts	  arising	  around	  different	  models	  of	  clinical	  
translation,	   it	   is	   now	   of	   some	   importance	   to	   succinctly	   appreciate	   the	   purposes	   of	  
controlled	  clinical	  trials,	  as	  they	  are	  intended	  by	  the	  international	  medical	  community.	  To	  
begin	  with,	  the	  aim	  of	  a	  CCT	  is	  not,	  in	  any	  of	  its	  stepwise	  phases,	  to	  attain	  treatment	  for	  
the	   research	   subjects.	  The	  possibility	  of	  a	  given	  medical	  product	   to	  be	  effective	   for	   the	  
patient	  in	  the	  research	  context	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out,	  but	  the	  real	  aim	  of	  a	  CCT	  is	  to	  gain	  
scientifically	   sound	   knowledge	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   tested	   product	   on	   the	   target	  
population.	  Clinical	   trials	   thus	  aim	  at	   two	   interconnected	  gains:	   first,	   to	   test	   safety	  and	  
efficacy	   on	   the	   research	   cohort,	   and	   second,	   to	   attain	   statistically	   reliable	   grounds	   for	  
thinking	   that	   the	   treatment	   will	   have	   similar	   effects	   and	   side-­‐effects	   in	   the	   general	  
population	  to	  which	  it	  is	  targeted.	  To	  these	  aims	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  increases	  as	  
the	  trial	  proceeds	  to	  its	  more	  advanced	  phases,	  so	  as	  to	  gain	  statistically	  relevant	  data	  on	  
the	  tested	  product.	  In	  this	  sense,	  CCTs	  are	  a	  genuine	  research	  tool	  and	  not	  a	  therapeutic	  
setting,	   meaning	   that	   they	   point	   at	   gaining	   knowledge	   and	   not	   at	   curing	   people.	  
Attempting	  an	   innovative	  medical	  procedure	  on	  a	  patient,	  might	  well	   contribute	   to	   the	  
gain	   of	   knowledge,	   but	   one	   that	   lacks	   the	   generalizable	   character	   of	   CCTs.	   There	   are	  
indeed	  examples	  in	  the	  history	  of	  medicine	  showing	  that	  innovative	  medical	  procedures	  
eventually	  resulted	  in	  fully	  established	  therapeutic	  paradigms.	  But	  the	  medical	  procedure	  
itself,	  in	  those	  cases,	  did	  not	  do	  anything	  more	  than	  providing	  a	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  that,	  it	  
is	   assumed,	   should	   finally	   be	   validated	   by	   means	   of	   a	   CCT.	   Nowadays,	   there	   exist	  
widespread	   consensus	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   trying	   to	   establish	   proof-­‐of-­‐concept	   for	   a	   new	  
treatment	  on	  humans	  without	  previous	  pre-­‐clinical	  data	  speaking	  in	  favour	  of	  it,	  is	  a	  risky	  
shorthand	   for	   establishing	   scientifically	   sound	   conclusions	   and,	   for	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	  
	  182	  
ethically	   unacceptable	   to	   proceed	   with	   research	   on	   human	   subjects	   without	   prior	  
extensive	  characterisation	  in	  non-­‐human	  models.	  	  
Moreover,	   when	   the	   necessities	   of	   clinical	   research	   lead	   scientists	   to	   enrol	  
unhealthy	   volunteers	   in	   a	   clinical	   trial,	   every	   effort	  must	  be	  made	   to	   avoid	   therapeutic	  
misconception.	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  when	  due	  to	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  available	  therapeutic	  
means,	   a	   medical	   doctor	   resorts	   to	   experiment	   a	   new	   procedure	   or	   an	   off-­‐label	  
prescription,	   strictly	  defined	  conditions	  must	  hold:	   first,	   that	   the	  patient	  does	  not	  have	  
further	  reasonable	  chances	  of	  resolving	  her	  condition;	  second,	  that	  the	  patients	  and	  her	  
relative	  understand	  the	  risks	  the	  procedure	  involves;	  and	  finally	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
procedure	  is	  made	  public	  to	  the	  scientific	  community.	  	  
Speaking	  of	  publicity,	  regulated	  clinical	  research	  does	  not	  mandate	  the	  publication	  
of	   preliminary	   results	   in	   peer-­‐review	   journals.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   kind	   of	  
experimental	   procedures	   of	   the	   last	   section,	   the	   public	   dissemination	   of	   information	  
about	   on-­‐going	   trials	   through	   peer-­‐review	   and	   disclosure	   to	   regulatory	   agencies	   are	  
generally	   assumed	   as	   hallmarks	   of	   correctness	   and	   commitment	   to	   the	   public	   aims	   of	  
scientific	  research.	  	  
Notwithstanding	   international	   consensus	   on	   those	   general	   principles	   of	   clinical	  
research,	  CCTs	  have	  been,	  and	  indeed	  continue	  to	  be,	  occasions	  of	  major	  disagreements	  
within	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  in	  regulatory	  agencies.	  This	  point	  has	  not	  received	  all	  
the	  attention	  it	  deserves	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  ethical	  and	  sociological	  dimensions	  of	  
clinical	  research.	  Most	  scholars	  are	  perfectly	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  disagreement	  on	  trial	  
design,	   execution	   and	   oversight	   keep	   on	   recurring,	   especially	   in	   innovative	   areas	   of	  
clinical	   science.	   Nevertheless,	   recurrent	   failures	   of	   this	   cherished	   paradigm	   in	   creating	  
stable	   regulatory	   conditions	   for	   innovative	   clinical	   research	   have	   rarely,	   in	  my	   opinion,	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been	  fully	  thematised	  and	  discussed.	  Even	  within	  strictly	  defined	  ethical	  boundaries	  and	  
agreed	   upon	   epistemic	   criteria,	   staged	   clinical	   research	   often	   proved	   sub-­‐optimal	   in	  
absorbing	  disagreements	  within	  the	  clinical	  community	  and	  in	  generating	  enduring	  public	  
trust	   within	   larger	   publics.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   ethical	   and	   scientific	   principles	  
guiding	  development	  of	  new	  drugs	  or	  new	  therapies	  are	  inherently	  inadequate	  to	  do	  their	  
job.	   Nor	   my	   remarks	   have	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   implying	   that	   tighter	   and	   more	   precise	  
regulations,	  guidelines	  and	  oversight	  mechanism	  are	  desirable.	  It	   is	  however	  a	  fact	  that,	  
despite	  the	  high	  level	  of	  scientific	  agreement	  on	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  clinical	  research,	  
scientists,	   ever	  more	   often,	   find	   themselves	   on	   opposing	   sides	   of	   harsh	   debates	   about	  
innovative	  therapies	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  adverse	  events.	  
Gene	   transfer	   research	   offers	   a	   vivid	   example	   to	   illustrate	   how	   the	  
institutionalised	  management	  of	  risks	  and	  uncertainties,	  de	  facto,	  may	  fail	  to	  protect	  both	  
clinical	   science	   and	   clinical	   research	   subjects	   in	   the	   case	   of	   innovative	   therapies	   –	   as	  
testified	  in	  the	  following	  famous	  case.	  
Ornithine	  Transcarbamylase	  Deficiency	  (OTD)	  is	  a	  recessive	  genetic	  disease	  caused	  
by	  the	  incapacity	  of	  the	  liver	  to	  control	  the	  production	  of	  an	  enzyme	  that	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  
metabolism	  of	  ammonia.	  People	  affected	  by	  OTD	  present	  excessive	  levels	  of	  ammonium	  
ion	   in	  the	  brain,	  a	  condition	  that	   leads	  to	  brain	  damages	  such	  as	  encephalopathy.	   In	   its	  
more	   acute	  manifestations,	   OTC	   is	   conducive	   to	   death	   during	   infancy.	   The	   standard	   of	  
care	  for	  acute	  OCT	  is	  liver	  transplant.	  For	  milder	  manifestations	  of	  the	  disease	  however,	  
the	  genetic	  underpinning	  of	  OTC	  suggests	  that	  correcting	  the	  genetic	  defect	  responsible	  
for	   the	   metabolic	   disorder,	   may	   be	   a	   promising	   therapeutic	   strategy.	   In	   1999,	  
Pennsylvania	  University	  researchers	  Steven	  Raper	  and	  James	  Wilson,	  founder	  of	  Genovo	  
Co.,	  thus	  initiated	  a	  clinical	  trial	  to	  test	  the	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	  a	  gene	  transfer	  protocol	  
to	  treat	  mild	  forms	  of	  OTC	  (Batshaw	  et	  al.	  1999).	  Scholars	  in	  the	  field	  of	  research	  ethics	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know	  all	  too	  well	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study.	  On	  13	  September	  1999	  an	  
eighteen	  year-­‐old	  patient	  named	  Jesse	  Gelsinger	  received	  a	  recombinant	  vector	  injection	  
in	  his	   liver.	  Seventeen	  people	  had	  received	  the	  vector	  before	  Jesse,	  and	  none	  had	  been	  
reported	   to	   experience	  major	   complications.	  A	   few	  ours	   after	   the	  procedure,	   however,	  
Jesse	   began	   to	   hyperventilate	   and	   fell	   into	   a	   coma.	   He	   eventually	   died	   four	   days	   after	  
receiving	  the	  vector	  (Emanuel	  2008,	  ch	  10;	  Kimmelman	  2010,	  ch	  3).	  Less	  than	  three	  years	  
after	  the	  event,	  the	  Institute	  for	  Human	  Gene	  Therapy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  
chaired	  by	  Wilson	  himself,	  was	  shut	  down.	  
The	   Gelsinger	   case	   soon	   became	   the	   subject	   of	   ethical	   and	  medical	   discussions	  
and	   rose	   to	   the	   level	   of	   a	   textbook	  example	  of	  what	   can	  go	  wrong	   in	   clinical	   research.	  
After	   the	   Gelsinger	   incident,	   commentators	   argued	   that	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   impinged	  
negatively	  on	  this	  unfortunate	  outcome.	  In	  particular,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  medical	  
équipe	  did	  not	  fully	  respect	  the	  protocol	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Jesse18.	  Furthermore,	  some	  have	  
argued	   that	   the	   team	   leaders	   were	   known	   to	   be	   very	   ambitious	   scientists	   and	   that	  
pressure	  from	  the	  industry	  may	  have	  been	  particularly	  strong	  in	  those	  time	  –	  which	  might	  
explain	   a	   “cavalier”	   attitude	   towards	   generating	   clinically	   relevant	   data	   (Kimmelman	  
2010,	  34).	  Also	  to	  this	  point,	  during	  the	  proceedings	  of	  Jesse’s	  father	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  
University	   of	   Pennsylvania,	   it	   emerged	   that	   individual	   and	   financial	   interests	   were	   not	  
properly	  disclosed	  to	  participants	  in	  many	  occasions.	  	  
Although	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  intricate	  story	  of	  the	  OCD	  trial	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  
of	   this	  dissertation,	   two	  considerations	  are	  nevertheless	   in	  order	  here.	  First,	  Gelsinger’s	  
death	  brought	  the	  credibility	  of	  gene	  transfer	  clinical	  research	  to	  a	  sudden	  drop.	  A	  line	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	   In	   particular	   an	   FDA	   audit	   revealed	   that	   Jesse’s	   blood	   ammonia	   levels	   were	   good	   at	   the	   moment	   of	  
recruitment	  but	  exceeded	  exclusion	  levels	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  dosing	  –	  thus	  requiring	  the	  research	  team	  to	  
exclude	   Jesse	   from	  the	   trial.	   It	  has	  also	   to	  be	  noticed,	  however,	   that	   such	  diversion	   from	  the	  established	  
protocols	  was	  approved	  by	  FDA	  itself.	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research	  that	  was	  considered	  the	  most	  promising	  fruit	  of	  the	  biotechnological	  revolution	  
initiated	  with	  recombinant	  DNA	  experiments	  in	  the	  early	  Seventies,	  abruptly	  came	  to	  be	  
seen	  as	  harbouring	  more	  risks	  than	  promises,	  and	  gene	  therapy	  soon	  started	  to	  epitomise	  
the	  delusion	  of	  a	  broken	  medical	  dream.	  	  
Secondly,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   recalled	   that	   the	   intensity	   of	   regulatory	   oversight	   that	  
attended	   to	   the	   accomplishment	   of	   the	   OTD	   gene	   transfer	   clinical	   trials	   was	  
unprecedented.	   In	  striking	  contrast	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  detailed	  public	  dispensations	   in	  
the	   field	   of	   innovative	   stem	   cell	  medicine	   (see	   supra	   chapter	   3.II),	   the	   NIH	   had	   issued	  
extremely	   accurate	   “Guidelines	   for	  Research	   Involving	  Recombinant	  DNA	  Molecules”	   in	  
1994	   and	   had	   kept	   on	   amending	   and	   updating	   them	   regularly.	   NIH	   Recombinant	   DNA	  
Advisory	  Committee,	  originally	  established	   in	  1974,	  directly	   revised	   the	  clinical	  protocol	  
proposed	   by	   Wilson	   and	   colleagues	   according	   to	   NIH	   Guidelines	   before	   starting	  
recruitment	   in	   1997.	   FDA	   was	   obviously	   overseeing	   the	   trial	   as	   well,	   and	   NIH	   had	  
established	   an	   Office	   of	   Biotechnology	   Activities	   (OBA)	   with	   the	   intent	   of	   making	   all	  
information	  about	  r-­‐DNA	  activities	  available	  to	  the	  FDA	  and	  to	  the	  public	  as	  well.	  All	  these	  
safeguards	   notwithstanding,	   what	   strikes	   as	   surprising	   is	   not	   so	  much	   Jesse’s	   death	   in	  
itself:	   although	   unfortunate,	   severe	   adverse	   events	   can	   occur	   in	   clinical	   research.	   it	   is	  
indeed	   remarkable	   that	   a	   huge	   display	   of	   regulatory	   oversight	   eventually	   proved	  
insufficient	  to	  prevent	  a	  casualty	  that	  ended	  up	  undermining	  the	  credibility	  of	  an	  entire	  
field	  of	  biomedical	  innovation.	  	  
Therefore,	  if	  a	  lesson	  can	  be	  learnt	  form	  the	  OTD	  case,	  it	  is	  that	  not	  necessarily	  a	  
system	  of	  closer	  regulatory	  oversight	  than	  the	  one	  that	  is	  in	  place	  for	  stem	  cell	  translation	  
is	  conducive	  to	  more	  efficient	  governance	  of	  biomedical	  innovation.	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In	   the	  present	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	   for	   stem	  cell	   innovation,	  many	  blind	  
spots	   remain	   as	   to	   how	   clinical	   and	   ethical	   criteria	   will	   be	   negotiated	   between	  
practitioners	  and	  regulatory	  bodies.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  of	  the	  arguably	  most	  innovative	  
and	   uncertain	   area	   of	   application	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   research,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   first-­‐in-­‐
human	  research	  with	  human	  embryonic	  stem	  cells	  and	  their	  derivatives.	  
As	   yet,	   only	   a	   few	   companies	   are	   on	   their	   way	   to	   start,	   or	   have	   just	   initiated	  
clinical	  trials	  with	  stem	  cell	  of	  human	  embryonic	  origin.	  Currently,	  four	  major	  clinical	  trials	  
with	  innovative	  stem	  cell	  approaches	  are	  underway.	  	  
Geron	  Co.,	   the	  unique	   licensee	  of	   the	  WARF	  patents	  on	  human	  embryonic	   stem	  
cells,	  is	  currently	  performing	  phase	  I	  for	  spinal	  cord	  injury	  in	  selected	  centres	  throughout	  
the	  States19.	  	  
Advanced	  Cell	  Technology	  has	  two	  FDA	  approved	  phase	  I/II	  clinical	  trials,	  one	  for	  
dry	  age	  related	  macular	  degeneration,	  and	  one	  for	  Stargardt’s	  muscular	  dystrophy,	  both	  
involving	  derivatives	  of	  embryonic	  stem	  cells.	  	  
ReNeuron,	  a	   company	  based	   in	   the	  UK,	  has	   recently	  gained	  clearance	   to	   initiate	  
the	  first	  approved	  clinical	  trial	  –	  called	  PISCES	  –	  for	  treating	  the	  aftermath	  of	  stroke	  with	  
foetal	  neural	  stem	  cells.	  They	  are	  planning	  to	  use	  their	  CTX	  cell	  line	  in	  a	  clinical	  protocol	  
called	  ReN001.	   In	   their	  website,	  ReNeuron	  explains	   that	  CTX	  cells	  are	  obtained	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   On	   November	   14th,	   2011	   Geron	   Co.	   decided	   to	   discontinue	   all	   its	   stem	   cell-­‐related	   programmes,	  
including	  the	  CIRM-­‐sponsored	  Phase	  I	  clinical	  trial	  on	  spinal	  cord	  injury.	  Unfortunately,	  being	  this	  episode	  so	  
recent,	   I	  could	  not	  give	  full	  account	  of	   it	   in	  this	  dissertation.	  Being	  Geron	  among	  the	  most	   important	  and	  
innovative	   companies	   in	   the	   stem	   cell	   field,	   a	   brief	   comment	   is	   however	   necessary.	  Geron	   press	   release	  
indicates	  that	  among	  the	  causes	  of	  this	  decision	  the	  present	  global	  financial	  crisis	  might	  have	  played	  a	  role.	  
In	   particular,	   the	   company	   refers	   “capital	   scarcity	   and	   uncertain	   economic	   conditions”	   as	   motivations	  
behind	  its	  decision	  (see	  Geron	  website).	  Furthermore,	  they	  also	  make	  reference	  to	  “clinical,	  manufacturing	  
and	  regualtory	  complexities”	  as	  reasons	  for	  discarding	  stem	  cell	  programmes	  (ibidem).	  This	  decision,	  in	  my	  
opinion,	  may	   have	   profound	   implications	   for	   the	   whole	   field	   in	   terms	   of	   credibility	   and	   ability	   to	   purge	  
funding	  from	  venture	  capital	  firms	  and	  	  from	  the	  stock	  market.	  Obviously,	  further	  research	  into	  the	  causes	  
and	  consequences	  of	  this	  important	  industrial	  decision	  will	  be	  decisive	  to	  assess	  its	  impact.	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proprietary	   cell	   expansion	   and	   cell	   selection	   technologies	   and	   that	   they	   qualify	   as	  
commercial-­‐grade	   cell	   therapy	   products	   that	   would	   match	   all	   possible	   patients.	  
Additionally,	  ReNeuron	  is	  developing	  a	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  treatment	  for	  blindness	  (ReN003)	  
and	  another	  one	  for	  peripheral	  arterial	  disease	  (ReN009).	  
Furthermore,	  Viacyte,	  formerly	  known	  as	  Novocell,	   is	  bound	  to	  file	  an	  Innovative	  
New	  Drug	  (IND)	  application	  to	  the	  FDA	  for	  a	  phase	  I	  clinical	  trial	  with	  Pro-­‐IsletTM,	  a	  stem	  
cell	  line	  of	  embryonic	  origin	  that,	  in	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  company,	  may	  replace	  intensive	  
insulin	   therapy	   for	   diabetic	   patients.	   The	   company	   is	   currently	   performing	   pre-­‐clinical	  
studies	  to	  support	  the	  FDA	  application	  with	  convincing	  evidence	  of	  safety	  and	  proof-­‐of-­‐
concept	  efficacy.	  
These	  four	  companies	  are	  uniquely	  positioned	  as	  the	  initiators	  of	  the	  translational	  
phase	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  state-­‐regulated	  CCTs.	  	  
It	   is	   however	   too	   early	   to	   have	   a	   picture	   of	   how	   the	   relationship	   between	  
researchers,	   regulators	   and	   the	   public	   will	   be	   developed	   and	   articulated20.	   For	   this	  
reason,	   it	   is	   also	   not	   possible	   to	   fully	   anticipate	   how	   scientists	   in	   research	   groups	   and	  
their	   colleagues	   in	   regulatory	   agencies	   will	   cope	   with	   each	   other.	   By	   the	   same	   token,	  
considerations	   about	   public	   reactions	   to	   possible	   adverse	   events	   in	   this	   field	   of	   clinical	  
innovation	  are	  bound	  to	  remain	  speculative.	  	  
One	  observation	  is	  nevertheless	  possible.	  What	  is	  emerging,	  is	  that	  scientists	  both	  
at	  the	  clinical	  and	  the	  regulatory	  side	  are	  bound	  to	  use	  pre-­‐clinical	  studies	  and	  early	  data	  
form	   the	   first	   research	   subjects	   to	   articulate	   their	   respective	   narratives	   on	   safety	   and	  
efficacy.	   Notions	   of	   risk	   will	   be	   negotiated	   with	   ideas	   of	   epistemic	   credibility,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  A	  thorough	  comparative	  examination	  of	   these	  cases	  will	  be	  the	  object	  of	  a	  EU-­‐funded	  research	  project	  
led	  by	  Prof.	  Brian	  Salter	  (King’s	  College	  London),	  Dr.	  Alex	  Faulkner	  (King’s	  College	  London),	  Giuseppe	  Testa	  
(SEMM	  –	  IEO)	  and	  me	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Bio-­‐objects	  research	  consortium	  (link).	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eventually	   balanced	   with	   considerations	   relative	   to	   public	   acceptability	   of	   safety	  
standards.	   However,	   the	   public	   itself	   seems	   unlikely	   to	   be	   granted	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
voice	  its	  own	  concerns	  and,	  even	  less,	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  incipient	  
trajectory	  of	  innovation.	  	  
4.3.2	  The	  stem	  cell	  credibility	  cycle	  
As	   I	   said	   above,	   according	   to	   the	   shared	   governance	   framework	   a	   network	   of	  
diverse	   actors	   is	   taking	   position	   around	   the	  development	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	   research.	  
this	   network	   constitutes	   what	   has	   been	   described	   as	   a	   ‘credibility	   cycle’	   (Latour	   and	  
Woolgar	  1979,	  201).	  According	  to	  this	  explanatory	  framework,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  track	  the	  
array	  of	  actors,	  activities	  and	  tools	  that	  converge	  to	  provide	   internal	  as	  well	  as	  external	  
credibility	   to	   the	   scientific	   enterprise	   In	   general	   terms.	   Credibility	   cycle	   analysis	   is	   thus	  
able	  to	  visualise	  how	  the	  production	  and	  certification	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  subject	  to	  
a	  wide	  array	  of	  influencing	  factors.	  More	  specifically,	  credibility	  cycles	  explain	  how	  public	  
trust,	   scientific	   knowledge	  and	  economic	   resources	   are	  mutually	   transformed	   into	  one-­‐
another	   to	   make	   the	   pursuit	   of	   professional	   objectives	   possible.	   Typically,	   credibility	  
cycles	   depict	   the	   interplay	   of	  mechanisms	   to	   attain	   power,	   claim	  professional	   capacity,	  
demonstrate	   efficacy,	   achieve	   credibility,	   being	   recognised	   as	   a	   credible	   expert,	   being	  
attributed	   decisional	   status	   and	   influence	   and,	   back	   again	   to	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   cycle,	  
acquire	  power	  over	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  (adapted	  from	  Fleck	  1997).	  
The	   notion	   of	   credibility	   cycle	   has	   fruitfully	   been	   applied	   in	   science	   studies	   to	   a	  
variety	   of	   social	   phenomena,	   especially	   in	   the	   field	   of	   scientific	   controversies	   and	  
technological	   development.	   In	   particular,	   credibility	   cycle	   analysis	   proved	   useful	   to	  
reconstruct	   the	   behaviours	   and	   explain	   the	   strategic	   moves	   of	   organisations,	   such	   as	  
	   189	  
research	   councils	   (Rip	   1994),	   scientific	   institutions	   (Latour	   and	  Woolgar	   1979)	   and	   the	  
privately	  sponsored	  scientific	  groups	  (Jacob	  2009).	  
In	   the	   case	  of	   stem	  cell	   clinical	   research,	   the	   credibility	   cycle	   serves	   the	  aims	  of	  
creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  clinical	  errors	  to	  be	  affordable	  and	  not	  to	  ultimately	   impinge	  
on	  the	  overall	  tenability	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  Thus	  discursive	  resources	  are	  mobilised	  –	  
both	   epistemic,	   ethical	   and	   political	   –	   building	   on	   a	   number	   of	   elements	   that	   can	   be	  
captured	  in	  the	  following	  diagram	  (Figure	  1).	  	  









In	   both	   the	   US	   and	   the	   UK,	   dedicated	   governmental	   agencies	   frame	   clinical	  
translation	   as	   being	   about	   the	   development	   of	   an	   innovative	   biological	   drug,	   and	   set	  
standards	   of	   good	  manufacturing	   practices.	   The	   latter	   dispensations	   convey	   a	   political	  
message	  of	  risk	  stabilisation	  and	  public	  oversight	  by	  setting	  technical	  standards	  to	  which	  
practising	  scientists	  have	  to	  conform.	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This	  is	  intended	  to	  bring	  under	  control	  the	  activity	  of	  clinical	  researchers	  that	  are	  
sponsored	   with	   money,	   both	   public	   and,	   to	   a	   much	   greater	   extent,	   from	   private	  
investment	   capitals.	   Private	   companies	   provide	   research	   with	   the	   necessary	   resources	  
and	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  that	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  is	  economically	  valuable,	  if	  translation	  to	  
the	   clinic	   succeeds.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   however,	   resorting	   to	   market	   capital	   requires	  
evidence	   that	   commercial	   interests	   are	   not	   capturing	   the	   whole	   enterprise	   in	  
epistemically	  and	  morally	  unacceptable	  ways.	  This	  is	  why	  stem	  cells	  are	  framed	  as	  drugs,	  
and	  GMP	  parameters	  are	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  configuration	  establishes	  a	  first	  
filter	   on	   clinically	   unacceptable	   cellular	   therapy,	   one	   that,	   it	   is	   worth	   recalling,	  
practitioners	  agree	  with.	  At	  this	  level	  of	  the	  credibility	  cycle,	  regulators	  and	  scientists	  do	  
not	  find	  themselves	  in	  an	  adversarial	  relationship.	  
As	  we	  move	  on	   into	   the	   circular	  direction	  of	   the	  diagram	  however,	  we	   see	   that	  
GMP	  standards	  are	  able	  to	  stabilise	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  oversight	  
and	  clinical	  research	  teams.	  The	  tension	  between	  commercially	  driven	  efforts	  and	  public	  
oversight	   on	   clinical	   development	   is	   substantially	   left	   to	   an	   open	   dynamic.	   Scientific	  
expertise	   mediates	   between	   the	   regulatory	   expectations	   of	   governmental	   agencies	   on	  
one	  side,	  and	  the	  commercial	  interests	  of	  industries	  and	  researchers	  on	  the	  other.	  As	  to	  
the	  ethical	  concerns	  that	  such	  an	  open-­‐ended	  relationship	  can	  elicit,	  as	   I	  also	  said,	  they	  
are	   handled	   by	   means	   of	   a	   principled	   bioethical	   approach.	   This	   happens,	   mainly,	   by	  
including	   specialised	   staff	   in	   advisory	   bodies,	   scientific	   societies,	   IRBs	   and	   regulatory	  
agencies.	   It	   is	   thus	   by	   building	   ethical	   expertise	  within	   the	   process	   of	   clinical	   oversight	  
that	  the	  whole	  enterprise	  seeks	  to	  construct	  its	  ethical	  credibility,	  especially	  in	  matters	  of	  
informed	  consent	  and	  safety	  provisions	  with	  respect	  to	  research	  subjects.	  	  
Peer-­‐reviewed	   pre-­‐clinical	   evidence,	   and	   adherence	   to	   the	   stepwise	   process	   of	  
clinical	   development	   join	   a	   principled	   bioethical	   approach	   (administered	   by	   co-­‐opted	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experts	   and	   included	   in	   guidance	   documents)	   to	   provide	   confidence	   over	   the	   good	  
functioning	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  regulatory	  choices	  and	  commercially	  sponsored	  
research.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   gene	   therapy	   case,	   regulatory	   agencies	   do	   not	   provide	   any	  
detailed	   guidance	   as	   to	   how	   much	   and	   what	   specific	   kinds	   of	   practices	   and	   evidence	  
should	   inform	   the	   shift	   from	   pre-­‐clinical	   to	   human	   clinical	   research.	   The	   burden	   of	  
certifying	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  validity	  and	  risk	  assessment	  considerations	  is	  entirely	  left	  to	  a	  
self-­‐administered	  process	  of	  peer-­‐reviewing	  and	   individual	  communication	  between	  the	  
research	   team	   and	   the	   regulatory	   bodies.	   Peer-­‐reviewing	   and	   CCTs	   are,	   so	   to	   say,	   the	  
common	  currency	  that	  allows	  transactions	  between	  regulators	  and	  practitioners	  to	  take	  
place.	   They	   therefore	  perform	  an	   analogous	   function	   as	   the	   language	   and	  principles	   of	  
canonical	   bioethics	   (Evans	  2000	  and	  2002)	   in	   the	   context	  of	   divisive	  public	   issues:	   they	  
stabilise	   the	   normative	   and	   the	   epistemic	   order	   around	   a	   common	   core	   of	   shared	  
practices	  and	  values,	   thus	  projecting	   credibility	  on	  a	   specific	   framing	  of	   the	  problem	  of	  
stem	  cell	  translation.	  	  
Again,	   scientific	  actors	  who	  adhere	  to	   the	   framing	   in	   this	  model	  –	   like	   ISSCR,	   for	  
example	  –	  see	  peer-­‐reviewing	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  their	  scientific	  independence	  and	  value	  it	  
as	   the	   most	   reliable	   tool	   for	   knowledge	   certification.	   As	   I	   tried	   to	   explain	   elsewhere,	  
however,	  this	  leaves	  ample	  room	  for	  discretionary	  decisions	  to	  be	  made.	  Those	  decisions	  
include	  real-­‐time	  trial	  design	  adjustments	  according	  to	  data	  and	  evidence	  that	  might	  arise	  
in	  the	  course	  of	  clinical	  and	  pre-­‐clinical	  research.	  Regulators	  and	  practitioners,	  however,	  
converge	   on	   this	   relatively	   under-­‐regulated	  mode	   of	   interaction	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	  
given	  the	  high	  degrees	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  characterise	  such	  innovative	  clinical	  efforts,	  a	  
good	  deal	  of	   flexibility	   is	  required	  to	  cope	  with	  them	  in	  a	  co-­‐ordinated	  fashion.	  Second,	  
and	   directly	   relating	   to	   this	   first	   point,	   this	   flexibility	   assures	   that	   the	   pace	   of	   clinical	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development	  be	  adapted	  –	  either	  by	  slowing	  it	  down	  or	  by	  speeding	  it	  up	  –	  to	  the	  actual	  
degree	  of	  knowledge	  gathered	  as	  clinical	  studies	  unroll.	  	  
So	  far,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  maps	  onto	  an	  agreed	  
upon	   scheme	   of	   ethical	   and	   epistemic	   criteria.	  Our	   diagram	  however,	   introduces	  more	  
problematic	  elements	  as	  we	  move	  to	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  it.	  As	  I	   illustrated	  in	  chapter	  
two,	  the	  clinical	  promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  has	  generated	  almost	  uncontrollable	  levels	  
of	  public	  hype	  that	  is	  reinforced,	  together	  with	  increasing	  expectations,	  each	  time	  a	  new	  
clinical	  projects	  successfully	  secures	  new	  funding.	  Practising	  scientists	  and	  politicians	  are	  
also	   partly	   responsible	   for	   this	   phenomenon,	   as	   keeping	   expectations	   high	   is	   generally	  
conducive	   to	   secure	   stronger	   support	   –	   and	   budgets	   –	   for	   research	   and	   clinical	  
development.	   To	   a	   certain	   extent	   however,	   public	   excitement	   about	   the	   therapeutic	  
outcomes	   of	   an	   innovative	   field	   of	  medicine	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   be	   exploited	   by	   less	   than	  
scrupulous	  subjects	  –	  as	  shown	  in	  other	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
It	   is	   thus	   to	   control	   the	   proliferation	   of	   hype-­‐driven	   excesses	   that	   an	   intense	  
patrolling	  activity	  is	  being	  enacted	  to	  exclude	  alternative	  modes	  of	  framing	  the	  pipeline	  of	  
clinical	  development	  –	  see	  the	  ICMS	  controversy	  above.	  We	  saw	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  actors,	  
often	  with	  the	  sincere	  complicity	  of	  patients,	  exploit	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  credibility	  
cycle,	  by	  stressing	  elements	  that	  are	  not	  included	  here,	  such	  as	  therapeutic	  freedom	  and	  
creative	  forms	  of	  cell	  line	  clinical	  staging.	  	  
Ultimately,	  and	  so	  the	  cycle	  reaches	  back	  to	  its	  inception,	  regulators	  and	  scientific	  
societies	   try	   to	   counteract	   these	   alternative	  modes	   of	   clinical	   translation	   by	   re-­‐stating	  
principles	  of	  GMP	  and	  by	  constructing	  stem	  cell	  products	  as	  innovative	  biological	  drugs.	  
It	  appeared	  from	  my	  previous	  analyses	  that	  the	  epistemic	  and	  ethical	  standards	  of	  
clinical	   research,	   albeit	   at	   least	   partially	   entrenched	   in	   legislation	   and	   patrolled	   by	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dedicated	   agencies	   and	   scientific	   societies	   as	   well,	   fall	   short	   of	   forming	   a	   stable	  
framework	  for	  translational	  debates	  to	  peacefully	  take	  place.	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  
enforcement	   of	   epistemic	   and	   ethical	   commitments	   into	   the	   institutional	   design	   of	  
regulatory	   activities,	   constitutes	   an	   occasion	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   contestations	   and	  
alternative	   political	   narratives,	   whereby	   those	   commitments	   are	   reframed	   and	  
reinterpreted.	  	  
The	   cases	   I	   reported	   in	   this	   chapter	   testify	   to	   the	  material	   power	   of	   alternative	  
constructions	   of	   clinical	   research.	   The	   fact	   that	   they	   may	   appear	   scientifically	  
unconvincing	  and	  politically	  misguided,	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  me	  for	   instance,	  does	  not	  but	  
reinforce	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  not	  on	  established,	  pre-­‐given	  categories	  and	  distinctions	  that	  
clinical	   narratives	   and	   counter-­‐narratives	   rely	   for	   doing	   their	   job.	   And	   I	   have	   provided	  
evidence,	  in	  the	  above	  sections,	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  stem	  cell	  stakeholders	  to	  partner	  up	  with	  
real	  therapeutic	  interests,	  and	  viable	  understandings	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  people,	  
their	  diseases	  and	  the	  state.	  By	  so	  doing	  they	  seek	  control	  over	  their	  clinical	  activities	  and	  
construct	  their	  image	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  stakeholders.	  	  
As	  I	  anticipated	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  major	  rearrangements	  are	  at	  
play	  at	  the	  junction	  of	  stem	  cell	  research	  and	  clinical	  application.	  Long-­‐held	  ideals	  on	  how	  
we	  should	  continue	  the	  battle	  of	  mankind	  against	  morbidity	  challenge	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  
democracy	  in	  its	  relationship	  with	  science.	  The	  state	  is	  alternatively	  conceptualised	  as	  an	  
ally	  or	  as	  an	  enemy	  in	  the	  individual	  research	  for	  healing	  –	  and	  the	  scientific	  community	  
as	   well.	   The	   latter,	   just	   as	   it	   tries	   to	   establish	   shared	   criteria	   for	   safe	   and	   efficacious	  
clinical	  innovation,	  comes	  to	  be	  perceived	  with	  suspicion.	  The	  model	  according	  to	  which	  it	  
is	  experts	  that	  certify	  knowledge,	  and	  regulatory	  science	  that	  certifies	  experts	  no	  longer	  
represent	  the	  backbone	  of	  credible	  science	  policy,	  at	   least	  when	  the	  political	  conditions	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exist	  to	  hold	  a	  variety	  of	  differing	  opinions	  on	  what	  counts	  as	  legitimate	  expertise,	  as	  the	  
cases	  just	  presented	  stand	  out	  to	  demonstrate.	  	  
FDA	  and	  ISSCR,	  on	  their	  part,	  showed	  a	  sincere	  commitment	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  
stem	  cell	  patients	  and	  clinical	  subjects,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  prevent	  alternative	  visions	  from	  
emerging	  and	  from	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  socially	  relevant	  therapeutic	  phenomenon.	  That	  stem	  
cell	  clinics	  proliferate	  and	  provide	  their	  services	  to	  patient-­‐consumers	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  fact.	  
And	   also	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   ICMS	   succeeded	   in	   providing	   some	   stabilization	   to	   the	  
otherwise	  boisterous	  phenomenon	  of	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  clinics.	  	  
Every	  actor	  in	  this	  game	  of	  demarcation	  is	  scared	  of	  loosing	  credibility.	  Obviously	  
ISSCR	   does	   not	   want	   to	   play	   the	   part	   of	   an	   industry-­‐driven	   obstacle	   to	   stem	   cell	  
innovation.	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  ICMS	  shows	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  depicting	  its	  activities,	  
and	   those	   of	   its	  members,	   as	   legitimate	   and	   reliable.	   To	   these	   ends	   the	   ISSCR	   lines	   up	  
with	  the	  FDA,	  of	  which	  it	  shares	  the	  epistemic	  and	  normative	  premises,	  and	  tries	  what	  it	  
can	   to	  contrast	   the	  emergence	  of	  unproven	  stem	  cell	   treatments.	  On	   the	  other	  pole	  of	  
the	   divide,	   ICMS	   interprets	   the	   existing	   regulatory	   regime	   in	   its	   favour	   and	   exploits	   a	  
globalised	  world	  to	  circumvent	  it.	  The	  displacement	  of	  stem	  cell	  therapy	  across	  national	  
borders	   is	   indeed	   a	  major	   feature	  of	   some	  of	   the	  phenomena	  analysed	   so	   far.	   It	   could	  
thus	  be	  tempting	  to	  see	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  as	  a	  result	  of	  globalisation.	  However,	  after	  initial	  
episodes	   of	   interpretative	   enthusiasm,	   sociological	   literature	   on	   globalisation	   has	  
highlighted	  the	  near	  absence	  of	  truly	  global	  social	  phenomena	  in	  our	  world.	  The	  stem	  cell	  
clinics,	   although	   international	   in	   the	   range	   of	   their	   activity,	   are	   no	   exception	   to	   this	  
diagnosis.	   They	   could	   be	   better	   conceptualised	   as	   global/local	   phenomena.	   Without	  
importing	  any	  of	   the	  normative	  meanings	   recently	  attached	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  glocality,	   I	  
nonetheless	   believe	   that,	   interpreting	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   clinics	   as	   a	   global/local	  
phenomenon	  does	  justice	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  them	  in	  at	  least	  two	  senses.	  Notwithstanding	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the	   international	   character	   of	   the	   therapeutic	   networks	   of	   patients	   and	   providers	   that	  
stem	   cell	   clinics	   exploit,	   their	   business	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   rooted	   in	   very	   local	  
conditions,	  namely,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strong	  technological	  infrastructure	  in	  one	  country,	  
and	  the	  absence	  of	  specific	  regulations	  in	  another.	  Albeit	  reliant	  on	  worldwide	  means	  of	  
communication	   and	   marketing	   like	   the	   Internet	   for	   promoting	   their	   activities	   and	  
attracting	  new	  customers,	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  offering	  service	  across	  national	  borders	  are	  the	  
result	  of	   conditions	   that	  have	   strong	  geographical	   connotations.	  Moreover,	   the	   level	  of	  
transnational	  engagement	  is	  higher	  where	  geography	  plays	  out	  as	  a	  logistic	  facilitator,	  like	  
at	   the	   borders	   between	   US	   and	   Central	   America,	   or	   when	   the	   remoteness	   of	   places	  
corresponds	  to	  regulatory	  distance	  between	  places	  of	  extraction	  and	  places	  of	   injection	  
of	   stem	  cell	   concoctions.	   These	   features	  qualify	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   cross-­‐border	   stem	  
cell	  therapies	  as	  a	  global/local	  one.	  
	  
The	   drug-­‐like	   framing	  was	   intended	   to	   exert	   regulatory	   power	   on	   the	   emerging	  
field	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research.	  However,	  it	  was	  exactly	  this	  framing	  that	  left	  regulatory	  
room	   for	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   to	   emerge	   and	   appropriate	   a	   politically	   and	   epistemically	  
uncharted	  territory.	  	  
The	  credibility	  cycle	  of	  the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  is	  thus	  in	  place.	  Its	  aim	  is	  
to	  afford	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  with	  the	  necessary	  argumentative	  tools	  and	  discursive	  
practices	   to	  cope	  with	   risk,	  uncertainty	  and	   the	  presence	  of	  alternative	   framings	  of	   the	  
route	  to	  stem	  cell	  application.	  As	  I	  said,	   it	   is	  now	  too	  early	  to	  attempt	  an	  assessment	  of	  
how	   this	   model	   is	   performing	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	   social	   robustness	   to	   this	   scientific	  
enterprise.	   We	   are	   still	   in	   an	   early	   phase	   with	   stem	   cell	   innovation,	   albeit	   actors	   are	  
gearing	  up	  to	  compete	  for	  delivering	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  stem	  cell	  technological	  platform	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to	  patients	  worldwide.	   It	   is	   likely	  however,	  that	  empirical	  material	  will	  soon	  accumulate	  
about	  the	  actual	  transactions	  between	  interested	  stakeholders.	  
The	   credibility	   cycle	   that	   I	   described	   is	   thus	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   hopefully	   useful	  
interpretative	   tool	   to	   read	   into	   this	   trajectory	   of	   innovation.	   This	   tool	   is	   thus	   an	  
explanatory	  instrument,	  and	  is	   informed	  by	  a	  co-­‐productionist	  outlook	  on	  the	  reciprocal	  
crafting	  of	  a	  regulatory	  and	  epistemic	  order	  in	  biomedical	  innovation.	  	  
	  
So	   far,	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   described	   but	   the	   early	   movements	   of	   the	   actors	  
involved	  in	  constructing	  and	  challenging	  the	  regulatory	  regime	  of	  stem	  cell	  governance.	  It	  
is	  possible	  however	   that	   the	  uncertainties	   that	   surround	  novel	  biotechnological	  objects	  
like	  human	  cell	  lines	  in	  regenerative	  medicine,	  coupled	  with	  the	  shifting	  power	  relations	  
between	   stem	   cell	   actors	   will	   continue	   shape	   the	   governance	   model	   in	   as	   yet	  
unpredictable	  ways.	   In	   this	   sense,	  also	   the	  credibility	  cycle	   that	   I	  propose	  as	  a	  prism	  to	  
look	   into	   this	   field	  of	   innovation	   is	   bound	   to	   require	   adjustments	   as	   the	   field	  proceeds	  
towards	  further	  clinical	  applications.	  
I	   followed	   framing	   efforts	   and	   contestations	   where	   they	   arose,	   thus	   refraining	  
from	  a	  strict	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  national	  governance	  regimes.	  In	  many	  respects,	  such	  
an	  analysis,	  at	  the	  present	  stage	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  translation,	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  flattening	  
the	  analytic	  outlook	  onto	  pre-­‐given	  state	  boundaries.	  My	  analysis	  has	  instead	  shown	  that	  
roughly	  the	  same	  regime	  of	  governability	  may	  apply	  to	  different	  countries	  (as	  for	  example	  
happens	   between	   the	   US	   and	   the	   UK	  with	   respect	   to	   stem	   cell	   CCT	   research).	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   unorthodox	   framings	   emerge	   both	   in	   countries	   where	   with	   an	   established	  
tradition	   in	  scientific	  governance,	  through	  loopholes	   in	  regulation,	  and	  in	  emerging	  new	  
bio-­‐economies	   like	   China.	   Moreover,	   we	   saw	   how	   stem	   cell	   actors	   exploit	   unbalances	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across	   national	   boundaries	   to	   install	   their	   human	   cell	   therapeutic	   practices	   on	   a	   global	  
biomarket	   that	   states	   can	   hardly	   control.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   a	   more	   traditional	  
comparative	   approach	   looked	   analytically	   unsuited	   to	   track	   the	   early	   movements	   into	  
stem	  cell	  translational	  innovation.	  	  
Furthermore,	   individual	   countries	   like	   the	  UK	  may	   seek	   for	   hegemonic	   positions	  
through	   the	   certification,	   standardisation	  and	  distribution	  of	  banked	  human	  cell	   lines	  –	  
thus	   transcending	   national	   boundaries	   in	   a	   way	   that	   stretches	   the	   limits	   of	   national	  
authority.	  
The	   next	   step	   for	   us	   is	   to	   use	   deliberative	   theory	   to	   assess	   the	   democratic	  
properties	  of	  the	  governance	  framework	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
With	  this	  aim	  in	  mind,	   in	  the	  next	  and	  final	  chapter	  I	  will	  assess	  the	  political	  features	  of	  
the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  and	  advance	  a	  proposal	  on	  how	  to	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  
accountability	   in	   the	   highly	   uncertain,	   but	   nonetheless	   highly	   promising	   enterprise	   of	  
translating	  stem	  cell	  science	  to	  clinical	  applications.	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Chapter	  5:	  Democracies	  of	  translation:	  towards	  a	  
deliberative	  democracy	  of	  clinical	  innovation	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapters	  I	  analysed	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  novel	  governance	  model	  for	  
the	  clinical	  translation	  of	  stem	  cells.	  I	  showed	  that,	  contrary	  to	  previous	  models	  of	  strict	  
regulatory	  oversight	  for	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research,	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  is	  developing	  in	  
the	   context	   of	   a	   shared	   model	   of	   governance.	   At	   present,	   state	   agencies	   and	   clinical	  
scientists	   jointly	   construct	   stem	  cell	   innovation	  as	   the	  development	  of	  new	  drugs	   to	  be	  
tested	   experimentally	   in	   the	   context	   of	   controlled	   clinical	   trials.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  
exploiting	  blind	  spots	  in	  current	  regulations	  and	  working	  across	  state	  boundaries	  to	  their	  
advantage,	  a	  number	  of	  clinicians	  are	  contesting	  the	  previous	  framing	  and	  already	  start	  
commercialising	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  procedures	  to	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  patients.	  
In	   the	   present	   chapter,	   my	   aim	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   contested	  
governance	  regime	  from	  a	  deliberative	  democracy	  point	  of	  view.	  	  
5.1	  The	  quest	  for	  deliberative	  science	  
A	   growing	   body	   of	   literature,	   fed	   by	   actual	   experiences	   in	   public	   engagement	  
initiatives	   on	   issues	   ranging	   from	   environmental	   risk	   appraisal,	   to	   radioactive	   waste	  
management	   and	   urban	   planning,	   produced	   a	   myriad	   of	   deliberative/participatory	  
proposals	   as	   to	   how	   to	   democratically	   reconcile	   alternative	   framings	   of	   scientifically	  
loaded	   problems	   (Fiorino	   1989;	   Laird	   1993;	   Renn	   et	   al.	   1993;	   Rowe	   and	   Frewer	   2000;	  
Rowe	  and	  Frewer	  2004;	  Santos	  and	  Chess	  2003;	  Webler	  1999;	  Webler	  and	  Tuler	  2001).	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Interestingly,	   the	  participatory	   turn	   (Jasanoff	  2005)	   reaches	  beyond	   the	   limits	  of	  
academic	  enclosures.	  Between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Nineties	  and	  the	  early	  2000s,	  at	  least	  three	  
reports	   suggested	   the	   necessity	   to	   break	   up	   elitist	   arrangements	   about	   expertise	   and	  
open	   decision	   making	   to	   wider	   publics	   in	   matters	   of	   science	   and	   risk	   management.	  
Namely,	  the	  US	  National	  Research	  Council,	  following	  an	  established	  institutional	  interests	  
in	   these	   matters21,	   issued	   a	   report	   in	   1997	   animated	   by	   the	   realisation	   that	   risk	  
management	   should	   be	   conducted	   by	   blending	   scientific	   analysis	   and	   deliberative	  
decision-­‐making	   (Stern,	   and	   Fineberg	   1996).	   Along	   the	   same	   lines,	   the	  British	  House	  of	  
Lords,	   drawing	  on	   the	   recognition	   that	  public	   trust	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   science	  
and	   politics	   had	   been	   undermined	   by	   episodes	   like	   the	   BSE	   crisis,	   wrote	   an	   important	  
report	   in	  2000	  where	   it	   recommended	  various	   forms	  of	  public	  engagement	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
bring	   public	   values	   and	   concerns	   at	   policy-­‐making	   sites	   (House	   of	   Lords	   2000).	  
Analogously,	   in	   2001,	   the	   European	   Commission	   issued	   a	   white	   paper	   on	   governance	  
aimed	  at	  transforming	  policy-­‐making	  so	  as	  to	  better	  connect	  public	  decisions	  and	  citizens’	  
needs	   and	   aspirations,	   mostly	   by	   opening	   up	   decisional	   processes	   to	   increased	  
involvement	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  public	  (European	  Commission	  2001)22.	  	  
These	   documents	   testify	   that,	   both	   in	   the	   US	   and	   in	   Europe,	   deliberation	   is	  
understood	   as	   a	   valid	   development	  of	   democratic	   culture.	   The	   reason	   for	   applying	   this	  
normative	  outlook	  to	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  resides	   in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  governance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	   See	   Health	   1983;	   Communication	   1989;	   National	   Research	   Council	   (U.S.).	   Committee	   to	   Review	   Risk	  
Management	  in	  the	  DOE’s	  Environmental	  Remediation	  Program	  e	  Program	  1994;	  Pollutants	  1994.	  
22	  Other	  examples	  of	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  a	  deliberative-­‐participatory	  culture	  in	  political	  bodies	  may	  include	  
the	  Danish	  Act	  on	  Environment	  and	  Gene	  Technology	  –	  which	  allows	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  the	  
right	   to	   join	   the	   evaluation	   of	   genetically	   modified	   organism	   (GMO)	   release	   applications	   –	   and	   similar	  
provisions	  adopted	  by	  the	  Canadian	  and	  the	  Australian	  Governments	  still	  in	  the	  context	  of	  GMO	  regulations	  
(Einsiedel,	  Jelsøe,	  and	  Breck	  2001).	  Furthermore,	  in	  many	  countries	  including	  Denmark,	  France,	  UK	  and	  the	  
US,	   ad	   hoc	   advisory	   bodies	   on	   issues	   relative	   to	   the	   development	   of	   biomedical	   and	   biotechnological	  
innovation	   steadly	   include	   experts	   in	   the	   field	   of	   ethics	   and	   policy	   as	  well	   as	   consumer	   groups,	   patients	  
advocates	  and	  lay	  citizens	  too.	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model	   that	   is	   emerging	   in	   the	   field	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation.	   In	   the	   present	   context,	   a	  
number	   of	   uncertainties	   and	   risks	   overshadow	   the	   development	   of	   stem	   cell	   science	  
towards	  clinical	  application.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  extremely	  high	  expectations	  characterise	  
this	  field	  of	  innovation,	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  it	  may	  well	  be	  problematic	  to	  ever	  meet	  them,	  
or	  explain	  to	   interested	  publics	  how	  slow	  the	  developmental	  process	   inevitably	   is.	  Stem	  
cell	  science,	  should	  early	  translational	  efforts	  fail	  or	  result	  in	  serious	  adverse	  events,	  runs	  
the	  risk	  of	  being	  discarded	  as	  a	  promising	   field	   thus	  undermining	   the	  very	  possibility	  of	  
regenerative	  medicine.	  The	  existing	  shared	  model	  of	  governance,	  pulled	  in	  contradictory	  
directions	  by	   interested	  stakeholders,	  may	  thus	  well	  underperform	  in	  assuring	  sufficient	  
degrees	  of	  public	  confidence	  while	  creating	  the	  most	  effective	  conditions	   for	  science	  to	  
steadily	  proceed	  into	  clinical	  translation.	  	  
How	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  prevent	  or	  at	  least	  limit	  such	  negative	  scenarios?	  How	  could	  
the	   development	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   be	   brought	   on	   a	   democratically	   accountable	  
trajectory?	   What	   is	   needed	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   discursive	   fragmentation	   of	   contrasting	  
narratives	  about	  biomedical	  innovation?	  
The	   medical	   promise	   of	   regenerative	   medicine	   is	   too	   important	   for	   these	  
questions	   be	   overlooked.	  Moreover,	   the	   biotechnology	   industry,	   sprout	   out	   of	   steadily	  
increasing	  public	  research	  budgets,	  represents	  a	  driver	  for	  economic	  growth	  that	  cannot	  
be	   ignored.	  Also	   in	   the	   face	  of	   rising	  costs	   in	  providing	  health	   to	  aging	  populations,	   the	  
economic	   opportunities	   offered	   by	   the	   advent	   of	   regenerative	   medicine	   cannot	   be	  
missed.	  In	  this	  delicate	  situation,	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  political	  conditions	  that	  may	  
help	  realising	  the	  promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  is	  thus	  needed.	  The	  present	  scenario,	  as	  
it	  emerged	  from	  my	  previous	  analyses,	   is	  one	  of	  profound	  disagreement	  and	  competing	  
interests	   in	   the	   framing	   of	   regenerative	   medicine.	   Moreover,	   the	   regulatory	   grip	   of	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involved	  actors	  seems	  insufficient	  to	  grant	  one	  view	  to	  outweigh	  all	  the	  others:	  regulatory	  
pluralism	  seems	  characteristic	  of	  the	  actual	  governance	  outlook	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  	  
Therefore,	  what	   is	   needed	   is	   a	   political	   appraisal	   of	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   current	  
regulatory	  regime	  to	  bring	  about	  accountable	  governance	  to	  the	  field,	  while	   leaving	  the	  
door	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  adapting	  to	  present	  uncertainties	  and	  future	  new	  findings	  
on	  the	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	  stem	  cell	  based-­‐therapies.	  	  
As	   I	   tried	   to	   show	  elsewhere	   in	   this	   thesis,	   it	   is	   through	  deliberative	   democracy	  
that,	   in	  my	  opinion,	  accountability	  and	   legitimation	  can	  be	   infused	   into	   the	  governance	  
structure	  of	  contentious	  biotechnological	  innovation.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recall	  
that	  deliberative	  democracy,	  as	  I	  introduced	  it	  in	  chapter	  one,	  aims	  at	  crafting	  the	  process	  
of	  public	  decision	  making	  as	  one	  of	  “collective	  deliberation	  conducted	  rationally	  and	  fairly	  
among	  free	  and	  equal	  individuals”	  (Benhabib	  1996,	  69).	  
It	  is	  thus	  preliminarily	  useful	  to	  assess	  the	  democratic	  potential	  of	  what	  we,	  thus	  
far,	  described	  as	  the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  translational	  activities.	  	  
To	   this	   aim,	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   existing	   assessment	   criteria	   to	  
perform	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  democratic	  quality	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  stem	  cells.	  
5.1.1	  Democratic	  assessment	  
According	   to	   the	   deliberative	   theory	   of	   democracy,	   the	   public	   legitimation	   of	   political	  
decisions	   rests	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   public	   discourse	   that	   precedes	   it.	   In	   the	   public	  
sphere,	  discourses	  informally	  circulate	  that	  produce	  evidence,	  arguments	  and	  persuasion	  
as	   to	   the	   better	   or	   more	   just	   solutions	   to	   important	   policy	   problems.	   In	   current	  
democracies,	  these	  very	  general	  principles	  have	  been	  implemented	  into	  the	  practical	  life	  
of	  nation	  states,	  especially	  at	  the	  local	  or	  regional	  level.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  resulting	  in	  a	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profound	  transformation	  of	  the	  very	  aspect	  of	  democratic	  polities	  as	  they	  try	  to	  innovate	  
the	  political	   rituals	  of	   representative	   institutions	  so	  as	   to	  yield	  more	  accountable,	  more	  
inclusive,	  and	  less	  divisive	  public	  decisions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  political	  communities.	  In	  an	  
effort	   to	   foster	   a	   deliberative	   turn	   in	   democratic	   life,	   various	  mechanisms	   of	   inclusion	  
attempt	  to	  enlarge	  policy	  forums	  to	  the	  participation	  of	  concerned	  stakeholders	  and	  lay	  
citizens.	  	  
In	   concomitance	  with	   these	   political	   novelties,	   an	   articulated	   body	   of	   literature	  
developed	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  the	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  political	  initiatives.	  
However,	   in	   the	   face	  of	  a	  marked	  diversity	  of	  approaches,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	   say	   that	  
there	  exists	  something	  like	  a	  universally	  agreed-­‐upon	  list	  of	  criteria	  whereby	  assessing	  the	  
effectiveness	   and	   consistency	   of	   governance	   activities	   from	   a	   participatory-­‐deliberative	  
perspective.	  It	  is	  nonetheless	  possible	  to	  isolate	  a	  kernel	  of	  benchmarks	  that	  are	  generally	  
used	  in	  these	  evaluative	  exercises	  in	  the	  literature.	  Jason	  Chilvers	  has	  recently	  produced	  a	  
version	   of	   such	   a	   benchmark	   set	   of	   criteria	   in	   an	   interesting	   study	   that	   included	   both	  
scholarly	   accounts	   and	   practitioners’	   viewpoints	   on	   deliberative	   appraisal	   activities	  
(Chilvers	  2008).	  What	  Chilvers	  proposes	   is	   therefore	  a	   set	  of	   criteria	   that	   lends	   itself	   to	  
some	  degree	  of	  overlapping	  consensus.	  
In	  what	   follows	  –	   freely	  drawing	  on	  Chilver’s	   grid	   (ivi,	   176,	  Table	  3)	  –	   I	  will	   thus	  
assess	  how	  the	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  in	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  fares	  with	  respect	  to	  
a	   deliberative-­‐participatory	   account	   of	   democratic	   decision-­‐making,	   legitimation	   and	  
accountability.	  
My	   own	   version	   of	   the	   benchmark	   comprises	   the	   following	   baseline	   criteria	   to	  
assess	  the	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  biomedical	  regulatory	  regimes:	  fairness	  of	  inclusion	  with	  
respect	   to	   the	   engagement	   of	   all	   potential	   stakeholders;	   correct	   timing	  of	   engagement	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with	   respect	   to	   the	   technical	   development	   of	   innovation;	   constructive	   role	   of	   expert	  
knowledge	  in	  the	  elaboration	  of	  technological	  appraisal;	  implementation	  of	  characteristic	  
deliberative	   virtues	   into	   the	   political	   discourse	   –	   that	   is,	   interactive	   engagement,	  
symmetry	   between	   participants,	   openness	   to	   alternative	   framings,	   social	   learning	   and	  
independence	  of	  facilitators.	  	  
Those	   criteria	   express,	   in	   a	   very	   broad	   sense,	   the	   ideal	   characteristics	   of	  
deliberation	   as	   a	   legitimising	   procedure.	   In	   applying	   them	   to	   the	   appraisal	   of	   a	   given	  
techno-­‐scientific	  phenomenon,	  one	  should	  however	  consider	  two	  things.	  First,	  whatever	  
the	   level	   of	   institutionalisation23	   of	   and	   commitment	   to	   deliberative	   politics,	   no	   actual	  
governance	  regime	  will	  ever	  fully	  meet	  the	  ideal.	  Second,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  use	  
of	   the	   above	   criteria	   need	   not	   be	   restricted	   to	   the	   appraisal	   of	   explicitly	   deliberative	  
exercises.	   The	   intuitive	   idea	   behind	   deliberative	   theories	   of	   democracy	   is	   not	   that	  
representative	   democracy	   is	   totally	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   ideals	   of	   deliberation	   –	   and	   thus	  
morally	  wrong	  or	  politically	  illegitimate.	  Rather,	  deliberative	  democrats	  conceive	  of	  direct	  
participation	  in	  deliberative	  exchange	  as	  being	  the	  tentative	  realisation	  of	  an	  ideal	  public	  
sphere	  where	  all	  are	  included	  and	  no	  one’s	  point	  of	  view	  is	  excluded	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
social	  position	  of	  the	  speaker24.	  Members	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  in	  other	  words,	  recognise	  
each	  other	  as	  free	  and	  equal,	  thus	  granting	  each	  member	  with	  the	  same	  rights	  to	  decide	  
politically.	  However,	   it	   has	   to	  be	   stressed,	   this	   idea	   is	  not	   the	  backbone	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	   only,	   as	   it	   informs	   all	   other	   different	   frameworks	   of	   democratic	   thinking	   as	  
well.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  two	  distinguished	  political	  theorists,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  “Institutionalization	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  a	  body	  acquires	  a	  definite	  way	  of	  performing	  its	  functions	  –	  a	  
way	  that	  sets	   ita	  part	  from	  its	  environment	  and	  that	   is	   independent	  of	  the	  membership	  and	  issues	  of	  the	  
moment”	  (Hibbing	  1988)	  
24	   This	   intuitive	   ideal	   has	   been	   fully	   formalised	   by	   Jürgen	  Habermas	   in	   his	   famous	  writings	   on	   the	   “ideal	  
speech	  situation”	  (Habermas	  1970;	  Habermas	  1987).	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«democratic	  arrangements	  have	  the	  intrinsic	  virtue	  
of	   treating	   those	   who	   are	   subject	   to	   binding	   collective	  
decisions	   with	   respect,	   as	   free	   and	   equal:	   ‘the	   person	   of	  
the	  humblest	   citizen	   is	  as	   sacred	  and	   inviolable	  as	   that	  of	  
the	   first	  magistrate.’	   [25]	  Thus,	   the	   judgements	  of	  citizens,	  
who	   are	   expected	   to	   govern	   their	   conduct	   in	   accordance	  
with	   collective	   decisions,	   are	   treated	   by	   the	   processes	   of	  
collective	   decision	   as	   equally	   authoritative.	   Though	  
decisions	   will	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	   be	   unanimous,	   no	   one’s	  
judgement	  of	  the	  proper	  rules	  of	  cooperation	  is	  treated	  as	  
having	   greater	  weight.	  Given	   the	   back-­‐ground	   conception	  
of	  citizens	  as	  free	  and	  equal,	  any	  assignment	  of	  differential	  
weights	   to	   the	   views	   of	   different	   citizens	   is	   a	   form	   of	  
disrespect	   (unless	   it	   can	   be	   provided	   with	   a	   suitable	  
justification)»	  (Cohen	  and	  Sabel	  1997,	  319).	  
These	  last	  considerations,	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  that	  deliberative	  criteria	  can	  indeed	  
be	  used	  to	  assess	  non-­‐deliberative	  political	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  deliberative	  ones,	  and	  to	  
produce	  possibly	  useful	  political	   indications	   to	  ameliorate	   the	  democratic	  quality	  of	   the	  
process	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  
The	  fairness	  of	  inclusion	  
A	  first	  intuitive	  specification	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  democratic	  participation	  prescribes	  that	  
all	  interested	  and	  affected	  parties	  be	  included	  in	  the	  deliberative	  process	  that	  precedes	  a	  
publicly	  binding	  decision.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  inclusive	  participation	  should	  follow	  criteria	  
of	  representativeness	   in	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  whose	  viewpoints	  need	  to	  be	  
taken	  into	  (discursive)	  consideration.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  (Rousseau	  1970,	  3.14)	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With	   respect	   to	   this	   aspect,	   scientific	   controversies	   frequently	   show	   the	  
democratic	   inefficiency	   of	   traditional	   governance	   strategies.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   chapter	   3.I,	  
contemporary	  science	  stemmed	  out	  of	  a	  blind	  delegation	  model	  that	  left	  scientists	  alone	  
to	  decide	  about	   the	  content	  and	   timing	  of	   their	  professional	  activities.	   Furthermore,	  as	  
one	   can	   appreciate	   from	   nowadays	   classical	   STS	   works	   on	   scientific	   advice	   to	   public	  
decision-­‐making	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Jasanoff	  1994),	  this	  delegation	  model	  reverberated	  in	  
the	  exclusive	  privilege	  afforded	   to	   scientists	   to	  directly	   interact	  with	  decision-­‐makers	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   controversies	   about	   contaminants,	   carcinogens,	   radioactive	   waste	   and	  
chemicals	  used	  in	  the	  food	  industry,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  classic	  examples.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  r-­‐
DNA,	  we	  saw	  that	  a	  self-­‐regulation	  model	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  exclusive	  character	  of	  
scientific	  governance.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  
GM	   crop/GM	   food	   controversy),	   however,	   such	   political	   configuration	   simply	   proved	  
unable	   to	   contain	   and	  manage	   the	   amount	   of	  moral	   disagreement	   that	   such	   strand	   of	  
innovation	  gave	  rise	  to.	  	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   emergent	   governance	   configuration	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	  
translation,	   as	   one	   can	   appreciate	   from	   our	   previous	   analyses,	   the	   situation	   is	   mixed.	  
Certainly,	  not	  all	  interests	  and	  viewpoints	  are	  granted	  equal	  weight	  in	  all	  the	  political	  sites	  
(both	  institutional	  and	  informal)	  where	  discourses	  circulate	  and	  decisions	  are	  taken	  as	  to	  
the	   future	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation.	   Alternative	   framings	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   sit	   at	  
opposite	   sides	   of	   a	   scientific	   and	   regulatory	   divide,	   and	   only	   enter	   in	   contact	   at	  
adversarial	   occasions.	   Furthermore,	   the	   voice	   of	   patients	   is	   substantially	   less	   powerful	  
than	   that	  of	   scientists,	  practitioners	  and	   regulators26.	  Other	   important	   stakeholders	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	   I	  would	   just	   like	   to	  mention	  that	   this	   last	   feature	  needs	  not	  necessarily	  be	   the	  case,	  as	   it	   is	   sometimes	  
argued	  in	  consideration	  of	  the	  vulnerable	  conditions	  of	  diseased	  individuals.	  For	  instance,	  the	  engagement	  
of	  patients’	   groups	  has	   certainly	  played	  a	  major	  political	   role	   in	   the	   case	  HIV-­‐AIDS	   research	   in	   the	  States	  
(Epstein	  1998),	  and	  Muscular	  Distrophy	  in	  France	  (Callon	  and	  Rabeharisoa	  2008).	  For	  a	  general	  appraisal	  of	  
this	  theme,	  see	  (Epstein	  2007).	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private	   funders	   of	   clinical	   translation	   and	   patent	   holders.	   Their	   presence	   is	   not	  
immediately	  visible	   in	   the	  public	  debate	  taking	  place	  on	  specialised	   journals	  and	  on	  the	  
media.	  It	   is	  however	  evident	  that	  their	   influence	  is	  decisive	  to	  the	  development	  of	  stem	  
cell	   innovation.	   This	   situation	   introduced	   in	   the	   debate	   arguments	   based	   on	   the	   doubt	  
that	  commercial	  interests	  insidiously	  articulate	  the	  vision	  and	  political	  strategies	  of	  stem	  
cell	   researchers.	  A	  major	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  hidden	  relationship	  between	  scientists	  
and	   their	   commercial	   partners	   concerns	   unscrupulous	   behaviours	   with	   respect	   to	  
research	  subjects	  and	  patients.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  have	  also	   recognised	   that	  a	  culture	  of	  
concern	  for	  the	  ethical	  consequences	  and	  social	  implications	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  research	  
is	  undeniably	   in	  place	   in	   the	  declared	   intentions	  of	   international	  scientific	   societies.	  We	  
saw	  that	  ethicists	  and	  social	  scientists	  are	  co-­‐opted	   in	  the	  advisory	  bodies	  that	  regulate	  
clinical	  translation,	  and	  also	  called	  to	  contribute	  to	  research	  guidelines.	  	  
It	  is	  however	  evident	  that	  no	  truly	  deliberative	  forum	  exists	  where	  all	  stakeholders	  
can	  meet	  on	  a	  par,	  discuss	  and	  shape	  the	  course	  of	  stem	  cell	   innovation	  according	  to	  a	  
shared	   vision	   of	   how	   the	   latter	   should	   look	   like.	   The	   regulatory	   panorama	   is	   instead	  
fragmented	  and	  dominated	  by	  adversarial	  and	  exclusivist	  attitudes.	  This,	  however,	  is	  not	  
imputable	   to	  a	   lack	  of	  democratic	   civility,	  or	  at	   least	  not	  only	   to	   that.	  Rather,	   stem	  cell	  
innovation	   is	   still	   technically	   uncertain,	  meaning	   that,	   as	   I	   said	   from	   the	  beginning,	   the	  
actual	  route	  of	  stem	  cell-­‐based	  regenerative	   is	  truly	  hard	  to	  anticipate.	   In	  this	  situation,	  
stakeholders	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  framed-­‐out	  by	  alternative	  visions	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine,	  
and	   thus	   compete	   for	   safer	   positions	   in	   the	   regulatory	   landscape.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  
interested	   stakeholders	   compete	   also	   for	   another	   important	   resource,	   namely	   public	  
support.	  They	  thus	  enact	  their	  own	  strategies	  to	  build	  credibility	  (see	  supra,	  4.3.2	  on	  the	  
credibility	   cycle),	   irrespective	   of	   the	   consequence	   that	   those	   activities	   have	   on	   the	  
discursive	  position	  of	  other	  stakeholders.	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In	  my	  opinion,	  in	  the	  current	  context,	  the	  field	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  thus	  sits	  at	  a	  
perilous	  junction.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  actors	  need	  to	  show	  that	  their	  interests	  are	  legitimate	  
and	   their	   framings	   convincing,	   if	   they	  want	   to	   look	   as	   socially	   accountable	   and	   reliable	  
innovators.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   their	  way	   of	   pursuing	   this	   objective	   relies	   on	  
framing	   strategies	   that	  may	   be	   exclusive,	   and	   thus	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   inclusiveness	   that	  
democracy	   requires	   as	   a	   public	   hallmark	   of	   legitimacy.	   All	   the	   more	   so,	   such	   intricate	  
dynamic	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   eroding	   both	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   involved	   parties	   (scientists,	  
clinicians	   and	   regulators)	   and	   the	   civic	   capital	   of	   democratic	   culture	   that	   preserves	  our	  
polities	   upon	   divisive	   controversies.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   present	   configuration	   of	   the	  
governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation	  looks	   ill	  equipped	  to	  prevent	  both	  a	  credibility	  crisis	  
and	  democratic	  erosion.	  	  
To	   address	   both	   concerns,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   the	   implementation	   of	  
participatory	   initiatives	  could	  represent	  an	  opportunity	  for	   innovation	  to	  take	  place	   in	  a	  
much	  more	  accountable	  way.	  Fostering	  inclusion	  in	  technological	  development	  responds	  
to	  the	  realisation	  that	  science	  and	  technology	  are	  «increasingly	  recognized	  to	  be	  open	  to	  
individual	  creativity,	  collective	  ingenuity,	  economic	  priorities,	  cultural	  values,	  institutional	  
interest,	   stakeholder	   negotiation,	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	   power»	   (Stirling	   2008,	   263).	  
Therefore,	  to	  begin	  with,	  widening	  the	  panel	  of	  relevant	  experts	  to	  include	  humanists	  (i.e.	  
bioethicists	  and	  social	  scientists)	  may	  enhance	  the	  credibility	  of	  stem	  cell	  governance	  and	  
the	  open	   character	   of	   the	  public	   discourse	   about	   it.	  Moreover,	   should	  patients	   also	  be	  
involved	   in	   a	  deliberative	  exercise	   about	   stem	  cell	   innovation,	   they	   could	   contribute	   to	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  socially	  more	  favourable	  climate	  around	  early	  translational	  efforts	  in	  this	  
field.	  In	  particular,	  patients	  could	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  setting	  the	  priority	  agenda	  of	  
stem	  cell	  innovation	  and	  in	  trimming	  the	  ethical	  criteria	  that	  regulate	  the	  involvement	  of	  
research	  subjects	  in	  clinical	  research	  (see	  infra).	  
	   209	  
	  
The	  timing	  of	  inclusion	  
As	  noted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	   in	  the	  field	  of	  STS	  and	  Technology	  Assessment	  
(see	   infra,	   5.2.1),	   innovation	   can	   avail	   itself	   of	   various	   forms	   of	   political	   inclusion.	  
However,	  the	  time	  point	  when	  stakeholder	  inclusion	  takes	  place	  is	  not	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  
In	   the	   ambit	   of	   an	   emerging	   institutional	   awareness	   about	   the	   desirability	   of	   more	  
inclusive	  policy	  processes,	  and	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  science-­‐related	  crises	   like	  the	  BSE	  case	   in	  
the	  UK	  and	  the	  GM	  food	  controversy	  in	  Europe,	  scholars	  have	  started	  to	  appreciate	  how	  
the	   timing	   of	   inclusion	   might	   indeed	   play	   a	   primary	   role	   in	   science-­‐related	   public	  
controversies.	  	  
The	  field	  of	  policy	  oriented	  STS	  has	  indeed	  generated	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  
opportunity	   for	   inclusion	  to	  take	  place	  as	  early	  as	  possible	   in	  the	  very	   framing	  phase	  of	  
technological	   trajectories	   (Grove-­‐White,	   Macnaghten,	   and	   Wynne	   2000;	   Marris	   et	   al.	  
2001;	   Wynne	   2001;	   Wildson	   and	   Willis	   2004).	   Although	   this	   cannot	   be	   considered	   a	  
golden	  rule	  that	  suits	  equally	  well	  in	  all	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that,	  in	  this	  initial	  
phase	   of	   stem	   cell	   translation,	  more	   opportunities	   are	   granted	   to	   interested	   parties	   to	  
shape	  the	  future	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  This	  must	  happen	  before	  interests	  crystallise	  to	  
the	  point	  of	  causing	  what	  has	  been	  called	  sociotechnical	  lock-­‐in	  (Callon	  and	  Rabeharisoa	  
2008,	   246).	  What	   is	  meant	  with	   that	   expression	   is	   that	   the	   development	   of	   innovation	  
may	  take	  a	  route	  determined	  by	  the	  privileges,	  both	  political	  and	  economic,	  acquired	  by	  
one	   or	   few	   technical	   and	   scientific	   options.	   In	   these	   circumstances,	   stakeholders	   have	  
fewer	  opportunities	  to	  influence	  the	  trajectory	  of	  innovation	  than	  in	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  
technological	  framing.	  	  
	  210	  
It	  may	  be	  argued,	  however,	   that	   it	   is	   in	   a	   sense	  already	  quite	   late	   for	  upstream	  
inclusion	   to	   take	   place	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stem	   cell	  medicine.	   Certainly,	   dominant	   framings	  
have	  already	  occupied	  the	  political	  space,	  but,	  once	  again,	  the	  future	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  
development	   is	   uncertain	   enough	   to	   afford	   occasions	   of	   effective	   inclusion	   to	   occur	  
nonetheless.	   All	   this	   notwithstanding,	   in	   terms	   of	   early	   inclusion	   of	   a	   broad	   set	   of	  
interests	   and	   viewpoints,	   the	   present	   regulatory	   regime	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   seems	  
wanting,	   notwithstanding	   some	   timid	   efforts	   at	   co-­‐opting	   patients’	   representatives	   and	  
humanists	  at	  decisional	  venues	  (see	  the	  case	  of	  CIRM-­‐mandated	  SCROs).	  Therefore,	  even	  
if	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   has	   not	   so	   far	   included	   large	   panels	   of	   stakeholders	   in	   the	  
definition	  of	  shared	  priorities	  and	  socially	  affordable	  framings,	  there	  is	  still	  some	  room	  for	  
intervening	  upstream	  on	  the	  technical	  development	  of	  the	  field,	  especially	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
specific	  translational	  initiatives	  (see	  infra	  5.2.3).	  	  
Expert	  knowledge	  in	  participatory	  appraisal	  
What	   is	   the	   role	   of	   expert	   knowledge	   in	   the	   regulatory	   decisions	   on	   stem	   cell	  
translation?	   In	   my	   previous	   analyses,	   I	   highlighted	   a	   relatively	   insulated	   circulation	   of	  
scientific	   information	   among	   scientific	   experts	   and	   regulators.	   The	   production	   and	  
certification	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   that	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   technical	   and	   regulatory	  
advancement	  of	  the	  field	  (namely	  pre-­‐clinical	  and	  clinical	  scientific	  data	  about	  safety	  and	  
efficacy)	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   innermost	   communications	   between	   regulators	   and	   IND	  
applicants	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  standard	  CCTs	  –	  and	  between	  practitioners,	  ICMS	  and,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  patients	  –	   in	  the	  case	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinics.	  Therefore,	  scientific	   information	  is	  not	  
used	  to	  inform	  participated	  deliberative	  decisions	  in	  a	  truly	  meaningful	  sense.	  According	  
to	  Chilvers’	  criteria,	  scientific	  knowledge	  in	  effective	  participatory	  governance	  should	  be	  
produced	   either	   to	   support	   deliberation	   or	   to	   respond	   iteratively	   to	   the	   needs	   of	  
deliberators	  and,	   finally,	  should	  be	  transparent	  to	  participants,	   thus	  “making	  underlying	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uncertainties	   and	   assumptions	   explicit”	   (Chilvers	   2008,	   246).	   In	   the	   present	   regulatory	  
framework	  however,	  no	  such	  inclusive	  process	  is	  actually	  taking	  place.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  
scientific	   knowledge	   is	   actually	   being	   produced	   and	   made	   public	   to	   allow	   the	   clinical	  
control	   of	   cellular	   entities,	   on	   the	   one	   side,	   and	   to	   strategically	   secure	   positions	   of	  
authority	  and	  control	  over	  stem	  cell-­‐related	  activities,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
Deliberative	  ways	  
According	   to	   deliberative	   theories,	   a	   participatory	   exercise	   should	   build	   on	   a	  
diverse	   set	  of	   discursive	   virtues	   to	   fulfil	   its	   legitimating	   role.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   technology-­‐
related	   issues,	   deliberative	   participation	   should	   be:	   interactive,	   symmetrical,	   able	   to	  
emphasise	   rather	   than	   reducing	   diversity,	   and	   conducive	   to	   mutual	   social	   learning	  
(adapted	   from	   Chilvers	   2008).	   To	   what	   extent	   does	   the	   current	   shared	   model	   of	  
governance,	   albeit	  not	  originally	   conceived	   in	  deliberative	   terms,	  allow	   those	  virtues	   to	  
shape	   the	   trajectory	  of	   stem	  cell	   innovation?	  A	   certain	  degree	  of	   interactivity	   between	  
interested	   parties	   is	   present	   at	   the	   already	   mentioned	   level	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	  
communication	   between	   scientists	   and	   dedicated	   advisory	   committees	   in	   regulatory	  
bodies.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  these	  exchanges	  enjoy	  some	  degree	  of	  symmetry,	  but	  only	  so	  
far	  as	  they	  involve	  scientists	  on	  both	  sides.	  Nonetheless,	  they	  tend	  to	  exclude	  any	  other	  
interlocutor	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  linguistic	  specialisation	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  actual	  possibilities	  of	  
interaction.	  
In	   another	   sense,	   scientists	   and	   clinicians	   are	   truly	   trying	   to	   produce	   public	  
awareness	  about	  the	  possibilities	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  It	  has	  however	  to	  be	  noticed	  that	  
such	  efforts	  often	  portray	  the	  therapeutic	  promise	  of	  stem	  cell	  science	  as	  imminent	  and	  
revolutionary.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	   on	   the	   biology	   of	   stem	   cell	  
accumulates	  quickly,	   it	   is	  also	  worth	  noticing	  that	  the	  route	  to	  the	  clinical	  application	  of	  
that	  knowledge	  is	  still	  conceivably	  long	  and	  uncertain,	  both	  from	  the	  scientific	  and	  from	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the	   regulatory	   point	   of	   view.	   Therefore,	   those	   efforts	   at	   rising	   public	   attention	   on	   the	  
clinical	  benefits	  of	  stem	  cells	  may	   indeed	  result	   in	  hyping	  the	  promise	  and	  downplaying	  
the	  difficulties	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation.	  What	  is	  worrisome	  about	  this	  tendency	  is	  its	  effect	  
on	   the	   democratic	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation.	   Public	   hype	   about	   stem	   cells	  
certainly	  played	  a	  positive	  role	  in	  securing	  public	  research	  funding	  in	  certain	  circumstance	  
(see	  the	  2004	  Proposition	  71	  referendum	  in	  California	  for	  example).	  But	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  it	  
has	  produced	  a	  climate	  of	  impatience	  towards	  the	  delivery	  of	  stem	  cell	  applications	  that,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  put	  pressure	  on	  innovators	  and	  investors	  while,	  on	  the	  other,	  created	  
the	   conditions	   for	   cunning	   practitioners	   to	   offer	   stem	   cell	   treatments	   to	   credulous	  
patients.	   In	   other	   words,	   an	   unfaithful	   picture	   of	   the	   state	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   is	  
conducive	  to	  an	  unbalanced	  public	  discourse	  on	  this	  complex	   issue,	   thus	  resulting	   in	  an	  
unfavourable	  climate	  and	  problematic	  social	  phenomena.	  	  
As	  to	  patients,	  they	  can	  indeed	  interact,	  for	  instance,	  with	  both	  ISSCR	  and	  ICMS	  in	  
seeking	  information	  about	  stem	  cell	  trials	  and	  clinics.	  To	  this	  point,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ISSCR	  
‘submit	  a	  clinic’	  initiative	  severed	  an	  emerging	  link	  between	  patients	  and	  academics	  that	  
might	  have	  been	  developed	   in	   fruitful	  directions27.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  however,	   those	  
latter	   forms	   of	   communication	   are	   scarcely	   symmetrical,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   one	   of	   the	  
speakers	  retains	  full	  epistemic	  authority	  over	  the	  other.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  the	  attitudes,	  
expectations	   and	   values	   of	   the	   patients	   that	   contact	   scientific	   societies	   are	   not	  
systematically	   and	   publicly	   reviewed,	   nor	   are	   their	   reactions	   to	   the	   information	   they	  
receive	   are	   monitored	   by	   independent	   observers.	   These	   latter	   activities,	   would	   be	  
convenient	   in	   view	   of	   gaining	   insight	   into	   the	   patients’	   own	   framing	   of	   stem	   cell	  
innovation.	  Such	   insight,	   I	  would	   like	  to	  suggest,	  would	   indeed	  be	  precious	   if	  eventually	  
used	  to	  inform	  deliberative	  exchange.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Giuseppe	  Testa	  for	  pointing	  out	  this	  idea.	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Along	   the	   same	   lines,	   interaction	   and	   symmetric	   consideration	   of	   discursive	  
contributions	  are	  likely	  to	  open	  up	  the	  regulatory	  process	  to	  the	  widest	  possible	  variety	  of	  
interests	   and	   viewpoints.	   This	   possibility	   has	   recently	   been	   proposed	   as	   a	   hallmark	   of	  
effective	   inclusive-­‐participatory	  processes	   (Stirling	   2008).	   In	   the	   vein	  of	   not	   considering	  
stem	   cell	   innovation	   as	   a	   pre-­‐determined,	   inevitable	   and	   locked-­‐in	   process,	   the	  
construction	   of	   regulatory	   order	   around	   stem	   cells	   should	   be	   favourable	   to	   the	  
emergence	   of	   «any	   inherent	   indeterminatcies,	   contingencies,	   or	   capacities	   for	   agency»	  
(ivi,	   279).	   Openness	   to	   diversity,	   both	   in	   the	   viewpoints	   about	   innovation	   and	   in	   the	  
language	  through	  the	  latter	  are	  expressed,	  is	  indeed	  conducive	  to	  the	  realisation	  of	  four	  
important	   features	   of	   legitimate	   democratic	   governance.	   First,	   diversity	   is	   more	   likely	  
than	   authoritative	   closure	   to	   result	   in	   increased	   levels	   of	   representativeness.	   Second,	  
deliberative	   decisions	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   rational	   through	   an	   open	   process	   of	   cross-­‐
checking	  of	   the	  available	  policy	  options,	   rather	   than	   through	  exclusive	  appropriation	  of	  
decisional	  power	  by	  individual	  stakeholders.	  Third,	  through	  opening	  up	  the	  public	  debate	  
to	   a	   variety	   of	   viewpoints,	   it	   is	   to	   some	   extent	   possible	   to	   anticipate	   or	   to	   prevent	  
conflicts	   arising	   form	   exclusions	   that	   are	   perceived	   as	   unjust	   and	   undermining	   of	  
democratic	  equality.	  Fourth	  and	  last	  advantage	  of	  openness,	  should	  a	  variety	  of	  interests,	  
value	  and	  ideas	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  a	  deliberative	  process,	  resulting	  decisions	  would	  
be	   democratically	  more	   justified.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   surplus	   of	   legitimation	   is	   that,	   in	  
ideal	   conditions,	  openness	   favours	  argumentative	  opting-­‐out	  over	  strategic	   framing-­‐out	  
of	   given	   policy	   options	   and	   innovation	   trajectories.	   In	   an	   ideal	   deliberative	   process,	   all	  
options	  are	   taken	   into	  consideration	  possibly	  without	  biases	   in	   favour	  or	  against	  any	  of	  
them.	   It	   is	   however	   through	   argumentative	   exchanges	   that,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process,	  
some	  options	  are	  discarded	  (argumentative	  opting-­‐out)	  and	  some	  others	  are	  retained	  and	  
eventually	   implemented.	  Furthermore	   it	   is	  also	  possible	  that,	   through	  deliberation,	  new	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political	  or	  technological	  options	  emerge,	  or	  initial	  ones	  are	  modified	  via	  non-­‐dominated	  
discursive	   exchange.	   This	   feature	   is	   thus	   intended	   to	   preserve	   policy-­‐making	   from	  
enacting	  democratic	  erosion	  (see	  supra,	  chapter	  1.7).	  	  
The	   public	   discourse	   about	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   is	   partially	   open	   to	   alternative	  
framings,	   values	   and	   imaginaries	   about	   the	   future	   of	   stem	   cell	  medicine.	  Nevertheless,	  
lack	  of	   interactivity	   and	   symmetry	   fosters	   an	   adversarial	   relationship	   among	  bearers	  of	  
different	   visions	   and	   contrasting	   interests.	   Furthermore,	   openness	   is	   incomplete	   with	  
respect	   to	   patients’	   voices	   and	   commercial	   actors,	  whose	   discourses	   lack	   publicity	   and	  
tend	  to	  remain	  hidden	  in	  the	  backstage.	  
Creating	   more	   structured	   occasions	   of	   deliberative	   engagement	   between	  
stakeholders	   should	   also	   be	   conducive	   to	   enhance	   social	   learning.	   This	   means	   that	  
different	  actors	  may	  end	  up	   learning	   from	  each-­‐other	  directly	   through	   sustained	  public	  
engagement.	   Together	  with	   interaction,	   symmetry	   and	   openness,	   social	   learning	   draws	  
on	  the	  democratic	  commitment	  of	  acknowledging	  all	  affected	  parties	  as	  free,	  equal	  and	  
equally	  entitled	  to	  have	  their	  voice	  heard	   in	  public	  deliberation.	  This	   is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
elusive	   cultural	   task	   of	   protecting	   associate	   life	   from	   democratic	   erosion,	   but	   it	   also	  
advantages	   stakeholders	   in	   giving	   them	   the	   opportunity	   of	   knowing	  more	   (and	   better)	  
about	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  political	  landscape	  in	  which	  they	  act.	  	  
Overall,	  however,	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation	  fares	  quite	  poorly	  with	  
respect	   to	   these	   ideals	   of	   deliberative	   democracy.	   Regulators,	   public	   funding	   agencies,	  
scientists,	   patients	   and	   the	   industry	   have	   not	   so	   far	   been	   engaged	   in	   meaningful	  
deliberative	  initiatives	  and	  thus,	  as	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine,	  they	  had	  but	  few	  and	  limited	  
chances	   of	   practicing	   the	   virtues	   of	   deliberative	   citizenship.	   Lay	   citizens,	   as	   well,	   have	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mainly	   been	   called	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   occasion	   of	   referenda	   about	   stem	   cell	   public	  
funding	  –	  indeed	  a	  deliberatively	  poor	  political	  activity.	  	  
5.2	  The	  democratic	  control	  of	  clinical	  innovation	  
My	  analyses	   in	   the	  previous	   section	  demonstrate	   that	   the	  emerging	  governance	  
regime	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  is	  sub-­‐optimal	  in	  deliberative	  respects.	  The	  main	  problem	  
that	  I	  see	  with	  the	  democratic	  character	  of	  stem	  cell	  governance	  (or	  the	  lack	  thereof)	   is	  
the	   preference	   afforded	   to	   a	   politically	   dangerous	  way	   of	   coping	  with	   uncertainty	   and	  
diversity	  of	  technological	  visions.	  At	  present,	  politically	  interested	  and	  active	  parties	  tend	  
to	  adopt	  muscular	   regulatory	  attitudes	   to	  expel	   those	   that	   they	  perceive	  as	  adversaries	  
from	  the	  territory	  of	  practicable	  innovation.	  Others,	  thus	  reacting	  through	  an	  analogous	  
strategy,	  contest	  the	  regulatory	  authority	  of	  public	  agencies	  and	  of	  some	  sectors	  of	   the	  
scientific	   establishment	   by	   discrediting	   their	   intentions	   on	   moral	   grounds	   and	   by	  
constructing	   their	   own	  ad	   hoc	   epistemological	   commitments.	   In	  my	   analysis,	   I	   tried	   to	  
remain	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  oppositions	  –	  political	  and	  scientific	  –	  that	  I	  described.	  
This	   neutrality	   followed	   through	   in	  my	   deliberative	   assessment	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	  
governance.	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  very	  general	  political	  indications	  in	  the	  
last	  section	  that,	  as	  the	  reader	  will	  have	  noticed,	  were	  more	  procedural	  that	  substantive	  
in	  character.	  My	  main	  aim	  here,	   is	  to	  stress	  once	  again	  that	  ‘framing-­‐out’	  the	  activity	  of	  
stakeholders	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  adversaries	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  a	  stabilised/normalised	  
governance	  of	   innovation.	  In	  our	  case	  this	   is	  true	  even	  of	  framings	  that	  I,	  personally,	  do	  
not	   find	  attractive	   from	  both	  a	   scientific	  and	  an	  ethical	  point	  of	   view.	  According	   to	   the	  
normative	   outlook	   that	   I	   decided	   to	   adopt	   as	   a	   methodological	   tool	   for	   my	   analyses,	  
policy	  dispensations	  that	  are	  the	  result	  of	   framing-­‐out	  activities,	  are	  conducive	  to	  much	  
less	  accountable	  outcomes	  than	  other,	  deliberation-­‐friendly	  strategies.	  According	  to	  the	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ideal	  of	   free	  and	  unconstrained	  circulation	  of	  discourses,	  a	   regulatory	   regime	  would	  be	  
much	  more	   legitimate	   if	   it	   resulted	   from	   fair	   deliberation.	   As	   far	   as	   possible,	   strategic	  
framing-­‐out	  should	  thus	  be	  replaced	  by	  argumentative	  opting-­‐out	  of	  innovation	  options.	  
This	  means	  that,	  if	  a	  given	  trajectory	  of	  innovation	  is	  discarded,	  an	  argument-­‐based	  public	  
rationale	  is	  provided	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  relative	  power	  positions	  of	  the	  speakers.	  In	  
ideal	   deliberative	   conditions,	   actors	   do	   not	   compete	   for	   power	   but	   for	   persuasion	  
through	   justifying	   discourses.	   In	   tune	  with	   the	   ideals	   of	   deliberative	   engagement,	   “the	  
reciprocal	  requirement	  to	  put	  forward	  reasons	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  challenges	  will	  tend	  to	  
eliminate	   irrational	   preferences	   based	   on	   false	   empirical	   beliefs,	   morally	   repugnant	  
preferences	   […]	   and	   narrowly	   self-­‐regarding	   preferences”	   (Smith	   and	   Wales,	   2000)28.	  
Obviously,	  abiding	  by	  this	  very	  abstract	  ideal	   is	  problematic.	  But	  I	  have	  specified	  criteria	  
and	   virtues	   that,	   allegedly,	   correspond	   to	   the	   ideal	   and	  may	   thus	   facilitate	   its	   –	   always	  
tentative,	  partial	  and	  provisional	  –	  realisation	  into	  real	  political	  life.	  	  
Deliberatively	   oriented	   initiatives	   could	   contribute	   to	   a	   more	   democratically	  
accountable	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   especially	   in	   the	   face	   of	   present	  
uncertainties	   about	   its	   realisation.	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   is	   advisable	   that	   interested	  
stakeholders,	   upon	   their	   own	   initiative	   or	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   dedicated	  political	   stimuli	  
engage	   in	  more	   frankly	   deliberative	   activities	   to	   foster	   the	   creation	   of	   less	   adversarial	  
conditions	  for	  techno-­‐scientific	  innovation.	  	  
Obviously,	   as	   highlighted	   in	   the	   case	   of	   scientific	   technology	   appraisal	   (Jasanoff	  
1990),	   also	   participatory	   deliberation	   is	   sensitive	   to	   framing	   (Stirling,	   2008,	   275).	   This	  
does	  not	  undermine,	  however,	  the	  value	  of	  spending	  political	  efforts	  on	  trying	  to	  mitigate	  
the	   erosive	   consequences	   of	   framing-­‐out	   strategies	   in	   controversies	   about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  also	  Miller	  1992	  on	  the	  “moralising	  effects	  of	  public	  discussion.	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biotechnological	  and	  biomedical	  innovation.	  Even	  more	  so,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  promising	  fields	  
of	  biomedical	  research	  the	  systemic	  political	  effects	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  innovation	  bear	  
consequences	   on	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   patients	   and	   research	   subjects,	   thus	   calling	   for	   an	  
even	  more	  pressing	  commitment	  towards	  responsible	  and	  accountable	  policy-­‐making.	  	  
In	   the	  case	  of	  stem	  cell	   innovation,	   this	   translates	   in	   resorting	   to	  deliberation	   to	  
tackle	   the	   emerging	   sticking	   points	   of	   the	   field,	   that	   is,	   primarily,	   the	   concern	   that	  
commercial	  interest,	  albeit	  legitimate,	  may	  outweigh	  considerations	  of	  safety	  and	  respect	  
for	   patients	   and	   research	   subjects’	   autonomy.	   To	   this	   aim,	   technology	   assessment	   (TA)	  
has	   developed	   ways	   to	   cope	   with	   discrepant	   stakeholders’	   framings	   in	   deliberatively	  
accountable	  terms	  –	  as	  the	  coming	  sub-­‐section	  illustrates.	  I	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  thus	  show	  
how	   participatory	   and	   constructive	   TA	   could	   serve	   the	   aims	   of	   fostering	   democratic	  
accountability	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation.	  	  
5.2.1	  The	  technological	  assessment	  of	  biomedical	  innovation	  
Technology	   assessment	   (TA)	   is	   the	   activity,	   typically	   conducted	   within	  
parliamentary	   bodies,	   whereby	   technological	   options	   are	   evaluated	   and	   their	  
consequences	   are	   discussed	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   bringing	   their	   evolution	   and	   development	  
under	  various	  forms	  of	  political	  control.	  
TA	   emerged	   in	   the	   late	   Sixties,	  mainly	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   ever	  more	   pressing	  
environmental	  concerns	  and	  under	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  increased	  public	  justification	  
for	   science-­‐related	  policy	   choices.	   The	  beginning	  of	   TA	  as	   an	   institutionalised	  activity	   is	  
generally	   placed	   in	   1972,	   when	   the	   Office	   of	   Technology	   Assessment	   was	   established	  
within	   the	   US	   Congress29.	   About	   ten	   years	   later,	   a	   number	   of	   European	   parliaments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	   I	   cannot	   go	   into	   the	   details	   of	   the	   OTA	   activities	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   See	   (Bimber	   and	   Guston	   1995;	  
Bimber	  1996)	  for	  reference.	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adopted	  analogous	  dedicated	  departments	  to	  cope	  with	  activities	  of	  TA30.	  TA	  is	  thus	  to	  be	  
intended	   as	   a	   mandated	   activity	   that,	   generally,	   is	   prompted	   by	   a	   political	   actor	   and	  
implemented	  either	  by	  this	  actor	  itself	  (as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  early	  parliamentary	  TA)	  or	  by	  
co-­‐opted	  specialists	  and	  stakeholders.	  	  
The	  overall	   inspiration	  of	  TA	  comes	   from	  the	  perceived	  necessity	   to	  “reduce	  the	  
human	  costs	  of	  trial	  and	  error	  learning	  in	  society’s	  handling	  of	  new	  technologies,	  and	  to	  
do	   so	   by	   anticipating	   potential	   impacts	   and	   feeding	   these	   insights	   back	   into	   decision	  
making,	  and	  into	  actors’	  strategies”	  (Schot	  and	  Rip	  ,	  251).	  
The	  aims	  of	  TA	  are	  multifarious.	  They	  comprise	  a	  number	  of	  objectives	  that	  should	  
constitute	  the	  core	  of	  decision	  making	  processes	  about	  science	  and	  technology,	  and	  they	  
originally	   include:	   strengthening	   the	   influence	   of	   public	   decision-­‐makers	   by	   firstly	  
providing	   them	   with	   the	   necessary	   information	   about	   scientific	   innovation	   and	  
technological	   phenomena;	   exploring	   available	   technological	   alternatives	   and	   assessing	  
them;	   providing	   more	   legitimate	   and	   politically	   more	   accountable	   policy	   decisions;	  
alerting	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  the	  public	  about	  undesirable	  consequences	  of	  technology	  as	  
early	   as	   possible;	   supporting	   and	   stimulating	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	   groups’	   visions	  
about	   technological	   development;	   sustaining	   the	  development	  of	   socially	   desirable	   and	  
useful	   technologies;	  promoting	  public	  acceptance	  of	   science	  and	   technology;	  uplifting	  a	  
self-­‐reflexive	   attitude	   in	   scientists	   and	   innovators	   about	   their	   social	   responsibilities	  
(adapted	  from	  van	  EiJndhoven,	  1997,	  270).	  Overall,	  the	  final	  product	  of	  TA	  initiatives	  is	  a	  
series	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  legislators,	  who	  mandate	  the	  initiatives	  in	  the	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  The	  list	  of	  countries	  that	   initially	  engaged	  in	  TA	  at	  the	  parliamentary	  level	  comprises:	  Denmark,	  France,	  
Germany,	  The	  Netherlands,	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament	   (Vig	  and	  Paschen	  2000).	  Other	  
countries	  in	  the	  European	  area	  have	  more	  recently	  adopted	  TA	  departments,	  and	  joined	  the	  latter	  to	  form	  
European	   Parliamentary	   Technology	   Assessment	   (EPTA)	   network,	   namely:	   Catalonia,	   Finland,	   Flanders,	  
Greece,	  Italy,	  Norway,	  Sweden	  and	  Switzerland.	  This	  testifies	  of	  the	  widespread	  realisation	  that	  technology	  
has	  important	  social	  and	  political	  consequences	  that,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  had	  to	  be	  coped	  with	  in	  politically	  
accountable	  way.	  For	  details	  about	  parliamentary	  TA	  in	  Europe	  see	  (Vig	  and	  Paschen	  2000).	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place,	  are	  variously	  committed	  to	  take	  into	  account.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  however,	  that	  TA	  
initiatives	  result	  in	  new	  legislation.	  
As	  one	  can	  grasp	  form	  this	  brief	  description,	  the	  theoretical	  background	  of	  TA,	  as	  
well	  as	   its	  various	   realisations,	   stress	   the	   joint	  evolution	  of	   technology	  and	  society	   thus	  
going	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   co-­‐production	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   scientific	   and	  
technological	  phenomena,	  and	  with	  a	  deliberative-­‐participatory	  appraisal	  of	  democratic	  
policy	  on	  science	  and	  technology	  (Schot	  and	  Rip	  1996;	  Guston	  and	  Sarewitz	  2002).	  	  
Moreover,	   TA	   is	   often	   described	   has	   having	   to	   do	   with	   tackling	   what	   has	   been	  
called	  the	  Collingridge	  dilemma	  (Collingridge	  1980).	  In	  his	  1980	  book	  on	  the	  social	  control	  
of	   technology,	   social	   scientist	   David	   Collingridge	   famously	   depicted	   the	   governance	   of	  
technological	   innovation	   as	   being	   impaired	   by	   the	   unpredictable	   trajectories	   that	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  is	  open	  to	  take,	  both	  at	  the	  technical	  and,	  a	  fortiori,	  at	  
the	   societal	   level;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   Collingridge	   also	   observed	   that,	   once	   fully	  
developed	   and	   socially	   entrenched,	   technologies	   are	   unlikely	   to	   lend	   themselves	   to	  
political	   steering	   initiatives	   and	   control	   –	   thus	   putting	   politics	   in	   front	   of	   a	   governance	  
dilemma.	  Therefore,	  regulating	  innovation	  early	  on	  is	  made	  difficult	  by	  the	  uncertainties	  
and	   the	   unknowns	   that	   surround	   technological	   development;	   however,	   intervening	   to	  
create	  a	  governance	  regime	  around	  a	  given	  technology	  once	  it	  has	  emerged	  is	   impaired	  
by	  the	  fact	  that	  technologies,	  once	  available,	  rapidly	  shape	  widespread	  social	  practices.	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   Collingridge	   dilemma	   affects	   the	   development	   of	   stem	   cell	  
medicine	  in	  a	  very	  direct	  way.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	   is	  presently	  hard	  to	  anticipate	  where	  
and	  how	  the	  technological	  platform	  of	  stem	  cells	   is	  going	  to	  deliver	   its	  applicative	  fruits	  
and	  how	  the	  latter	  are	  going	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  life	  of	  future	  patients.	  On	  the	  other,	  we	  saw	  
that	   the	   risk	   of	   socio-­‐technical	   lock-­‐ins	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   likely	   result	   of	   involved	   actors’	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framing	  strategies.	  For	  this	  reason,	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  seems	  to	  fit	  well	  the	  application	  
of	  TA,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  work	  out	  the	  difficulties	  the	  dilemma	  tries	  to	  capture.	  
5.2.2	  Participation	  through	  technology	  assessment	  
TA	  has	  developed	  in	  many	  diverse	  strands,	  and	  has	  proposed	  and	  implemented	  a	  
number	  of	  strategies	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  dilemma31.	  
Of	   relevance	   to	   the	   analyses	   that	   I	   developed	   in	   the	   previous	   sections,	  
participatory	   TA	   (Joss	   and	   Bellucci	   2002)	   certainly	   has	   some	   suggestions	   to	   offer	   as	   to	  
how	   a	   climate	   of	   public	   consensus	   and	   social	   responsiveness	   could	   support	   the	  
development	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  The	  core	  tenet	  of	  the	  participatory	  strand	  of	  TA	  is	  the	  
idea	   that	   technology	  assessment	   initiatives	   should	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  way	   to	  “empower	  
democracy	   in	   influencing	   the	   directions	   taken	   in	   technological	   development”	   (van	  
Eijndoven,	   1997,	   258).	   The	   focus	   is	   thus	   on	   effective	   methods	   to	   foster	   public	  
engagement	   of	   lay	   citizens	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   technological	   options	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  
creating	   socially	   robust	   conditions	   around	   scientific	   and	   technical	   novelties.	  Moreover,	  
participatory	  TA	  may	  well	  inform	  legislation,	  but	  it	  need	  not	  be	  conceived	  as	  undermining	  
the	  constitutional	  privileges	  of	  elected	  representatives.	  
Various	   methods	   have	   been	   used	   to	   involve	   the	   pubic	   in	   deliberative	   exercises	  
about	   technology	   in	   the	   recent	   past.	   They	   range	   from	   focus	   groups,	   consensus	  
conferences,	   citizens’	   panels	   (Burgess,	   O’Doherty	   2008,	   Fishkin,	   Luskin	   &	   Jowell	   2000,	  
Fowler	  and	  Allison	  2008),	  public	  consultations	  (Fiorino	  1990),	  scenario	  workshops	  (Ogilvy	  
200),	   citizens’	   juries	   (Smith	   and	  Wales	   2000),	   citizen’s	   review	   panels	   (Wakeford	   2002),	  
open-­‐space	  methods	   (Owen	  1997),	   elicitation	   techniques	  and	  public	   surveys	   (McKewon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	   It	   is	   generally	   assumed	   that	   TA	   comprises	   a	   number	   of	   variants	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   focus	   of	   their	  
interests	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  follows:	  expert	  TA,	  participatory	  TA	  (also	  known	  as	  public	  TA	  or	  Danish	  model),	  
parliamentary	  TA,	  constructive	  TA	  (or	  Netherlands	  model),	  health	  TA.	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and	   Thomas	   1988;	   Fransella	   et	   al	   2004).	   Being	   TA	   eminently	   initiated	   via	   political	  
initiative,	  choosing	  among	  this	  array	  of	  participatory	  techniques	  without	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  
the	  specific	  political,	  social	  and	  scientific	  context	  in	  which	  such	  participatory	  TA	  should	  be	  
pursued	  would	   be	   a	   scholastic	   exercise.	  However,	   I	  would	   suggest	   that	   political	   actors,	  
such	  as	   regulatory	  bodies	   (e.g.	  EMA	  or	  FDA)	  and	  parliaments	  could	  act	  as	   facilitators	  of	  
inclusive-­‐participatory	   initiatives	   aimed	   at	   highlighting	   stakes	   and	   hurdles	   of	   stem	   cell	  
innovation	  and,	  eventually,	  provide	  recommendations	  for	  their	  political	  handling.	  
One	   possibility,	   among	  many	   other	   feasible	   ones,	   is	   to	   involve	   citizens	   in	   what	  
have	   been	   called	   ‘citizens’	   juries’	   (Smith	   and	   Wales	   2000)	   or	   ‘planning	   cells’	  
(Planungzellen)	   as	   they	   are	   labelled	   in	  Germany.	  A	   citizen	   jury,	   similar	   to	   juries	   in	   legal	  
contexts,	  is	  a	  group	  of	  citizens	  selected	  randomly	  or	  according	  to	  representational	  criteria	  
that	   vary	   from	   case	   to	   case.	   Those	   who	   accept	   to	   sit	   in	   the	   jury	   are	   engaged	   in	   a	  
deliberative	   exercise.	   Typically,	   citizens’	   juries	   amount	   to	   twelve	   to	   twenty-­‐five	   people	  
who	  convene	  in	  a	  dedicated	  location	  for	  two	  to	  four	  days.	  Participants	  are	  provided	  with	  
information	  materials	   to	   let	   them	  become	   familiar	  with	   the	   issue	  under	  discussion	   and	  
are	  exposed	  to	  expert	  witnesses	  and	  stakeholders’	  reports.	  Following	  this	  initially	  passive	  
phase,	  the	  jury	  starts	  discussing	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  a	  moderator.	  In	  this	  phase,	  jurors	  
are	   allowed	   to	   interrogate	   experts	   and	   stakeholders,	   including	   –	   if	   they	   deem	   it	  
appropriate	   –	   those	   that	   were	   not	   initially	   involved	   in	   the	   initiative.	   In	   the	   next	   step,	  
jurors	  deliberate	  about	  the	  issue	  and	  produce	  a	  report	  that	  contains	  recommendations	  to	  
the	   sponsoring	   institution	   as	   to	   how	   to	   act	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   matter	   at	   stake.	   The	  
promoting	   institution,	   is	   then	  supposed	  to	   reply	   to	   this	  document	  and/or	   to	   implement	  
those	  recommendations	  into	  policies	  or	  guidance	  documents.	  The	  whole	  process	  is	  public	  
(it	  can	  include	  observers	  from	  the	  media)	  and	  is	  steered	  by	  the	  moderator	  in	  an	  unbiased	  
way.	   To	   ensure	   this	   latter	   characteristic,	   rules	   of	   discussion	   can	   also	   be	   established	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beforehand	  in	  a	  preliminary	  meeting	  between	  organizers,	  promoters	  and	  selected	  jurors	  
(see	  for	  example	  Boniolo	  and	  Di	  Fiore,	  2010).	  	  
According	   to	   the	   accumulated	   experience	   on	   the	   use	   of	   citizens’	   juries32,	   this	  
instrument	  proved	  useful	  in	  a	  number	  of	  respects.	  A	  major	  advantage	  of	  participatory	  TA	  
initiatives	   is	   to	   stimulate	   the	   formation	  of	  political	  opinions	   that	  may	  not	  be	  present	   in	  
the	  citizenry	  beforehand.	  The	  public	  character	  of	  participatory	  TA	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  
be	   a	   vehicle	   fostering	   the	   formation	   of	   opinion,	   and	   eventually	   of	   political	   will,	   of	   lay	  
citizens	   about	   technological	   innovation.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation,	   the	  
public	  may	  not	  have	  already	  fully	  formed	  ideas	  about	  the	  stakes	  of	  this	  technology	  and	  its	  
impact	  of	   society	  and	   individuals.	   In	   this	   respect,	   TA	   can	  encourage	  a	  public	  debate	  on	  
matters	  that,	  otherwise,	  may	  remain	  hidden	  to	  the	  public	  eye.	  The	  emergence	  of	  public	  
debate	  is	  thus	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  political	  legitimation	  whereby	  the	  interests	  and	  
the	  reasons	  of	  innovators	  are	  brought	  to	  interact	  with	  wider	  societal	  concerns	  and	  needs.	  
Especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  technologies	  that,	  like	  stem	  cells,	  present	  various	  levels	  of	  ethical	  
and	  societal	  implication,	  the	  expected	  result	  of	  this	  engagement	  between	  innovators	  and	  
society	  at	  large	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  politically	  more	  stable	  climate	  around	  innovation,	  one	  
that	   is	   conducive	   to	   a	   more	   efficient	   management	   of	   possible	   controversies	   and	  
disagreements.	  
Participatory	   TA	   initiatives	   should	   be	   oriented	   to	   build	   widespread	   public	  
awareness	  about	  the	  problems	  and	  opportunities	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation,	  and	  should	  thus	  
primarily	   be	   directed	   to	   involve	   lay	   citizens.	   It	   can	   thus	   be	   up	   to	   the	   latter	   to	   actively	  
include	  all	  interested	  and	  affected	  parties	  in	  their	  assessment	  activities,	  from	  scientists	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	   The	   Jefferson	   Institute	   in	   the	   US,	   the	   Research	   Institute	   of	   Citizen	   Participation	   in	   Germany,	   and	   the	  
Institute	  of	  Public	  Policy	  Research,	  the	  King’s	  Fund	  Policy	  Institute	  and	  the	  Local	  Government	  Management	  
Board	  in	  the	  UK	  have	  run	  several	  participatory-­‐deliberative	  initiatives	  with	  citizens’	  juries.	  For	  reference	  see	  
Stuart,	  Coote	  and	  Kendall	  1994	  and	  Coote	  and	  Lenaghan	  1997.	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clinical	  researcher,	  from	  practitioners	  to	  patients.	  To	  this	   latter	  group,	   it	   is	  not	  said	  that	  
patients	  are	  already	  organised	  as	  a	  structured	  group,	  with	  clear	  interests,	  objectives	  and	  
identities.	   I	   thus	   reckon	   it	   is	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   that	   the	  participatory	   exercise	  
helps	  patients	  organise	  and	  speak	  out	  their	  visions	  about	  technological	  changes	  that	  may	  
affect	  them.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  foster	  their	  direct	  inclusion	  and	  closer	  collaboration	  
both	  as	  research	  subjects	  and	  possible	  future	  users	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine.	  To	  this	  end	  it	  is	  
critical	   that,	   through	   the	   participatory	   exercise	   itself,	   their	   interests,	   viewpoints	   and	  
identity	   acquire	   a	   more	   structured	   and	   publicly	   visible	   articulation.	   In	   other	   words,	   a	  
primary	  outcome	  of	  participatory	   TA	   initiatives	   should	  be	  of	   letting	  patients	   emerge	  as	  
key	   players	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation.	  Where	   this	   happened	   in	   the	  past,	   patients’	   groups	  
proved	  able	  to	  help	  biomedical	  development	  financially,	  by	  campaigning	  for	  fund	  raising,	  
scientifically	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  credibility	  (Callon	  and	  Law	  1982;	  Epstein	  1998;	  Epstein	  
2007;	   Callon	   and	   Rabeharisoa	   2008;	   Epstein	   and	   Peters	   2009).	   Moreover,	   different	  
patients’	   groups	  may	  develop	  different	   ethical	   stakes,	   both	   in	   participation	   to	   research	  
and	  as	  final	  users	  of	  future	  medical	  technologies,	  that	  current	  ethical	  standards	  and	  self-­‐
contained	   guidance	   documents	   can	   hardly	   be	   aware	   of.	   Patients	   can	   thus	   represent	   a	  
precious	   ally	   of	   scientific	   and	   medical	   development	   of	   stem	   cells	   both	   as	   self-­‐aware	  
research	  subjects	  and	  interested	  users.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  identities,	  political	  positions	  and	  wills	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  are	  likely	  to	  
form	   within	   the	   participatory	   TA	   exercise,	   instead	   of	   being	   fully	   available	   before	   it,	   is	  
consistent	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   deliberation	   is	   a	   process	  whereby	   reasons	   are	   exchanged	  
and	  initial	  opinions	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  modified	  through	  this	  exchange.	  It	  is	  thus	  enacting	  a	  
distinctive	   feature	   of	   deliberative	   democracy	   that	   participatory	   TA	   is	   expected	   to	   bring	  
legitimation	  to	  the	  democratic	  handling	  of	  technological	  development.	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5.2.3	  Constructive	  technology	  assessment	  
The	  importance	  of	  technology	  users	  as	  active	  determinants	  of	  innovation	  has	  been	  
stressed	   by	   another	   strand	   of	   TA,	   one	   that	   goes	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   constructive	  
technology	   assessment	   (CTA)	   (Rip,	   Schot,	   and	   Misa	   1995;	   Smits,	   Leyten,	   and	   Hertog	  
1995).	  The	  latter,	  also	  seems	  well	  equipped	  to	  steer	  the	  emergence	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  
towards	  a	  socially	  accountable	  and	  more	  robust	  development33.	  
The	  main	   tenet	   of	   CTA	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   role	   of	   stakeholders	   should	   not	   be	  
limited	   to	   the	   anticipatory	   appraisal	   of	   a	   given	   technological	   development	   (like	   in	  
canonical	   TA).	   Rather,	   according	   to	   CTA,	   the	   societal	   aspects	   of	   scientific	   and	  
technological	   novelties	   should	   be,	   and	   can	   in	   various	   ways	   be	   translated	   into	   actual	  
design	  criteria	  for	  the	  technology	  under	  consideration.	  	  
CTA	   is	   thus	   conceived	   to	   let	   interested	   stakeholders	   directly	   participate	   in	   the	  
framing	  of	  a	  technological	   innovation,	   in	  response	  to	  both	  the	  visions	  of	   innovators	  and	  
the	   necessities	   of	   societies.	   As	   stem	   cells	   are	   beginning	   their	   journey	   towards	   clinical	  
application,	   more	   doubts	   than	   certainties	   insist	   on	   the	   exact	   development	   of	   their	  
technological	   trajectory.	   This	   feature	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   complex	   and,	   as	   yet,	  
uncertain	  governance	  of	  this	  early	  phase	  of	  clinical	  translation.	  Therefore,	  the	  possibility	  
of	  influencing	  the	  very	  technical	  development	  of	  technology	  seems	  particularly	  important	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   technological	   platforms	   that,	   like	   stem	   cells,	   as	   yet	   do	   not	   provide	   clear	  
indications	  as	  to	  which	  application	  they	  will	  provide	  and	  with	  which	  direct	  consequences,	  
both	  positive	  and	  negative,	  on	  people’s	  lives.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  CTA	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  specific	  approach	  to	  technology	  assessment	  taken	  by	  this	  activity	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  
in	   the	   early	   Eighties.	   I	   do	   not	   have	   space	   here	   to	   reconstruct	   this	   historical	   development,	   nor	   to	   let	   the	  
reader	  appreciate	   its	  peculiarities	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  strands	  of	  TA.	  For	  more	  detailed	  reference	  about	  
these	  topics,	  see	  (van	  Eijndoven	  1996;	  Schot	  and	  Rip	  1997)	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CTA	  needs	  not	   take	  place	  at	   the	   level	  of	   representative	   institutions	  or	  executive	  
powers.	  Even	  though	  institutionalisation	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  CTA,	  this	  approach	  
to	  technological	  appraisal	  emphasises	  the	  fact	  that	  members	  of	  the	  civil	  society,	  variously	  
organised,	   can	   bring	   legitimation	   to	   policy	   decisions	   from	   outside	   traditional	   political	  
institutions.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  propensity	  of	  deliberation	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  
middle	  democracy	  (Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  1996).	  To	  this	  point	  it	  is	  worth	  recalling	  that	  
IFOM-­‐IEO	   (the	   research	   institution	   I	   work	   at)	   recently	   elaborated	   specific	   guidelines	   to	  
foster	  deliberative	  engagement	  with	  external	  stakeholders	  (Boniolo	  and	  Di	  Fiore,	  2010)34.	  
What	   is	   interesting	   about	   this	   initiative	   is	   that	   deliberation	   on	   the	   social	   and	   ethical	  
consequences	   of	   biomedical	   research	   occurs	   directly	   at	   the	   site	  where	   that	   research	   is	  
generated	   experimentally	   and	   translated	   clinically	   into	   hopefully	   successful	   new	  
treatments.	   I	   contend	   that	   this	  kind	  of	  activities	   is	  praiseworthy,	  and	   likely	   to	  stimulate	  
public	   awareness	  about	   the	  aims	  and	  methods	  of	  biomedical	   innovation.	   The	  proactive	  
involvement	  of	   scientific	   institutions	  at	   the	   level	  of	  deliberative	  exchange	  with	   relevant	  
stakeholders	   and	   the	   public,	   I	   believe,	   is	   bound	   to	   augment	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   public	  
accountability	  of	  innovation	  irrespective	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  takes	  place	  outside	  traditional	  
political	  locations.	  
I	  am	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  the	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  innovation	  could	  be	  brought	  
under	  more	  accountable	  political	   control	   through	  similar	  activities	  and,	   in	  particular,	  by	  
means	  of	  a	  CTA-­‐based	  approach	  to	  technological	  assessment.	  	  
Within	   the	   toolbox	   of	   CTA,	   one	  methodology	   seems	   particularly	   apt	   at	   realising	  
the	   purpose	   of	   direct	   stakeholder	   involvement	   in	   the	   discussion	   and	   planning	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  In	  November	  2011,	  IFOM-­‐IEO	  has	  also	  launched	  the	  “YouScientist”	  platform,	  that	  is,	  a	  programme	  aimed	  
at	   engaging	   lay	   citizens	   within	   the	   research	   institute	   to	   spread	   public	   awareness	   about	   the	   making	   of	  
scientific	  knowledge	  and	  its	  translation	  to	  the	  clinic.	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technological	  options:	  strategic	  niche	  management	  (Kemp,	  Schot,	  and	  Hoogma	  1998)	  can	  
be	  the	  basis	  for	  constructing	  a	  more	  accountable	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  medicine	  in	  the	  
coming	  years.	  	  
Strategic	  niche	  management	  (SNM)	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  creation,	  development	  and	  
controlled	   phase-­‐out	   of	   protected	   spaces	   for	   the	   development	   and	   use	   of	   promising	  
technologies	  by	  means	  of	  experimentation”	  (Kemp,	  Schot,	  and	  Hoogma	  1998,	  186).	  This	  
activity	  points	  at	  a	  number	  of	  expected	  outcomes.	   In	  particular,	   it	  aims	  at	  assessing	  the	  
social	  desirability	  of	  the	  available	  technological	  options,	  primarily	  through	  learning	  about	  
stakeholders’	   expectations	   and	   interests	   directly	   from	   the	   TA	   process.	   Furthermore,	   it	  
fosters	   to	   stimulate	   social	   changes	   that	   are	   necessary	   for	   the	   correct	   diffusion	   of	   a	  
technology	  according	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  relevant	  stakeholders	  (ibidem).	  Therefore,	  in	  
general	   terms,	   the	   aim	   of	   strategic	   niche	   management	   has	   been	   defined	   as	   “the	  
construction	   of	   a	   constituency	   behind	   a	   product	   –	   of	   firms,	   researchers	   and	   public	  
authorities.	  (ibidem).	  
SNM	   is	   thus	   to	   be	   conceived	   as	   an	   interactive	   process	   whereby	   different	  
stakeholders	  join	  forces	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  pilot	  experiment	  with	  a	  new	  technology	  and	  
contribute	   to	   the	  definition	  of	   technological	   options.	   This	   activity	   is	   therefore	  aimed	  at	  
integrating	   stakeholders’	   visions	   in	   the	   very	   fabric	   of	   the	   technology	   itself.	   A	   field	   of	  
innovation	   like	   stem	  cell	  medicine,	   that	   I	  presented	  as	  particularly	  unstable	   in	   terms	  of	  
design,	   would	   thus	   benefit	   from	   interactive,	   public	   and	   inclusive	   experiments	   in	   SNM.	  
Furthermore,	  being	  biomedical	  innovation	  traditionally	  attained	  through	  clinical	  trials,	  the	  
field	  easily	  lends	  itself	  to	  pilot	  experiments	  where	  inclusion	  and	  participation	  play	  a	  new	  
constructive	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  stem	  cell	  products.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  however,	  
given	   the	   present	   contested	   framing	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   through	   state-­‐controlled	  
clinical	  research,	  this	  kind	  of	  CTA	  may	  also	  encounter	  some	  resistance.	  However,	  should	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clinical	  trials	  with	  stem	  cells	  (or	  at	  least	  a	  few	  of	  them)	  be	  performed	  under	  the	  guiding	  
principles	  of	  inclusive	  and	  publicly	  visible	  CTA,	  the	  burden	  would	  be	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  
critics	  to	  display	  similar	   levels	  of	  commitment	  towards	  public	  accountability	  and	  respect	  
for	   the	   expectations	   of	   concerned	   publics,	   and	   patients	   in	   particular.	   By	   enlarging	   the	  
scope	   of	   participating	   stakeholders	   beyond	   public	   regulators	   and	   industry-­‐backed	  
scientists	  to	  patients’	  groups	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  SNM	  could	  thus	  raise	  
the	  democratic	  quality	  of	  innovation	  development	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  accountability,	  
thus	   feeding	   public	   credibility	   and	   social	   robustness	   into	   the	   early	   phase	   of	   stem	   cell	  
medicine.	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   also	   expected	   that	   SNM,	   and	   CTA	   in	   general,	   be	   conducive	   to	   a	  
better	   appraisal	   of	   the	   cultural,	   psychological	   and	   social	   dimensions	   of	   technological	  
change	  –	  which,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  biomedical	  innovation,	  is	  of	  substantive	  political	  advantage	  
(ivi,	  190).	  A	  further	  benefit	  of	  SNM	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  during	  the	  pilot	  experiments,	  enabling	  
conditions,	   both	   organisational	   and	   economic,	   are	   discussed	   among	   stakeholders	   at	   an	  
early	   phase	   of	   technological	   development.	   This	   is	   of	   the	   utmost	   importance	   for	   a	  
biomedical	   technology	   that	   is	   not	   only	   expected	   to	   become	   entrenched	   into	   already	  
existing	   and	   already	   complex	   health-­‐care	   systems,	   but	   also	   promises	   to	   potentially	  
change	  health-­‐care	  provision	  in	  quite	  substantial	  ways.	  	  
According	   to	   CTA,	   such	   experiments	   should	   thus	   promote	   the	   building	   of	   new	  
networks	   that	   are	   able	   to	   shape	   the	   direction	   of	   technological	   change	   in	   socially	  
accountable	  ways.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  two	  sections	  I	  suggested	  that	  stakeholders,	  expert	  communities,	  citizens	  
and	   public	   regulators	   can	   be	   brought	   together	   via	   their	   common	   involvement	   in	  
	  228	  
technology	   assessment	   activities.	   The	   outcome	   of	   such	   initiatives	   needs	   not	   be	   new	  
legislation,	  although	  this	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  organisation	  of	  
publicly	   visible	  workshops	   and	   deliberative	   venues,	   or	   the	   production	   of	   public	   reports	  
and	  white	  papers	  are	  in	  themselves	  interesting	  ways	  of	  stimulating	  public	  awareness	  and	  
complementing	   the	   traditional	   mechanisms	   of	   democratic	   decision-­‐making	   in	   complex	  
areas	  such	  as	  scientific	  innovation	  and	  technological	  development.	  
In	   general	   I	   take	   TA	   as	   promoting	   a	   much	   needed	   democratic	   culture	   of	  
participation	   about	   the	   development	   of	   science	   and	   technology.	   Traditional	   political	  
institutions	   and	   regulatory	   bodies	   may	   retain	   their	   politically	   legitimating	   function	   by	  
mandating	  and	  coordinating	  these	  activities	  themselves.	  Alternatively,	  the	  organisation	  of	  
social	   appraisal	   of	   technological	   change	   can	   stem	  directly	   from	   interested	   parties,	   thus	  
building	   civil	   society	   as	   a	   powerful	   democratic	   location	   for	   social	   learning	   and	  
deliberation.	  	  
Irrespective	   of	   the	   level	   of	   political	   institutionalisation,	   TA	   can	   however	   engage	  
wider	   publics	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   and,	   hopefully,	   contain	   the	  
erosive	   risks	   of	   current	   framing	   efforts.	   In	   particular,	   through	   participatory	   and	  
constructive	  TA,	  whether	  politically	  mandated	  or	  not,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  attain	  higher	  
levels	   of	   accountability	   to	   the	   early	   efforts	   at	   translating	   stem	   cells	   into	   clinical	  
applications.	  	  
Such	   exercises	   in	   technological	   forecasting	   and	   political	   anticipation	   are	   made	  
necessary	  by	  the	  adversarial	  character	  of	  older	  controversies	  about	  embryonic	  research	  
and	  early	  disputes	  about	  translational	  trajectories.	  Certainly,	   the	  platform-­‐like	  character	  
of	  stem	  cell	  technologies	  makes	  it	  problematic	  to	  anticipate	  where	  exactly	  and	  how	  stem	  
cells	  will	  be	  used	  with	  respect	  to	  patients.	  But	  this,	  far	  from	  undermining	  the	  value	  of	  TA-­‐
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based	  governance,	  makes	   it	  even	  more	  urgent	  that	  we	  find	  ways	  to	  cope	  with	   inherent	  
uncertainties	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   responsive	   to	   perceived	   social	   priorities	   and	   health-­‐care	  
needs.	   Only	   in	   this	   way	   can	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   attain	   the	   social	   robustness	   that	   is	  
necessary	  for	  its	  steady	  development	  towards	  new	  cures	  for	  future	  patients.	  	  




The	   promise	   of	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   is	   a	   fascinating	   one,	   but	   the	   route	   to	   its	  
fulfilment	  is	  still	  uncertain	  nonetheless.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  highlighted	  the	  contentious	  
negotiations	   that	   engage	   relevant	   stakeholders	   in	   trying	   to	   position	   themselves	   as	  
powerful	  actors	  with	  respect	  to	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  innovation.	  	  
In	  introducing	  my	  methodological	  outlook	  for	  the	  present	  dissertation,	  I	  described	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   explanatory	   potential	   of	   the	   co-­‐productionist	   framework	   can	   be	  
complemented	  by	  a	  philosophical	  account	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  (see	  supra,	  chapter	  
1).	   I	   could	   thus	   avail	  myself	   of	   a	   hybrid	   bundle	   that,	   while	  maintaining	   a	  minimal	   and	  
healthy	  degree	  of	  tension	  between	  its	  two	  components,	  provides	  a	  thick	  rendering	  of	  the	  
discursive	  interactions	  that	  take	  place	  around	  biotechnology,	  and	  puts	  the	  analyst	  in	  the	  
position	  to	  assess,	  normatively,	  the	  political	  quality	  of	  innovation	  trajectories.	  The	  field	  of	  
social	  studies,	   indeed,	  seems	  to	  have	  recently	  engaged	  in	  similar	  theoretical	  projects,	  as	  
testified	   by	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘participatory	   turn’	   (Jasanoff	   2003)	   in	   STS	   and	   technology	  
assessment	   (TA).	  The	   issue	  of	  public	  engagement	   in	  science	  and	   in	  policy-­‐making	  about	  
science	  has	  thus	  generated	  a	  wealth	  of	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  these	  topics,	  bringing	  social	  
and	  political	   scientists	   to	   interact	  with	   each	  other	   and	  with	   political	   philosophers,	   thus	  
cutting	  across	  different	  disciplinary	  sectors.	  
As	   it	  emerged	   from	  my	  previous	  analyses,	   the	  current	  configuration	  of	   stem	  cell	  
governance	   is	   mediated	   by	   discourses	   about	   clinical	   risk,	   quality	   and	   purity	   of	   cellular	  
products,	  modes	  of	  material	  circulation	  for	  human	  stem	  cell	  lines	  and	  certification	  of	  pre-­‐
clinical	   and	   clinical	   knowledge.	   The	   overall	   picture	   is	   one	   of	   a	   still	   fluid	   regulatory	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landscape,	  where	  no	  individual	  actor	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  an	  absolute	  dominant	  position.	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   due	   to	   regulatory	   loopholes,	   state-­‐specific	   differences,	   public	  
expectations	   about	   stem	   cell	   therapy	   and	   alternative	   framings	   of	   the	   clinical	   route	   to	  
stem	   cell	   translation,	   diversity	   characterises	   current	   efforts	   at	   fulfilling	   the	   promise	   of	  
stem	  cell	   research.	  The	  simultaneous	  presence	  of	  “contradictory	  voices	  and	  fragmented	  
messages”	   (Baxter	   2002,	   828)	   marks	   the	   diverse	   field	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation	   and	  
governance,	   as	   revealed	   through	  my	  methodological	   outlook	  –	  one	   that,	   from	   the	   very	  
beginning,	   gave	   prominence	   to	   the	   discursive	   constructions	   of	   policy-­‐makers	   and	  
innovators.	  What	   emerged	   is	   thus	   an	   unstable	  model	   of	   governance	   to	   cope	   with	   the	  
scientific	   uncertainty	   and	   the	   clinical	   unpredictability	   of	   a	   field	   of	   innovation	   that,	  
currently,	   is	   still	   under	   construction.	   I	   therefore	   stressed	   the	   way	   in	   which	   technical	  
uncertainties	  about	  the	  biological	  behaviour	  of	  stem	  cell	   lines	  and	  indecisions	  about	  the	  
clinical	   framing	   of	   stem	   cell	   therapies	   result	   in	   a	   discrepant	   regulatory	   regime.	  
Furthermore,	   fractures	   and	   interruptions	   in	   the	   political	   order	   of	   stem	   cell	   clinical	  
research	   have	   emerged	   across	   nation	   state	   borders	   as	   well.	   A	   traditionally	   reliable	  
boundary	   of	   regulatory	   power,	   the	   latter	   appeared	   as	   being	   variously	   transgressed	   by	  
alternative	  constructions	  of	  the	  innovation	  trajectory	  of	  stem	  cell	  science	  and	  practice.	  	  
The	  indecisions	  that	  surround	  the	  future	  application	  of	  stem	  cells	  to	  medicine	  are	  
evident.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  stem	  cells	  therapies	  could	  be	  developed,	  and	  regulated,	  as	  new	  
medicinal	   drugs.	   Industries	   and	   patent	   holders	   have	   a	   preference	   for	   this	   thread	   of	  
translation	   for	   the	   obvious	   reason	   that	   standardising	   an	   individual	   stock	   of	   proprietary	  
cells	  for	  its	  use	  as	  a	  pharmacological	  product,	  would	  straightforwardly	  allow	  the	  creation	  
of	  revenues	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  such	  product	  for	  clinical	  applications.	  In	  the	  view	  of	  many,	  this	  
model	  would	  encourage	  early	  investments	  in	  the	  clinical	  development	  of	  cell	  therapies	  by	  
private	   companies	   and	   venture	   capital	   firms	   –	   investments	   that,	   so	   far,	   have	   been	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minimal	   if	   compared	   to	   the	   amount	   of	   public	   spending	   on	   stem	   cell	   research	   and,	  
furthermore,	  concentrated	  in	  very	  few	  investigational	  studies.	  Framing	  the	  development	  
of	   stem	   cell	   therapies	   in	   a	   way	   that	   equates	   it	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   drug	   would	  
therefore	   provide	   possible	   returns	   for	   the	   risky	   initial	   investments	   of	   private	   funders.	  
Moreover,	  by	   the	  same	   token,	  a	  drug-­‐like	   framing,	  we	  have	  seen,	   is	   functional	   to	  bring	  
the	  field	  under	  the	  regulatory	  control	  of	  governmental	  agencies,	   thus	  putting	  them	  in	  a	  
powerful	  position	  to	  steer	  and	  oversee	  the	  clinical	  development	  of	  stem	  cell	  applications.	  
Many	   commentators	   argue	   however	   that,	   in	   this	   framing,	   commercial	   interests	   and	  
patent	   thickets	   illegitimately	   capture	   the	   developmental	   dynamic	   of	   innovation	   in	   the	  
field	  of	  stem	  cell	  research.	  Indeed,	  interpreting	  this	  regulatory	  configuration	  as	  a	  shared	  
model	   of	   governance	   also	   captures	   the	   convergence	   of	   epistemic	   and	   moral	  
commitments	   of	   scientists	   and	   regulators,	   as	   I	   have	   shown	   above.	   Controlled	   clinical	  
trials,	   performed	   under	   the	   normative	   framework	   of	   internationally	   valid	   principles	   of	  
human	  research	  ethics,	  thus	  represent	  a	  common	  ground	  for	  this	  particular	  framing	  to	  be	  
implemented	   in	   practice:	   they	   assure	   a	   technical	   definition	   of	   risks	   in	   terms	   of	   cellular	  
purity	   and	   absence	   of	   contamination,	   while	   leaving	   room	   for	   individual	   negotiations	  
between	  certified	  experts	  as	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  complications	  that	  may	  arise	   in	  
the	  course	  of	  clinical	  studies.	  	  
Blind	   spots	   nevertheless	   remain	   for	   other	   actors	   to	   criticise	   this	   framing.	   Some	  
argue	   that	   the	   time-­‐	   and	   resource-­‐consuming	   stepwise	   process	   of	   CCTs	   actually	   stifles	  
progress	   in	   the	   field,	   thus	   ultimately	   damaging	   patients	   who	   might	   benefit	   from	  
innovative	  therapeutic	  approaches	  early	  on.	  	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   on	   the	   other	   pole	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   previous	   framing,	   we	  
noticed	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  different	  understanding	  about	  the	  way	  stem	  cells	  could	  and	  
should	   be	   brought	   at	   the	   patient’s	   bedside.	   Instead	   of	   articulating	   stem	   cells	   as	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manufactured	   drugs,	   other	   stakeholders	   see	   them	   as	   natural	   products,	   whose	   safety	  
profile,	   in	   specific	   therapeutic	   settings,	   is	   sufficiently	   stable	   to	   grant	   their	   direct	  
administration	  to	  patients	  who	  require	  them.	  The	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  practitioners	  of	  
this	   kind	   of	   stem	   cell	   medicine	   does	   not	   come	   from	   the	   sale	   of	   cells	   themselves,	   but	  
rather	   from	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  medical	  service,	   like	   in	   the	  case	  of	  surgery	  or	  other	  
non-­‐pharmacological	   medical	   procedures.	   This	   model	   of	   translation,	   as	   I	   have	   shown,	  
relies	   on	   the	   regulatory	   gaps	   left	   open	   by	   the	   previous	   framing	   and	   on	   state-­‐to-­‐state	  
political	   differences.	   Interested	   stakeholders,	   in	   this	   case,	   contend	   that	   such	   clinical	  
procedures	  are	  scientifically	  unwarranted	  and	  thus	   ineffective,	   if	  not	  dangerous.	  Also	   in	  
this	  case,	  commercial	  interests	  are	  used	  to	  discredit	  the	  reputation	  and	  the	  credibility	  of	  
practising	   stem	   cell	   doctors.	   This	   contention	   carved	   a	   profound	   disciplinary	   as	   well	   as	  
cultural	   divide	   between	   stem	   cell	   clinics	   physicians,	   on	   the	   one	   side,	   and	   stem	   cell	  
scientists	   backed	   by	   regulatory	   agencies	   on	   the	   other.	   Again,	   the	   regulatory	   model	  
appears	  to	  be	  shared	  between	  the	  latter	  and	  the	  former,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  involved	  actors	  
seems	  to	  hold	  a	  position	  of	  absolute	  control	  over	  the	  initiatives	  of	  the	  other.	  Nonetheless,	  
judiciary	   and	   political	   activities	   mediate	   continuous	   efforts	   at	   constructing	   regulatory	  
supremacy.	  	  
Politics,	   it	   seems,	   lags	  behind	   the	  boisterous	  development	  of	   stem	  cell	  medicine	  
through	   innovative	   practices	   and	   unproven	   treatments	   offered	   on	   an	   international	  
medical	  market.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  stem	  cell	  translation,	  it	  thus	  seems	  that	  state	  initiatives	  are	  
lacking	  their	  familiar	  ordering	  efficacy,	  and	  inevitably	  leave	  room	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  
rather	  dispersed	  regulatory	  order.	  In	  truth,	  a	  more	  veridical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
politics	   in	  the	  emerging	  governance	  of	  stem	  cell	  clinical	  applications	  should	  see	  political	  
actors	  as	  being	  on	  a	  par	  with	  other	  relevant	  stakeholders	  in	  trying	  to	  establish	  their	  ends	  
onto	  this	  field	  of	  biomedical	  innovation.	  The	  state,	  in	  other	  words,	  should	  be	  understood	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as	  an	   interested	  party	   in	   the	  development	  of	   stem	  cell	   innovation	  and	  not	  as	  a	  neutral	  
mediator	  of	   the	   interests	  of	  others.	   It	   appeared	   from	  my	  previous	  analyses	   that	   states,	  
through	  their	  legislative	  powers	  and	  bureaucratic	  endowments,	  push	  their	  own	  narratives	  
about	  biomedical	  change	  through	  the	  intricate	  web	  of	  different	  framings	  and	  contrasting	  
interests	   that	   forms	   the	   landscape	   of	   stem	   cell	   innovation35.	  What	   my	   account	   of	   the	  
governance	   of	   early	   stem	   cell	   translation	   has	   shown,	   however,	   is	   that	   national	   policy-­‐
making	  has	  changed	  its	  nature	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  past	  decade.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  regulating	  
stem	  cell	  derivation	   from	  embryonic	  and	   foetal	  material,	   state	   intervention	  was	   indeed	  
responsive	   to	   precise	   industrial	   and	   political	   strategies	   that	   brought	   about	   severely	  
controlled	  regulatory	  regimes	  (Gottweis,	  Salter,	  and	  Waldby	  2009;	  Salter	  and	  Salter	  2010;	  
Salter	  and	  Faulkner	  2011).	  However,	  when	  stem	  cell	  research	  started	  to	  translate	  to	  the	  
clinic,	  a	  process	  that,	  as	  I	  showed,	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy,	  those	  strategies	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  
the	   technical	   uncertainties	   and	   clinical	   novelty	   of	   the	   field,	   thus	   resulting	   in	   the	  
comparably	  under-­‐structured	  shared	  model	  of	  governance	  that	  I	  depicted	  in	  chapters	  3.II	  
and	  4.	  	  
In	   the	   fifth	   chapter,	   drawing	   on	   those	   realisations,	   I	   have	   thus	   assessed	   this	  
emerging	  regulatory	  order	  form	  a	  deliberative	  perspective.	  In	  so	  doing,	  I	  have	  suggested	  
that	  a	  democratic	  polity	  incurs	  in	  risks	  of	  democratic	  erosion	  due	  to	  the	  current	  political	  
configuration	   of	   stem	   cell	   translation.	   Therefore,	   I	   have	   articulated	   a	   few	   normative	  
proposals	   as	   to	   the	   political	   stakes	   of	   innovative	   medicine	   and	   I	   had	   proposed	  
institutionalised	  mechanism	   of	   stakeholder	   inclusion	   and	   citizens	   participation	   to	   cope	  
with	   it.	   In	   so	   doing,	   I	   drew	   on	   participatory	   and	   constructive	   technology	   assessment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  This	  feature	  has	  been	  clarified	  in	  the	  work	  of	  political	  scientist	  Brian	  Salter	  and	  sociologist	  Alex	  Faulkner,	  
who,	   within	   the	   interpretative	   framework	   of	   ‘competition	   states’	   and	   ‘developmental	   state’	   theory,	  
insightfully	  described	  the	  agency	  of	  political	  actors	  as	  being	  oriented	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  national	  advantage	  
and	  biotechnological	  hegemony	  (Salter	  2007;	  Salter	  2009;	  Salter	  and	  Salter	  2010;	  Salter	  and	  Faulkner	  2011).	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techniques	   that	   may	   help	   align	   technological	   development	   with	   the	   expectations	   and	  
interests	  of	  wider	  publics.	  Albeit	   imperfect	  and	  strongly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  context	  of	  their	  
implementation,	  these	  techniques	  may	  represent	  a	  first	  move	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  more	  
accountable,	   and	   thus	   politically	   more	   stable	   translation	   of	   stem	   cells	   into	   valuable	  
applications	  for	  mankind.	  To	  this	  aim,	  I	  have	  maintained,	  fostering	  a	  democratic	  culture	  of	  
participation	   and	   inclusion	   appears	   to	   be	   an	   answer	   to	   the	  divisions	   that	   characterised	  
the	  social	  environment	  of	  biotechnology	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  	  
	  236	  
Bibliography	  
Adams,	   G.	   B.,	   R.	   P.	   Martin,	   I.	   R.	   Alley,	   K.	   T.	   Chabner,	   K.	   S.	   Cohen,	   L.	   M.	   Calvi,	   H.	   M.	  
Kronenberg,	   D.	   T.	   Scadden.	   2007.	   «Therapeutic	   targeting	   of	   a	   stem	   cell	   niche».	  Nature	  
Biotechnology	  25	  (2):	  238-­‐243.	  
Alic,	   J.	   A.	   1992.	   Beyond	   Spinoff:	   Military	   and	   Commercial	   Technologies	   in	   a	   Changing	  
World.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  Press.	  
Anon.	  2010.	  «Order	  from	  chaos».	  Nature	  466	  (7302):	  7-­‐8.	  	  
Anon.	   1997,	   Regulation	   of	   Tissues	   -­‐	   Reinventing	   the	   Regulation	   of	   Human	   Tissue.	  
Available	   at:	  
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/RegulationofTissues/u
cm136967.htm	  last	  accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
Anon.	   1981.	   Defining	   Death:	   a	   Report	   on	   the	   Medical,	   Legal	   and	   Ethical	   Issues	   in	   the	  
Determination	  of	  Death.	  Washington,	  DC:	  Government	  Printing	  Office.	  
Anon.	   1968.	   «A	   Definition	   of	   Irreversible	   Coma».	   JAMA:	   The	   Journal	   of	   the	   American	  
Medical	  Association	  205	  (6):	  337	  -­‐340.	  	  
Appelbaum,	  P.	  S.,	  L.	  H.	  Roth,	  and	  C.	  Lidz.	  1982.	  «The	  therapeutic	  misconception:	  informed	  
consent	  in	  psychiatric	  research».	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Psychiatry	  5	  (3-­‐4):	  319-­‐
329.	  
Aristotle	  2009.	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
———	  1997.	  Topics.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Arrow,	  Kennet.	  1962.	  Economic	  Welfare	  and	  the	  Allocation	  of	  Resources	  for	  Invention,	  in	  
idem	   The	   Rate	   and	   Direction	   of	   Inventive	   Activity.	   Princeton,	   NJ:	   Princeton	   University	  
Press.	  
Bal,	  R.,	  W.	  E.	  Bijker,	  and	  R.	  Hendriks.	  2004.	  «Democratisation	  of	  scientific	  advice».	  British	  
Medical	  Journal	  329	  (7478):	  1339.	  
Barry,	   Andrew.	   2001.	   Political	   Machines:	   Governing	   a	   Technological	   Society.	   Athlone,	  
Ireland:	  Continuum	  International	  Publishing	  Group.	  
Barry,	   Andrew.	   2006.	   «Technological	   Zones».	   European	   Journal	   of	   Social	   Theory	   9	   (2)	  
(May	  1):	  239	  -­‐253.	  
Batshaw,	   M.	   L.,	   J.	   M.	   Wilson,	   S.	   Raper,	   M.	   Yudkoff,	   and	   M.	   B.	   Robinson.	   1999.	  
«Recombinant	  adenovirus	  gene	  transfer	  in	  adults	  with	  partial	  ornithine	  transcarbamylase	  
deficiency	  (OTCD)».	  Human	  Gene	  Therapy	  10	  (14):	  2419-­‐2437.	  
	   237	  
Baxter,	   Judith.	   2002.	   «Competing	   discourses	   in	   the	   classroom:	   a	   Post-­‐structuralist	  
Discourse	  Analysis	  of	  girls’	  and	  boys’	  speech	   in	  public	  contexts».	  Discourse	  &	  Society	  13	  
(6):	  827	  -­‐842.	  	  
Benhabib,	   Sheila.	   1996.	   Toward	   a	   deliberative	   model	   of	   democratic	   legitimation.	   In	  
Benhabib,	  S	  (ed.),	  Democracy	  and	  Difference.	  Priceton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  
———,	  1992.	  Models	  of	  Public	   Space:	  Hannah	  Arendt,	   the	  Liberal	  Tradition,	  and	   Jürgen	  
Habermas.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  
Bijker,	  W.	  E.,	  R.	  Bal,	  and	  R.	  Hendriks.	  2009.	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Scientific	  Authority:	  the	  Role	  of	  
Scientific	  Advice	  in	  Democracies.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  
Bimber,	  B.,	  and	  D.	  H.	  Guston.	  1995.	  Politics	  by	  the	  same	  means:	  Government	  and	  science	  
in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  Handbook	  of	  science	  and	  Technology	  Studies,	  by	  S.	  Jasanoff,	  G.	  E.	  
Markle,	  J.	  C.	  Petersen,	  and	  T.	  Pinch,	  554-­‐551.	  London:	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc.	  
Bird,	  C.	  E.,	  P.	  Conrad,	  A.	  Fremont.	  2000.	  Handbook	  of	  Medical	  Sociology.	  Prentice	  Hall.	  
Blasimme,	   Alessandro.	   2011.	   «Governare	   la	   biomedicina:	   l’etica	   della	   ricerca	   scientifica	  
come	  questione	  pubblica».	  Paradigmi	  XXXIX	  (1)	  (May-­‐	  June):	  127	  -­‐	  144.	  
Boniolo,	  G.,	   and	  P.P.	  Di	   Fiore.	   2010.	   «Deliberative	   ethics	   in	   a	   biomedical	   institution:	   an	  
example	  of	  integration	  between	  science	  and	  ethics».	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  36	  (7):	  409	  
-­‐414.	  	  
Bopp,	   J.,	  and	  J.	  T.	  Burtchaell.	  1988.	  «Human	  fetal	   tissue	  transplantation	  research	  panel:	  
Statement	  of	  dissent».	  Report	  of	  The	  Human	  Fetal	  Tissue	  Transplantation	  Research	  Panel	  
1:	  45-­‐71.	  
Brivanlou,	  A.	  H.,	   F.	  H	  Gage,	  R.	   Jaenisch,	  T.	   Jessell,	  D.	  Melton,	   J.	  Rossant.	  2003.	  «Setting	  
standards	  for	  human	  embryonic	  stem	  cells».	  Science	  300	  (5621):	  913.	  
Broad,	  W.,	  and	  N.	  Wade,	  1982.	  Betrayers	  of	  the	  Truth.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster.	  
Burgess,	   M.,	   K.	   O’Doherty,	   and	   D.	   Secko.	   2008.	   «Biobanking	   in	   British	   Columbia:	  
discussions	   of	   the	   future	   of	   personalized	   medicine	   through	   deliberative	   public	  
engagement».	  Personalized	  Medicine	  5:	  285-­‐296.	  	  
Burke,	  W.,	  and	  B.	  M.	  Psaty.	  2007.	  «Personalized	  medicine	  in	  the	  era	  of	  genomics».	  JAMA:	  
The	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  298	  (14):	  1682.	  
Bush,	   Vannevar.	   1945.	   Science,	   the	   Endless	   Frontier.	  Washington,	   DC:	   National	   Science	  
Foundation.	  
Callon,	  Michel.	  1999.	  «Actor-­‐network	  theory:	  the	  market	  test».	   In	  Law,	  J	  and	  Hassard,	  J.	  
Actor	  network	  theory	  and	  after:	  181-­‐195.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing.	  
Callon,	   M.,	   and	   J.	   Law.	   1982.	   «On	   interests	   and	   their	   transformation:	   enrolment	   and	  
counter-­‐enrolment».	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  12	  (4):	  615.	  
Callon,	  M.,	  and	  V.	  Rabeharisoa.	  2008.	  «The	  Growing	  Engagement	  of	  Emergent	  Concerned	  
Groups	  in	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Life».	  Science,	  Technology	  &	  Human	  Values	  33	  (2):	  230.	  
	  238	  
Caulfield,	  T.,	  S.	  Christopher,	   I.	  Hyun,	  R.	  Lovell-­‐Badge,	  K.	  Kato,	  A.	  Zarzeczny.	  2010.	  «Stem	  
cell	  research	  policy	  and	  iPS	  cells».	  Nat	  Methods	  7	  (1):	  28-­‐33.	  	  
Cerny,	   Philip	   G.	   1990.	   The	   Changing	   Architecture	   of	   Politics:	   Structure,	   Agency	   and	   the	  
Future	  of	  the	  State.	  London:	  SAGE	  Publications.	  
———	   1997.	   «Paradoxes	   of	   the	   competition	   state».	   Government	   and	   Opposition	  
32(2):251-­‐274.	  
Chamberlain,	  C.	  1984.	  «The	  Meaning	  of	  Prohairesis	  in	  Aristotle’s	  Ethics».	  Transactions	  of	  
the	  American	  Philological	  Association	  114:	  147-­‐157.	  
Chilvers,	  Jason.	  2008.	  «Deliberating	  Competence».	  Science,	  Technology	  &	  Human	  Values	  
33	  (2):	  155	  -­‐185.	  	  
Cohen,	  J.,	  and	  C.	  Sabel.	  1997.	  «Directly	  Deliberative	  Polyarchy».	  European	  Law	  Journal	  3	  
(4):	  313-­‐342.	  
Collingridge,	  David.	  1980.	  The	  social	  control	  of	  technology.	  Frances	  Pinter.	  
Collins,	  Henry	  M.	  1982.	  «Knowledge,	  norms	  and	  rules	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  science».	  Social	  
Studies	  of	  Science	  12	  (2):	  299-­‐309.	  
Collins,	  H.	  M.,	  and	  R.	  Evans.	  2002.	  «The	  third	  wave	  of	  science	  studies:	  studies	  of	  expertise	  
and	  experience».	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  32	  (2):	  235-­‐296.	  
———	  2007.	  Rethinking	  expertise.	  Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Courtney,	  A.,	  P.	  de	  Sousa,	  C.	  George,	  G.	  Laurie,	  and	  J.	  Tait.	  2011.	  «Balancing	  open	  source	  
stem	  cell	  science	  with	  commercialization».	  Nat	  Biotech	  29	  (2):	  115-­‐116.	  
Coutts,	  Mary	  C.	  2009.	  «Fetal	   tissue	   research».	  Kennedy	   Institute	  of	  Ethics	   Journal	   3	   (1):	  
81-­‐101.	  
Curnutte,	  M,	   and	  Testa,	  G	  2011.	  «Consuming	  Genomes».	   Forthcoming	   in	  New	  Genetics	  
and	  Society.	  
Cyranoski,	  David.	  2011.	  «Texas	  prepares	  to	  fight	  for	  stem	  cells».	  Nature	  (477):	  377-­‐8.	  
———.	   2010.	   «FDA	   challenges	   stem-­‐cell	   clinic».	   Nature	   466	   (909).	   Online	   version	   –	  
available	   at:	   http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100817/full/466909a.html.	   Last	  
accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
———.	   2008.	   «Things	   to	   know	   before	   jumping	   on	   the	   iPS	   bandwagon».	   Nature	   452	  
(7186):	  406-­‐408.	  
———.	  2005.	  «Fetal-­‐cell	  therapy:	  Paper	  chase».	  Nature	  437	  (7060):	  810-­‐811.	  	  
Daar,	   A.	   S.,	   H.	   L.	   Greenwood.	   2007.	   «A	   proposed	   definition	   of	   regenerative	  medicine».	  
Journal	  of	  Tissue	  Engineering	  and	  Regenerative	  Medicine	  1	  (3):	  179-­‐184.	  
	   239	  
Daley,	   G.	   Q.,	   M.	   W.	   Lensch,	   R.	   Jaenisch,	   A.	   Meissner,	   K.	   Plath,	   S.	   Yamanaka,	   2009.	  
«Broader	  Implications	  of	  Defining	  Standards	  for	  the	  Pluripotency	  of	  iPSCs».	  Cell	  Stem	  Cell	  
4	  (3)	  (6):	  595-­‐605.	  
Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  &	  Skills.	  2011.	  Taking	  Stock	  of	  Regenerative	  Medicine	  
in	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   Department	   of	   Health.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/innovation/docs/t/11-­‐1056-­‐taking-­‐stock-­‐of-­‐
regenerative-­‐medicine.	  Last	  accessed	  October	  2011.	  
Department	   of	   Health	   and	   Human	   Services	   2006.	   Regenerative	  Medicine.	   Available	   at:	  
/info/scireport/2006report.htm.	  Last	  accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
Derrida,	  Jaques.	  1976.	  De	  la	  Grammatologie.	  Paris:	  Editions	  des	  Minuit.	  
Dimmeler,	  S.,	  A.	  M.	  Zeiher,	  and	  M.	  D.	  Schneider.	  2005.	  «Unchain	  my	  heart:	  the	  scientific	  
foundations	  of	  cardiac	  repair».	  Journal	  of	  Clinical	  Investigation	  115	  (3):	  572-­‐83.	  
Dobkin,	  B.	  H.,	  A.	  Curt,	   and	   J.	  Guest.	  2006.	  «Cellular	  Transplants	   in	  China:	  Observational	  
Study	   from	   the	   Largest	   Human	   Experiment	   in	   Chronic	   Spinal	   Cord	   Injury».	  
Neurorehabilitation	  and	  Neural	  Repair	  20	  (1):	  5	  -­‐13.	  
Dolgin,	  E.	  2010.	  «Survey	  details	  stem	  cell	  clinics	  ahead	  of	  regulatory	  approval».	  Nat	  Med	  
16	  (5):	  495	  
Dresser,	   R.	   2010.	   «Stem	   Cell	   Research	   as	   Innovation:	   Expanding	   the	   Ethical	   and	   Policy	  
Conversation».	  The	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Medicine	  &	  Ethics	  38	  (2):	  332-­‐341.	  	  
Van	   Eijndhoven,	   J.	   C.	   M.	   1997.	   «Technology	   assessment:	   Product	   or	   process?»	  
Technological	  Forecasting	  and	  Social	  Change	  54	  (2-­‐3):	  269-­‐286.	  	  
Eley,	   G.	   1994.	   «Nations,	   Publics,	   and	   Political	   Cultures:	   Placing	   Habermas	   in	   the	  
Nineteenth	  Century».	  In	  N.	  B.	  Dirks,	  G.	  Eley	  and	  S.	  B.	  Ortner	  (eds.),	  Culture/Power/History:	  
A	  Reader	  in	  Contemporary	  Social	  Theory,	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Ellis,	  J.,	  B.	  G.	  Bruneau,	  G.	  Keller,	  I.	  R.	  Lemischka,	  A.	  Nagy,	  J.	  Rossant,	  D.	  Srivastava,	  P.	  W.	  
Zandstra,	   W.	   L.	   Stanford.	   2009.	   «Alternative	   Induced	   Pluripotent	   Stem	   Cell	  
Characterization	  Criteria	  for	  In	  Vitro	  Applications».	  Cell	  Stem	  Cell	  4	  (3):198-­‐199.	  	  
Emanuel,	  Ezekiel	  J.	  2008.	  The	  Oxford	  textbook	  of	  clinical	  research	  ethics.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Emamaullee,	  J.	  A.,	  R.	  V.	  Rajotte,	  P.	  Liston,	  R.	  G.	  Korneluk,	  J.	  R.	  T.	  Lakey,	  A.	  M.	  Shapiro,	  J.	  F.	  
Elliott.	   2005.	   «XIAP	   overexpression	   in	   human	   islets	   prevents	   early	   posttransplant	  
apoptosis	  and	  reduces	  the	  islet	  mass	  needed	  to	  treat	  diabetes».	  Diabetes	  54	  (9):	  2541.	  
Epstein,	  Stephen.	  2007.	   Inclusion:	  the	  politics	  of	  difference	   in	  medical	  research.	  Chicago,	  
IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
———.	  1998.	   Impure	  science:	  AIDS,	  activism,	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  knowledge.	  Barkley	  and	  
Los	  Angeles,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  
Epstein,	   R.	   M.,	   and	   E.	   Peters.	   2009.	   «Beyond	   information:	   exploring	   patients’	  
preferences».	  JAMA	  302	  (2):	  195.	  
	  240	  
European	  Commission.	  2001.	   European	  Governance:	  A	  white	  paper.	  Commission	  of	   the	  
European	  Communities.	  
Evans,	  John	  H.	  2002.	  Playing	  God?	  Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
———.	  2000.	  «A	  Sociological	  Account	  of	  the	  Growth	  of	  Principlism.»	  The	  Hastings	  Center	  
Report	  30	  (5).	  
Ewertz,	   M.,	   M.	   B.	   Jensen,	   K.	   Gunnarsdóttir,	   I.	   Højris,	   E.	   H.	   Jakobsen,	   D.	   Nielsen,	   L.	   E.	  
Stenbygaard,	  U.	  B.	  Tange,	  S.	  Cold.	  2011.	  «Effect	  of	  obesity	  on	  prognosis	  after	  early-­‐stage	  
breast	  cancer».	  Journal	  of	  Clinical	  Oncology	  29	  (1):	  25.	  
Faden,	   R.	   R.,	   T.	   L.	   Beauchamp,	   N.	  M.	   P.	   King.	   1986.	  A	   History	   and	   Theory	   of	   Informed	  
Consent.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA.	  
Faulkner,	   Alexander	   2009.	   «Regulatory	   policy	   as	   innovation:	   Constructing	   rules	   of	  
engagement	   for	   a	   technological	   zone	   of	   tissue	   engineering	   in	   the	   European	   Union».	  
Research	  Policy	  38	  (4):	  637-­‐646.	  
Faulkner,	  A.,	  I.	  Geesink,	  J.	  Kent,	  D.	  FitzPatrick.	  2005.	  Purity	  and	  the	  dangers	  of	  innovative	  
therapies:	   re-­‐ordering	   regulation	   and	   governance	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   tissue-­‐engineered	  
medical	  technology.	  
Faulkner,	   A.,	   I.	   Geesink,	   J.	   Kent,	   D.	   FitzPatrick.	   2003.	   «Human	   tissue	   engineered	  
products—drugs	  or	  devices?»	  BMJ	  326	  (7400):	  1159.	  
FDA,	   2011.	   Cellular,	   Tissue,	   and	   Gene	   Therapies	   Advisory	   Committee.	   Available	   at:	  
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesa
ndOtherBiologics/CellularTissueandGeneTherapiesAdvisoryCommittee/default.htm.	   Last	  
accessed:	  Octorber	  2011.	  
Fiorino,	  David.	  J.	  1989.	  «Environmental	  Risk	  and	  Democratic	  Process:	  A	  Critical	  Review».	  
Columbia	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Law	  14:	  501.	  
Fischer,	   Frank.	   1990.	   Technocracy	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Expertise.	   London,	   UK:	   Sage	  
Publications.	  
———.	  2009.	  Democracy	  and	  Expertise:	  Reorienting	  Policy	  Inquiry.	  New	  york,	  NY:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  USA.	  
Fishkin,	  J.,	  R.	  Luskin,	  and	  R.	  Jowell.	  2000.	  «Deliberative	  polling	  and	  public	  consultation».	  
Parliamentary	  Affairs	  53:	  657-­‐666.	  
Fleck,	   J.	   1997.	   «Contingent	   knowledge	   and	   technology	   development».	   Technology	  
Analysis	  &	  Strategic	  Management	  9:4,	  383-­‐398.	  
Foucault,	  Michel.	  1969.	  L’Archéologie	  du	  Savoir.	  Paris:	  Éditions	  Gallimard.	  
Fowler,	   G.,	   and	   K.	   Allison.	   2008.	   «Technology	   and	   citizenry:	   a	   model	   for	   public	  
consultation	  in	  science	  policy	  formation».	  Journal	  of	  Evolution	  and	  Technology	  18	  (1):	  56-­‐
69.	  
	   241	  
Fransella,	  F.,	  D.	  Bannister,	  and	  R.	  Bell..	  2003.	  A	  Manual	  for	  Repertory	  Grid	  Technique.	  2nd	  
ed.	  London:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell.	  
Fraser,	  N.	  1990.	  «Rethinking	  the	  public	  sphere:	  A	  contribution	  to	  the	  critique	  of	  actually	  
existing	  democracy».	  Social	  text	  (25/26):	  56-­‐80.	  
Funtowicz,	  S.	  O.,	  J.	  R.	  and	  Ravetz.	  1993.	  «Science	  for	  the	  post-­‐normal	  age».	  Futures	  25	  (7):	  
739-­‐755.	  
Gaskell,	  G.,	   and	  H.	  Gottweis.	   2011.	  «Biobanks	  need	  publicity».	  Nature	   471	   (7337):	   159-­‐
160.	  
Gieryn,	   T.	   F.	   1983.	   «Boundary-­‐work	   and	   the	   demarcation	   of	   science	   from	   non-­‐science:	  
Strains	  and	  interests	  in	  professional	  ideologies	  of	  scientists».	  American	  sociological	  review	  
48	  (6):	  781-­‐795.	  
———.	  1995.	   «Boundaries	  of	   science»,	   in	   Jasanoff,	   S	  et	   al.	   (eds.),	  Handbook	  of	   Science	  
and	  Technology	  Studies.	  Thausand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications	  Inc..	  
Gilpin,	   R.,	   and	   Wright,	   C.	   1964.	   Scientists	   and	   national	   policy-­‐making.	   New	   York,	   NY:	  
Columbia	  University	  Press.	  
Gottweis,	   Herbert	   1998.	   Governing	   Molecules:	   The	   Discursive	   Politics	   of	   Genetic	  
Engineering	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  
Gottweis,	   H,	   and	   Lauss,	   G	   2010.	   «Biobank	   governance	   in	   the	   post-­‐genomic	   age».	  
Personalized	  Medicine	  7	  (2):	  187-­‐195.	  
Gottweis,	   H.,	   and	   S.	   Minger.	   2008.	   «iPS	   cells	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   promise».	   Nat	  
Biotechnology	  26	  (3):	  271-­‐272.	  
Gottweis,	  H.,	  B.	  Salter,	  C.	  Waldby.	  2009.	  The	  Global	  Politics	  of	  Human	  Embryonic	  Stem	  Cell	  
Science.	  London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
Grove-­‐White,	   R.,	   P.	  Macnaghten,	   and	   B.	  Wynne.	   2000.	  Wising	   up:	   The	   public	   and	   new	  
technologies.	  Lancaster,	  UK:	  Lancaster	  University	  Press.	  
Guston,	  David	  H.	   2000.	  Between	  Politics	   and	   Science.	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  
Press.	  
Guston,	   D.	   H.,	   and	   B.	   Bimber.	   1993.	   «Technology	   assessment	   for	   the	   new	   century».	  
Working	  paper	  #7,	  E.	  J.	  Bloustein	  School	  of	  Planing	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  Rutgers	  University,	  
New	   Brunswick,	   NJ.	   Available	   at:	   http://policy.rutgers.edu/papers/7.pdf.	   Last	   accessed	  
October	  2011.	  	  
Guston,	  D.	  H.,	  and	  D.	  Sarewitz.	  2002.	  «Real-­‐time	  technology	  assessment».	  Technology	  in	  
Society	  24	  (1-­‐2):	  93-­‐109.	  
Gutmann,	   A.,	   and	   D.	   F.	   Thompson.	   1996.	  Democracy	   and	   disagreement.	   Harvard,	  MA:	  
Belknap	  Press.	  
Habermas,	  Jürgen.	  1989.	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere.	  Cambridge,	  
MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  
	  242	  
———	  1994.	  «Three	  normative	  models	  of	  democracy».	  Constellations	  1	  (1):	  1-­‐10.	  
———	  1998.	  Between	  Facts	  and	  Norms:	  Contributions	  to	  a	  Discourse	  Theory	  of	  Law	  and	  
Democracy.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
Hacking,	  Ian.	  1983.	  Representing	  and	  intervening:	  Introductory	  topics	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
natural	  science.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Hamlett,	  P.	  2003.	  «Technology	  theory	  and	  deliberative	  democracy».	  Science,	  Technology	  
and	  Human	  Values	  28(1):	  112-­‐140.	  
Hamlyn,	  D.	  W.	  1990.	  «Aristotle	  on	  dialectic».	  Philosophy	  65	  (254):	  465-­‐476.	  
Hartzband,	   P.,	   and	   J.	   Groopman.	   2011.	   «Te	  New	   Language	   of	  Medicine».	  New	  England	  
Journal	  of	  Medicine	  365:	  1372-­‐1373.	  
Haseltine,	  W.	  A.	  2003.	  «Regenerative	  medicine	  2003:	  an	  overview».	  e-­‐biomed:	  the	  journal	  
of	  regenerative	  medicine	  4	  (3):	  15-­‐18.	  
Hay,	   C.	   2004.	   Re-­‐stating	   politics,	   re-­‐politicising	   the	   state:	   neoliberalism,	   economic	  
imperatives	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  competition	  state.	  Political	  Quarterly	  75(1):	  38-­‐50.	  
Hedgecoe,	  Adam.	   2004.	  The	   politics	   of	   Personalised	  Medicine:	   Pharmacogenetics	   in	   the	  
Clinic.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Henderson,	   S.,	   and	   A.	   R.	   Petersen.	   2002.	   Consuming	   Health:	   the	   Commodification	   of	  
Health	  Care.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
Hibbing,	   J.	   R.	   1988.	   «Legislative	   Institutionalization	   with	   Illustrations	   from	   the	   British	  
House	  of	  Commons».	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  32	  (3):	  681-­‐712.	  	  
Hirsch,	  J.	  1994.	  From	  the	  Fordist	  to	  the	  post-­‐Fordist	  State.	  In	  Jessop,	  B.	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Flexibility.	  Aldershot:	  Edward	  Elgar.	  	  
Hoffmaster,	   B.	   1994.	   «The	   forms	   and	   limits	   of	   medical	   ethics».	   Social	   Science	   and	  
Medicine	  39(9):11155-­‐1164.	  
Hood,	  L.,	  and	  S.	  H	  Friend.	  2011.	  «Predictive,	  personalized,	  preventive,	  participatory	  (P4)	  
cancer	  medicine».	  Nat	  Rev	  Clin	  Oncol	  8	  (3):	  184-­‐187.	  	  
Hoppe,	   R.,	   and	  A.	  Wesselink.	   2011.	   «If	   post-­‐normal	   science	   is	   the	   solution,	  what	   is	   the	  
problem?»	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Human	  Values.	  
House	   of	   Lords.	   2000.	   Science	   and	   Technology	   -­‐	   Third	   Report:	   Science	   and	   Society.	  
London:	  House	  of	  Lords.	  
Huang,	   H.,	   L.	   Chen,	   H.	   Xi,	   Q.	   Wang,	   J.	   Zhang,	   Y.	   Liu,	   and	   F.	   Zhang.	   2009.	   «Olfactory	  
ensheathing	  cells	  transplantation	  for	  central	  nervous	  system	  diseases	  in	  1,255	  patients».	  
Chinese	  Journal	  of	  Reparative	  and	  Reconstructive	  Surgery	  23	  (1):	  14-­‐20.	  
Hurlbut,	  W.	   B.	   2005.	   «Altered	   nuclear	   transfer	   as	   a	   morally	   acceptable	   means	   for	   the	  
procurement	  of	  human	  embryonic	   stem	  cells».	  Perspectives	   in	  Biology	  and	  Medicine	  48	  
(2):	  211-­‐228.	  
	   243	  
Institute	   of	   Medicine.	   1994.	   Fetal	   Research	   and	   Applications:	   A	   Conference	   Summary.	  
Washington,	  DC:	  The	  National	  Academies	  Press.	  
Issa,	   A.	   M.	   2002.	   «Ethical	   perspectives	   on	   pharmacogenomic	   profiling	   in	   the	   drug	  
development	  process».	  Nature	  Reviews	  Drug	  Discovery	  1	  (4):	  300-­‐308.	  
International	   Cellular	  Medicine	   Society	   (ICMS).	   2009.	   ICMS	   Best	   Practice	  Guidelines	   for	  
Cell	   Based	   Medicine.	   Available	   at:	   http://www.cellmedicinesociety.org/icms-­‐guidelines.	  
Last	  accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
International	  Society	  for	  Stem	  Cell	  Research	  (ISSCR).	  2008.	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  Conduct	  of	  
Human	   Embryonic	   Stem	   Cell	   Research.	   Available	   at:	  http://www.isscr.org/GuidelinesforhESCResearch/2917.htm.	   Last	   accessed	   October	  
2011.	  
Jacob,	   M.	   2009.	   «On	   Commodification	   and	   the	   Governance	   of	   Academic	   Research».	  
Minerva	  47:	  391-­‐405.	  	  
Jasanoff,	  Sheila,	  ed.	  2011.	  Reframing	  Rights:	  Bioconstitutionalism	  in	  the	  Genetic	  Age.	  MIT	  
Press,	  Luglio	  22.	  
———	  2005.	  Designs	  on	  Nature:	  Science	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
———	  2004.	  States	  of	  Knowledge:	  the	  Co-­‐production	  of	  Science	  and	  Social	  Order.	  London:	  
Routledge.	  
———	   2003.	   «Technologies	   of	   humility:	   citizen	   participation	   in	   governing	   science».	  
Minerva	  41	  (3):	  223-­‐244.	  
———	  2003a.	  «(No?)	  Accounting	  for	  Expertise».	  Science	  and	  Public	  Policy	  30	  (3):	  157-­‐162.	  
———	  2003b.	  «Breaking	  the	  waves	  in	  science	  studies:	  comment	  on	  Collins	  and	  Evans	  ’The	  
third	  wave	  of	  science	  studies’».	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  33	  (3):	  389-­‐400.	  
———	  1994.	  The	  fifth	  branch:	  Science	  Advisers	  as	  Policymakers.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press.	  
Jasanoff,	   S.,	   and	   S.	  H.	   Kim.	   2009.	   «Containing	   the	   atom:	   sociotechnical	   imaginaries	   and	  
nuclear	  power	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Korea».	  Minerva	  47	  (2):	  119-­‐146.	  
Jones,	  E.	  G.,	  and	  L.	  M.	  Mendell.	  1999.	  «Assessing	  the	  Decade	  of	  the	  Brain».	  Science	  284	  
(5415):	  739.	  
Joss,	   S.,	   and	   S.	   Bellucci.	   2002.	   Participatory	   technology	   assessment:	   European	  
perspectives.	  Centre	  for	  Study	  of	  Democracy,	  University	  of	  Westminster.	  
Keating,	  P.,	  and	  A.	  Cambrosio.	  2000.	  «Biomedical	  platforms».	  Configurations	  8	   (3):	  337-­‐
387.	  
———	  2003.	  Biomedical	  Platforms:	  Realigning	  the	  Normal	  and	  the	  Pathological	   in	  Late-­‐
twentieth-­‐century	  Medicine.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press.	  
	  244	  
Keirstead,	  H.	  S.,	  G.	  Nistor,	  G.	  Bernal,	  M.	  Totoiu,	  F.	  Cloutier,	  K.	  Sharp,	  O.	  Steward.	  2005.	  
«Human	   embryonic	   stem	   cell-­‐derived	   oligodendrocyte	   progenitor	   cell	   transplants	  
remyelinate	  and	  restore	  locomotion	  after	  spinal	  cord	  injury».	  The	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience	  
25	  (19):	  4694.	  
Kemp,	  R.	  P.	  M.,	  J.	  W.	  Schot,	  and	  R.	  J.	  F.	  Hoogma.	  «Regime	  shifts	  to	  sustainability	  through	  
processes	  of	  niche	  formation :	  the	  approach	  of	  strategic	  niche	  management».	  Technology	  
Analysis	  and	  Strategic	  Management	  10	  (2):	  175.	  
Kent,	  J.,	  A.	  Faulkner,	  I.	  Geesink,	  and	  D.	  FitzPatrick.	  2006.	  «Towards	  governance	  of	  human	  
tissue	  engineered	  technologies	  in	  Europe:	  Framing	  the	  case	  for	  a	  new	  regulatory	  regime».	  
Technological	  Forecasting	  and	  Social	  Change	  73	  (1):	  41-­‐60.	  
Kerridge,	   I.	  H.,	  C.	  F.	  C.	   Jordens,	  R.	  Benson,	  R.	  Clifford,	  R.	  A.	  Ankeny,	  D.	  Keown,	  B.	  Tobin.	  
2010.	  «Religious	  perspectives	  on	  embryo	  donation	  and	  research».	  Clinical	  Ethics	  5	  (1):	  35-­‐
45.	  
Kimmelman,	   Jonathan.	   2010.	  Gene	   Transfer	   and	   the	   Ethics	   of	   First-­‐in-­‐human	   Research:	  
Lost	  in	  Translation.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Klimanskaya,	   I.,	  Y.	  Chung,	  S.	  Becker,	  S.	  Lu,	  R.	  Lanza.	  2006.	  «Human	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  
lines	  derived	  from	  single	  blastomeres».	  Nature	  444	  (7118):	  481.	  
LaFollette,	   Marcel	   C.	   1992.	   Stealing	   into	   Print:	   Fraud,	   Plagiarism,	   and	   Misconduct	   in	  
Scientific	  Publishing.	  Barkley	  and	  Los	  Angeles,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  
Lakoff,	   S.	   A.	   1966.	  Knowledge	   and	   Power:	   Essays	   on	   Science	   and	  Government.	   London:	  
Collier-­‐Macmillan.	  
Laird,	  F.	  N.	  1993.	  «Participatory	  analysis,	  democracy,	  and	  technological	  decision	  making».	  
Science,	  technology	  &	  human	  values	  18	  (3):	  341.	  
Landecker,	  Hannah	  2007.	  Culturing	  Life:	  How	  Cells	  Became	  Technologies.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  
Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
Landes,	   J.	   B.	   1988.	  Women	   and	   the	   Public	   Sphere	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   the	   French	   Revolution.	  
Ithaca	  and	  London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  
Lapp,	  Ralph	  E.	  1965.	  New	  Priesthood:	  Scientific	  Elite	  and	  the	  Uses	  of	  Power.	  San	  Francisco:	  
CA:	  Harper	  &	  Row.	  
Latour,	   Bruno.	   1987.	  Science	   in	   action:	  How	   to	   Follow	   Scientists	   and	   Engineers	   through	  
Society.	  Cambridge,	  CA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
———	  2005.	  Reassembling	  the	  Social:	  An	   Introduction	  to	  Actor-­‐network	  Theory.	  Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Latour,	   B.,	   and	   S.	   Woolgar.	   1979.	   Laboratory	   Life:	   The	   Construction	   of	   Scientific	   Facts.	  
Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Lechner,	   A.	   2004.	   «Stem	   cells	   and	   regenerative	   medicine	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	   type	   1	  
diabetes:	  the	  challenges	  lying	  ahead».	  Pediatric	  Diabetes	  5	  (1):	  88-­‐93.	  
	   245	  
Li,	  Y.,	  P.	  Decherchi,	  and	  G.	  Raisman.	  2003.	  «Transplantation	  of	  Olfactory	  Ensheathing	  Cells	  
into	  Spinal	  Cord	  Lesions	  Restores	  Breathing	  and	  Climbing».	  The	   Journal	  of	  Neuroscience	  
23	  (3):	  727	  -­‐731.	  
Li,	   Y.,	   P.	   M.	   Field,	   and	   G.	   Raisman.	   1997.	   «Repair	   of	   Adult	   Rat	   Corticospinal	   Tract	   by	  
Transplants	  of	  Olfactory	  Ensheathing	  Cells».	  Science	  277	  (5334):	  2000-­‐2002.	  	  
Liberatore,	  A.,	  and	  S.	  Funtowicz.	  2003.	  «Democratising	  expertise,	  expertising	  democracy:	  
what	  does	  this	  mean,	  and	  why	  bother?».	  Science	  and	  Public	  Policy	  30	  (3):	  146-­‐150.	  
Lindvall,	   O.,	   Z.	   Kokaia,	   and	   A.	   Martinez-­‐Serrano.	   2004.	   «Stem	   cell	   therapy	   for	   human	  
neurodegenerative	  disorders–how	  to	  make	  it	  work».	  s10:	  S42-­‐S50.	  
Lipton,	  P.	  2003.	  «Pharmacogenetics:	  the	  ethical	   issues».	  The	  Pharmacogenomics	  Journal	  
3:	  14-­‐16.	  
Lyotard,	   Jean	   François.	   1984.	   The	   postmodern	   condition:	   A	   Report	   on	   Knowledge.	  
Minneapolis,	  MN:	  University	  Of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  
Maasen,	  Ss,	  and	  P.	  Weingart.	  2009.	  Democratization	  of	  expertise?	  Exploring	  Novel	  Forms	  
of	  Scientific	  Advice	  in	  Political	  Decision-­‐making.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer.	  
Macchiarini,	   P.,	   P.	   Jungebluth,	   T.	   Go,	   M.	   Asnaghi,	   L.	   Rees,	   T.	   A.	   Cogan,	   A.	   Dodson,	   J.	  
Martorell,	   S.	   Bellini,	   P.	   P.	   Parnigotto.	   2008.	   «Clinical	   transplantation	   of	   a	   tissue-­‐
engineered	  airway».	  The	  Lancet	  372	  (9655):	  2023-­‐2030.	  
Macnaghten,	  P.,	  M.B.	  Kearnes,	  and	  B.	  Wynne.	  2005.	  «Nanotechnology,	  Governance,	  and	  
Public	  Deliberation:	  What	  Role	   for	   the	  Social	   Sciences?»	  Science	  Communication	   27	   (2):	  
268	  -­‐291.	  	  
Madrazo,	  I.,	  R.	  Drucker-­‐Colín,	  V.	  Díaz,	  J.	  Martínez-­‐Mata,	  C.	  Torres,and	  J.	  J	  Becerril.	  1987.	  
«Open	  microsurgical	   autograft	   of	   adrenal	  medulla	   to	   the	   right	   caudate	   nucleus	   in	   two	  
patients	  with	  intractable	  Parkinson’s	  disease».	  New	  England	  Journal	  of	  Medicine	  316	  (14):	  
831-­‐834.	  
Magnus,	  D.	  2010.	  «Translating	  Stem	  Cell	  Research:	  Challenges	  at	  the	  Research	  Frontier».	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Medicine	  &	  Ethics	  38	  (2):	  267-­‐276.	  
Maherali,	  N.,	  and	  K.	  Hochedlinger.	  2008.	  «Guidelines	  and	  techniques	  for	  the	  generation	  
of	  induced	  pluripotent	  stem	  cells».	  Cell	  Stem	  Cell	  3	  (6):	  595-­‐605.	  
Maingueneau,	  Dominique.	  1984.	  Genèses	  du	  Discours.	  Liège:Pierre	  Mardaga.	  
Majone,	  Giandomenico.	  1989.	  Evidence,	  Argument,	  and	  Persuasion	  in	  the	  Policy	  Process.	  
New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  
Mancinelli,	   L.,	   M.	   Cronin,	   and	   W.	   Sadée.	   2002.	   «Pharmacogenomics:	   the	   promise	   of	  
personalized	  medicine».	  The	  AAPS	  Journal	  2	  (1):	  29-­‐41.	  
Manin,	  B.	  1987.	  «On	  legitimacy	  and	  political	  deliberation».	  Political	  Theory	  15	  (3):	  338.	  
March,	   R.,	   K.	   Cheeseman,	   and	  M.	   Doherty.	   2001.	   «Pharmacogenetics-­‐legal,	   ethical	   and	  
regulatory	  considerations».	  Pharmacogenomics	  2	  (4):	  317-­‐327.	  
	  246	  
Marmont,	   A.	   M.	   2000.	   «New	   Horizons	   in	   the	   Treatment	   of	   Autoimmune	   Diseases:	  
Immunoablation	  and	  Stem	  Cell	  Transplantation».	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Medicine	  51	  (1):	  115-­‐
134.	  
Marris,	  C.,	  B.	  Wynne,	  P.	  Simmons,	  and	  S.	  Weldon.	  2001.	  Public	  perceptions	  of	  agricultural	  
biotechnologies	   in	   Europe.	   Final	   PABE	   report.	   available	   at:	  
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/pabe/docs/pabe_finalreport.doc.	   Last	  
accessed	  October	  2011.	  
McGuire,	  A.	  L.,	  B.	  J.	  Evans,	  T.	  Caulfield,	  W.	  Burke.	  2010.	  «Regulating	  Direct-­‐to-­‐Consumer	  
Personal	  Genome	  Testing».	  Science	  330	  (6001):	  181-­‐182.	  
McKeown,	  B.,	  and	  D.	  Thomas.	  1988.	  Q	  Methodology.	  SAGE.	  
Merton,	  R.	  K.	  1973.	  «The	  normative	  structure	  of	  science».	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Science	  267:	  
273.	  
Miller,	  D	  .1992.	  Deliberative	  democracy	  and	  social	  choice.	  Political	  Studies	  -­‐	  Prospects	  for	  
Democracy	  Special	  Issue	  40(s1):	  54-­‐67.	  
Mironov,	  V.,	  R.	  P.	  Visconti,	  and	  R.	  R.	  Markwald.	  2004.	  «What	   is	   regenerative	  medicine?	  
Emergence	  of	  applied	  stem	  cell	  and	  developmental	  biology».	  Expert	  Opinion	  on	  Biological	  
Therapy	  4	  (6):	  773-­‐781.	  
Møldrup,	  C.	  2000.	  «Ethical,	  social	  and	  legal	   implications	  of	  pharmacogenomics:	  a	  critical	  
review».	  Public	  Health	  Genomics	  4	  (4):	  204-­‐214.	  
Mowery,	   D.	   C.,	   R.	   R.	   Nelson,	   B.	   N.	   Sampat,	   and	   A.	   A.	   Ziedonis.	   2001.	   «The	   growth	   of	  
patenting	  and	  licensing	  by	  US	  universities:	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  
act	  of	  1980».	  Research	  Policy	  30	  (1):	  99-­‐119.	  
Mowery,	  D.,	   and	  B.	   Sampat.	   2005.	   «The	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act	  of	   1980	  and	  University-­‐Industry	  
technology	   transfer:	   a	  model	   for	   other	  OECD	   governments?»	  Essays	   in	  Honor	   of	   Edwin	  
Mansfield:	  233-­‐245.	  
Müller,	  F.	  J.,	  J.	  Goldmann,	  P.	  Löser,	  and	  J.	  F.	  Loring.	  2010.	  «A	  call	  to	  standardize	  teratoma	  
assays	  used	  to	  define	  human	  pluripotent	  cell	  lines».	  Cell	  Stem	  Cell	  6	  (5):	  412-­‐414.	  
Nagel,	  Thomas.	  1989.	  The	  view	  from	  nowhere.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Nelson,	   R.	   R.	   1959.	   «The	   simple	   economics	   of	   basic	   scientific	   research».	  The	   Journal	   of	  
Political	  Economy	  67	  (3):	  297-­‐306.	  
Nowotny,	  H.,	  and	  G.	  Testa.	  2011.	  Naked	  Genes:	  Reinventing	  the	  Human	  in	  the	  Molecular	  
Age.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Nowotny,	  H.	  2003.	  «Democratising	  expertise	  and	  socially	  robust	  knowledge».	  Science	  and	  
Public	  Policy	  30	  (3):	  151-­‐156.	  
Nozick,	  Robert.	  1974.	  Anarchy,	  State,	  and	  Utopia.	  Malden,	  MA:	  Basic	  Books.	  
Office	  of	  the	  Governor.	  2011.	  Governor	  Rick	  Perry	  to	  Irvin	  E.	  Zeitler.	  July	  25.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.nature.com/nature/newspdf/477377a-­‐s1.pdf.	  Last	  accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
	   247	  
Ott,	  H.	  C.,	  B.	  Clippinger,	  C.	  Conrad,	  C.	  Schuetz,	  I.	  Pomerantseva,	  L.	  Ikonomou,	  D.	  Kotton,	  
and	   J.	   P.	   Vacanti.	   2010.	   «Regeneration	   and	   orthotopic	   transplantation	   of	   a	   bioartificial	  
lung».	  Nature	  Medicine	  16	  (8):	  927-­‐933.	  
Ott,	  H.	  C.,	  T.	  S.	  Matthiesen,	  S.	  K.	  Goh,	  L.	  D.	  Black,	  S.	  M.	  Kren,	  T.	  I.	  Netoff,	  and	  D.	  A.	  Taylor.	  
2008.	  «Perfusion-­‐decellularized	  matrix:	  using	  nature’s	  platform	  to	  engineer	  a	  bioartificial	  
heart».	  Nature	  medicine	  14	  (2):	  213-­‐221.	  
Ogilvy,	   James	  A.	   2002.	  Creating	   better	   futures:	   scenario	   planning	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   a	   better	  
tomorrow.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Owen,	   Harrison.	   1997.	  Open-­‐space	   Technology:	   A	  User’s	   Guide.	   New	   York,	   NY:	   Berrett-­‐
Koheler.	  
Pellegrini,	  G.,	  C.	  A.	  Traverso,	  A.	  T.	  Franzi,	  M.	  Zingirian,	  R.	  Cancedda,	  and	  M.	  De	  Luca.	  1997.	  
«Long-­‐term	  restoration	  of	  damaged	  corneal	  surfaces	  with	  autologous	  cultivated	  corneal	  
epithelium».	  The	  Lancet	  349	  (9057):	  990-­‐993.	  
Petersen,	  T.	  H.,	  E.	  A.	  Calle,	  L.	  Zhao,	  E.	  J.	  Lee,	  L.	  Gui,	  M.	  S.	  B.	  Raredon,	  K.	  Gavrilov,	  T.	  Yi,	  Z.	  
W.	   Zhuang,	   and	   C.	   Breuer.	   2010.	   «Tissue-­‐engineered	   lungs	   for	   in	   vivo	   implantation».	  
Science	  329	  (5991):	  538.	  
Petit-­‐Zeman,	  S.	  2001.	  «Regenerative	  medicine».	  Nat	  Biotech	  19	  (3):	  201-­‐206.	  	  
Polanyi,	  M.	  2000.	  «The	  republic	  of	  science:	  Its	  political	  and	  economic	  theory».	  Minerva	  38	  
(1):	  1-­‐21.	  
President’s	  Commission	   for	   the	  Study	  of	  Ethical	  Problems	   in	  Biomedical,	  and	  Behavioral	  
Research	   1982.	   Splicing	   life:	   a	   report	   on	   the	   social	   and	   ethical	   issues	   of	   genetic	  
engineering	  with	  human	  beings.	  Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Government	  Printing	  Office.	  
Price,	  Don	  K.	  1965.	  The	  scientific	  estate.	  Belknap	  Press.	  
Protani,	  M.,	  M.	  Coory,	  and	  J.	  H.	  Martin.	  2010.«Effect	  of	  obesity	  on	  survival	  of	  women	  with	  
breast	   cancer:	   systematic	   review	   and	   meta-­‐analysis».	   Breast	   Cancer	   Research	   and	  
Treatment:	  1-­‐9.	  
Rafii,	   S.,	   D.	   Lyden,	   R.	   Benezra,	   K.	   Hattori,	   and	   B.	   Heissig.	   2002.	   «Vascular	   and	  
haematopoietic	  stem	  cells:	  novel	  targets	  for	  anti-­‐angiogenesis	  therapy?»	  Nature	  Reviews	  
Cancer	  2	  (11):	  826-­‐835.	  
Rama,	   P.,	   S.	  Matuska,	   G.	   Paganoni,	   A.	   Spinelli,	  M.	   De	   Luca,	   and	   G.	   Pellegrini,	   G.	   2010.	  
«Limbal	  Stem-­‐Cell	  Therapy	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  Corneal	  Regeneration».	  New	  England	  Journal	  
of	  Medicine	  363	  (2):	  147-­‐155.	  	  
Ramon-­‐Cueto,	   A.,	   M.	   I.	   Cordero,	   F.	   I.	   Santos-­‐Benito,	   and	   R.	   Avila.	   2000.	   «Functional	  
Recovery	   of	   Paraplegic	   Rats	   and	   Motor	   Axon	   Regeneration	   in	   Their	   Spinal	   Cords	   by	  
Olfactory	  Ensheathing	  Glia».	  Neuron	  25	  (2):	  425-­‐435.	  
Ramsay,	   S.	   2001.	   «Ethical	   implications	  of	   research	  on	   the	  human	  genome».	  The	  Lancet	  
357	  (9255):	  535.	  
Rawls,	  John.	  1971.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
	  248	  
Renn,	   O.	   1999.	   «A	   model	   for	   analytic-­‐deliberative	   process	   in	   risk	   management».	  
Environmental	  Science	  &	  Technology	  33(18):3049-­‐3055.	  
Renn,	  O.,	   T.	  Webler,	   H.	   Rakel,	   P.	   Dienel,	   and	   B.	   Johnson.	   1993.	   «Public	   participation	   in	  
decision	  making:	  A	  three-­‐step	  procedure».	  Policy	  Sciences	  26	  (3):	  189-­‐214.	  
Rheinberger,	  Hans-­‐Jeorg	  1997.	  Toward	  a	  history	  of	  epistemic	  things:	  Synthesizing	  proteins	  
in	  the	  test	  tube.	  Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  
Robertson,	   J.	   A.	   2001.	   «Consent	   and	   privacy	   in	   pharmacogenetic	   testing.»	   Nature	  
Genetics	  28	  (3):	  207.	  
Rip,	  A.	  1994.	  «The	  republic	  of	  science	  in	  the	  1990s».	  Higher	  Education	  28:	  3-­‐23.	  
Rip,	  A,	  Schot,	  J	  W,	  and	  Misa,	  T	  J.	  1995.	  Managing	  Technology	  in	  Society.	  The	  Approach	  of	  
Constructive	  Technology	  Assessment.	  University	  of	  Twente:	  Pinter	  Publishers.	  	  
Robertson,	   J	   A,	   B.	   Brody,	   A.	   Buchanan,	   J.	   Kahn,	   and	   E.	   McPherson.	   2002.	  
«Pharmacogenetic	  challenges	  for	  the	  health	  care	  system».	  Health	  Affairs	  21	  (4):	  155.	  
Rothstein,	   M.	   A.,	   and	   P.	   G.	   Epps.	   2001.	   «Ethical	   and	   legal	   implications	   of	  
pharmacogenomics».	  Nature	  Reviews	  Genetics	  2	  (3):	  228-­‐231.	  
Rousseau,	  Jean-­‐Jacques	  1970.	  The	  social	  contract.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Hafner	  Press.	  
Rowe,	   G.,	   and	   L.	   J.	   Frewer.	   2000.	   «Public	   participation	   methods:	   A	   framework	   for	  
evaluation».	  Science,	  technology	  &	  human	  values	  25	  (1):	  3.	  
———.	   2004.	   «Evaluating	   public-­‐participation	   exercises:	   a	   research	   agenda».	   Science,	  
Technology	  &	  Human	  Values	  29	  (4):	  512.	  
Ryan,	   M.	   P.	   1992.	   Gender	   and	   public	   access:	   Women’s	   politics	   in	   nineteenth-­‐century	  
America.	   In	   Calhoun,	   C	   (ed.),	  Habermas	   and	   the	   Public	   Sphere.	   Chapter	   11.	   Cambridge,	  
MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Salter,	   B.,	   and	   A.	   Faulkner.	   2011.	   «State	   strategies	   of	   governance	   in	   biomedical	  
innovation:	   aligning	   conceptual	   approaches	   for	   understanding	   ‘Rising	   Powers’	   in	   the	  
global	  context».	  Globalization	  and	  Health	  7:	  3.	  	  
Salter,	   B.,	   and	   C.	   Salter.	   2010.	   «Governing	   innovation	   in	   the	   biomedicine	   knowledge	  
economy:	  stem	  cell	  science	  in	  the	  USA».	  Science	  and	  Public	  Policy	  37	  (2):	  87-­‐100.	  	  
Sampaolesi,	  M.,	  I.	  Torrente,	  A.	  Innocenzi,	  R.	  Tonlorenzi,	  G.	  D’Antona,	  M.	  A.	  Pellegrino,	  R.	  
Barresi.	  2003.	  «Cell	  Therapy	  of	  α-­‐Sarcoglycan	  Null	  Dystrophic	  Mice	  Through	  Intra-­‐Arterial	  
Delivery	  of	  Mesoangioblasts».	  Science	  301	  (5632):	  487-­‐492.	  	  
Santos,	  S.	  L.,	  and	  C.	  Chess.	  2003.	  «Evaluating	  citizen	  advisory	  boards:	  The	  importance	  of	  
theory	  and	  participant	  based	  criteria	  and	  practical	  implications».	  Risk	  Analysis	  23	  (2):	  269-­‐
279.	  
Scadden,	   D.	   T.	   2006.	   «The	   stem-­‐cell	   niche	   as	   an	   entity	   of	   action».	  Nature	   441	   (7097):	  
1075-­‐1079.	  
	   249	  
Schot,	  J.,	  and	  Rip,	  A.	  1997.	  «The	  past	  and	  future	  of	  constructive	  technology	  assessment».	  
Technological	  Forecasting	  and	  Social	  Change	  54	  (2-­‐3):	  251-­‐268.	  	  
Segers,	  V.	  F.	  M.,	  and	  R.	  T.	  Lee.	  2008.	  «Stem-­‐cell	  therapy	  for	  cardiac	  disease».	  Nature	  451	  
(7181):	  937-­‐942.	  
Senate	  and	  House	  of	  Representatives	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  1980.	  Stevenson-­‐
Wydler	   Technology	   Innovation	   Act	   of	   1980.	   Public	   Law	   96-­‐480,	   October	   21,	   1980,	   96th	  
Congress,	  94	  Stat.	  2311,	  15	  U.S.C.	  3701.	  
Smith,	  G.	  and	  C.	  Wales.	  2000.	  Citizens’	  juries	  and	  deliberative	  democracy.	  Political	  Studies	  
48:	  51-­‐65.	  
Smits,	  R.,	  J.	  Leyten,	  an	  P.	  Hertog.	  1995.	  «Technology	  assessment	  and	  technology	  policy	  in	  
Europe:	  New	  concepts,	  new	  goals,	  new	  infrastructures».	  Policy	  Sciences	  28:	  271-­‐299.	  	  
Soria,	   B.,	   E.	   Roche,	   G.	   Berna,	   T.	   León-­‐Quinto,	   J.	   A.	   Reig,	   and	   F.	  Martín.	   2000.	   «Insulin-­‐
secreting	  cells	  derived	   from	  embryonic	   stem	  cells	  normalize	  glycemia	   in	   streptozotocin-­‐
induced	  diabetic	  mice.»	  Diabetes	  49	  (2):	  157.	  
Stern,	   P.	   C.,	   H.	   V.	   Fineberg,	   and	   National	   Research	   Council	   (US)	   Committee	   on	   Risk	  
Characterization.	   1996.	  Understanding	   risk:	   Informing	  decisions	   in	   a	  democratic	   society.	  
Washington,	  DC:	  National	  Academy	  Press.	  
Stirling,	   A.	   2008.	   «“Opening	   Up”	   and	   “Closing	   Down”».	   Science,	   Technology	   &	   Human	  
Values	  33	  (2):	  262	  -­‐294.	  
Stoughton,	   R.	   B.,	   and	   S.	   H.	   Friend.	   2005.	   «How	  molecular	   profiling	   could	   revolutionize	  
drug	  discovery».	  Nature	  Reviews	  Drug	  Discovery	  4	  (4):	  345-­‐350.	  
Sturdy,	   S.	   2009.	   «Medical	   profiling	   and	   online	   medicine:	   the	   ethics	   of	   ‘personalised’	  
healthcare	  in	  a	  consumer	  age:	  Public	  consultation»	  Nuffield	  Council	  on	  Bioethics.	  
Sugarman,	   J.	   2010.	   «Reflections	   on	   Governance	   Models	   for	   the	   Clinical	   Translation	   of	  
Stem	  Cells».	  The	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Medicine	  &	  Ethics	  38	  (2):	  251-­‐256.	  	  
Takahashi,	  K.,	  and	  S.	  Yamanaka.	  2006.	  «Induction	  of	  pluripotent	  stem	  cells	   from	  mouse	  
embryonic	  and	  adult	  fibroblast	  cultures	  by	  defined	  factors».	  Cell	  126	  (4):	  663-­‐676.	  
Takahashi,	  K.,	  K.	  Tanabe,	  M.	  Ohnuki,	  M.	  Narita,	  T.	  Ichisaka,	  K.	  Tomoda,	  and	  S.	  Yamanaka.	  
2007.	   «Induction	   of	   pluripotent	   stem	   cells	   from	   adult	   human	   fibroblasts	   by	   defined	  
factors».	  Cell	  131	  (5):	  861-­‐872.	  
Testa,	   G.	   2011.	  More	   than	   Just	   a	   Nucleus:	   Cloning	   and	   the	   Alignment	   of	   Scientific	   and	  
Political	  Rationalities.	   In	  Reframing	  Rights.	  Bioconstitutionalism	   in	   the	  Genetic	  Age,	  by	  S	  
Jasanoff,	  85-­‐104.	  CAmbridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Testa,	   G.	   2009.	   «Nuclear	   transfer:	   an	   example	   of	   responsive	   epistemologies».	   Current	  
science	  97	  (11):	  1621.	  
Thomson,	   J.	   A.,	   J.	   Itskovitz-­‐Eldor,	   S.	   S.	   Shapiro,	   M.	   A.	   Waknitz,	   J.	   J.	   Swiergiel,	   V.	   S.	  
Marshall,	  and	   J.	   M.	   Jones.	   1998.	   «Embryonic	   stem	   cell	   lines	   derived	   from	   human	  
blastocysts».	  Science	  282	  (5391):	  1145-­‐1147.	  
	  250	  
Timmermans,	  S.,	  and	  M.	  Berg.	  2003.	  «The	  practice	  of	  medical	  technology».	  Sociology	  of	  
health	  &	  Illness	  25	  (3):	  97-­‐114.	  
Uygun,	  B.	  E.,	  A.	  Soto-­‐Gutierrez,	  H.	  Yagi,	  M.	  L.	  Izamis,	  M.	  A.	  Guzzardi,	  C.	  Shulman,	  J.	  Milwid,	  
N.	   Kobayashi,	   A.	   Tilles,	   and	   E.	   Berthiaume.	   2010.	   «Organ	   reengineering	   through	  
development	   of	   a	   transplantable	   recellularized	   liver	   graft	   using	   decellularized	   liver	  
matrix».	  Nature	  medicine	  16	  (7):	  814-­‐820.	  
Vaszar,	  L.	  T.,	  M.	  K.	  Cho,	  and	  T.	  A.	  Raffin.	  2003.	  «Privacy	  issues	  in	  personalized	  medicine».	  
Pharmacogenomics	  4	  (2):	  107-­‐112.	  
Vig,	  N.	  J.,	  and	  H.	  Paschen.	  2000.	  Parliaments	  and	  Technology.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  SUNY	  Press.	  	  
Vogel,	  G.	  2002.	  «In	  the	  Mideast,	  pushing	  back	  the	  stem	  cell	  frontier».	  Science	  295	  (5561):	  
1818.	  
Wakeford,	   T.	   2002.	   «Citizen’s	   juries:	   a	   radical	   aternative	   for	   social	   research».	   Social	  
Research	  Update	  (37).	  
Waldby,	  C.,	  and	  R.	  Mitchell.	  2006.	  Tissue	  economies:	  Blood,	  organs,	  and	  cell	   lines	  in	   late	  
capitalism.	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  
Warren,	   M.	   1995.	   The	   self	   in	   discursive	   democracy.	   In	  White,	   S.	   (ed.),	   The	   Cambridge	  
Companion	  to	  Habermas.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Webler,	   T.	   1999.	   «The	   craft	   and	   theory	   of	   public	   participation:	   a	   dialectical	   process».	  
Journal	  of	  Risk	  Research	  2	  (1):	  55-­‐71.	  
Webler,	   T.,	   S.	   Tuler.	   2001.	   «Public	   participation	   in	   watershed	   management	   planning:	  
Views	   on	   process	   from	   people	   in	   the	   field».	  Human	   Economy	   Review	   ook	   Review	   Co-­‐
Editor	  International	  Editor	  Book	  Review	  Co-­‐Editor	  8	  (2):	  29.	  
Webster,	  A.,	  P.	  Martin,	  G.	  Lewis,	  and	  A.	  Smart.	  2004.	  «Integrating	  pharmacogenetics	  into	  
society:	  in	  search	  of	  a	  model».	  Nature	  Reviews	  Genetics	  5	  (9):	  663-­‐669.	  
Weingart,	  P.	  1999.	  «Scientific	  expertise	  and	  political	  accountability:	  paradoxes	  of	  science	  
in	  politics».	  Science	  and	  Public	  Policy	  26	  (3):	  151-­‐161.	  
Wildson,	   J.,	   and	   R.	  Willis.	   2004.	   See-­‐through	   science:	  Why	   public	   engagement	   needs	   to	  
move	   upstream.	   London:	   Demos.	   available	   at:	  
http://www.greenalliance.org.uk/uploadedFiles/Publications/SeeThroughScienceFinalFull
Copy.pdf.Last	  accessed:	  October	  2011.	  
Winner,	  L.	  1993.	  «Upon	  opening	  the	  black	  box	  and	  finding	  it	  empty:	  Social	  constructivism	  
and	   the	   philosophy	   of	   technology».	   Science,	   Technology,	   &	  Human	   Values	   18	   (3):	   362-­‐
378.	  
Woodcock,	  J.	  2007.	  «The	  prospects	  for	  “personalized	  medicine”	  in	  drug	  development	  and	  
drug	  therapy».	  Clinical	  Pharmacology	  &	  Therapeutics	  81	  (2):	  164-­‐169.	  
Wu,	  S.	  M.,	  K.	  Hochedlinger.	  2011.	  «Harnessing	  the	  potential	  of	  induced	  pluripotent	  stem	  
cells	  for	  regenerative	  medicine».	  Nature	  Cell	  Biology	  13	  (5):	  497-­‐505.	  
	   251	  
Wynne,	  B.	  2001.	  «Creating	  public	  alienation:	  expert	  cultures	  of	  risk	  and	  ethics	  on	  GMOs».	  
Science	  as	  Culture	  10	  (4):	  445-­‐481.	  	  
Zarzeczny,	   A.,	   C.	   Scott,	   I.	   Hyun,	   J.	   Bennett,	   J.	   Chandler,	   S.	   Chargé,	   H.	   Heine,	   R.	   Isasi,	   K.	  
Kato,	  and	  R.	  Lovell-­‐Badge.	  2009.	  «iPS	  cells:	  mapping	  the	  policy	  issues».	  Cell	  139	  (6):	  1032-­‐
1037.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
